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Abstract 
Conceptual modelling of knowledge has remained an open research challenge. 
Existing frameworks do not cope with problems such as multiple user viewpoints, the 
plurality of epistemologies and representational forms, the mutability of knowledge, 
and the great body of legacy encoded knowledge. This thesis addresses the lack of a 
systematic method for the conceptual modelling of knowledge by presenting a novel 
perspective for dynamic knowledge exchange together with an associated modelling 
framework and tools.  
The thesis establishes a new perspective, the erotetic perspective, based on 
question-and-answer exchanges that match knowledge needs with knowledge 
capacities. It presents a unified design framework within this perspective and 
introduces appropriate modelling constructs, the Functional Entity and the Knowledge 
Relation. The framework comprises a methodology (the Functional Entity Relationship 
Methodology), a diagramming system for drawing conceptual models (the Functional 
Entity Relationship Diagram) and a transactioning language for representing the 
knowledge exchanges (the Functional Entity Relationship Language). These 
respectively extend the classic Entity Relationship Diagram and the class of SQL-like 
languages adequately to describe all possible transactions involving encoded 
knowledge. The different types of Functional Entity are shown to cover the complete 
space of knowledge seeking and retrieval and cope with situations not possible in 
conventional data modelling. 
As the modelling framework is a secondary design artefact (one that is capable 
of producing routine design artefacts) the design science research approach of Gregor 
& Jones was used. This approach necessitates an Alexander pattern drawn from prior 
research to guide development, followed by expository instantiations of the artefacts 
sought. Evaluation comprising verification, validation, generalization, substantiation 
and some external accreditation was conducted throughout. The models developed 
were tested for mutual encompassing through docking, which also confirms the erotetic 
perspective. Illustrative cases are presented to show the completed framework in 
action. 
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Introduction 
 
1.1  Chapter overview 
This chapter provides an introduction and overview for the research, which 
concerns the conceptual modelling of complex knowledge systems. It discusses the 
need for, and specific requirements of, conceptual modelling for knowledge systems, 
and the importance of a common set of abstracting and modelling tools for achieving 
these ends. It discusses the potential of a novel informatic perspective based on the 
metaphor of questions and answers to provide new tools for conceptual modelling. The 
research questions are presented and the research goals outlined. The manner in which 
research into a new perspective can be conducted is described: considering a 
perspective as a tertiary design artefact, and a framework of modelling tools as a 
secondary design artefact, using Design Science methodology. A brief synopsis of each 
chapter is presented to show the overall organisation of the work, and the major 
research contributions of this thesis are summarised. 
1.2  Research problem  
A fundamental step in solving a problem is to make a conceptual model of the 
problem and the system within which it is found (Ian I Mitroff & Pondy, 1974; Ian I 
Mitroff & Sagasti, 1973). Conceptual modelling is at the core of the activities of 
describing, predicting or measuring the world and provides an essential simplification 
that minimises complexity by identifying significant features that can be 
operationalised.  
Conceptual modelling is particularly essential to analysing existing information 
systems or designing new systems (Beynon-Davies, 2004), forming a plan (for existing 
systems) or a blueprint (for new systems or extensions to existing systems). Conceptual 
modelling has always been considered a necessary step in designing or analysing 
database systems (R. J. Brachman & Smith, 1980; Chen, 1977; Codd, 1979; Kent, 
1976; Nijssen, 1977b), and has been a core component of knowledge management  
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since its inception (J. F. Berry & Cook, 1976; Loucopoulos & Kavakli, 1999; Ian I 
Mitroff & Kilmann, 1977). 
Although data modelling is well established, modelling knowledge remains an 
open challenge in research as there is no universally accepted conceptual modelling 
framework (Griffiths & Evans, 2011; Heisig, 2009; Lambe, 2010; Onions, 2010; 
Pritchard, 2009). This is in part because the discipline is still coalescing from its 
tributary disciplines (Lambe, 2011b; Vasconcelos, 2008), but also because there is little 
agreement on the underpinning epistemology (Kilduff, Mehra, & Dunn, 2010; 
Midgley, 2010; Pritchard, Millar, & Haddock, 2010). 
This open problem arises from several core problems, including the wickedness 
of modelling holarchic systems, the problem with representing multiple points of view, 
the problems of rival epistemologies and concomitant representational forms, and 
significantly, problems arising from the resource-based conception in the root 
metaphor of dominant modelling tools. These problems are discussed in detail in the 
literature review in Chapter 2. The research tradition of database conceptual modelling 
has addressed these problems by assuming a closed world, through identifying unique 
values in closed domains; this assumption however is inadequate for modelling 
knowledge (Hustadt, 1994), requiring a qualitatively different modelling framework. 
Modelling frameworks are secondary design artefacts — design artefacts that 
exist solely for the purpose of creating other artefacts (Tong & Siriam, 1992). These 
are called into being when the existing solution set for dealing with a class of problems 
is found to be inadequate. Secondary design artefacts are created by the invocation of 
tertiary, theoretical artefacts to reappraise existing understandings to make a new class 
of solutions, manifested as a secondary artefact. 
Given the inherent mutability of design artefacts including theoretical constructs 
(Gregor & Iivari, 2007), it is reasonable to seek to resituate existing reliable modelling 
artefacts with reference to a different or novel tertiary artefact without the constraints 
of the closed world assumption. Far from being a philosophical or psychological task, 
to do so becomes a meta-representational mapping task, with complexities of 
individual knowledge modelling tasks delegated to component systems. Following 
arguments made by Lauer (2001) based on his research in knowledge elicitation 
through questions and answers (e.g. Lauer & Peacock, 1990, 1992; Lauer, Peacock, & 
Jacobs, 1992) this thesis proposes a question-centric or erotetic perspective to resituate 
established conceptual modelling tools and techniques. Since the erotetic perspective  
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effectively provides a contextualising paradigm or research tradition (in Laudan’s 
1977 term) within which the framework is developed, establishing the theoretical 
adequacy of the proposed perspective
1 also forms part of the research reported here. 
1.3  Research aims and questions 
The requirements for knowledge modelling are shown to theoretically exceed 
those for data modelling. The objective of the research described in the thesis is to 
create a new, unifying meta-modelling framework that overcomes identified problems 
(including multiple user viewpoints, the plurality of epistemologies and 
representational forms, and the mutability of knowledge, while remaining hospitable to 
legacy knowledge encoded from other established perspectives and other 
epistemological bases, and which can provide fully realised diagramming and 
description tools for effective knowledge modelling. The present research seeks to 
enable knowledge modelling through developing an original framework that can model 
arbitrarily complex knowledge systems at all levels from community-of-knowing down 
to a single question. This should be flexible enough to cope with different modelling 
situations and design requirements, and ultimately produce primary artefacts or models 
that can be implemented in practice. 
An analysis of Lauer (2001) suggests that using a question-centric metaphor of 
KNOWLEDGE IS RESOLVED INQUIRY
 can provide a beneficial perspective, here 
called the erotetic perspective, for analysing and using information and knowledge 
systems. Determining whether this view is beneficial provides the overarching research 
question for the current thesis: Can a fruitful modelling framework be derived from an 
erotetic perspective on knowledge? 
Four specific research questions follow from this, discussed next. 
While Lauer suggests the erotetic metaphor as an approach, he does not go on to 
provide an account of what would serve as suitable ground for the metaphor, nor for 
the kernel theory that would justify such an explanation over and above Churchman's 
(1971) theory of inquiring organisations. This provides the first research question: 
                                                      
 
1 Nygaard and Sorgaard (Nygaard & Sorgaard, 1985) deliberately chose the term perspective rather than 
paradigm, in establishing the context for their research into the democratic informatics methodology. This 
was to indicate the presence of the reflective choice that is missing in the conventional scientific 
paradigm. We follow that terminology here.  
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1.  Is the erotetic perspective on knowledge theoretically legitimate as a paradigm 
for metamodelling? 
Neither does Lauer provide for the operationalisation of the erotetic perspective 
in terms of the day-to-day informatic artefacts that would be employed working within 
such a perspective. The thesis will therefore not only investigate the theoretical basis 
for the erotetic perspective, but also address the issue of its operationalisation. This 
leads to the second research question: 
2.  How can the erotetic perspective be operationalised into a framework of explicit 
constructs for knowledge modelling? 
Practical knowledge modelling mandates a framework of tools that have a solid 
basis in established theory and practice. If such a framework is to be theoretically 
coherent and practically useful, it must disrupt as little as possible existing design and 
work practices, ideally using or adapting precedents from the literature. This has two 
implications for the research: the framework must encompass existing designs and 
design representations without loss, and that existing practices can be adapted to 
provide validation for the perspective. This leads to the third research question: 
3.  Can the erotetic perspective and its constructs seamlessly encompass existing 
knowledge representation and conceptual modelling practices?  
Finally, the framework must be capable of producing routine design artefacts, in 
particular knowledge models and implementation designs. These must be both 
descriptively sufficient to specify computational consequences, and to match modes of 
knowledge representation established in practice. This leads to the fourth and final 
research question: 
4.  Can the erotetic framework produce representationally adequate implementation 
designs across different situations? 
The research approach adopted to address these four questions is discussed next, 
together with the goal artefacts that will be the outcome of the research.  
1.4  Research approach  
Following the suggestion that using a question-centric metaphor can provide a 
fruitful perspective for analysing and using information and knowledge systems, this 
thesis addresses the open challenge of modelling knowledge by resituating knowledge 
modelling and knowledge modelling tools within a new erotetic perspective. This new  
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perspective is based on the metaphor of question and answer pairs, rather than simply 
conceptualising knowledge, information or data as a concrete resource to be 
discovered, refined and transformed. This alternative perspective, the erotetic 
perspective, is congruent with, and underpins other (non-operationalised) accounts of 
knowledge including Walsham’s communicative account of knowledge (Barrett, 
Cappleman, Shoib, & Walsham, 2004; Walsham, 2001, 2002, 2005) and Gammack’s 
process-dynamic account (J. G. Gammack, 1997; J. G. Gammack & Stephens, 1997).  
When we view a knowledge system as a communicative process (Walsham 
2005), embedded in both the understanding and expectations of the practitioners and 
the mechanisms being created to meet those expectations, we can model the system at 
the teleological level, aggregating the needs that can be anticipated, and modelling the 
entirety as a series of questions that are askable of such a system when complete. In 
other words, when we model a system for knowledge retrieval we have to model the 
flow of questions and answers that exist within that system. By modelling the questions 
and answers a system needs to provide, we can plan allocation of question-answering 
resources — we can delegate to different infrastructures the questions that are best 
suited to it, including outsourcing complex queries or work out what is best suited to a 
reference librarian or a consultative expert. 
This thesis will establish a new approach to the conceptual modelling of 
knowledge by contributing a coherent set of new formalisms and processes for creating 
knowledge models. The work adopts a communitarian view of knowledge highlighting 
the needs and capacities of the community of knowing rather than isolating and 
objectivising the things or actors to be found in that community. 
It will present a new perspective for knowledge analysis, based on the question-
and-answer metaphor suggested by Lauer 2001 as potentially providing new insights to 
KM and MIS generally. It will also formalise the conditions for effective question-and-
answer communication to permit knowledge modelling. Lastly, it will create a 
conceptual modelling framework to permit the creation, communication, review and 
enactment of such models. 
Although a full account of the nature of a perspective and framework is 
necessary in order to define the terms used in this thesis, the discussion has been placed 
in Appendix B in order not to interrupt the main narrative of the thesis. We shall 
however briefly discuss them now.   
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The goal of the work being conceptual modelling, we start by noting a general 
similarity in notation, purpose and status to other conceptual models such as entity 
relationship diagrams. Drawing on definitions by Shanks et al. (2003), ter Bekke 
(1991) and Wand et al. (1999), formally we view a conceptual model as a simplified, 
temporally-embedded, representation of a universe of discourse, prepared for the 
purpose of representing that universe in an informatic manner, taking account of both 
the points of measurement available and the agencies that cause the changes in those 
measurements. 
Conceptual models, being intellectual constructs, are created from a point of 
view, within an operating paradigm or, as specifically termed here, perspective. 
Following Welke (1983 p. 209), we view a perspective as the set of fundamental 
categories by which a part of reality is constructed in an observer’s mind, and which 
provides the basis for an initial selection of frame(s).  
Perspectives are made usable by being operationalised into frameworks for 
modelling (Denzin, 1970, p. 32): they make it possible to use theoretical principles 
established by a perspective to create tools clearly enough defined to enable their use 
without continuous resort to design principles (McKinney, 1954). To be able to go 
towards operational tools from the perspective developed here we require well defined 
constructs and, as is done in in Artificial Intelligence research tradition (e.g. Mostow, 
1979 #32719) form a specification that can translate the theoretical into actionable 
terms.  
The goal of a conceptual modelling framework is descriptive adequacy 
(Chomsky, 1957, p. 286): for all situations that the user of the framework is likely to 
encounter within their universe of discourse, the framework will be adequate to making 
a clear, unambiguous and executable description. A framework functions by a process 
of simplified affordance
2 (sensu Gibson, 1977). By limiting the possible options, the 
potential for representation is both more limited and more useful, and the task of the 
modeller is both simplified and empowered (Amarel et al., 1967). A conceptual 
modelling framework is thus a framework that is descriptively adequate to create 
conceptual models.  
                                                      
 
2 The construct of affordance refers to the qualities perceived as useful in a particular active context. 
Affordances consequently determine what can be known about something, this is detailed further in 
chapter 2.  
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A framework comprises four essential components in order to achieve that 
adequacy, discussed in detail in Appendix B. Firstly there is an ontology, which gives a 
list of types of things of interest (items, phenomena, changes) in the domain and how 
they interrelate. These are represented by a symbology − a set of symbols that can be 
used to represent those things of interest − and informed by a methodology — a set of 
instructions for how to use those symbols to make representations. Finally there is a 
deontology — a set of norms for using the symbols with respect to each other and the 
domain. All four are required in order to provide the requisite modelling affordances. 
These constructs — a perspective, a framework operating within that perspective, and 
its four components — make up the concrete design goals for the research. 
A framework is a secondary artefact, a kind of meta-artefact whose purpose is to 
create other artefacts. Accordingly, a perspective is a tertiary design artefact, a special 
kind of meta-artefact designed to facilitate the creation of such meta-artefacts as 
frameworks. According to Nunamaker et al (1990), the appropriate path to create such 
artefacts is design science (DS), as design science is concerned with (amongst other 
artefacts) the  
…development of new ideas and concepts, and construction of conceptual frameworks, 
new methods, or models (e.g., mathematical models, simulation models, and data models). 
(Nunamaker Jr., Chen, & Purdin, 1990 p 94). 
 
Tertiary artefacts are a special (and rare) case of design research, only invoked 
when existing secondary artefacts have exhausted a standard problem's solution-space 
(Tong & Siriam, 1992). New tertiary artefacts are created by a reinvestigation of first 
principles to extend the possible solution-space, and existing secondary artefacts (i.e., 
existing methods, techniques and artefacts) adapted to the new principles. These 
adapted artefacts are then used to create trial primary artefacts (in this case, conceptual 
models) to test the utility of both the perspective and framework. Such trial primary 
artefacts are termed expository instantiations, and play the role of substantiating and 
already validated and verified set of secondary and primary artefacts. 
 This has two consequences for methodology. One is a logical dependence of the 
artefacts: the knowledge models are framed by the modelling tools used to create them, 
which are in turn framed by the perspective and its affordances (see Figure 1.1).  
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Figure 1‐1 Artefact dependence on enclosing frame of reference 
This leads to a logical precedence for design creation: the perspective must be 
created initially, in order that tools be made using the perspective’s constructs, and 
finally conceptual solutions in the shape of implementable knowledge models created 
using those tools (see Figure 1.2). 
 
Figure 1‐2 Logical artefact precedence 
 Equally, the form of knowledge models required will inform the kind of 
framework that must be created, which will in turn determine the kind of perspective 
that will provide useful conceptualisation for satisficing the research goals.  
Accordingly, the structure of the research, and therefore the thesis presentation, 
will follow the precepts of Design Science theory research as laid out in Gregor & 
Jones (2007). This means that the research process will be to show how the DS 
approach permits the production from the newly established perspective of self- and 
mutually-consistent artefacts at all four levels within the design science canon (Iivari, 
2010; March & Smith, 1995; Tan & Siau, 2009): constructs, specifications,
3 methods 
and instances.  
Following our account of framework above, this means that the perspective meta 
artefact will be the initial target of design activity, which will then be operationalised 
(per Denzin, 1970, p. 32) to produce constructs that are combined in a generalised 
specification for all of the target domain. This specification will then be used to create 
a design framework, as a part of the generalised method (incorporating the ontology, 
                                                      
 
3 These are called models by March and Smith (1995, p. 253), meaning an operationalised specification 
combining higher order constructs for making generalised meta-models, rather than the more commonly 
understood meaning of instances of a conceptual model. We use the term specification here to avoid 
confusion. 
Knowledge model
Framework
Perspective
Perspective Framework Knowledge model 
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symbology, methodology and deontology described above). Finally this framework 
will be used to produce a series of expository instantiations at the instance level. This 
four level artefact creation substantiates the perspective. Following Gregor & Jones 
(2004), mutable artefacts are identified for adaptation as part of the research process. 
The Erotetic Perspective is the principal design artefact. Within it, the central 
construct will be the Functional Entity (FE),  which is an encapsulated knowledge 
resource that acts as a question-answering system. A functional entity is a 
generalisation of the Entity (within the relational model) for sources of knowledge that 
are non-relational, or for which the standard processes of single entity modelling are 
difficult to achieve. A functional entity permits the modelling of any knowledge source 
in response to a request for information by returning a tuple of a consistent nature, 
while black-boxing the inner working in both design and use.  
The Functional Entity design framework itself consists of two separately 
developed representational systems: a generalised diagram extending the ERD called 
the Functional-Entity Relationship Diagram (FERD) and a knowledge transactioning 
language analogous to SQL called the Functional-Entity Representation Language 
(FERL). Models using these systems are created according to the Functional-Entity 
Representation Methodology (FERM), adapted from the standard knowledge 
engineering research methodology. 
By giving a principled account of the erotetic perspective, operationalising that 
perspective with constructs, creating an arrangement of those constructs as a 
generalised model for all knowledge systems, creating a design framework for making 
representations of those systems, and then finally using the framework to create 
expository knowledge models, a generalised solution for modelling knowledge will 
have been created. Figure 1.3 shows these interrelated constructs in the context of the 
overall research using a Concept Map (Novak, 1979). A glossary of all original terms 
used is given in Appendix G.  
  10
 
Figure 1‐3 A Concept map of the research 
1.5  Organisation of the thesis  
The thesis is laid out according to the logical progression of establishment of the 
design constructs, as described in the previous section, and according to the 
methodology that is established in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 2, Literature Review considers the literature around the problem of 
modelling knowledge systems, investigates the problems associated with the existing 
solutions based on the resource-based metaphors for knowledge and reviews the 
erotetic alternatives. It examines the traditions of question and answer representations, 
including typologies and hierarchies, and sets out the epistemological basis for the 
present thesis to prepare for the later modelling activity. This includes presenting a 
literature derived epistemological hierarchy capable of modelling knowledge from 
simple QA Pairs through to societal level communities of knowing. 
Chapter 3, Methodology, investigates the way in which theory artefacts can be 
created and evaluated following Gregor & Jones (2004), using Alexander patterns 
derived from existing informatic research traditions. It introduces an evaluation 
strategy through distributed justification to be used during development and prepares 
sets of criteria in order to evaluate the research design contracts necessary for 
evaluation. It examines the literature to identify suitable mutable design artefacts to be 
adapted and extended to apply in the erotetic perspective. The Alexander Pattern for  
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design shows the stages of invention (involving metaphoric analysis, perspective 
creation through kernel theory selection), elaboration (involving establishing 
constructs, making a representation language, developing a routine methodology) and 
substantiation (making expository instantiations that substantiate the theoretical and 
theory-derived research claims): these stages are used to describe the research sequence 
followed in this thesis. 
Chapter 4, The Erotetic Perspective, presents the metaphoric grounding for the 
erotetic perspective, the knowledge-seeking question-and-answer dialogue between a 
library patron and the reference librarian, formalised in library science as the reference 
interview. It uses the library science literature's analysis of this knowledge seeking 
practice to give a fuller account of what can be expected of an erotetic account of 
knowledge. 
Chapter 5, Formalising the Erotetic Perspective, presents the kernel theory for 
the current research, and describes an existing complete erotetic epistemology, 
Nicholas Rescher's inquiry dynamics (Rescher, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1995, 
1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001a, 2004, 2006, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). It uses 
Rescher's writings to demonstrate the multi-levelled emergent nature of knowledge 
from simple knowledge-seeking behaviour to the community of inquiry that creates 
and preserves knowledge at the societal level. This will accomplish the first research 
goal of the thesis, to present a principled account of a theoretically legitimate erotetic 
perspective. 
Chapter 6, Operationalising the Erotetic Perspective, uses the necessary features 
of erotetic epistemology, to operationalise the Rescherian erotetic framework to 
establish suitable artefacts for modelling knowledge systems. It results in an holarchic 
theoretical structure built on typed
4 cooperative question-answer (QA) pairs, together 
with an account of the pragmatic ancillaries necessary for qualification and complexity. 
It shows how modelling knowledge capacities at a median level, (i.e. between simple 
QA Pairs and communities of knowing), using a series of QA Pairs is adequate to the 
task of modelling complex knowledge systems, and therefore to Walsham's community 
of knowing. 
                                                      
 
4 “Typed” in this thesis is used sensu Russell (Russell, 1905) to denote characteristics of collectivities 
from amongst a logically determined typology. Typed collectivities can be considered synonymous with 
categories (J. L. Bell, 2012).  
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In Chapter 7, Deriving the Functional Entity Framework, the QA Pair construct 
established in Chapter 6 is shown to be an instance of a categorial functional entity pair 
joined by a typed knowledge relation. It describes how this construct is typed 
according to the typology of the QA Pair, and that this qualified typology gives an 
ontology which permits the representation of all encoded knowledge sources, together 
with the framework deontology guiding its use in practice.  
Chapter 8, The Functional Entity Framework, gives a complete account of the 
framework, including a catalogue of all of the constructs and their interoperation. This 
establishes two of the goal components (the ontology and deontology) of the modelling 
framework. 
Chapter 9, FERD: The Functional Entity Relationship Diagram, presents the 
Functional Entity-Relationship Diagram, a diagrammatic language for sketching 
conceptual models using Functional Entities. FERD adapts the conventional ERD to 
represent knowledge systems, substituting the Functional Entity/Knowledge Relation 
Pair for Chen’s entity and relationship. This establishes the modelling framework’s 
third component, the symbology. 
Chapter 10, FERM: The Functional Entity Relationship Methodology, features 
the design methodology whereby knowledge models in the Functional Entity 
framework can be created. This methodology provides the fourth component to 
completes the framework. 
Chapter 11, Substantiation, provides a substantiation of the completed 
modelling framework by demonstrating its adequacy to represent world case studies for 
complex knowledge systems, drawn from different disciplines and knowledge needs. 
Chapter 12, FERL: The Functional Entity Representation Language, develops 
the Functional Entity Relationship Language, a textual knowledge transactioning 
language. FERL is derived from the same question-answering perspective described in 
chapter 4 as FERD, but was built using the kernel theory of speech acts. By employing 
a secondary mode of representation (string logic to FERD’s sketch logic) and by 
employing a different kernel theory (speech acts to FERD’s category theory and 
erotetic logic) it is possible to dock the two symbologies (described in Chapter 13), and 
by proving mutual encompassing, providing confirmation for the erotetic perspective. 
Chapter 13, Evaluation, uses the distributed justificatory framework described in 
Chapter 3 to confirm that the Functional Entity Framework has met its design goals.  
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 Chapter 14, Conclusion, contains a summary and discussion of the research 
project and its limitations, and makes suggestions towards further research. 
1.6  Significance of the research 
This thesis has a research impetus borne of three challenges in informatics: 
firstly is Lauer's (2001) suggestion that many problems in informatics might be 
resolved by replacing a resource-metaphor based perspective with one based on the 
metaphor of questions and answer. Secondly is Dampney's proposal (1991) that 
information systems can be specified more generally and on stronger formal grounds 
by abstraction to the more fundamental, categorial basis of which the static categories 
of ERD are just one example. Thirdly is Walsham's suggestion that adopting 
structuration could lead to a computable representation of a community of practice 
(2005). 
By conceiving of the informatic dimension in knowledge management as 
participants (human, organisational or computational) within question and answer 
conversations, Dampney's dynamic informatic categories become the exchange of 
knowledge within the conversations, and ultimately amount to Walsham's communities 
of knowing. The challenge then becomes one of operationalising the erotetic exchanges 
in accordance with the structuration envisaged by Walsham, in a manner conforming to 
formal informatic categories. 
The particular solution to the open challenge of modelling knowledge presented 
in this thesis has both theoretical and practical significance. A comprehensive 
assessment of schools of knowledge representation identifies for the first time the need 
for a non-reductive abstraction for knowledge sources, and a system for the symbolic 
manipulation of those abstractions. A complete knowledge hierarchy is developed 
using the erotetic perspective that encompasses all possible askable questions and, 
because knowledge is viewed as resolved inquiry, therefore all encodable knowledge. 
A coherent erotetic philosophy is fully operationalised using QA constructs that 
model knowledge at different epistemological levels from simple queries through to 
complete cultures and communities of knowing. A new and thoroughgoing perspective 
for development in IS is presented, fulfilling Lauer’s proposal that new insights would 
emerge if the erotetic approach to informatic modelling were explored. Practically an 
extension to the ERD that covers the complete space of potential encoded knowledge 
interrelation allowing for modelling of recursion, order, intensionality and typing not  
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presently possible has been demonstrated through expository instances, answering 
Dampney’s (C N G Dampney, Johnson, & Monro, 1991) call for the ERD to be 
abstracted in a principled manner to model knowledge. A further practical outcome is a 
prototype KM transactioning language to permit the interchange of knowledge in a 
similar way to the current interchange of data through SQL.  
Finally, the Design Science approach for building theory artefacts of Gregor & 
Jones (2007) has been fully applied in practice to derive an Alexander pattern for 
tertiary artefacts, and its suitability shown for development of both secondary and 
tertiary theory artefacts. 
1.7  Summary 
This chapter has described the research problem in KM that is the subject of this 
thesis: the conceptual modelling of complex knowledge systems. It has discussed the 
motivation for the work, the potential of a novel perspective based on a metaphor of 
questions and answers to provide a fruitful modelling framework for knowledge. It has 
presented the four research questions to be investigated, which are to be answered 
using the design science theory artefact development approach of Gregor & Jones 
(2007). A set of goal artefacts was described: a perspective, a framework (consisting of 
an ontology, a deontology, a symbology and a methodology) and expository 
implementation designs. The research approach to be followed was laid out as the 
chapters of the thesis. Lastly, the motivation and significance of the research was 
discussed.   
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Chapter 2  
 
Literature Review 
 
2.1  Chapter overview 
This chapter reviews relevant literature that informs the research presented in 
this thesis. It begins with working definitions of knowledge and knowledge 
management (KM), then reviews the current state of the art in conceptual modelling of 
knowledge, noting several widely accepted problems with common tools and 
approaches. It investigates the potential of an alternative, question-centric (erotetic) 
perspective in addressing these problems, and concludes with a review of the literature 
on using questions and answers (QAs) as a formalism in informatics
5, including a 
detailed consideration of the epistemological levels and typologies in QA research to 
derive an adequate conceptualisation for modelling within this perspective. 
2.2  Knowledge and knowledge management 
We begin by establishing the working definitions for knowledge and knowledge 
management to be used in the present research, recognising the problems in defining a 
clear-cut account of either concept. 
2.2.1 A working definition of knowledge 
There are no universally accepted definitions of knowledge, and those 
definitions that have been put forward and have achieved some acceptance are 
generally also widely dismissed (Fuller, 2002a; Pritchard, 2009). Consequently 
establishing a working definition of knowledge is to some extent a matter of “picking a 
team” from amongst the rival accounts. Table 2.1 indicates some candidate definitions 
in the literature: rather than rehearse these here, we distinguish two major lines 
(knowledge as a static object or commodifiable resource) vs. knowledge as 
                                                      
 
5 Informatics is taken to include the disciplines Information Systems (and the cognate Information 
Technology), Knowledge Management, Cognitive Science (and the cognate Artificial Intelligence, 
Knowledge Representation, Knowledge Representation and Intelligent Systems), Systems Theory, 
Decision Science, Library Science (and the cognate Bibliography and Classification Science), and such 
aspects of philosophy as ontology, taxonomy, philosophy of science and philosophical logic as impinge 
upon them. This is an intentionally inclusive definition.  
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dynamically constructed in locally active social contexts, and discuss the relevant 
characteristics of each as they occur in the following discussion. 
Table 2.1 Sample Knowledge definitions from the literature 
Definition
Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and 
expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new 
experiences and information. It originates and is applied in the minds of knowers. 
(Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 5)
Knowledge […] is defined to be the data, the relationships that exist among the data 
items, the semantics of the data (i.e., the use to which the information is to be 
put), and the rules and conditions which have been established as applying to the 
data of an enterprise. (J. F. Berry & Cook, 1976, p. 5)
Knowledge consists of a set of truths and beliefs, perspectives and concepts, 
judgments and expectations, methodologies and know‐how. (Wiig, 1998, p. 1) 
 [Knowledge is …] a structure composed of epistemological primitives. (Kangassalo, 
1990, p. 29)
 [Knowledge is …] a set of mental models of an external reality, accompanied by other 
models known to be fiction and by yet others whose status in this respect is 
disputed. (Jolley, 1971, p. 335)
Knowledge is inseparable from practice, [...] and Knowledge‐in‐practice needs to be 
contextually situated. (Walsham & Barrett, 2005)
Knowledge is a form of spontaneous activity with the purpose not of producing 
objects (which would be the goal of all outer activities gearing into the world) but 
of becoming better and better acquainted with a pregiven object. (Schutz, 1950, 
p. 386) 
Knowledge is a justified personal belief that increases an individual’s capacity to take 
effective action. (Alavi & Leidner, 1999, p. 5)
Knowledge is an activity which would be better described as a process of knowing. 
(Polanyi, 1961, p. 466) 
Knowledge is information that changes something or somebody—either by becoming 
grounds for actions, or by making an individual (or an institution) capable of 
different or more effective action. (Drucker, 2003, p. 242)
[Knowledge is…] a true belief accompanied by a rational account ¹ (Plato, ca 369 BCE, 
pp. 201d‐210d) 
Knowledge is not a substance that can be held in hand; rather knowledge is the 
capacity for behaviors that external observers judge to be “intelligent.” (M. A. 
Musen, 1992, p. 34) 
Knowledge the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas. (Locke, 
1690, p. 332)
Notes to table 2.1: 
1 Usually rendered as “justified true belief”, this is a straw man definition by Plato which he introduces by having Socrates say “I 
once heard someone suggesting that…”, to then go on and refute thoroughly in the dialogue. It is erroneously yet commonly 
described as “Plato’s definition” or “the philosopher’s definition” despite being refuted for more than two millennia. 
Emphasising the contextual and relational aspects in which knowledge emerges 
this thesis uses a model of knowledge that situates knowledge in the community: an  
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approach justified by kernel theories of social cognition
6 and social epistemology.
7 
Distinguishing between knowledge-as-object and knowledge-in-practice, Walsham’s 
(2005) approach draws on Lave & Wenger’s community of practice (Lave & Wenger, 
1991; Wenger, 1991), Giddens’s mutual knowledge (1976, 1984), and Polanyi’s 
personal knowledge (1958, 1962, 1967). This approach to knowledge incorporates its 
relational and dynamic nature: as it is learned, forgotten, discovered and shared 
(Rescher, 2000a, 2001a, 2004). Hutchins’s account of distributed cognition gives 
further impetus to this communitarian view (Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000; E. 
Hutchins, 1996, 2000; E. Hutchins & Klausen, 1996): many common human activities 
(team sports, navigation, decision making, indeed language itself) are only practicable 
when shared.  
Gammack & Stephens (1997), building on Lave (1988, 1993) and Suchman 
(1987), propose a “verb or active (rather than noun or nominalist) conception of 
knowledge”: in other words, instead of discussing “knowledge about something” we 
discuss “knowing about something”. “Knowledge of the world” is the active state of 
“knowing about the world”. This avoids many fallacies that arise from reifying 
accounts of knowledge (largely metaphor-driven, as discussed below), while still 
valuing knowledge highly. It also gives an account for the problems of knowledge loss 
and vanishing expertise both within institutions and in society at large (Stephens & 
Gammack, 1994). 
A dynamic, communitarian account of knowledge is compatible with many 
accounts of personal knowledge and as such effectively bypasses many of the 
controversies associated with static accounts of knowledge. It is also a long-term view 
of knowledge in that, although the things known might be different, the act of knowing 
is a common human activity transcending geography and time.  
Additionally, a communitarian account usefully provides a locus for knowledge 
management activity. It also happily co-exists with models of organisational memory 
(e.g.Linger & Burstein, 1998; Hardimos Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001). Gammack & 
Stephens (1997) show how an active view of knowledge can theoretically underpin the 
Community of Practice identified pragmatically by Lave & Wenger (1991) and J. S. 
                                                      
 
6 In e.g. social psychology (1996, 2003, 2008, 2010) cognitive science (A. Clark, 1997, 2001, 2008), and 
in sociology (Douglas, 1986; Halbwachs, 1980) 
7 In e.g. philosophy of science (Fuller, 1988, 2002a, 2002b, 2005, 2008) and library science (Shera, 
1965a, 1968, 1981)  
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Brown, Collins, and Duguid (1989). Similarly Boland & Tenkasi (1995) show that it is 
the discussion between individuals with expertise that enables a community of 
knowing to emerge, which both preserves and enriches that knowledge, giving rise to 
sense making (and ultimately cultures and Kuhnian paradigms). Their account 
separates the practice of knowing from the things that can be used to record the fact of 
knowing.  
Drawing on these various authors we can formulate a working definition for 
knowledge for the current research as the sum of everything that a community knows 
about the world, factually, explanatorily, methodologically and culturally, continually 
co-created and redefined by a living community. 
2.2.2 A working definition of knowledge management  
Hayes & Walsham (2000) build on Boland & Tenkasi to give the 
communicative account of knowledge that recognises the interplay between local 
context and the availability of knowledge, leading to Walsham’s (2005, p. 6) 
recognition that “[knowledge management systems] use should be conceptualised as 
inextricably interlinked to communication processes within a specific context”. This 
provides a communitarian foundation for KM activity.  
Additionally, a communitarian account of knowledge lets us consider its use in 
knowledge management as dynamic affordances (Cook & Brown, 1999).
8 The 
construct of affordance refers here to the qualities perceived as useful in a particular 
active context: utility for one questioner’s situation may not be perceived as such in 
another’s. Affordances consequently determine what can be known about something. 
Consequently, encoded (and encodable) knowledge, when accessible, make up the 
knowledge affordance (Beynon-Davies, 1997) of a complex knowledge system.  
This thesis references the locus of knowledge management to knowledge 
communities (Barrett et al., 2004), with knowers in various roles, and enabling the 
maximal utilisation of information and communications technologies. In the 
perspective established here this construct is equivalent to Rescher's communities of 
inquirers (Rescher, 2004) 
                                                      
 
8 Dynamic affordances are a technologically- and institutionally-based version of Gibson's original 
ecologically-inspired notion of affordances (Gibson, 1977, 1979) reconsidered using Ortego Y Gasset's 
idea of the “facilities and frustrations” offered to an individual by the world (Ortega y Gasset, 1941a, 
1941b).  
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The difficulty with defining knowledge management is legendary (Bouthillier & 
Shearer, 2002; Hlupic, Pouloudi, & Rzevski, 2002; Luijendijk & Mejia-Velez, 2005; 
Stenmark, 2001). Numerous candidate definitions are readily found, and equally 
readily contested, so these will not be rehearsed here. Table 2.2 gives a flavour 
showing the range and their varying conceptual emphases. 
Table 2.2 Sample Knowledge Management definitions from the literature 
Definition
[KM is] the capability of an organization to create new knowledge, disseminate it throughout 
the organization and embody it in products, services and systems. (I. Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995, p. 58) 
[KM is] the process by which an organization creates, captures, acquires, and uses knowledge 
to support and improve the performance of the organization. (Kinney, 1998, p. 1) 
Knowledge management is the behaviors and processes by which a group of people 
maintains and increases their personal and collective actionable knowledge to compete, 
to increase performance and innovation, and to decrease risk. (Parsons, 2004, p. 26) 
A good operational definition of knowledge management is the deliberate introduction of an 
improved and more effective information environment. (Koenig, 1999, p. 77) 
Information or data management with the additional practice of capturing the tacit 
experience of the individual to be shared, used and built upon by the organization 
leading to increased productivity. (Starr, 1999)
Knowledge management embodies organisational processes that seek synergistic 
combination of data and information processing capacity of information technologies, 
and the creative and innovative capacity of human beings. (Y. Malhotra & Craven, 2005, 
p. 1) 
A working definition of knowledge management is that it is the process of creating value 
from an organization's intangible assets. (Liebowitz, 2004, p. 63)
[KM is] the effective learning processes associated with exploration, exploitation and sharing 
of human knowledge (tacit and explicit) that use appropriate technology and cultural 
environments to enhance an organisation’s intellectual capital performance. (Jashapara, 
2004, p. 12) 
Knowledge Management is about creating an environment that encourages people to learn 
and share knowledge by aligning goals, integrating bits and pieces of information within 
and across organizational boundaries, and producing new knowledge that is usable and 
useful to the organization. (Corso, Giacobbe, Martini, & Pellegrini, 2006, p. 210) 
 
Many sources cite the plurality and inconsistency of definitions as revealing the 
nature of the discipline: that it is inchoate (Vorakulpipat & Rezgui, 2006; Whyte, 
2008), is in constant flux (Anand & Singh, 2011), has lost its way (Prusak, 1999; 
Zeleny, 2005) or even is non-existent (or at the very least epiphenomenal) (Alvesson & 
Kärreman, 2001; F. S. Berry et al., 2004; Downes, 2003; Ferguson, 2004; T. D. 
Wilson, 2002b).  
One explanation for the variability of definitions is that KM is still an emerging 
interdiscipline that is responding to older problems (Bouthillier & Shearer, 2002; 
Sutton, 2007; Vasconcelos, 2008), and drawing on intellectual traditions some of 
which (such as cognitive science or informatics) are recent enough themselves to have  
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similar problems of core definitions (Middleton, 2005) or which have borrowed core 
methodologies at their centre (Walls, Widmeyer, & El Sawy, 1992).  
Such disciplinary emergence is not unique to KM, but is a typical pattern in the 
history of academic disciplines (Becher, 1989; Becher & Parry, 2005; Becher & 
Trowler, 2001). Vasconcelos (2008) has suggested that many KM practices are a 
continuation of library science in much the same way that linguistics took over from 
philology, or that biomechanics took over from functional morphology.
9 There is 
moreover, always a continuous process of redefinition going on between academicians, 
their key terms, and their subject field (Quine & Ullian, 1970).  
Walsham notes that “encoded forms of ‘knowledge’ can be shared, in the sense 
that the same material can be looked at by many people, but their individual 
interpretation of the meaning of the symbolic material will be unique” (Walsham & 
Barrett, 2005, p. 8). This view recognises the personal and collective context, and 
avoids issues with static models.  
Walsham's account of knowledge is an informed reaction against the resource-
based account of knowledge that has until recently been prevalent. Through Giddens 
(1976), Walsham's account however still rests on the Austrian School view of 
knowledge as existing in stocks and flows (Hayek, 1937, 1945; Machlup, 1962, 1979) 
especially as espoused by Schutz (1944, 1945, 1946, 1950, 1953, 1959). Following 
Giddens, he moves the emphasis away from stocks towards flows, but fails to account 
for the apparent existence of knowledge stocks, and a fortiori for the many accounts of 
knowledge as resource. 
Our account of KM is not unconcerned with the preservation of encoded 
knowledge, but sees the shared context existing in dynamic form, expressed through 
the medium of curated knowledge capacities, such as continuous education in 
communities of practice (Walsham & Barrett, 2005), and in institutions dedicated to 
preservation of encoded knowledge such as archives and libraries (Shera, 1965b), 
including recent developments in knowledge preservation by learned societies (e.g. the 
                                                      
 
9 Significantly, Becher suggests (2005) that these changes frequently accompany paradigm shifts in 
science. Several authors have commented that such a shift from the old Information Science to the new 
KM is under way (Collins & Weiner, 2010; Krishnan, 2009; Magnani, 2009; Nolin, 2009; Shreeve, 
2008). A similar shift to information management from documentation or records management was seen 
in the late 1960s (Marchand, 1985; Shera, 1972), with similar questions about the nature of the discipline 
being asked.  
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ACM, Rous, 2001) or by publishing houses (e.g. Wiley Interscience, R. E. Wright, 
Jacobson, & Smith, 2007). 
For the purpose of the current research, we shall use a formulation of KM (J G 
Gammack, Hobbs, & Pigott, 2011) that conforms to the definition of knowledge 
presented in the previous section as the purposive activities of identifying, 
remembering, communicating and applying valuable information in context. 
2.3  Problems in modelling knowledge  
When Knowledge Management (KM) first emerged from its tributary 
disciplines, it was seen as a “cure-all” solution to the problems of organisation (Lambe, 
2011b), as it represented the classic tasks of informatics — data storage and 
information retrieval — within a greater context (Wiig, 1997) and drew richly from the 
recent tools of artificial intelligence and cognitive science (e.g. Wiig, 1988) as well as 
existing practices in library science (e.g. Levitan, 1982), management (e.g. J. F. Berry 
& Cook, 1976), and education (D. Smith, 1971).  
For some time however there have been strongly critical re-appraisals of this 
hubristic view (Gorman, 2004; T. D. Wilson, 2002b), chiefly because of the overstated 
and vested claims of its proponents (Fuller, 2002a) and the lack of delivered outcomes 
(Lambe, 2010). There has been a continuing problem with the multiplicity of 
epistemologies and representational formalisms that are embedded in disciplinary 
practice (Cohendet & Steinmueller, 2000): current KM formalisms cannot cope with 
the variety and mutability of knowledge. There has also been a considerable disquiet 
regarding the looseness of core terms such as data, information and knowledge 
(Griffiths & Morse, 2009; Heisig, 2009; T. D. Wilson, 2002b) and their ontological 
circularity (D. J. Pigott, Hobbs, & Gammack, 2004a; Tuomi, 2002). 
The rejection of the inflated claims of early KM proponents does not mean that 
the goals of KM don’t remain desirable, but rather that it has not yet given a clear 
mechanism to achieve them. As a new discipline emergent from other disciplines KM 
is still partly inchoate (Vasconcelos, 2008) and inevitably in the process of 
rationalising the basic terms it is using (Lambe, 2011a; Onions, 2010).  
There is also, significantly, a tendency to locate the new discipline’s discourse in 
the metaphorical terms of previous disciplines (Andriessen, 2011; Steen, 2011; Ward, 
2010). Lauer’s (2001) analysis suggests that the dominant metaphor of KNOWLEDGE 
AS A RESOURCE engenders problematic limitations for practice and that a metaphor  
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using questions-and-answers potentially yields a better perspective. Formalisms such 
as the conceptual modelling of data using ERDs (Chen, 1976, 1977) are essentially 
inadequate to modelling knowledge, and this also motivates a more radical approach to 
conceptual modelling. 
 Modelling an entire knowledge system is a wicked
10 problem (Marjomaa, 2002; 
Rittel & Webber, 1973), inherently complex and multiple. Knowledge systems are not 
more complicated because there are more points of data, or more connexions between 
those points, it is because the quality of the values at those points are of a different 
nature. Information systems and data sources are only part constituents of the 
knowledge whole (Walsham, 2005), so the extra considerations for modelling entire 
systems of knowledge are now reviewed.  
The literature suggests that there are several significant ways in which the 
requirements for modelling knowledge systems conceptually exceed those for data 
systems. Iivari (1992) and Gregor & Iivari (2007) identify three: 
1.  Mutability: systems change in time, and this involves change in both 
need and capability. In addition, novices become experts, and expertise 
itself changes as the discipline changes. Both double-loop learning 
(Argyris & Schön, 1974) and deutero-learning (Bateson, 1972) must be 
representable. Any abstraction must be able to represent new capabilities 
of a system without altering the status of existing details. 
2.  Multiplicity: a knowledge system must accommodate multiple 
viewpoints, multiple roles, multiple jurisdictions and multiple disciplines 
of thought that necessitate that any categorical abstraction be more 
dynamic than the emergent entities found in data solutions.
11 
3.  Representational abstraction: entities within a knowledge system will be 
of different kinds, levels and recursive extensibilities, yet be present in a 
single holarchic form. Any abstraction must keep to a simple uniform 
representation yet represent these features.  
To these can be added Lee’s (1978) notion:  
                                                      
 
10 This term is due to Rittel & Webber (1973) and refers to problem complexes with multiple conflicting 
issues among other non-trivial characteristics 
11 Iivari (1992) expressed this as "conceptual abstraction". Data here (for example fuzzy values, rough 
sets, granular data, ternary Booleans and partial answers in additional to conventional tabular data), all 
still represent direct singular responses, and the general principle involved remains a call to a single store 
or source of suitable facts. For this reason we prefer multiplicity as the more general term.  
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4.  Cooperation: human systems are cooperative (sensu Grice 1975; 1978). 
Participants within a knowledge system have deontic roles in addition to 
ontological roles. Questions within knowledge systems require fruitful, 
current, timely, trustworthy, comprehensive answers. Any abstraction 
must represent these contextual communication requirements. 
The first three of these requirements, and the consequent problems for modelling 
that they imply, are explored in the remainder of this section. Further knowledge 
representation concerns and Gricean cooperation are detailed in 2.4.1. 
2.3.1 Problems with mutability and multiplicity
12 
Any knowledge management system relies ultimately on the timely and accurate 
retrieval of appropriate facts, and facts, self-evidently, come in many different forms. 
They have different structures; they vary in terms of certainty, reliability, applicability, 
and accessibility; they may be located institutionally within the enterprise's own data 
and information management systems, in external systems and libraries, or they may be 
implicit in human expertise. Designing and building a knowledge management system 
involves ensuring that the appropriate facts can be called upon to answer the question 
at hand, and coordinating a number of resources disparate in nature or location. 
Systems, contexts and received knowledge all change over time, and this implies 
change in both need and capability. Knowledge based systems (KBSs) that use static 
representational forms suffer both from brittleness, and from obsolescence; they don’t 
know what they don’t know, and without a learning capability their scope is limited to 
very narrow contexts. While they can perhaps answer specifically formulated 
questions, this architecture is unrealistic for effective knowledge modelling.  
The problem facing the designer is that the same material will be required to 
provide different functions, yield different facts, and be the subject of different 
methodologies. Equally, a single knowledge-seeking mechanism may draw on material 
owned by different groups, updated with different frequencies, and sponsored in 
different manners. This makes it difficult to take design decisions about what stable 
information to deliver to end users, and makes it difficult to ensure the stability and 
accuracy of a knowledge management system.  
                                                      
 
12 A version of portions of this section appeared in Pigott & Hobbs (2011).  
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One illustration of this problem, treated separately by Brilliant (1988) and by 
Bearman (1988) is the situation where the same information in an art historical 
information resource would show value to insurers, range to a curator, examples to an 
artist, size and shape to removalists, and the opinions of rivals to an art historian. 
O'Sullivan and Unwin (2003) discussed a situation in which the same details stored by 
different owners – the geographical information for a rural district, maintained by a 
council and a bus company – would provide information on surfaces and potential 
conflicts with other agencies (telecoms and gas) to the council, while it would 
simultaneously provide information on routes and demographics for timetabling to a 
bus company. 
These examples illustrate how one single source of material lends itself to 
multiple use and interpretation, and one system of use and interpretation can rely on 
multiple sources and hegemonies (i.e. ownerships and de facto controls). Every new 
observer or questioner of a system will compound the problems, and there is no 
guarantee of stability. 
Apart from the above, other well-known problems with KBS include a 
requirement for constant maintenance as knowledge changes, lack of transferability 
and reuse, expensively developed knowledge bases and user interfaces, knowledge 
acquisition difficulties and few established standards (JTEC, 1993). Current knowledge 
management formalisms do not cope well with the variety or mutability of knowledge 
as it is encountered by the knowledge engineer. In particular they do not deal with the 
mediated and system-embedded way in which so much knowledge is to be found, but 
require its consideration as a complex yet essentially unified entity. 
2.3.2 Problems with representations and abstractions 
Entities within a knowledge system will be of different kinds, levels and 
recursive extensibilities, but current data modelling formalisms cannot cope readily 
with recursion, null values and emergent types. Aggregation into higher level objects is 
possible, though conceptually ambiguous for data modelling (Iivari, 1992), but is a 
critical principle of construction for systems of knowledge, whose aggregates emerge 
at different levels, with different kinds of properties, and self-similar arbitrary 
recursivity. These require different types of representational abstraction, and many 
formalisms for knowledge representation have been proposed.  
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The dividing up of knowledge representational (KR) forms has evolved over 
time, with some systems of KR becoming less popular, while others have been created 
or recreated from earlier traditions. The early distinction was between “logical” and 
“procedural” AI forms, (also referred to as “neat” versus “scruffy” AI, Bundy, 1982). 
Mylopoulos (1980) expanded this to logical, network, procedural, and frame-based 
representation schemes. Gasevic et al. (2006) propose systems based on logic, frames, 
rules, sketches, natural language and ontology. 
Each one of these traditions in KR formalism had both an originating 
epistemological basis, and a concomitant knowledge modelling formalism. This is 
necessarily so (Thagard, 1988; Wille, 1997) – the tradition is generated by and 
validates the epistemology. That means that without a mediating process of translation, 
two apparently similar atomic representations made in different system of 
representation cannot be used in a common expression (Minsky, 1996; Thagard, 1988). 
A full list of these representational traditions is given in Appendix A, which contains 
nine prominent KR traditions with their underlying epistemological bases. An extract 
showing the range of indicative approaches is given for convenience in Table 2.3. 
Even within one of these epistemological traditions there is divergence: Clancey 
(1983, p. 243) lists six different formalisms for expert systems frameworks that are at 
least partially incompatible, while proposed merging of ontologies both within 
disciplines (M. Musen, Lewis, & Smith, 2006; Soldatova & King, 2005) and across 
disciplines (Milton & Smith, 2004; Poli & Obrst, 2010) finds incompatibility among 
underlying assumptions regarding “naturalism”. There is no logical reason to prevent a 
list such as indicated in Table 2.3 growing and fragmenting with future research – there 
are no successful ontologies of AI or KR that are not ex post facto, and even assuming 
that an a priori ontology could be constructed is to participate in a particular 
epistemological approach. Not only does the paradigm within which one is working 
establish the terms one uses, it alters the nature of the problem one is trying to solve. 
This fractured approach is complexified by cross-representation (Berkovsky, 
Kuflik, & Ricci, 2009) where an integrating representation needs to represent 
heterogeneous formalisms describing the same underlying objects. So the approach to 
modelling must either accept a partial modelling of its application domain, or must find  
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a way of encompassing systems that are incompatible based on their constitutive 
formalisms.
13  
                                                      
 
13 Not to mention more seriously, epistemic incompatibility seen from the point of view of sociology of 
science (Frigg & Hartmann, 2012; Nersessian, 1995). Table 2.3 The relationship between epistemology and formalisms, for nine established representation traditions 
Basis  Formalism  Authority System
Rules  Logic   Aristotle (ca 350 BCE‐a); Boole (1854) Production systems (C L Forgy & McDermott, 1977) after 
Newell (1973) 
Expert system frameworks (Clancey, 1983)
Norms  Deontics  von Wright (1951) LSE deontic systems (R. K. Stamper & Lee, 1986)
Organizer (Flores, 1982)
Situations  Frames  Fillmore (1968); Goffman (1974); Minsky (1974)  KRL (Bobrow & Winograd, 1977)
Scripts  Schank and Abelson (1977) Knowledge Machine (P. Clark & Porter, 1997a)
Ontology  Hierarchy  Aristotle (ca 340 BCE); Günther (1962); Husserl (1900)  Ontological Cybernetics (Pask, 1973)
TIM (P. J. Hayes, 1977)
Facts  Semantic networks  Quillian (1967); Richens (1956) Semantic data systems (Abrial, 1974)
Conceptual Graphs  Peirce (1998); Sowa (1976) Conceptual Graphs (Sowa, 1976)
Heuristics  Procedures  J. McCarthy and Hayes (1973) (Direct) Procedural Reasoning System (Lansky, 1985)
Newell and Simon (1972); Norvig (1992) (Indirect)  General Problem Solver (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1959) 
Ideas  Concept lattices  Kant (1800) Formal Concept Analysis (Wille, 1982)
Communication  Conversation  Lave and Wenger (1991) Caste (Pask & Scott, 1973)
Approximations  Rough Sets  Zdzislaw Pawlak (1984) Rough Set Data Analysis (Z. Pawlak, 1991)
Fuzzy Sets  Zadeh (1965) Fuzzy Systems (Zadeh, 1965)
Neighbourhoods  T. Y. Lin (2004) Granular Computing (T. Y. Lin, 2004)
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This in turn leads to a greater problem still: namely the heterodox nature of 
knowledge representation artefacts as they are found in organisations (C.H Goh, 1996; 
Cheng Hian Goh, Bressan, Madnick, & Siegel, 1996; M. L. Lee, Bressan, Goh, & 
Ramakrishnan, 1999). Since the representation, storage and retrieval of knowledge 
artefacts embodies an epistemological paradigm, and knowledge modelling also 
involves an epistemological paradigm (potentially a rival one to that embodied in those 
artefacts), then a consistent explanation involves the deconstruction of those existing 
systems. 
What has emerged is a sense that there is no candidate for the best theory, 
language or symbol/notational/formal system for knowledge modelling and 
representation (Gasevic et al., 2006; Grangel, Chalmeta, & Campos, 2007). Rather, 
each tradition, with its specific representations, is best for the general kind of problem 
for which it was developed (see also the later view of Minsky 1996). This view is 
supported by Clancey’s (1994, 1997) conceptualisation of knowledge as situated, 
pertaining to a particular emergence within an active context.  
This does not necessarily lead to a ghettoization of disciplines, nor a nihilism 
with respect to generalised modelling techniques. Toulmin (1958) makes the useful 
distinction between field-dependent and field-invariant constructs that are present in 
any discourse. This means that no matter what the field of study, certain high-level 
constructs (such as reasoning, statistics, argumentation, rhetoric, bibliography) will 
always be available. Godden (2009) has observed that this enables epistemological and 
evaluative tools that are transdisciplinary. The task of the modelling systems designer 
becomes one of finding formalisms and techniques that are transdisciplinary in this 
Toulminian sense. 
 An established mechanism for dealing with this problem is metamodelling (T. 
Clark, Evans, & Kent, 2003; Halpin, 2001b; Karagiannis & Kuhn, 2002; Kiwelekar & 
Joshi, 2007; Kurpjuweit & Winter, 2007; R. Malhotra, 2010), which models the 
existence and interrelation of models and of the modelling systems that enable them to 
be created. By adopting a pluralist epistemological stance, the metamodeller can reject 
the notion of a single primary reference system, and so is enabled to employ the 
knowledge formalism (with its underpinning epistemological basis) as well as any 
analytical or representational tools that are appropriate to each system (Spender, 1998). 
Additionally, it is possible to develop new forms of solutions by using connective  
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knowledge (Downes, 2007), and minimise the potential for culturally inappropriate 
abstractions or rationalisations to be employed (Rošker, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). 
J. G Gammack and Young (1985) demonstrated that at least four forms of 
modelling – concepts and relations, techniques and procedures, facts and heuristics, 
and classifications – are necessary to represent expertise : the pluralist epistemological 
position is situated at a metamodelling layer. Consequently, it is possible to model 
systems of knowing and their representations without compromise or subversion from 
a metamodelling standpoint. It is this position that is held in this thesis, with 
complexities of individual knowledge modelling tasks delegated to component 
systems. 
2.3.3 Other problems: root metaphors 
Apart from the problems listed above, a more fundamental problem lies in the 
metaphor underlying the conceptualisation of knowledge and impacting on its 
modelling potential. Widespread use of a misleading root metaphor has been argued by 
Lauer (2001) as being a potential cause for the difficulties encountered in knowledge 
modelling. His analysis suggests that the dominant existing perspectives are 
underpinned by a resource-based metaphor – styled KNOWLEDGE IS A 
RESOURCE.
14 The use of this metaphor leads to perpetuation of what Lauer calls 
“unrealistic expectations” regarding the objectively unambiguous mapping of a 
representation to the world, denying polysemy and interactively embodied human 
understandings, and suggesting an illusory stability. Particularly in regard to issue of 
usage, communication and responsibility, the KNOWLEDGE IS A RESOURCE 
metaphor is found wanting, and is discussed at greater length in the next section.  
We follow Lauer's example in using a methodological tool called metaphoric 
analysis: Morgan’s (1986) operationalisation of Schön’s (1963, 1979) ideas. 
Metaphoric analysis examines the literature of a problem domain to identify misleading 
metaphors. It reinvestigates established but stalled conceptual traditions, by examining 
those traditions for buried diaphoric
15 metaphors (i.e. those with uncritically presumed 
connotations) and their concomitant (and thus fictive) artefacts – things purported to 
                                                      
 
14 Lauer makes use of Lakoff & Johnson’s (1980b) cognitive linguistics based approach to metaphoric 
analysis, a form of organisational and informatics analysis pioneered by Schön (1963, 1979, 1983). The 
uppercase convention is used in this literature to denote an identified metaphor. 
15 An epiphor is a metaphor that uses a known thing to illuminate another known thing e.g. ”My Toyota is 
a workhorse”. By contrast, a diaphor is where a known thing is used to explore an unknown thing; e.g. 
“Time is a river”.  
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exist that are discernible only because of the use of the metaphors concerned (Talmy, 
1995). Rhetorical use of such metaphors creates and reifies distorted world pictures 
that lead to inaccurate descriptions of, and expectations of, the world. 
 Broadly speaking metaphoric analysis examines the literature for generative 
metaphors that are in fact unconfirmed diaphors, which are then examined to see if 
they are problematic, or are generating fictive artefacts. Metaphoric analysis then 
substitutes a new diaphoric metaphor for the original to investigate alternative analyses 
or descriptions, and (optionally) operationalises and subsequently confirms the new 
generative metaphor. We therefore first examine a common metaphor that underlies 
much discussion in both informatics and knowledge management. This is the reifying 
metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS A RESOURCE, which promotes a perspective of 
knowledge as a product of refining raw materials, ending up as something owned and 
sellable, and an inherent part of the intellectual capital of an organisation. 
2.3.3.1 A metaphoric analysis of standard knowledge modelling 
Walsham (2005 p.6) identifies the “knowledge-as-object school” as a dominant 
approach in the business-oriented literature of KM. This approach, which Walsham 
identifies with Nonaka (1991, 1994), emphasises knowledge as an artefact amenable to 
processing, possession, and exchange.  
Nonaka envisaged knowledge creation as a chief purpose of an organisation 
(Ikujiro Nonaka, 1991), after having earlier given that role to information (Ikujiro 
Nonaka, 1988). Alavi and Leidner (1999, 2001) are typical in invoking the resource-
based value theories of Penrose (1959) and Barney (1996), and applying them to the 
strategic advantages of perceived knowledge assets. This “industrial” conception of 
knowledge has been seen as useful by its proponents as it enables the development of 
specific tools for tasks, and for permitting an evaluation of knowledge work. Walsham, 
however, argues that such accounts of knowledge create the very objects they purport 
to identify. Moreover, they have many other problems in reconciling with commonly 
held notions about knowledge. 
Lauer (2001 p.42ff) demonstrates that information and knowledge when 
described this way are fictive artefacts, relying on two related reifying cognitive 
metaphors, INFORMATION IS A RESOURCE and KNOWLEDGE IS A 
RESOURCE. These reifying metaphors limit possible descriptions and explanations in 
the manner described by Kuhn (1979). Lauer (2001) holds that, as long as  
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INFORMATION IS A RESOURCE (and a fortiori KNOWLEDGE IS A RESOURCE) 
are used for descriptions and analysis, systems cannot be rigorously constructed in 
informatics or KM.  
The reifying metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS A RESOURCE however remains 
ubiquitous in the literature: Andriessen’s (2005, 2006) analysis of critical texts in the 
discipline
16 reveals a wide range of fictive reifying accounts of knowledge and its use, 
derived from contradictory generative metaphors. In reply to Andriessen’s analysis, 
Prusak (2006) acknowledges the limitations of reifying metaphors, remarking : 
[…] If I were to re-write Working Knowledge I would try and use less reified metaphors. 
However, our language does limit us and forces us to say things less accurately then [sic] 
we may wish. […] I'm not sure our metaphors are industrial but they can be improved. We 
should all certainly work at this. (Prusak, 2006 pp. 109-110) 
 
A fuller systematic survey of the cognate literature revealed thirty-five such 
reifying metaphors, revealing a narrative going from metaphoric extraction of raw 
materials from the earth through to metaphoric processing into monetised commodities, 
summarised in Table 2.4 Such metaphors are deeply problematic for knowledge 
modelling. 
                                                      
 
16 The texts are Davenport & Prusak (2000), Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) and Stewart (1991).  
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Table 2.4 Common Reifying Metaphors in IS and KM literature 
Metaphor  Data  Information  Knowledge
Object  R. N. Thompson and Wilkinson (1963)
Hsu, Johnson, and Yang (2009)
Mooers (1959)
Pentikousis (2009)
Freuder (1977)
Borgo and Pozza (2009)
Resource  Voich, Wren, and Froemke (1968)
Brackett (2011) 
Swank (1971)
Bhattacharjee, Marsden, and Singh (2011) 
Walker (1985)
Kitagata, Sasai, Sveholm, Takahashi, and 
Kinoshita (2012)
Discovery  G. H. Moore, Earley, Lary, and Murray (1963)
Pallickara, Pallickara, Zupanski, and Sullivan 
(2010)
Garfield (1964)
Doss, Li, Mak, and Tissera (2010) 
Fayyad, Piatetsky‐Shapiro, and Smyth (1996)
Giunchiglia, Xu, Birukou, and Chenu (2010) 
Hunting  Rawski (1973) 
Ben‐Haim (2006) 
C. Williams and Baitsell (1954)
Fulton (2010)
Huang, Yang, and Wang (1999)
Ting, Kwok, Lee, Tsang, and Lee (2008)
Capture  C. R. Smith (1964) 
Hazeline (2011) 
Preshing (1967)
Thakur, Gormish, and Erol (2011) 
Hawkinson, Knickerbocker, and Moore (1984)
James, Gatward, and Shipley (1995)
Harvesting  Modell (1959) 
Rao and Biswas (2012) 
Bradshaw (1965)
Qureshi (2011) 
Murray (1992)
Y. Wang, Yang, Zoupanos, Spaniol, and Weikum 
(2011)
Mining  Kaufman (1966) 
Bie (2011)
Bates and Fortino (1986)
J. Li (2011)
Anwar, Beck, and Navathe (1992)
Palpanas (2012)
Extraction  Kellogg (1960) 
Chang and Cheng (2012) 
Toda (1956)
Karkaletsis, Fragkou, Petasis, and Iosif (2011)
F. Nishida, Takamatsu, Tani, and Kusaka (1986) 
Kim, Choi, and Kwak (2012)
Sieve  Inmon and Caplan (1992) 
Dyreson and Florez (2011) 
Nilsen (1996)
Zafiris (2010)
Twiney, Edwards, and Wilson (1994)
Graham and Tetroe (2011)
Filter  Ragazzini and Franklin (1958) 
Cervantes, López, García, and Trueba (2011)
Boulding (1962)
Capitán, Merino, Caballero, and Ollero (2011)
Markovitch and Scott (1989)
Xu, Zhou, and Shi (2008)
Cleaning  Goldstein (1970) 
Jiang, Xiao, Wang, and Li (2011)
Belmont (1990)
Chavez‐Mora and Finnie (2010) 
Kuo, Tseng, and Lin (2003)
Vassev and Hinchey (2012) 
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Metaphor  Data  Information  Knowledge
Processing  Engineering Research Associates (1950)
Balmin, Kaldewey, and Tata (2012)
A. Cohen (1950)
Schlosser, Tichelmann, Kruse, and Birkl (2011)
Hayes‐Roth (1977)
Karmacharya, Cruz, Boochs, and Marzani (2011) 
Hardening  Cottle (1970) 
Zhou et al. (2008) 
Stein (2000)
M. Lin, Prabhala, and Viswanathan (2012)
Huang et al. (1999)
Siemens (2006)
Conversion  Nelson (1950) 
Asgar, Akour, and King (2012) 
Chestnut and Mikelson (1959)
Taheri and Vorobyov (2011) 
(Henderson, Moats, Stevens, & Newman, 1966) 
Janhonen and Johanson (2011) 
Distillation  Hornsell (1969) 
Myers and Patil (2012) 
Ling, Bernius, and Morrison (1987) 
Levit, Hakkani‐Tür, Tur, and Gillick (2009)
Kulatilaka, Perotti, and Kuwada (1998)
Kantardzic (2011)
Refinery   Huhns and Bridgeland (1991) 
Lal, Gupta, and Patel… (2010) 
Clippinger and Konsynski (1989) 
Zhang and Jin (2011)
J. S. Brown (1992)
Chun and MacKellar (2012)
Store  Pearcey, Hill, and Ryan (1954) 
Chun and MacKellar (2012) 
Lovell (1958)
(Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, 2011author‐year)
Hall, Negus, and Dancy (1971)
Minton, Macskassy, LaMonica, and See (2011) 
Repository  Bowles (1965) 
J. C. Stamper et al. (2011) 
Ellett (1959)
Bibbo, Michelich, Sprehe, and Lee (2012)
J. M. Smith (1989)
Silva et al. (2011)
Silo  Hirschsohn (1971) 
A. Mitchell (2012) 
Gopal and Cahill (1992)
Zhu et al. (2011)
Prencipe and Tell (2001)
Hayne, Troup, and McComb (2011)
Factory  Owen (1971) 
Fan (2011)
Saunders (1969)
W.‐T. Wang and Xie (2011)
Müller and Schappert (1999)
Gupta, Crk, and Bondade (2011)
Warehouse  Devlin and Murphy (1988) 
Destercke et al. (2011) 
W. S. Davis and McCormack (1979) 
Hui, Knoop, and Schwarz (2012) 
Williamson (1987)
Dang and Yuan (2011)
Mart  The Editors (1967) 
Battaglia et al. (2011) 
The Editors (1969)
Ruiyuan, Kang, and Zhanhong (2011) 
Mattison (1999)
Aslam et al. (2012)
Transfer  Loev, Miehle, Paivinen, and Wylen (1956)
C. Wright and Middleton (2012)
Seader (1957)
Thraen, Bair, Mullin, and Weir (2012) 
de Vries (1964)
Vaara, Sarala, Stahl, and Björkman (2012)
Transport  Chapin (1957)  Chapin (1957) Coates (1955) 
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Metaphor  Data  Information  Knowledge
Coté, Meyerson, and Tagiku (2011) Kaur and Cappellaro (2012) von Gamm (2010)
Distribution  National Academy of Sciences (1962)
Elwaer, Taylor, and Rana (2011) 
Christie (1954)
Meade and Gigone (2011) 
COSATI (1973)
Motskin, Downes, Kusy, Gnawali, and Guibas 
(2011)
Inventory  Downs (1967) 
Z. Hong and Maozhi (2011) 
Dawes (1996)
Ladley (2010)
Wiig, De Hoog, and Van Der Spek (1997)
Herrmann (2011)
Catalogue  Irby, Hsing, and Voss (1976) 
Ding, Peristeras, and Hausenblas (2012)
Orfali, Harkey, and Edwards (1994) 
Breitman et al. (2012)
Junnarkar (1997)
Jiuling, Jiankang, and Jisheng (2010)
Ownership  Leathem (1963) 
B. J. Evans (2011) 
Wessel (1976)
Hurlburt, Voas, and Miller (2012) 
Derber, Schwartz, and Magrass (1990)
Saetang and Theodoulidis (2011)
Assets  Martin (1975) 
Gregory (2011) 
Vincent (1983)
Kumar, DuPree, and Halpert (2011) 
Boisot (1998)
Schiuma, Carlucci, and Sole (2012)
Capital  Arvas (1973)
Mousavizadeh and Rajshekar (2010)
Strassmann (1985)
Cabanac, Chevalier, Chrisment, and Julien (2010)
Griliches (1979)
Y. Chen, Horstmann, and Markusen (2012)
Stocks and 
flows 
Voich et al. (1968) 
Duff (2009)
Dordick (1986)
Hilbert (2012)
Machlup (1979)
Del Giudice et al. (2012)
 
Note to Table 2.4: These are first citations of the metaphorical usages as terms of art to indicate a tradition of usage, and a sample of recent usage to demonstrate currency. The list is indicatory not exhaustive, and others 
observed in literature searches but not sighted in text included fishing, trawling, netting, cultivation, blocking, yielding, sequestration, burying, refreshing etc. Some like analysis, audit, exchange, exploration, retrieval 
and source have a legitimate history in some forms of concept manipulation that predate (or are coeval but separate with) computing.  
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2.3.3.2 Problems with the use of reifying metaphors 
The narrative of industrial metaphors (such as those presented in Table 2.4) 
gives force to the currently dominant model of informatics and KM: of a supply chain 
leading from “raw data” to “value added information” to “refined knowledge”:  
Data is commonly conceived as the raw material for information, which is commonly 
conceived as the raw material for knowledge. Knowledge is the highest order construction. 
(Zins, 2006 p.447) 
 
This continuum (e.g. Davenport & Prusak, 1997) is the standard account in 
college level textbooks on knowledge work (Rowley, 2007), and is expressed explicitly 
in many of the classic accounts of modernising and the information society (e.g. D. 
Bell, 1979).  
Reifying metaphors are not intrinsically fallacious, but there is always a strong 
risk of committing the fallacy of misplaced concreteness (Whitehead, 1954, p. 52), or 
what might be called here connotative overreach: mistakenly including the entire 
connotation of terms, when only a specific aspect is intended, or the inclusion of 
naturalistic meanings for terms used only metaphorically.  
Døving (1996) discusses various commonly occurring fallacies in analogical 
reasoning and finds that although underpinning so much of its discourse, several other 
major problems can be found with the reifying metaphors used in the KM literature, 
particularly:  
i.  contradiction with normal expectations: shedding or ignoring normal 
connotations (real world significations) of the terms, such as properties, 
behaviour or roles. 
ii. fictive artefacts: stipulated yet non-existent artefacts in the subject domain, 
which cannot be identified independently of the metaphors of the items 
described with the metaphors.  
iii. unwarranted conclusions: through the force of metaphor, unwarranted 
expectations of the world are created. 
As an example, no observation can exist without knowledge (Clancey, 1993; 
Hanson, 1958; Kuhn, 1962) and thus the idea of “raw data” or “intermediate 
information” is both an artefact of hypothesis (F. J. Miller, 2002; D. J. Pigott, Hobbs, 
& Gammack, 2005; Roszak, 1986) and the product of category errors (Fricke, 2008).   
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Moreover, in practice such transformations and their products are unreliably 
noticeable in situ (Ahmed & Dayal, 1998; Benyon, 1990; Court, 1997; D. J. Pigott et 
al., 2005). Walsham (2005 p.10) cites Tsoukas (2003 p.410) pointing out the 
impossibility of actually “capturing, translating or converting knowledge” as is often 
described. The problems that Tsoukas and Vladimirou have diagnosed in isolating the 
subject matter of KM (H Tsoukas, 2003; Hardimos Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001) – i.e. 
that nothing is actually being refined, converted, captured or stored in organisations – 
would suggest that the metaphors are indeed inappropriate or misapplied. 
Use of reifying metaphors bring contradictions, which can be observed for 
instance, where knowledge is considered a critical resource of a company (and by 
implication inimitable and unsubstitutable) (Curado, 2006; Jayne, 2007) yet there is no 
explanation for the eminent substitutability of knowledge (Quine & Ullian, 1970) or 
multiple independent invention (Constant, 1978; Merton, 1961; Scharf, 2008; 
Vermont, 2006). Similarly if it is economically conceptualised as a Ricardian rent
17 
(Yaming & Jiande, 2006), there is no explanation for trans-organisational knowledge-
sharing without loss (e.g. Shadravan, Amani, Molinari, & Hugall, 2010) or of the 
necessity of knowledge pooling in science. This has already been noted of information 
(Cleveland, 1982), so would be a fortiori true of KNOWLEDGE IS A RESOURCE. 
A second class of problems with the reifying metaphor is that to use the terms 
“knowledge”, “wisdom” or “truth” as extensions to refined data or information goes 
against pre-existing notions of those concepts. Geisler (2007) points out how it cannot 
account for the existence of knowledge outside of the continuum from data upwards.
18 
Ardelt (2004) shows how it trivialises the wisdom that is acquired through the 
experience and suffering of ageing, and the role that love and sociality plays in its 
acquisition. Fuller (2002a) argues that it not only objectifies knowledge, it ignores or 
misuses the problems with knowing per se as a human activity, while any suggestion 
that “truth” is a processed form of anything trivialises the role that truth (or its 
unattainability) plays in philosophical and religious traditions.  
Surveys find that the terms data, information and knowledge are widely and 
divergently defined and inconsistently used (Gourlay, 2006; Thow-Yick, 1998; Zins, 
                                                      
 
17 i.e. the rent or value of a piece of land is equal to the amount gained by putting it to its most productive 
use over that gained by using the most productive free land for the same purpose. 
18 Faucher et al (2008) point out that the emergence of the words in the English corpus appears in reverse 
order from the DIKWT continuum.  
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2007), or used in such a way that (if they existed) any such processes would be part of 
a continuous system of emergence (Bellinger, 1997) (and likely reversed — Tuomi, 
2002).
19 Even for those who take the multi-levelled reifying account, although there is 
agreement about the general data/ information / knowledge division, there is little 
agreement as to what is in the sections (Pao & Warner, 1993 p. 546). 
Accounts of knowledge in the Western tradition (e.g. Holsapple, 2003) often 
deprecate as non-consequential those features of knowledge from a traditional 
perspective that do not fit with their reifying versions. Knowledge isn’t just Western 
capitalist knowledge, and the need to model knowledge also requires modelling non-
western knowledge (Ali & Brooks, 2009; Gill, 2007; Heimbürger, 2008; W. Li, 2010). 
Any account of “knowledge” must consider the importance of trust, co-operation, faith 
and secrecy; features which are not considered as primary in KNOWLEDGE AS A 
RESOURCE. Conceptual models of knowledge must be able legitimately to represent 
those forms of knowledge that take a stand against the values held as incontestable in 
business practices. 
By investigating the implications of metaphors in organisations and 
organisational information systems we can avoid trying to account for things in 
descriptions of organisations that are only there because of the force of metaphors.  
2.4  An alternative: the Erotetic Perspective  
The currently dominant approach to knowledge discovery treats the world as 
passive and inert: opposed to that approach is a question-answering perspective 
(Rescher, 2001a), which views knowledge created as a response to an inquiry, and 
dynamically shaped by it. The formal philosophical term for Question-Answering is 
erotetics (Prior & Prior, 1955), and the erotetic principle informs all systems that can 
be considered as a responsive dialogue between a questioner and a respondent 
(Rescher, 2001b, 2001c). The response can come from an individual, from the social 
world, or the physical world — as reply, education, or observation respectively. 
We have just seen the problems inherent in using the reifying metaphor in 
discussing informatics. Since creation of systems of expression will always, however, 
require metaphor (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a, 1980b), Lauer (2001) has 
                                                      
 
19 The problems persist in application of the metaphor: as the data changes in format, level, detail and 
phase problems are observed with loss of data, incomprehensibility, focus on instances or types, and 
ascertaining correctness. (van Bommel, 2005)  
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proposed that a reconceptualisation of KM (and MIS more generally) using alternative 
(but substantively grounded) metaphors be attempted to avoid the iatrogenic problems 
mentioned above. 
2.4.1 Erotetic approaches in informatics 
This section discusses the question-centric, or erotetic perspective and its history 
within information systems and knowledge modelling research. It demonstrates that the 
question-and-answer formalism has always been present in informatics, implicitly or 
otherwise, and has informed much system development, especially within databases 
and artificial intelligence. 
Question-Answering (QA) has existed as a research tradition since the origins of 
modern computing (McCulloch, 1974). In “What makes a question?” MacKay (1960) 
proposed that in addition to Shannon’s (intentionally context-free) conception of 
information, there was not only a contextualised version conceived of as a response to 
the need to acquire information but also a third role of validating information that can 
only be conceived of as a response to a question. 
In early database research the question-answering (QA) paradigm was 
influential in early semantic information retrieval: e.g. Green (1961), Black, 1968) and 
Robinson (1965). Based on the logic of Quine (1959) this considered what “amounted 
to” a satisfactory answer to a given question. A more mature version of the logical 
paradigm, erotetic logic (developed by  Harrah, 1961 and Belnap, 1963  following the 
work of Prior & Prior, 1955 and Hamblin, 1958) provided a more formalised picture of 
the alignment of question and responding statements. Rescher later expanded this 
formalism to a complete epistemological framework (Rescher, 1955, 1967, 1969, 
2000a, 2001a), detailed in its entirety in Chapter 5.  
Question answer (QA) pairs also formed the basis for expert systems (Clancey, 
1983; R. T. Hartley, 1982), for interactive computer programming systems (Sammet, 
1969) and computer dialog command systems (P. R. Cohen, 1978; Schank & Abelson, 
1975). 
Lauer (2001) gives examples of how useful a question-centric approach has 
already proved in KM and MIS, and shows how there can be a rational usage of the 
QA metaphor from the lowest possible level in IS, the response to a signal with another 
signal, in conformance with a pre-established code. Drawing on Churchman’s idea of 
the inquiring organisation (C W Churchman, 1971), he discusses the alternative view  
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of information that Mackay’s (1951) theory of question-contextualised information 
provides. 
Mackay’s account of information, which has underpinned several productive 
research traditions (Hayles, 1999; Soloski, 1977), was a coherent and contemporaneous 
rival view to that of Shannon and Weaver  (1949, see Hayles (1999) and Dupuy 
(2000)), and one that saw the impossibility of measuring a value without a context. 
Overextending the already decontextualised Shannon and Weaver communication 
model to larger scale and higher level systems is simplistic, and fails at the knowledge 
level: it is really these failings that are encapsulated in the resource-based metaphor.
20 
Basing discussions of knowledge on the notion of an answered question instead, 
however, can be fully underpinned by logic. An alternative to the conventional logic of 
propositional form is a logic of questions and answers (erotetic logic), which describes 
the rules for determining the correctness of answers, and how question and answer 
chains can be formed (Belnap, 1963, 1966; Belnap & Steel, 1976; Bromberger, 1966, 
1992b, 1997; Harrah, 1961, 2002; Prior & Prior, 1955; Rescher, 2000a, 2001a, 2004). 
The erotetic logic tradition holds that question and answer chains are a valid alternative 
to propositional chains as a basis for knowledge representation.  
Parallel to the direct logical entailment of an answer by a question is a socially 
based context regarding how a question should be properly answered when one person 
asks another a question, termed conversational co-operation by Grice (1975, 1978). 
Conversational cooperation enables people to rely on an answer received in 
conversation because they know that answer will tell them what they want to know 
without misleading, confusing or omitting details. Gricean conversation has been used 
by Lee (1978, 1981a, 1981b) to propose an alternative to directly entailed data queries 
in cooperative databases (e.g. Gaasterland, Godfrey, & Minker, 1992; Gal, 1988). It 
has also informed the development of information retrieval systems in public access 
catalogues for libraries (Belkin & Vickery, 1985; Hannabuss, 1989; Vickery & 
Vickery, 2004). 
Rescher (1955, 1967, 1969, 2000a, 2001a) has built up a fully comprehensive 
epistemological program based on erotetic logic ranging from simple question-answer 
                                                      
 
20 Hamblin (1958) proposed an erotetic reconceptualisation of what he saw as the Hartley and Shannon 
model, by presenting information content as QAs: “… the definitions given by Hartley and Shannon are 
analogous to definitions referring not to statements but to questions.” (Hamblin, 1958 pp. 167-168). A 
modified form of information theory using this approach has also been proposed by Knuth (2005).  
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pairs to active massively distributed communities of inquiry, acting as a repository for 
a dynamic form of knowledge. This program is called knowledge as dynamic inquiry or 
simply inquiry dynamics. 
This thesis aims to establish a new knowledge modelling framework based on an 
erotetic perspective. It uses Rescher’s erotetic account of epistemology to develop an 
abstraction of the information-seeking processes in complex distributed knowledge 
systems, whereby the process of intercommunication between knowledge seekers and 
knowledge sources is envisaged as a (possibly recursive) series of questions and 
answers. The remainder of this chapter considers the nature of conceptual modelling 
within an erotetic perspective on knowledge. 
2.5  Conceptualising knowledge for modelling 
Given the identified problems of conceptualisation, representation and 
perspective inherent in current approaches, a radical reconsideration of the knowledge 
modelling enterprise is in order. It is now appropriate to look in more detail towards 
the representational forms such models might take and the potential for an erotetic 
perspective to provide a comprehensive epistemology for modelling. 
A communally held knowledge source will ideally contain all possible answers 
to a class of questions (Rescher, 2000a). This is representable as a construct that 
Rescher & Grim (2008) have called a collectivity. Given the right conditions, a 
community of inquirers will form around the communal knowledge and itself create 
further knowledge (Rescher, 2000a, 2001a, 2004). The sum total of all things known 
about everything by that community is called a knowledge plenum. 
Our working definition of knowledge (in 2.2.1) is the sum of everything that a 
community knows about the world, factually, explanatorily, methodologically and 
culturally, continually co-created and redefined by a living community. 
As a social phenomenon residing in collective memory and communication, and 
comprising the aggregation of facts, beliefs, heuristics and maps about the world and 
ourselves, held privately and in common we can usefully conceptualise knowledge by 
analogy with lore (Leach, 1976).  
Lore is amenable to encoding and documentation – the creation of meta-
knowledge about message-bearing objects (traditionally cultural materials, now 
expanded to cover all computerised artefacts). These objects can be catalogued, and the 
lore or knowledge that is encoded in them retrieved according to a need. For modelling  
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knowledge retrieval, there needs to be an account as to how, for an as-yet-unasked 
question, the “stored answer” and its communication can be modelled. 
Heilprin’s (1961) established model of information communication provides one 
account that can enable message bearing artefacts to be seen as the equivalent of a 
dynamic source of knowledge. Heilprin (1961, 1972b, 1972c) distinguishes between 
short-duration messages (intended for immediate transmission and single occasion 
reception), and long-duration messages (intended for storage, indefinite transmission 
and multiple repeated receptions). Long-duration messages (e.g. encoded signals 
digitally stored, or curated collections of information including books, journals, diaries, 
maps, recordings etc.) differ from short in that the encoding results in storage before 
retrieval, decoding and delayed transmission. When decoded, a long-duration message 
acts as if it were a short-duration message. This distinction enables the logical 
construction of information repositories that have to be anticipated and prepared for 
use in servicing a field of knowledge. 
As there is no logical difference between the long-duration messages on any of 
the retrieval occasions (assuming properly performed encoding), it follows that an 
identically coded message can serve as the construct of a question “answered before 
asked” by the use of a long-duration message.  
Consequently it is possible for a “repository of answers” to exist that predates 
the questions posed, and this significantly operationalises a knowledge plenum that 
contains all possible answers to a class of questions (Rescher & Grim, 2008); such a 
plenum will also provide answers to many other classes of questions as well (Hamblin, 
1958), acting as a knowledge source for them all. 
QA systems are useful because they permit modelling of partial and incomplete 
answers, as well as modelling nonsensical answers, when the question is insufficient or 
when the answer is vague. They also help modelling of questions that aren’t possible 
with current KM systems, but whose answers could be provided by an enquiry through 
human resources or generalised expertise (e.g. in a library). A QA system also permits 
a role for the enquirer in interpretation – we cannot assume that the details returned 
necessarily provide the final answer – they may require reprocessing by another 
system, or combination with other answers.  
QA systems can model the entirety of the knowledge resources of an enterprise, 
not just the portion of it that is computerised, let alone encoded and stored in a 
database. To do this requires a generalisation of types of the questions to be asked, with  
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a matching generalisation of the type of answer available. What is needed is an 
abstraction that permits conceptual modelling of fact retrieval operations of various 
types, where the abstracted entities can be seen as representing the replies to such 
operations, together with their existential and quantitative qualities.  
We therefore require two features for QA systems: levels and types. The erotetic 
activities (of entailment and satisficing) occur at different levels within a knowledge 
system, and in a number of identifiable ways. In the next two sections we shall 
investigate QA levels and types, and how they have been used to represent the 
complexities of knowledge, and knowledge bearing artefacts. 
2.5.1 Identified Levels of QA Activity 
Levels are a meta-modelling construct used to organise other models, and of 
which common features can be predicated (Jolley, 1971, 1973). This is not modelling 
at a software or product level, but rather modelling in terms of how the system as a 
whole responds to requests made of it, and as a system, this comprises levels and 
emergent properties.  
Levels are a construct used to make comprehensible descriptions of a world that 
is far too rich, complex and chaotic to make directly corresponding representations of 
(Gaines, 1987). Introduction of the notion of levels was critical to the development of 
disciplines such as physics (Parker-Rhodes, 1981), ecology (Rowe, 1961) and 
psychology (Churchland, 1981). Meta-modelling of levels through abstraction (Floridi, 
2004b; Gnoli & Poli, 2004) is likewise fundamental to the informatics disciplines. 
Newell’s introduction of the knowledge level (Newell, 1981) recognises the 
pivotal role of levels in general, in the representation, storage and retrieval of 
knowledge. Other additional levels proposed for complete representation included the 
“epistemological level” (R. J. Brachman, 1979; Guarino, 1994), the “linguistic level” 
(Ambroslo, Métais, & Meunier, 1997; R. J. Brachman, 1979; Guarino, 1994; 
Johannesson, 1997; Métais, Kedad, Comyn-Wattiau, & Bouzeghoub, 1997) the 
“organization level” (Fox, 1987) and the “ontological level” (Guarino, 1994, 2009).
21  
                                                      
 
21 despite its importance, the usage of the term “level” is confused (Floridi, 2008; Poli, 2006). Bunge 
(1960) notes 9 distinct usages of the term “level” in discourse but also shows that despite divergence in 
usage, only two (rank and layer) are not part of an integrated whole, and even they are sometimes 
representations.  
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Along with differentiation, the notion of “level” forms the basis for ontological 
classification (Gómez-Pérez, Fernández-López, & Corcho, 1991; Guarino, 1994, 
1998b; Guarino & Poli, 1995). Constructs at the same level are considered to be (in 
some sense) similar (M. Bunge, 1977b, 1979; Gómez-Pérez, 1999; Guarino & Welty, 
2000b; Sowa, 1995, 2000) and that is what enables generalisations to be made about 
everything at a particular level. When the constructs at all levels can be coherently 
modelled, at every level, according to the same consistent organising principles, then 
the hierarchy is self-similar and the principles can be considered a good universal 
modelling construct for that system (Joslyn, 2004). 
More importantly for the current research, we can consider the hierarchy as a 
partially ordered set (Scott, 2000), which provides an appropriate semantics for the 
knowledge representation (Battle, 1990). This in turn means that the class of similar 
statements can be made about all elements of that partially ordered set (Battle, 1990; 
J.G. Gammack, Battle, & Stephens, 1989; S. P. H. Morgan & Gammack, 1990) and 
thereby legitimise the use of categories from a theoretical level (Barr & Wells, 2005; 
Diskin, 2005b, 2005c). The remainder of this section details a hierarchy (or, more 
correctly, a holarchy) of seven literature-derived levels, summarised in Table 2.5, that 
together constitute a complete erotetic epistemology for modelling, from communities 
of knowing down to individual QA Pairs. 
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Table 2.5 Hierarchic levels of the erotetic explicative framework 
Level & type Features Authors (listed chronologically)
1: Isolated QA Pairs Formalism of QA as a type of logic Aristotle (ca 350 BCE), Avicenna (ca 1020), Whately (1827,1828), Sperantia (1936), Hare (1949), Prior and 
Prior (1955), Hamblin (1958;1963;1973), Harrah (1961), Belnap (1963;1966), Aqvist (1965), Rescher 
(1967), Katz (1968,1977), Flores and Ludlow (1980)
2: Information  Information as contextualised QA: QA 
framed within the universe of 
discourse and in the context of 
question asking 
Gabor (1946; 1952; 1953), MacKay (1951;1969; 1960), Maruyama (1959; 1961a; 1961b;1961c), Rescher 
(1955,2000), Polanyi (1962), Harrah (1963), Jolley (1967), Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch and Pitts 
(1968), Stamper (1971;1973), Codd (1974), Earnest, McCarthy, Feigenbaum, Lederberg and Cerf 
(1974), Forgy (1974), Maturana (1974;1978a;1978b), Shortliffe and Buchanan (1975), Clark and 
Haviland (1977), Kent (1978;2000), van Fraassen (1980), Floridi (1999; 2003a;2003b;2005a;2005b), 
Walsham (2005)
3: Dialogue  Learning as QA that has a feedback cycle 
to confirm the efficacy of answer 
Gabor (1946; 1952; 1953), MacKay (1951; 1960; 1969), Maruyama (1959; 1961a;1961b;1961c), Polanyi 
(1962), Harrah (1963), Jolley (1967), Lettvin, H. Maturana, W. S. McCulloch and W. Pitts (1968), 
Stamper (1971; 1973), Codd (1974), Earnest, McCarthy, Feigenbaum, Lederberg and Cerf (1974), Forgy 
(1974), Maturana (1974; 1978a; 1978b), Shortliffe and B. G. Buchanan (1975), Clark and S. E. Haviland 
(1977), Kent (1978,2000), Floridi (1999; 2003a;2003b; 2005a;2005b), Rescher (2000,2001), Walsham 
(2005)
4 Conversation  Conversation as QAs that cause more QA 
instances, spawned from major or 
minor premises in original 
Gautama (ca 280 BCE), Maruyama (1961), Schegloff and Sacks (1969;1974;1977), Kunz and Rittel (1970), 
Codd (1971), Pasnopk (1971), Rittel and Webber (1973), Maturana (1974; 1978; 1996;1999), Grice 
(1975;1978;1989), Gaines (1979), Habermas (1979), Flores and Winograd (1980; 1988), Bach and 
Harnish (1982), Rescher (2000,2001,2004)
5: Meshes  Linked QA conversations that continue 
independently 
Simon (1962;1973), Glanville (1977), Flores and Winograd (1980, 1982, 1988), Pask and Pangaro (1981), 
Buckingham Shum, Domingue and Motta (2000), Stahl (2000,2002,2005), Conklin, Selvin, Buckingham 
Shum and Sierhuis (2001)
6: Responsive 
Emergent Levels 
Emergent metaentities that are QA 
conversational meshes build up to 
higher level ontological states, and 
new things can be asked of them 
Spencer (1862), Alexander (1920), Lloyd Morgan (1923), Conger (1925), Wertheimer (1934), von 
Bertalanffy (1950), Bunge (1960), Buckley (1968), Jolley (1968,1971,1973), Lettvin, Maturana, 
McCulloch and Pitts (1968), Codd (1971), Maruyama (1974), Maturana (1974,1975,1978a,1978b), 
Bunge (1977), Foskett (1977), Glanville (1977), Smith and Smith (1977a,1977b), Iivari (1992), Miller and 
Miller (1992a,1992b,1992c, 1993,1995), Buckingham Shum, Domingue and Motta (2000), Liu (2000), 
Conklin, Selvin, Buckingham Shum and Sierhuis (2001)  
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Level & type Features Authors (listed chronologically)
7: Communities of 
Knowing 
Holarchic aggregations of QA 
conversations, including 
conversational meshes. Groups of 
expertise emerging, Time causes 
novices to become experts. Often 
topologically topographically or 
teleologically defined. 
Ackoff and Churchman (1950), Vickers (1968a,1968b), Mitroff, Betz and Mason (1970), Churchman (1971), 
Mitroff (1971), Ackoff and Emery (1972), Stamper (1973), Goldkuhl and Lyytinen (1982), Winograd and 
Flores (1986), Lave (1988, 1993), Lloyd (1989, 2004), Sinha (1990), Brown and Duguid (1991), Lave and 
Wenger (1991), Wenger (1991,1998,1999), Lenk and Paul (1993), Bhattacharyya (1994) Boland Jr, 
Tenkasi and Te'eni (1994), Boland Jr and Tenkasi (1995), Dietz, Goldkuhl, Lind and Van Reijswoud 
(1998), Kaphagawani and Malherbe (1998, 2003), Hayes and Walsham (2000), Liu (2000), Soni (2000), 
Orlikowski (2002), Barrett, Cappleman, Shoib and Walsham (2004), Rescher (2004), Hamminga (2005), 
Orlikowski (2005, 2006) Walsham (2005), Uren, Buckingham Shum, Bachler and Li (2006), Hu (2007), 
Sunstein (2007,2008,2009), Shirkey (2008,2010)
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2.5.1.1 Level 1 QA formalisms – formalism of QA as a type of logic 
At its very simplest, the QA formalism resembles traditional propositional form 
(Aristotle, ca 350 BCE-a). It already communicates knowledge: the respondent must 
match answer to the question in the same terms it was posed for it to be appropriate. 
From the earliest formalisms to the latest erotetic logics, this simple match has been 
considered essential. Belnap and Steel (1976) propose reply as a larger category than 
answer to a question to denote “a term covering the host of more or less responsive 
noises that can follow upon a question” (Belnap & Steel, 1976 p. 15). This is 
significant to the current research as it points towards the provision of knowledge 
through a question-answering system, rather than simply matching a direct 
propositional statement. 
2.5.1.2 Level 2 QA formalisms – information as contextualised QA 
The next level up enshrines a question in an explicitly shared context – a 
contextualised question and answer. Lauer & Graesser (1992) show how Mackay’s 
explicative framework defines information in terms of the capacity to effect a change 
in any representation in response to a request for verification. 
 Lehnert (1977, 1978, 1981) shows that Gricean cooperation (what she termed 
“an appropriate answer”) involves consideration of such things as state-assessment, 
contextualising and attention to focus. She points out that such considerations mean 
that an appropriate answer to the same question may be different when asked on 
separate occasions.  
Significantly for the current research, there is a sense in which the question 
entails the knowledge the answer contains (H. H. Clark & Haviland, 1977), as well as 
other entailed features of the world, a phenomenon termed implicature (Grice, 1975). 
This implicature is part of the way that a QA creates knowledge (Lehnert, 1977, 1978), 
and it will form the basis of the current research’s construct knowledge relation 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
2.5.1.3 Level 3 QA formalisms – dialogue 
At the end of the QA process the questioner ideally knows the answer. However, 
a number of eventualities can lead to the questioner not becoming informed 
(Bromberger, 1992a). The QA process requires some form of confirmation that it has 
occurred. This leads to the establishment of the formalism at level 3, dialogue, as  
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formalized by Moore (1995). Dialogue implicitly has a third communication arc, a 
feedback loop, so that the questioner can tell the respondent whether or not the 
questioner is happy with the answer – which is essential to the formation of systems.  
One form of confirmation is Teachback (Pask & Scott, 1972) where the 
questioner demonstrates understanding by repeating the answer. Expert systems apply 
a QA formalism with feedback to provide and justify domain knowledge (e.g. Walton, 
2005). A similar QA exchange formalism – the domain-entity/inter-relationship pair 
will form the basis for a major construct for this thesis, the functional entity, also 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
2.5.1.4 Level 4 QA formalisms – conversations 
A formal conversation emerges when one question leads to another: questions 
are open-ended in a way that statements are not.
22 Several significant QA formalisms 
for the current research are found at the conversational level. 
Pask’s conversation theory (Pask, 1972) demonstrates how the emergence of 
complex knowledge forms in stored representations are serial QA Pairs. His “learning 
machines” anticipated many of the conceptual mechanisms involved in the 
development of knowledge based systems. Pask viewed the conversation, rather than 
the stimulus-response pair, as the smallest meaningful representation of intelligence 
(Pask, 1972). Significantly, he saw that while one participant could exhibit multiple 
conversational facets (consistent potential interpretations), a contractual basis for 
participation correctly ensured the requisitely faceted psychological typing. This 
faceted heuristic/typing formalism forms part of the abstraction for the knowledge 
relationship which ensures modelling of the in-system multiple use of a functional 
entity, discussed in Chapter 7. 
Grice’s conversational analysis (1975, 1978) provides the Cooperative 
Principle,
23 setting up the formalisms for the successful exchange of knowledge in a 
series of questions and answers. Grice’s theory underwrites all cooperative data 
systems (e.g. Gal, 1988; Gal & Minker, 1988;  Weigand & Dignum, 1995) and is 
                                                      
 
22 This is the chief reason why Lauer (2001) suggests that questions and answers, rather than statements, 
are the best knowledge representations. 
23 Grice’s Conversational Principle is stated as “Make your conversational contribution such as is 
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in 
which you are engaged” (Grice, 1989 p. 26).  
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particularly important for the current research as it operationalises implicature. This is 
discussed further in chapter 6. 
2.5.1.5 Level 5 QA formalisms – conversational meshes 
When formal conversations link into each other we get what are called 
conversational meshes (Pangaro, 2001; Pask & Pangaro, 1981). These formalisms 
permit multiple concurrent answers by the same individuals to different questions, and 
permit others to join in with the QA process. Academic discourse through response to 
and via conference papers and journal articles can be modelled as meshes. 
2.5.1.6 Level 6 QA formalisms – responsive emergent levels 
Responsive emergent levels occur when meshes have been recorded with some 
mechanism that permits orthogonal enquiry. The conflux of QA systems is present as a 
store for others external to the QA sessions to “eavesdrop”: indeed most early database 
modelling was formalised in this way (Foskett, 1977).  
As an example, interrogating academic literature as part of the research process 
interacts with that body of literature as an emergent system, rather than with individual 
papers or paper chains. 
2.5.1.7 Level 7 QA formalisms – communities of knowing 
The apex level concerns the community-of-inquirers described by Rescher 
(2004): 
If its cognitive needs and wants are strong enough, any group of mutually communicating, 
rational, dedicated inquirers is fated in the end to become a community of sorts, bound 
together by a shared practice of trust and cooperation, simply under the pressure of its 
evident advantage in the quest for knowledge (Rescher, 2004, p108).  
 
This level is the equivalent of the knowledge communities as discussed by 
Barrett et al. (2004) and Walsham (2005), based on the earlier constructs of Lave & 
Wenger (1991) and Boland and Tenkasi (1995). It is at this level that research 
communities have been described by Brown and Duguid (1991), and this apex 
construct is sufficient to specify inquiry at the level of human cultures. 
2.5.1.8 QA level formalisms and emergence 
These seven QA level formalisms apply variously to individuals, machines, 
systems, running conversations, academic debate, organisations and societies. 
However, we can accept as peers within a community of knowing any sources of  
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information, including databases, search engines and expert systems as well as single 
or collectives of people, as long as they adhere to Gricean cooperative maxims (Grice, 
1989). 
It is important to note that this set of seven levels comprises the entirety of QA 
formalisms. Following Bunge (1960, 1977a) all instances of QA formalisms will 
necessarily appear as an instance or a group of QA systems at a level, and when their 
interactions get sufficiently complex, a QA system amounting to the next level 
formalism will emerge. 
Given that these different formalisms have the same metaphorical base, there is 
no a priori reason why they cannot co-exist as models within a holarchic frame of 
reference. Each higher level permits the inclusion of representations as the lower level. 
In fact, the QA systems are complete and coherent at each level, yet after the simple 
QA Pairing they emerge from the action of the systems at the immediate lower level. 
An attempt to explain the higher level in terms of the sum of the lower level destroys 
its holism (Checkland, 1988; Koestler, 1969; Pichler, 1998; Yolles, 2004), which 
shows that the community-of-knowing is holarchic in nature.
24 
At the apex, the community-of-knowing can incorporate smaller communities-
of-knowing: cultures are communities-of-knowing (Duguid, 2005). As Hayek (1969) 
points out, it is in the nature of such systems that the most abstract representation (i.e. 
the higher-most level) will have primacy in observation, and changes effected below 
will be perceived as changes in the whole, and “discernible only through the principle 
of pattern” (Hayek, 1969, p. 309). The holarchy is depicted in Figure 2.1.
25 
 
 
                                                      
 
24 Koestler (1969); Pichler (1998) demonstrate holarchy in abstract systems, with an attempt at generality; 
Checkland (1988); Yolles (2004) for soft systems. It has also been demonstrated for Business processes 
in distributed organisations (F.-T. Cheng, Yang, Lin, & Hung, 2001; Clegg, 2007), customer relations in 
distributed organisations; (G. Bell, Cooper, Jenkins, Qureshi, & Warwick, 2001; Nucci Franco & 
Batocchio, 2001) distributed manufacturing (Bou-Saba, Esterline, Homaifar, & Rodgers, 2005; 
Cossentino, Galland, Gaud, Hilaire, & Koukam, 2008), Management of wide area organisations 
(McHugh, Merli, & Wheeler, 1995; Ulieru & Este, 2004) and self-coordination of autonomous agents in 
distributed control systems (Mella, 2009; Moujahed, Gaud, & Meignan, 2007). 
25 In effect, we see five, not seven, levels because two of the abstractions (levels 1 and 3) do not 
practically appear: as MacKay (1956) demonstrates, we get no such exchanges without context which 
(per Hayek) means we see them as level 2 structures. Level 3 abstractions require a confirmation of the 
dialogic process, so are (again, per Hayek) only practically observable as level 4 structures, i.e. 
conversations.  
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Figure 2‐1 The erotetic holarchy shown at each level, from simple QA form up to communities‐
of‐knowing. 
Summarising the significance of this section for the thesis, it can be seen that 
Rescher’s community-of-inquiry (Rescher, 2004) extended to include systems as 
participants, can be modelled operationally by modelling the interactions of Gricean-
structured lower-level formalisms Grice (1975, 1978). In Chapter 7, a candidate 
formalism, the functional entity, will be proposed as a solution to the problems of 
modelling knowledge using this holarchic formalism. 
2.5.2 Typologies of QA Systems  
In this section we shall briefly examine the ways in which QA typologies have 
been described in the literature, and select the ontological basis for the particular QA 
typologies to be used for the current research. 
Pragmatically, research about QAs always involves QA typologies (Dillon, 
1984; Harrah, 2002; Wiśniewski, 1994). It is also generally recognised (Harrah, 2002) 
that QAs are not something for which there can ever be an absolute taxonomy, but 
rather a domain for which there will always be a best possible taxonomy for a purpose, 
based on the context of examination. Consequently, a challenge for the current research 
is to produce the appropriate typology, justified on theoretical and pragmatic grounds 
that can cover the space of all possible askable questions. 
In accord with the principles of knowledge representation, modelling knowledge 
requires the analysis of generalities of domains before (and independent of) their 
structure (H. Weber, 1980) : general task typing is fundamental to the construction of  
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knowledge representation systems that are rooted in human cooperation 
(Chandrasekaran, 1986b, 1987; Pask, 1972). 
2.5.2.1 Question meta-typing schemes 
There are many and varied existing QA typologies (Dillon, 1982; J. Pomerantz, 
2002), but some general meta-types can be observed. In an extensive survey of the QA 
research, Dillon (1982 p148) identifies three broad approaches to QA: theoretical 
(“setting forth formal systems, often axiomatic and symbolic, for the description and 
analysis of questions”), practical (“oriented to practitioners’ concerns and setting forth 
recommended techniques of questioning”), and empirical (“setting forth findings from 
descriptive or experimental research into the use of questions and typically relating 
these findings either to some analytic system or to some practice”). Dillon shows that 
in all of the research, there are typologies of both question and answer, and that the 
typology of questions determines the typology of answers.  
More recently, Pomerantz (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005; J. Pomerantz & Lankes, 
2003) found commonalities to all QA taxonomies on pragmatic, linguistic and 
teleological grounds. He derived a five-fold QA meta-taxonomy: 
  1.  Wh- words – i.e. the basic question indication mechanism 
  2.  Subjects of questions  
  3.  The functions of expected answers to questions  
  4.  The forms of expected answers to questions  
  5.  Types of sources from which answers may be drawn 
(J. Pomerantz, 2005 p. 10) 
For the purposes of the current research, these indicate three sources of typing: 
the question-indicating mechanism (the copula), the subject of enquiry and the nature 
of the reply.  
Case Grammar (Dik, 1989; Dirven & Radden, 1987; Fillmore, 1968, 1975) 
holds that in any sufficiently large body of discourse repeated situations will occur, and 
those situations are represented in frames in language. In conversations, case grammars 
arise autopoietically because of repeated human social interactions. For QA they arise 
from the stage-setting for QA (Chu-Carroll & Carberry, 1994; Gaasterland et al., 1992; 
Gal, 1988; Gal & Minker, 1988; Joshi, 1982): an establishment of mutual or common 
knowledge that Joshi (1982) termed squaring away, necessary before the Gricean 
maxims can operate. Establishing the purpose of the questioning and agreement as to  
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context is necessary for well-formed questions to be created (and answered) and 
therefore creates the consistency of discourse for the QA typology to emerge.
26 
Squaring away considerations regarding purpose of questioning, duties of participants 
and stage of cooperative enterprises, create a need for a cognitive map of the QA 
process (and therefore some form of typology). This is reflected in the meta-typology 
of Pomerantz. 
Dillon (1982) points out that a significant problem with meta-typing schemes in 
the field of QA is that much activity is carried out in complete separation from other 
work in the field, leading to incommensurability of published research. A case in point 
is the general QA lists from the field of logic, seemingly developed in isolation from 
the work in cognitive science. 
Harrah (2002) has assembled a QA type list which is generally referenced as the 
standard taxonomy (Peliš, 2009; Wiśniewski, 2010). It is drawn from the precedent 
literature, and thereby partakes of all three of the approaches delineated by Dillon (i.e. 
theoretical, empirical and practical): whether, yes-no, which, what, who, why, 
deliberative, disjunctive, hypothetical, conditional, and given-that.  
This list essentially fits into the first category of Pomerantz’s meta-taxonomy 
(the Wh- words).
27 It is an assemblage from practice, and while the terms may fit into 
some methodological frameworks, they are not established a priori. While using the list 
for his work, Wisniewski points out: 
The list is by no means exhaustive. One can easily add to it when, where, how ..., etc. New 
types and/or subtypes are distinguished in many theories; the terminology is not well-
established. (Wiśniewski, 2010 p. 5) 
However, as Wiśniewski (2001) notes, there is nonetheless merit in making a set 
of QA types, for using the Łukasiewicz calculus the question forms can act as functions 
in logical expressions. The completeness of a list is secondary, as a new member of the 
list can take the same role in those expressions (Wiśniewski, 1993). Although couched 
in philosophical logic, the lists prepared have the same fundamental character of 
mutability as the lists generated in cognitive science. A consequence of the 
representation is, however, that any typology (including such as might be created in the 
current research) must be describable within the calculus model it presents. 
                                                      
 
26 This is in accord with the situation logic of Barwise (1981, 1989) which requires that pre-conditions 
regarding context have to be taken into consideration before the logic of propositions (and a fortiori of 
erotetics) can be established. 
27 although it exceeds the “Wh- ” criteria strictly  
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QA formalisms complexify through the feedback, interconnection, chaining and 
concurrency with other QA structures and recontextualisation through the QA process, 
all providing a more and more powerful modelling/explaining tool for informatic 
systems. (We saw in the previous section how different QA models represented in the 
literature can be seen to emerge from less complicated ones.) However, no matter what 
their storage or formalism is, they all are informed by the erotetic principle.
28
 
These considerations suggest that what is required is an ontological typology 
that respects the nature of the object of the enquiry, the nature of the response, and the 
nature of the mechanism of enquiry. In the next section we investigate the kinds of QA 
typologies presented in the literature. 
2.5.2.2 QA typologies  
A review of the literature reveals four distinct kinds of QA typologies. We first 
consider simple typologies based on intrinsic QA semantics. The remaining QA 
typologies derive from the circumstances in which questions are asked. These extrinsic 
forms can be usefully considered in three broad categories. Firstly they can be seen as 
deriving from the process of assembly of answers determined by the domain about 
which they are enquiring – which we term here assemblage-based QA typologies. Then 
there is a class of typology deriving from the attitude or deontology of the individuals 
asking the question – behaviourally-based QA typologies. Finally there are typologies 
deriving from the point in time during a larger organisational or individual cycle – 
phase-based QA typologies. 
Table 2.6 shows the four forms of QA typologies discussed in the following 
sections, together with prominent authorities on those typologies.
                                                      
 
28 An additional complexification is that all stored questions are doubly-contextualised. Even the simplest 
piece of information will be contextualised by the circumstance in which it was created (i.e. the way in 
which it was called into being, including the purpose of that creation) and the frame of subsequent 
enquiry (i.e. the context in which the piece of information exists, and if stored, by the context of its 
storage). The act of observing creates information via an erotetic process (per MacKay, 1960), with the 
sense-data as a response to the action of enquiry, the continuing existence of the observer providing the 
context. The act of consulting an information store is another erotetic process, effectively rediscovery 
within the context of storage. It could be argued that systems are planned, filled, and used at different 
levels of abstraction.  
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Table 2.6 Emergent typing of the erotetic explicative framework 
Type  Features Authors (Listed chronologically)
Typing of simple QAs At its most simple level, the questions can be typified as:
Basic types (Aristotle) 
Is it? What is it? Which is it? What sort is it? Why is it? 
Subsidiary types (Avicenna) 
Where is it? When is it? How many? How much?
Aristotle (ca 350 BCE), Avicenna (ca 1020), Whately (1827), Prior and Prior (1955), 
Harrah (1961), Belnap (1963,1964), Aqvist (1965), Rescher (1967), Katz (1968), 
Kleiner (1970), Lehnert (1978), Hughes (1987) 
Typing of QA Behaviour Certain approaches suit organisational and individual needs Churchman (1971), Pask (1972), Mitroff and Sagasti (1973), Mitroff and Pondy 
(1974), Chandrasekaran (1986,1987), Miller (1990), Miller and Miller 
(1990,1992a,1992b,1992c,1992d,1993,1995), NSF/BL (1997,2000, 2002,2004) 
Typing of QA phases Certain periods in inquiry mandate certain QA Behaviour  Kuhn (1970), Lakatos (1970, 1979), Nolan (1973), Lyles and Mitroff (1980), 
Nersessian (1989, 1995, 2001), Lave and Wenger (1991), Thagard (1992, 
1995,1999), Cavaleri and Reed (2000,2001), Arabatzis, Ioannidou, Nersessian 
and Vosniadou (2009)
Typing of QA 
assemblages 
QA assemblages have significant features that dominate them, it 
is proper to work out a typology to permit adaptation of QA 
systems to them 
Bliss (1910; 1935a;1935b), Ranganathan (1933,1937,1937,1951), Guttman 
(1940,1944,1952,1954, 1971), Hiz (1962), Jolley (1968, 1973), Austin (1969), 
Classification Research Group (1969), Wand and Weber (1990a,1990b, 1995), 
Guarino and Poli (1995), Guarino (1998), Bowker and Star (1999), Guarino and 
Welty (2000), Svenonius (2000)  
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2.5.2.3 Simple QA typologies 
The most common typologies for QA typing are simple ones based on question 
indicators. These are generally isolated from conversations or confirmations of dialogs, 
and are based on the intrinsic qualia that the question semantics imply. Most follow the 
precedent of Aristotle’s question types or its later expansions. 
Aristotle proposed a typology of four questions: is-it, what-is-it, what-sort-is-it 
and why-is-it
29 (Aristotle, ca 350 BCE-b). Avicenna (ca 1020) later extended this to a 
set of four subsidiary questions: how, where, when and how-much (or many). 
Questions of agency, (“who did A?”) were covered in the causal answers to the why 
questions. 
The next major development on question analysis was by Whately (1827) and 
independently by Sperantia (1936), which together formed the basis for work by Prior 
& Prior (1955). Prior & Prior point out (1955 p 49) that while some of the other 
questions elaborated by Avicenna can be reduced to qualifications of terms (when = 
what time, where = what place, why = what reason etc), questions of quality, quantity, 
and modality are a different kind of typing distinction. The distinction made between 
the form of the question asked and the modality of the answer provides the basis for the 
typology of the current research. 
In informatics, a widely used QA typology is that of Lehnert (1978), developed 
using Schank and Abelson’s script
30 model (Schank & Abelson, 1975). The types were 
intentionally developed as a case grammar for comprehension of automated reading of 
stories by a computer, and sought to take into account all the kinds of questions that 
could be asked of it. 
Lehnert’s typology features 13 types of questions: 
1) Causal Antecedent 
2) Goal Orientation 
3) Enablement 
4) Causal Consequent 
5) Verification 
8) Concept Completion 
9) Expectational 
10) Judgemental 
11) Quantification 
12) Feature Specification 
                                                      
 
29 “Is A B?”, “Why is A B?”, “Does A exist?” and “What is the nature of A?” respectively. 
30 According to Schank and Abelson a script is a “structure that describes […] an appropriate sequence of 
events in a particular context. A script is made up of slots and requirements about what can fill those 
slots.” (Schank & Abelson, 1975) Lehnert’s questions are such linguistic structures.  
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6) Disjunctive 
7) Instrumental/Procedural 
13) Request 
 
Hughes (1987) points out however, that Lehnert's list combines several different 
categories and can be better represented as a hierarchical typology differentiating 
between subjects, contexts and means of answering. 
Graesser and Person (1994) extended the list to 16 items based on several years 
of application in questionnaire construction. This illustrates the logical problems that 
can arise with an assembled list of QA types. Their modified typology is: 
1. Verification  
2. Disjunctive  
3. Concept completion  
4. Example 
5. Feature specification  
6. Quantification  
7. Definition questions  
8. Comparison 
9. Interpretation  
10. Causal antecedent  
11. Causal consequence  
12. Goal orientation  
13. Instrumental/procedural  
14. Enablement  
15. Expectation  
16. Judgmental 
 
Graesser and Person’s listing abandons Hughes’s attempt to fit the QA list into 
an ontology, instead it divides the QA types into simple/shallow (1-4), intermediate (5-
8) and complex/deep types (9-16). More significantly for the current research, later 
work by Graesser’s programme (A. Graesser, Rus, & Cai, 2008; A. C. Graesser, Ozuru, 
& Sullins, 2009) determined that two extra dimensions were missing from this list: 
types of knowledge (Wisher & Graesser, 2007), and types of cognitive processes based 
on the 2001 revised Bloom taxonomy (L. W. Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001).  
That these lists are unreliable for a generalised representational formalism can 
be seen in various pragmatic assemblages compiled by others. Nielsen et al. (2008) for 
example describe the process whereby they derived the list they present: 
This question branch of our taxonomy started with the list of question types described by 
Graesser and Person (1994), adapted from Lehnert (1978). We added question types from 
Collins (1985) and Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives (1956). Then through an 
iterative process of analyzing and annotating portions of the transcripts, we revised the 
taxonomy until we felt each dialog turn was accurately and sufficiently annotated. (Nielsen, 
Buckingham, Knoll, Marsh, & Palen, 2008, p. 1)  
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Soon after came the taxonomy presented by Boyer et al. (2009) which purports 
to be a “union” of Graesser’s list described above, and of that presented in Nielsen et 
al. (2008).  
Such typologies are inherently mutable, because it is not only likely, but 
appropriate and correct, that they should change when new candidates are discovered. 
Such lists are considered contextualised workable heuristics rather than absolute 
mappings of the domain, with research actively testing language corpus repositories to 
see if other types of QA form might exist (Boyer et al., 2009; Forăscu, 2008; Forăscu 
& Draghici, 2009). However, they are not comprehensively and exclusively mapping 
out the domain of QAs, and as Morshead (1965) showed, that means that they cannot 
be candidates for supporting generalised logical schemes (a fortiori including those 
required for the current research). 
2.5.2.4 Assemblage-based QA typologies 
Assemblage-based typologies are familiar in the social sciences from the forms 
used to construct questionnaires.
31 The kinds of questions that can be asked are often 
determined to a high degree by the subject matter of the inquiry. In medicine, 
particularly epidemiology, it has been necessary to prepare specific typological systems 
for diagnosis and intervention (Bowker & Star, 1999; Svenonius, 2000). In the life 
sciences classification of specimens is likewise performed through preconfigured 
questions (Bowker & Star, 1999). Generally, the typology is assembled from a domain 
to predetermine the types of questions to be asked and the enumeration of values to be 
answered.  
Orderly retrieval of information is only achievable by the preparation of the 
possible paths taken through dialogue (Sacks et al., 1974; Sacks, Schegloff, & 
Jefferson, 1978; E. A. Schegloff et al., 1977; E. A. Schegloff & Sacks, 1969), and the 
preparation of an enumeration of answers representing the best available knowledge 
(Svenonius, 2000). With meta-disciplines such as library science and information 
science, there has been a need to create typologies of answers to navigate through pre-
established ontological and/or classification systems, combining typology with a 
levels-based structure. Influentially, Bliss (1910), Ranganathan (1937b) and Otlet 
(1934) prepared exhaustive classification systems that could locate appropriate 
                                                      
 
31 e.g. in psychology Guttmann (1940, 1950, 1954a, 1954b, 1971; 1943), and McKinney (1950, 1957, 
1966, 1969) in sociology  
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information rapidly. Bunge’s combination of universal taxonomy (M. Bunge, 1977b) 
and levels (M. Bunge, 1960) based structure has been used in information systems by 
Wand & Weber (1999; 1990a, 1993, 1995). Separately Guarino (1998a, 2006; 1995; 
2000a) has pursued a similar path in knowledge organisation 
In some instances typology construction involves “carving nature at the joints”, 
in others it involves recognizing or reifying institutional facts (Anscombe, 1958; Roy 
Goodwin D'Andrade, 1981, 1984; John R Searle, 1995). Either way there is a 
specification of a kind of question to be asked in order to elicit the appropriate answers. 
Any knowledge-seeking enquiry will have to have a question of each type in order to 
succeed. 
2.5.2.5 Behaviourally-based QA typologies 
Miller and Miller in an extended exposition (1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1992d; 
1990; 1993, 1995) show that the intent of the questioner will have a qualitative impact 
on the kind of question a particular form of words implies, with the respondent 
expecting to perceive the question in that form. Behaviourally-based QA typologies 
derive from the fact that certain approaches particularly suit organisational and 
individual needs. Churchman (1971) divided the forms of organisational inquiry into 
five kinds, based on the different approaches and epistemologies of the philosophers 
Leibniz, Locke, Kant, Hegel and Singer. He was followed in this approach by Mitroff 
(1973; 1972), and, significantly for this project, Lauer (2001). 
Library science distinguishes various kinds of enquiry depending on its purpose. 
A standard set described by a NSF/British Library survey (Ford et al., 2002; Spink, 
Wilson, Ford, Foster, & Ellis, 2002a, 2002b; T. D. Wilson et al., 2002) gives: 
orientation (seeking to discover what is happening); reorientation (seeking to check 
that the person is on the right track); reconstruction (seeking to form an opinion or 
solve a problem) and extension (seeking to build upon existing knowledge). As with 
Miller & Miller, the same individual can use the same form of words, yet their 
behavioural intention amounts to a different kind of question. 
2.5.2.6 Phase-based QA typologies 
The final typological form we identify involves temporality. Particular periods 
in inquiry mandate certain QA types to elicit answers: certain forms of question are 
only usefully asked at the end or beginning of an enquiry, depending on the degree of 
knowledge possessed.   
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In philosophy of science, askable questions depend on the position in the 
development of a discipline. For Kuhn (1970a, 1970b) the kinds of question possible to 
ask both reflect and indicate the stage in the revolutionary cycle. Lakatos (1965, 1979) 
also adopted the idea of temporally-situated and temporally-determined enquiry. 
Laudan explicitly describes scientific endeavour in terms of a question and answer 
typology based in part on what questions are answerable – empirical v. conceptual 
questions, solved, unsolved or anomalous answers (1977, 1981). 
 Wartofsky’s (1960a, 1960b, 1976) temporal account of epistemology 
emphasizes prior enquiry. Higher order questions need to be couched in declarative 
terms that are only possible to use as a result of prior learning: some sophisticated 
questions are not possible to form because of the lack of the abstractions necessary to 
form them. 
In informatics, the kinds of investigations possible in the lifecycle of systems 
development vary as well – e.g. Nolan (1973) identifies four stages of development 
which are based on the degree of prior development – a there are specific questions 
which literally make no sense when asked at the wrong stage. This kind of phase-based 
questioning follows earlier work by managerial practitioners (e.g. Churchill, Kempster, 
& Uretsky, 1969), and is present in all the current system development lifecycles: 
iterative (e.g. Bittner & Spence, 2007; Larman, 2004), agile (e.g. Beck & Fowler, 
2000; Larman, 2004; Shore & Warden, 2008), as well as agile variants (e.g. Naranjo-
Bock, 2012; Schwaber, 1995). Many KM approaches emphasise stage-based enquiry 
(e.g. Cavaleri & Reed, 2000, 2001; Durrant, 2001; Thierauf, 1999; Vestal, 2005) as do 
organisational learning methodologies (e.g. Dixon, 2000; Fiol, 1994; J. F. L. Hong, 
1999; Løkken, Kaindl, Steiner, & Kramer, 1997). 
2.5.2.7 A QA meta-typology for knowledge modelling 
For the purposes of the current research, any typology developed by assembling, 
even if informed by an understanding of case grammar, will not prove useful as it 
presents either a generic meta-level of typing (an ex ante assertion that there exist 
particular types) or an expansible low-level typing (which is effectively ad hoc 
analysis) and will not provide adequate guidance for the knowledge modelling. What 
can be made use of is the separation between the form of the question asked, the 
modality of the answer, and the resources used in answering, and this will form the 
basis for the typology used in the current research.  
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Summarising the significance of this section for the current research, it can be 
seen that typing is an inevitable concomitant of erotetic communication, and that the 
typing can occur both intrinsically (through the nature of questions and answers) and 
extrinsically (through the circumstances of their being raised). Both intrinsic and 
extrinsic typologies will always be found in a population of questions and answers 
(Rescher, 2003, p. 2). Intrinsic typologies come about as a result of the combinatorial 
processes involved in question formation. Extrinsic typologies come about because of 
the heuristics involved in those questions being answered. Both kinds of typology will 
always be present in any system where kinds of QA Pairs are significant (including the 
current research). This two dimensional consideration of QA typing will inevitably 
inform the erotetic constructs being developed, in order that they are a better fit to the 
task of modelling than purely monotonic constructs. This matter will be revisited in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 12. 
2.6  Summary 
This chapter has presented an analysis of the literature to motivate and inform 
the research. It presented literature-derived definitions and an analysis of nine major 
knowledge representation traditions to clarify the epistemological stance taken here for 
the key terms knowledge and knowledge management. Opposing a view of knowledge 
as an objectivised resource, this thesis adopts a dynamic and contextualised view of 
knowledge, located within a communitarian basis. 
Following an examination of several widely accepted problems with common 
tools and approaches in knowledge modelling, particularly mutability, multiplicity, 
representation and root metaphor, the chapter investigated a proposed alternative, 
erotetic account for KM. It then gave an account of the prior usage of erotetics to show 
its long and fruitful history either explicitly or implicitly in informatics.  
To begin to conceptualise knowledge within the new perspective this was 
followed by a consideration of the literature concerning the role of levels and 
typologies in QA research, which was drawn upon to produce a complete 
epistemological hierarchy capable of modelling knowledge from simple QA Pairs 
through emergent levels of complexity up to complete communities of inquiry. Given 
the inadequacy of extant QA typologies, this section also demonstrated the need for an 
ontological typing that recognises both intrinsic and extrinsic types that respects the 
nature of the object of the enquiry, the nature of the response, and the nature of the  
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mechanism of enquiry. This use of the literature was described in order to theoretically 
inform the development and operationalisation of the perspective and, later in the 
thesis, the framework. 
The next chapter will examine the literature on creating design artefacts to 
establish a methodology for carrying out the research.  
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Chapter 3  
 
Methodology 
 
3.1  Chapter overview 
This thesis is motivated by an open research question that follows from the 
analysis in Chapter 2: can a fruitful knowledge modelling framework be created if the 
dominant reifying metaphor based perspective for informatics is replaced with one 
based on the metaphor of questions and answers? 
The four specific research questions identified are: 
1.  Is the erotetic perspective on knowledge theoretically legitimate as a 
paradigm for metamodelling? 
2.  How can the erotetic perspective be operationalised into a framework of 
explicit constructs for knowledge modelling? 
3.  Can the erotetic perspective and its constructs seamlessly encompass 
existing knowledge representation and conceptual modelling practices?  
4.  Can the erotetic framework produce representationally adequate 
implementation designs across different situations? 
The associated design goals identified are: 
1.  A perspective based on the metaphor of questions and answers 
2.  A conceptual modelling framework operating within that perspective, and its 
four components (an ontology, a deontology, a symbology and a 
methodology) 
3.  Exemplary models created using that framework 
This chapter describes the methodology followed in this research. The Gregor & 
Jones’s (2004, 2007) design science approach to theory-artefact development is used to 
lay out a principled approach to investigate the research questions and to develop a 
new modelling framework based on a question-centric perspective.  
Firstly, Section 3.2 examines how the overarching research question can be 
expressed as design research goals, and how design science research can help deliver 
those goals. It examines the orders of design artefacts, and discusses how working with  
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secondary and tertiary artefacts requires the adoption of the Gregor & Jones approach 
to research theory artefacts (Gregor & Jones, 2004, 2007). 
Section 3.3 examines the problems with standard qualitative and quantitative 
(particularly hypothetico-deductive) approaches to evaluating modelling research. It 
adapts the existing evaluation techniques for scientific modelling (validation, 
verification, generalisation, substantiation) combined with the multi-path evaluation 
method of docking (comparing two separately developed secondary artefacts for 
congruence). To evaluate the artefacts developed in this thesis, this means that the 
principal modelling tools must be developed separately and compared, each receiving a 
separate development path. 
The criteria for evaluation are presented in Section 3.4. They chiefly consist of a 
series of sets of criteria, with the complete justification presented in full in Appendix E. 
Tertiary design artefacts require the adaptation of existing successful secondary 
design artefacts as part of their development (Tong & Siriam, 1992), accordingly 
section 3.5 identifies three established, mutable design artefacts – the ERD, SQL and 
the standard KR development methodology – to be adapted to the erotetic perspective. 
Since the Gregor & Jones approach acts as a pattern language (C. Alexander, 
1968), requiring the adaptation of an existing successful research tradition to the new 
project, the research involves the creation of criteria for, and the selection of, an 
Alexander pattern for the current project (Section 3.6).  
As docking evaluation is to be used, there is a need for two Alexander patterns, 
based on the same conceptual metaphor, and using the same metaphoric ground, but 
having representations in different modalities (sketch logic versus string logic), and 
using different kernel theories for justification (erotetic logic versus speech acts). The 
first Alexander pattern is necessary to guide the establishment of the erotetic 
perspective and design framework, and is created using the Language/Action 
Perspective (Flores, 1982) as an exemplar research tradition. The second is created 
using the Formal Language for Business Communication (S. A. Moore, 1993) to act as 
a pattern for creating the knowledge transactioning language. 
The chapter concludes (Section 3.7) with the research path sequence and outline 
of the thesis exposition based on these two patterns.  
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3.2  A methodology for developing tertiary design artefacts 
Lauer (2001) suggests that new insights for working with knowledge and 
information could emerge if the conventional perspective based on the KNOWLEDGE 
IS A RESOURCE cognitive metaphor was replaced with a new perspective based on a 
question-centric metaphor. A conceptual metaphor viewing KNOWLEDGE IS 
RESOLVED ENQUIRY supports such an erotetic perspective. This section 
investigates what kind of design artefact such a perspective can underpin both for the 
purposes of establishing a research goal, and for seeking to cast a framework of 
modelling tools and the resultant knowledge models as design artefacts in relation to 
that perspective. The argumentation of Section 1.2 is reprised here before discussing 
the design goals in more detail. 
The analysis in chapter 2 implies that an erotetic perspective can be used to 
design a modelling framework, which in turn will generate models of the world. This 
has two consequences for methodology. One is a logical dependence of the artefacts: 
the knowledge models are framed by the modelling tools used to create them, which 
are in turn framed by the perspective and its affordances (Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3‐1 Artefact dependence on enclosing frame of reference 
This leads to a logical precedence for artefact creation: the perspective must be 
created initially, in order that tools be made using the perspective’s constructs, and 
finally conceptual solutions in the shape of implementable knowledge models created 
using those tools (Figure 3.2). 
 
Figure 3‐2 The logical precedence for design creation 
Perspective Framework Knowledge model 
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 Equally, the form of knowledge models needed will inform the kind of 
framework that must be created, which will in turn determine the kind of perspective 
that will provide useful conceptualisation for satisficing the research goals.  
This interrelation of three orders of mutually informing artefacts conforms to 
Wartofsky’s model of primary, secondary and tertiary artefacts in culture (Wartofsky, 
1976). Primary artefacts are used to achieve goals directly. Secondary artefacts are 
artefacts that either describe, direct or create primary artefacts. Tertiary artefacts 
provide the background shared cognition.
32 For example, in informatics, formal logic 
and its invocation of set theory is a tertiary artefact, while the relational algebra built 
using it is a secondary artefact. A database schema written in the relational algebra 
would exemplify a primary artefact (Codd & Date, 1975; Codd & Strehlo, 1990). 
The three order artefact ontology aligns with a long-standing distinction between 
routine, innovative and creative research activity (Cagan & Agogino, 1989; Thorpe, 
1995; Tong & Siriam, 1992). Broadly speaking, creative, innovative and routine design 
activity produce tertiary, secondary and primary design artefacts respectively. 
This distinction arises from consideration both of the intended user – 
respectively a practitioner, researcher or theoriser (Tong & Siriam, 1992) and of the 
circumstances of creation – either technological application of science, normal science, 
or revolutionary science
 (sensu Kuhn 1962) (Heath, 1993; Thorpe, 1995).  
Routine design occurs when sufficient knowledge and methods exist to always 
“[directly converge] on an acceptable design with little or no search” (Tong & Siriam, 
1992). Routine design activity producing first order or primary design artefacts is by 
far the commonest, and the primary artefacts created have little or no significance 
outside their domain of application. An example of a primary design artefact is a 
custom installation of a commercial accounting package. If, however, no such package 
existed, then innovative design is required.  
Innovative design is needed where there is missing design knowledge within a 
discipline: i.e. there are no existing design affordances for problem solvers (Tong & 
Siriam, 1992). Innovative design fills this knowledge gap by creating new secondary 
artefacts, which are effectively systems for producing routine artefacts (Offermann, 
Blom, Schonherr, & Bub, 2010). Innovative design produces a shared second order or 
                                                      
 
32 This approach has been used extensively in informatic-related research such as Activity Theory (Engeström, 1990); 
distributed cognition (M. Cole, 1996), and organisational learning (Pea, 1993).  
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secondary design artefact, which describes the primary artefact destined for routine use 
(Bertelsen, 1994). Secondary artefacts have a significance for all the primary artefacts 
that are created, or could be created, with them. Designing a new generic accounting 
package in a standard programming framework is innovative design work. If, however, 
programming frameworks didn’t exist, then there would be a need for creative design. 
Creative design is needed when the underlying principles for supporting such 
missing knowledge is itself absent (Tong & Siriam, 1992). What is missing are the 
basic constructs for design, and an absence of prototypes for secondary artefact 
construction, and so a search must be made either from a new combination of basic 
constructs, or an examination of prior research programmes for a successful tertiary 
artefact creation. Creative design activity produces third order or tertiary design 
artefacts. In either case, rather than searching an infinite solution space, a bounded 
problem space is creatively explored (K. Brown & Cagan, 1996). Creative design 
research is rare, although the tertiary artefacts produced by creative design research are 
highly significant for its universe of discourse, completely dominating it for the 
lifetime of its currency. 
We now examine the implications of the three kinds of design, and the 
concomitant three kinds of design artefacts, for the current project, in terms of 
establishing goals, evaluating completed research, and intellectual reliance. 
3.2.1 Research questions and design goals 
We can see the relationship within the design goal artefacts as each framing the 
other: a creative research artefact (perspective) is used to host an innovative design 
artefact (framework), which will then be used to produce two sorts of routine design 
artefacts (conceptual models and their implementation design). Figure 3.3 shows the 
relationships among these modelling components. 
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Figure 3‐3 Relationships among the four design artefacts 
The perspective provides the philosophy of the research; the framework 
comprises the guidelines and tools established within that perspective. This framework 
will be used to create conceptual models realisable as implementation designs. As this 
occurs, any implementation designs substantiate (Section 3.5.5.2) the framework, and 
the substantiated framework in turn substantiates the perspective.  
We can operationalise the research questions by creating research goals for the 
thesis at each of these three artefact levels. These comprise the design of a creative 
tertiary artefact (the erotetic perspective), leading to and guided by a secondary 
innovative artefact set (the erotetic framework), within which a series of primary, 
routine artefacts (conceptual models) can be built.  
As artefacts, their development is managed by reference to the principles of 
Design Science (Simon, 1968,1996). There is no single accepted design science 
methodology research path (Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010a; Winter, 2008); however, 
primary design artefacts are capable of being developed using a standard design 
research methodology such as that established by Peffers & Tuuanen (Peffers et al., 
2006; Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, & Chatterjee, 2008). Secondary and tertiary 
artefacts are both classed as design theories (sensu Walls et al., 1992), and so must be 
established using a special design science research methodology, here the approach of 
Gregor & Jones (2004, 2007). 
At the core of design science research is the multi-level artefactual schema 
established by March & Smith (1995, p. 253) which includes the conceptual ladder of 
constructs ⇒ models ⇒ instantiations. Although initially stated as design goals by 
March & Smith, it has become a de facto typology (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 
2004, p. 78). There is a logical order of precedence within the research path: constructs  
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are used to create models which are implemented as instantiations. Constructs are seen 
as a language
33and models as problem-solving expressions
34 formed out of those 
languages, used to create solutions. There is a clear mapping of the constructs to the 
innovative design artefacts, and of the models and instantiations to the routine design 
artefacts. March & Smith do not, however, have a separate location for in their schema 
for creative design research. 
This present research requires artefacts to be created at all three levels: a 
perspective providing the philosophy of the research, a design framework comprising 
the guidelines and tools established within that perspective, and exemplary models 
created with those tools.  
The tools must be grounded in theory in order for them to be sufficient to their 
task, and in order that their theoretical quality meets the requirements of an IS theory 
for design and action (Gregor, 2002b). This type of theory says “how to do” 
something. It is about the methodologies and tools used in the development of 
information systems (Gregor, 2002b, p. 11). Since these design tools are going to be 
the product of design research, they are design artefacts (Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2008). 
The classic statement about artefacts being the goal of design research is in Hevner et 
al. (2004): 
The result of design-science research in IS is, by definition, a purposeful IT artifact created 
to address an important organizational problem. It must be described effectively, enabling 
its implementation and application in an appropriate domain. (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 82). 
Hevner et al. make use of the formulation of “informatic artefact” given by Orlikowski 
& Iacono (2001): 
those bundles of cultural properties packaged in some socially recognizable form such as 
hardware and/or software (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001, p. 121) 
but add 
we include not only instantiations in our definition of the IT artifact but also the constructs, 
models, and methods applied in the development and use of information systems. (Hevner 
et al., 2004, p. 82) 
The definition in Hevner et al. thereby explicitly excludes 
                                                      
 
33 For Hevner et al., this is explicitly referenced as following Schön (1983, p. 81), and in turn Schön means this sensu 
Wittgenstein (1953). For Schön, designing is playing a language game within a context, and preparing for design is 
“designing a metalanguage” 
34 For Hevner et al., this is sensu Simon (1968,1996) wherein designing is representing a problem in a problem 
solving language.  
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people or elements of organizations […and] the process by which such artifacts evolve 
over time. (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 82 emphasis added) 
Hevner’s formulation of the design artefact rules out a large amount of design 
research, yet when it is intentional, such artefact evolution is very much at the core of 
IS research (and a fortiori KM research).  
The omission of artefact evolution in the account of design artefact is significant 
not only for the current research project, but all such research projects. Working with 
Hevner et al.’s definition as it stands, IS would be in a condition of stasis. Gregor & 
Iivari (2007; 2007) point out that mutability (adaptation to changing circumstances) is a 
key attribute of successful design artefacts, and that any theoretical account of design 
artefacts must address how an artefact can be mutable in a principled way. This 
includes the consideration of what, if any, design artefacts are involved in this process 
of design mutability, and to what principles they are designed. 
Several writers (Gregor & Jones, 2007; Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2008; Markus & 
Majchrzak, 2002; Peffers et al., 2008; Winter, 2008) address this omission by making 
the useful distinction between those artefacts that that are the direct result of intentional 
activity (both designs and things produced from designs) and those artefacts that 
provide the framework for the directly intentional artefacts to be created. Walls et al. 
(1992; 2004) call for the acknowledgement of the role that meta-artefacts have as part 
of the process of creating the artefact described by others. Similarly, Offermann et al. 
(2010) call for a distinction in design science between first order objects (things 
designed or made) and second order objects (such as theories, that permit first order 
objects to be made).  
We can use this distinction to show that definition given in Hevner et al. (2004), 
and used to motivate the Peffers & Tuunanen methodology, is concerned only with a 
subset of possible design artefacts, that is, those which are the product of routine 
design. The remainder of design artefacts are those which are the product of innovative 
design, including intentionally constructed second-order design artefacts. These latter 
artefacts include both design frameworks for creating artefacts, and theoretical 
constructs for legitimising the frameworks (and a fortiori, the first order artefacts 
created with them). A comprehensive account of design artefacts must therefore extend 
Hevner et al.’s (2004) definition to include artefacts resulting from creative and 
innovative, in addition to routine, design.  
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Accordingly, we cannot use the Peffers & Tuunanen methodology for principled 
development of a perspective, but must instead use Gregor & Jones’s (2007) approach. 
This approach requires the investigator to identify within the literature a suitable 
previous piece of theory design research that can serve as a pattern for the new research 
to be undertaken. We discuss this process further in Section 3.6.  
3.2.2 Evaluation in tertiary artefact development 
A major consideration for tertiary artefact development is the challenge of 
evaluating the outcome of the research. A statement of the evaluation strategy at the 
outset of any research project is essential (Hunston, 2003); this is certainly the case for 
research design (Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010b), and even more so for tertiary artefacts, 
where conventional methods of assurance are lacking (Gero, 1996; Tong & Siriam, 
1992). Absence of a theory of theory artefact evaluation (Gregor & Jones, 2007) means 
that appropriate mechanisms for evaluation need to be established as a part of the 
research design. We shall investigate this in Section 3.3. 
3.2.3 The role of precedence in theory artefact development 
Gregor & Jones (2007) identify three ways in which precedence plays a role 
within theory artefact development: justificatory knowledge borrowed from other 
disciplines to provide a theoretical basis (Gregor & Jones, 2007 p.327), design patterns 
to guide the course of theory artefact development (2007, p. 318), and mutable 
artefacts to adapt during the course of the design (2007, p. 330). We can usefully group 
these forms of precedence together as intellectual reliance (Herbst, 1969). 
Intellectual reliance is critical for design science. All research has at its core 
intellectual reliance: intellectual achievement is cumulative and communitarian (Fuller, 
1988; Rescher, 2004), contingent on prior research (Kochen, 1987) and tribal (Becher, 
1989; Mullins, 1973), but that this is so is implicit in the practice and discourse. The 
nature of design science research, however, places features of research that are normally 
in the background in the foreground. Intellectual reliance must be explicit for design 
science research owing to its use of precedence and patterns in artefact design (Purao et 
al., 2008; Purao, Storey, & Han, 2003; Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2007).  
In designing theory artefacts the role of exemplars in creating templates for 
research is critical (Gregor & Jones, 2004), and the declaration of justificatory 
knowledge is essential (Gregor & Jones, 2007). Without the appraisal of predecessor or 
pattern being open to scrutiny, design research is reduced to the rote creation of  
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software artefacts (Iivari, 2005). 
We discuss justificatory knowledge in Section 3.2.3.1, mutable artefacts in 
Section 3.2.3.2, and design patterns in Section 3.2.3.3. 
3.2.3.1 The role of kernel theories in theory artefact development  
All design researchers rely on the work of investigators both within their fields 
and in other fields that provide the theoretical justification for the work that they do. 
Gregor & Jones call this justificatory knowledge (Gregor & Jones, 2007 p.327). 
Justificatory knowledge permits the design researcher to rely on theoretical constructs 
(theories and methods) from outside their discipline. Justificatory knowledge is present 
in the form of kernel theories
35. Kernel theories are “Theories from natural or social 
sciences governing design requirements” (Walls et al., 1992). They enable the design 
researcher to use concepts, constructs and methods that aren’t verifiable within the 
design discipline. At the start of every research project is a statement of research 
positioning (Castaneda, 2007) which states the universe of discourse in which the 
research is conducted, the disciplinarian tradition within which the research is being 
carried out, and the kernel theories that are either assumed or explicitly employed. This 
research positioning process may be mostly implicit, but cannot be so in design 
science.  
The actual discussion of the kernel theories chosen in the current is in the main 
body of the thesis in other chapters, rather than this chapter. The selection is argued for 
in those sections. The four main kernel theories employed
36 in the current research are 
erotetic logic (Harrah, 1961; Prior & Prior, 1955) which is employed in Chapters 2, 5, 
6 and 7; research librarianship (Ranganathan, 1940; Rothstein, 1955) which is 
employed in chapters 4, 6 and 12; speech acts theory (J. L. Austin, 1962; D. Hymes, 
1964; John R Searle, 1968) which is employed in Chapter 12, and category theory 
(Mac Lane, 1948; B. Mitchell, 1965) which is used in Chapters 2, 6, 7 and 9. 
We discuss the selection of kernel theories in full in Appendix E, and the set of 
criteria used in this thesis for selecting kernel theories is presented in Section 3.4.1.  
                                                      
 
35 The term kernel theory used in the literature is from Walls et al. (1992). Gregor & Jones use the term microtheory 
from Simon (1981), we are using the more common usage. 
36 Some kernel theories are always involved in academic research: bibliography, argumentation, epistemology, 
mathematical reasoning and rhetoric. Some are used in all quantitative research – theories of probability, and the 
methods of statistics. These implicit kernel theories are rarely justified as they form the body of knowledge. Instead 
what occurs is a justification for a particular school of though within the reference discipline.  
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3.2.3.2 Predecessor artefact selection in theory artefact development 
The recommended practice for creative design is to resituate an appropriate 
intellectual predecessor (Tong & Siriam, 1992). An existing reliable artefact with a 
track record of proven mutability will be able to adapt to the new design context. In 
terms of the orders described earlier, an appropriate existing secondary artefact must be 
adapted to fit in with the design principles of the new tertiary artefact.  
This adaptation will occur within the context of the research path established by 
the creation of a pattern, but there also needs to be a principled selection of which 
representation artefacts to adapt. We discuss the selection of appropriate mutable 
existing design artefacts with a view to adapting them to the new paradigm, once it has 
been constructed, in section 3.4 below. 
3.2.3.3 The role of patterns in theory artefact development 
The Gregor & Jones approach to developing secondary design artefacts is a 
pragmatic account of theory artefact development, based on the pattern/pattern-
language paradigm of Alexander (1968, 1979). A pattern is “an abstract solution to a 
restricted design problem” (C. Alexander, 1968, p. 336), while a pattern language “is a 
system which coordinates the patterns with one another [which] makes certain that the 
solutions to various projects are properly related” (C. Alexander, 1968, p. 336). In 
terms of Alexander's meta-methodology, the Gregor & Jones approach is a pattern 
language informing how the derived pattern is to be used, following Simon’s original 
conception of a science of design (Simon, 1968,1996 p.113) – “intellectually tough, 
analytic, partly formalisable, partly empirical and teachable” (cited by Gregor, 2009 
p.1).  
The pattern itself is to be drawn from intellectual predecessors in an appropriate 
domain. Gregor & Jones point out that this explicit predecessor selection is a standard 
design practice, near universal in design studies, though often downplayed in design 
science research. A pattern is a reusable generic solution to a recurrent problem in a 
design space (C. Alexander, 1968), a four-part structure that states the scope of the 
problem and its solution, the prescription as to the activity to carry out, and a 
justificatory principle.  
The pattern creation process begins with a survey of the literature to identify a 
suitable intellectual predecessor for the research undertaken (Gregor & Jones, 2007), 
which when located is used as a template for a local one-off methodology (i.e. one to  
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be used only once, for a specific purpose). By selecting a suitable intellectual 
predecessor, the pathway to a finished design is laid out, with the assurance that the 
local methodology described is appropriate and practicable. By stressing the 
importance of recognising and emulating intellectual predecessors the body of 
knowledge of the research discipline plays a stronger role, while making for a more 
flexible design methodology. 
Suitable pattern exemplars are chosen by reference to the overall aim and 
methodology of the research for which they will act as a pattern. In the case of the 
current research, we are seeking to solve a wicked modelling problem through 
investigation of, and replacement of, an existing perspective through metaphoric 
analysis, and the incorporation of a differentiating kernel theory to establish that 
perspective. Candidate patterns must therefore demonstrate a similar aim and 
methodology, although the nature of the metaphor and the kernel theory used in the 
pattern are not important. 
The pattern, once created, provides guidance for the research (Gregor & Jones, 
2007), specifically the research path to be followed, the kinds of goal artefacts that are 
needed, the points on the research path where those artefacts must be created, and the 
acceptable forms of evaluation for the research conclusions. The pattern creation 
process needs to be informed by a clearly articulated design goal, with criteria 
established before the search to justify the selection. In addition, the overall form of the 
design goal components must be clear to ensure a practicable search space. 
Gregor and Jones do not, however, explicitly describe what makes prior research 
appropriate or for a quality for consideration. In the social sciences, Camic 
demonstrated that intellectual predecessors were (ideally) chosen on the basis of “the 
fit between the arguments, concepts, themes, materials, orientations, or methods of 
certain earlier figures and some aspect(s) of the work … under study” (Camic, 1992). 
Camic’s criteria are used in the current research (at section 3.4.1) to choose the 
patterns. 
In the current research, the goals are a new perspective for the conceptual 
modelling of knowledge, and a design framework for creating those models complete 
with constructs and a diagramming system. This limits the number of possible 
intellectual predecessors to a manageable size. We establish the patterns required for 
guiding the present research in section 3.5 below.  
  75
3.3  Establishing a mechanism for evaluation 
The nature of tertiary and secondary artefacts presents special problems for 
development, particularly for evaluation of the research goals when they have been 
achieved. This section examines those problems, and discusses the evaluation strategy 
to be used for the artefacts developed in the present research. 
3.3.1 Evaluation in Design Science 
Evaluation is a vital part of the design science approach to research, as an 
artefact’s justification lies in its utility, and thorough evaluation ensures sound designs 
which are fit for purpose. This section discusses evaluation considerations in design 
science, and the approach taken throughout the development of the goal artefacts. A 
multimethodological evaluation strategy permits discussion of quantitative, qualitative 
and mixed analyses within the same framework: the way in which this can occur is 
explicitly described in this section, and then carried out in chapter 13, after the goal 
design artefacts have been built. For an evaluation to be legitimate, criteria have to be 
established and publicly accessible before use (Hunston, 2003) to avoid the equivalent 
of begging the question.  
Hevner and Chatterjee (2010b p.109) described evaluation as “the systematic 
determination of merit, worth, and significance of something (information resource, 
healthcare program) or someone”. However, while they spell out one pragmatic 
research path for evaluation (Section 3.3.2) they do not examine the theoretical 
requirements for evaluation in design science. 
Evaluation studies as a discipline, however, can provide reference theories, and 
a cognitive-linguistic account of evaluation can be used to theoretically underwrite 
Hevner and Chatterjee’s pragmatic approach to evaluation. Hunston (1989) 
demonstrated how (in experimental science) evaluation consisted of two aspects: 
establishing a frame for judgment (including a lexicon for that universe of discourse) 
and then selecting an acceptable value from within that lexicon. 
Evaluation provides a cognitive-linguistic hinge function between two concepts: 
the thing we want to evaluate, and the expression we wish to use to evaluate it 
(Hunston & Sinclair, 2005). In technical language, the qualia of the evaluation have to 
be separately identifiable in the thing considered (as an attribute) and in the lexicon of 
evaluation (as a potential value for that attribute). Again, this requires a shared world-
view that pre-exists the evaluation.  
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3.3.2 Hevner and Chatterjee's pragmatic generalisation of evaluation 
Hevner and Chatterjee (2010b) propose a pragmatic solution to the conundrum 
of generalising evaluation in design science: a design contract that affirms if a piece of 
design research has produced the expected outcome, and the extent to which that 
outcome has been successful. They express it in terms of a quasi-contractual negotiated 
set of criteria, according to which success or failure can be ascertained (Figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3‐4 The process of evaluation of artefacts (after Hevner and Chatterjee, (2010b) 
The negotiation phase establishes what matters to the user of the designed 
artefact. That negotiation gives rise to a series of problems which can be resolved 
through investigations. Since all design artefacts are produced to be used, this becomes 
a matter of establishing a form of acceptability for the outcomes of research to the user, 
to determine criteria of success or failure, or even of adequacy, before the design 
process begins. This accords with the requirement to specify the terms of the 
evaluation before its occurrence that is found in Jones’s seminal Design Methods (J. C. 
Jones, 1992), as well as the cognitive-linguistic account of evaluation (G. Thompson & 
Hunston, 2005). 
The quantitative and qualitative analyses of a theoretical design artefact 
accomplish this in the same manner, by laying out the criteria for success or failure in 
advance, and making the necessary investigations to meet those criteria. Post artefact 
development, trials and surveys are sometimes used for evaluation, these however are 
both inadequate and inappropriate for theory artefacts, which we discuss next, in 
section 3.3.3 and 3.3.4.  
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3.3.3 Higher order design artefacts: implications for evaluation 
Innovative design creates a meta-solution for a class of routine design problems 
(Tong & Siriam, 1992). A corollary of this is that secondary artefacts are normative, 
predictive, explicative and descriptive for the class of problem-solving artefacts they 
create, even though those qualities are not the same qualities as are found in natural or 
social sciences. They have no truth value per se, as they have no epistemological status 
(Iivari, 2007). They do however determine whether or not a secondary design artefact 
is correct, a quality called truthlikeness (Niiniluoto, 1993).  
This truthlikeliness means they have quasi-theoretical status, and accordingly 
have been classed as a special kind of theory construct, the design theory (Gregor, 
2002a). Design theories are shared sets of normative statements that hold universally 
for a constructed universe of discourse, and are above individual subjective judgement 
(Gregor, 2002a). Their normative status derives from their residence in World 3 (sensu 
Popper, 1979) as shared mental constructs.
37 Within the universe of discourse to which 
they apply, they provide guidance as to correct and incorrect actions and values 
(Gregor, 2002a). 
The difficulties that arise with testing design theories are due to the open 
challenge of how to test World 3 constructs (D. Miller, 2009). Even when World 3 
constructs have been validated (i.e. checked to see whether they have reached their 
design goal) and verified (ie. checked to see whether they are properly constructed), 
simply claiming confirmation by the act of substantiation (building an expository 
instantiation per Gregor & Jones, 2007) would be committing the fallacy of affirming 
the consequent. 
Gregor & Jones (2007) draw on Takeda et al. (1990), Gregg et al. (2001) and 
Hevner & March (2003) to establish a consequential approach to evaluating design 
theories: secondary artefacts serve as implications in World 3 for design theories much 
the same way that observable phenomena in World 1 serve as implications for 
scientific theories in the hypothetico-deductivist framework. They hold that: 
[t]esting theoretical design propositions is demonstrated through an 
instantiation, by constructing a system or implementing a method, or 
possibly in rare cases through deductive logic (Gregor & Jones, 2007 
p.327) 
                                                      
 
37 The three worlds of Popper and Habermas are World 1 is the shared objective reality, World 2 comprises private 
mental states and World 3 is shared mental states (Habermas, 1981; Popper, 1979).
  
  78
However, such instantiations (even in the best case outcome) still affirm the 
consequent, and the problems facing hypothetico-deductivism remain. Moreover, some 
form of evaluation must be completed before secondary artefacts are created. There is 
no reason to proceed to the secondary artefact creation phase of the research if there is 
not ex ante a reasonable expectation of success. In the absence of such an expectation, 
there would be no point in proceeding, and it is appropriate to establish what criteria 
would serve as part of an ongoing evaluation process (International Council for 
Science, 2002) to confirm the adequacy of design theories before they are employed.  
Accordingly, secondary and tertiary artefacts require different mechanisms for 
development and evaluation from first order artefacts (Gregor & Jones, 2007) since 
their telos (i.e. their ultimate design purpose) cannot be non-theoretically specified. 
Because the telos is an abstract, development must be carried out following a path that 
reduces risk of failure for the particular cases presented. This is in part mitigated by the 
use of a design contract – that is, by setting up itemised design goals and criteria for 
success and failure. 
3.3.4 Considerations in evaluating design frameworks 
Modelling tools in IS design science are a form of meta-model (Iivari, 2003), 
and meta-models (as secondary artefacts) must be evaluated for the entirety of their 
specified domain (Gregor & Iivari, 2007). This compounds the problem of evaluating 
theory artefacts since the specified domain will always be effectively infinite.  
For a set of conceptual modelling tools, this is made more complex still because 
of the profound problem of evaluating conceptual models themselves. Oreskes et al. 
(1994) argue that models are intellectual constructs that make a claim to be a faithful 
representation of the world but to demonstrate that claim again risks the fallacy of 
affirming the consequent. Moreover in an ethical dimension, models impinge on 
everyday life, by providing the basis for the built and designed environments, and by 
forming the basis of both long-term policies and short-term decision-making. Despite 
this importance, they do not offer themselves up for analysis except by their eventual 
outcome (Oreskes, Shrader-Frechette, et al., 1994). This problem is greater still for 
claims of fidelity for modelling systems, which essentially attest to the plausibility of 
all models built within them, but again do not readily offer themselves up for testing 
(Refsgaard & Henriksen, 2002).   
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Landmark papers about quality in conceptual modelling do not address this 
issue: Lindland et al. (1994) and Teeuw & Van den Berg (1997) both list criteria for 
the quality of conceptual models, but they are chiefly concerned with the fidelity of the 
models not their validity (as per Pace & Sheehan, 2002). The current standard 
reference for evaluation of conceptual modelling systems – Burton-Jones et al. (2009) 
– also explicitly restricts itself to empirical rather than analytic evaluation.  
Galliers and Land (1987) found a strong belief within the IS community (still 
apparent in some quarters) that using empirical evaluation supports the status of IS as a 
scientific discipline, and this belief lies behind the drive to place empirical methods as 
the prime mechanism for a research methodology. It is this belief in quantitative 
evaluation that drives much UML-style modelling research (e.g. Burton-Jones & Meso, 
2002; A. Evans, France, Lano, & Rumpe, 1999; Krogstie, 2003; Odell, Bauer, & Van 
Dyke Parunak, 1999). However, such an approach is untenable in establishing a 
conceptual modelling system for knowledge systems. There are ethical, 
methodological and pragmatic problems which preclude those approaches here, 
described next prior to consideration of what standard forms of evaluation can be used 
for a modelling system. 
3.3.4.1 Ethical considerations 
Because of potential adverse side effects, ethical considerations rule out the 
traditional milieux for trials (student populations and cooperative business 
organisations) when new theoretical constructs are being developed in IS. The 
concomitant effects of using a potentially erroneous or incomplete perspective or 
framework are non-trivial (B. C. Stahl, 2004, 2008) whether for training or design. 
Wide scale trials or implementations are ruled out. Instead, it is appropriate for the 
investigator to carry out some form of reflective or participatory action research (Eden 
& Huxham, 1996; Huxham, 2003), which allows for critical development at the same 
time as the research becomes established, and is both logically and temporally prior to 
any trials. 
A similar problem has been recognised in the expert systems literature. 
Generally expert systems are used in situations, such as medical diagnosis, where 
decision reliability is critical (D. E. O'Leary, 1987, 1991), so validation before use is 
the only acceptable scenario. 
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3.3.4.2 Methodological considerations 
With the creation of theoretical structures there are methodological problems for 
the use of trial/survey methods, an approach best suited for hypotheses whose 
consequences are measurable. 
The first problem follows from the kinds of hypothesis that can be tested. 
Design science artefacts are measured according to their utility (March & Smith, 
1995), and while utility of physical artefacts such as bridges can be measured, the 
utility of a design system itself cannot be measured in such a way (A. Brooks, Roper, 
Wood, Daly, & Miller, 2008). Moreover, secondary and tertiary artefacts are 
intentionally one-off processes designed for research, not for repeatability. 
A second problem is with the hypothetico-deductivist approach itself. What a 
trial/survey process in fact does is establish a rival hypothesis to the theory being tested 
(Quine, 1951), and that hypothesis in turn has to be tested. Moreover, every hypothesis 
has a host of unacknowledged sub-hypotheses, each of which could account for a given 
finding (Allix, 2003; K. D. Miller & Tsang, 2010). 
When testing theories, the investigator has to establish criteria of success or 
failure internally before proceeding, and regardless of the presence or absence of trials, 
criteria are needed for them. To test the validity of a perspective, a number of 
supporting hypotheses would also have to be tested, with the possibility of infinite 
regress. 
3.3.4.3 Pragmatic considerations 
There are also pragmatic problems with the trial/survey mechanism: there is no 
way of knowing beforehand if the proposed representative techniques will work, but 
some criteria must be used to establish plausibility (i.e., whether or not they should 
work, other things being equal).  
In IS development for a conceptual model there needs to be an appraisal of the 
design artefact before use. Shanks et al. (2003) propose that the correct way to validate 
a conceptual model is by its fit with an ontological framework. This is not a task that 
can be left until the point where empirical studies can be used; it has to be established 
with all the stakeholders before design itself happens. Shanks’ argument suggests 
looking for a theoretical agreement with a preconceived conceptual framework (a call 
for explanatory coherence). This is in fact a pragmatic variant of the ethical side- 
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effects problem discussed above – by the time a design is implemented, it would be too 
late to investigate whether or not the design precepts hold. 
With simulations (which can be considered as advanced conceptual models) the 
process of empirical validation is actually impossible until after the simulation has 
been run, often (for long term forecasts) well after they have been run (Naylor, 
Burdick, & Sasser, 1967; Naylor & Finger, 1967; Naylor, Wallace, & Sasser, 1967). 
These aren't unfortunate side-effects of some situations, but are fundamental problems 
with any non-trivial simulations
38 (Kleindorfer & Ganesan, 1993; Kleindorfer, O'Neill, 
& Ganeshan, 1998). Empirical validation is seen as a question-begging usage of a 
“logical positivist viewpoint” (Turnley, 1995),  
Moreover, it is not possible to have complete validation over the space of 
possible situations (Scarborough, 2011 p. 3), neither it is possible to validate a 
conceptual modelling system for all of the things in the world (Knuuttila, 2011). 
Alternative strategies are needed for any system that can result in the combinatorial 
creation of artefacts (Newell, 1981). This is particularly significant for the current 
research, since a conceptual modelling framework (and a fortiori a modelling 
perspective) has to cover all situations. 
3.3.5 Alternative evaluation mechanisms 
The considerations outlined in Section 3.3.4 demonstrate the impossibility for a 
simple trial-and-analysis methodology to work with establishing a novel framework for 
designing artefacts. However, the same problems have challenged the disciplines of 
expert systems and simulations – both of them forms of modelling. Since the 
perspective and framework are metamodels, it is legitimate to investigate what 
remedies have been found for these problems in those disciplines, and establish criteria 
for the current research on that basis. 
3.3.5.1 Validation and verification 
Modelling literature provides technical distinctions in the matter of 
confirmation-as-justification. A model has to be verified, validated and substantiated 
before it can be considered reliable (T. J. O'Leary, Goul, Moffiit, & Radwan, 1990). 
                                                      
 
38 This problem is compounded with the more nebulous variables found in Human, Social, Cultural, and Behavioural 
(HSCB) simulations used in social, political and military modelling (Schmorrow et al., 2009; Tolk et al., 2010), as 
what counts as the "initial conditions" or the bounded rationality for many of these simulations is in effect what is 
being investigated.  
  82
Boehm (1979) established the terms for software development: verification establishes 
truth of the system to its specifications, validation the use of system for its purpose
39, 
immortalised by the adage “verification is building the thing right, validation is 
building the right thing”. 
Verification and validation of conceptual models before implementation is vital 
to avoid costly mistakes as well as missed opportunities (Kleindorfer & Ganesan, 
1993; Shanks, Nuredini, et al., 2003). It is not ethically acceptable to proceed with use 
of a design artefact until verification and validation have been accomplished. 
A modelling framework can be considered both as a knowledge representation 
system and a theory artefact. Accordingly, we can see that it must be successfully 
evaluated as both. Gregor & Jones (2004, 2007) specify a set of core attributes required 
for an artefact to be considered a design theory. A successful modelling theory must 
possess all of those attributes. Representational adequacy can be determined by using 
the criteria established by Bench-Capon (1990), Reichgelt (1991), and Bingi et al 
(Bingi, Khazanchi, & Yadav, 1995). Accordingly, in modelling knowledge, validation 
is carried out by checking for theory artefact sufficiency and representational 
adequacy. The complete validation criteria sets used in this thesis are laid out in the 
section 3.4.2. 
Verification of a knowledge model is carried out by checking for its well-
formedness, which can be operationalised by examining explanatory coherence (Allix, 
2003). Allix supports what is called the coherence justification for knowledge, which 
underwrites the principle of coherence in evaluation theory noted earlier. Coherence 
justification involves looking for super-empirical virtues that good theories possess: 
These virtues entail considerations of simplicity, consistency, conservatism, comprehensiveness, 
fecundity, explanatory unity, refutability, and learnability, which collectively constitute features 
of coherence justification (Allix, 2003).
40 
A coherence justification is especially applicable to theoretical frameworks in 
IS: Design Science predicates the growth of design science theories on the backs of 
core theories from other disciplines. Although sometimes portrayed as a weakness (e.g. 
Benbasat & Zmud, 2003) it is, however, the opposite – Rescher (1979) draws a 
comparison with Simon’s (1962) structures of complexity, pointing out that this 
                                                      
 
39 Boehm derived the terms from the Latin: veritas for truth and validas for worth (Boehm, 1979, p. 3) 
40 It is interesting to note that these are similar in requirement to the core values of content analysis in Grounded 
Research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967): “objectivity, intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, 
generalisability, replicability, and hypothesis testing”(Neuendorf, 2002).  
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interlinked nature of knowledge precepts is in fact what makes all conceptual 
frameworks resilient, using the term coherentism for the justificatory approaches to the 
formation and retention of theoretical knowledge in networks. Establishing a new IS 
perspective will involve dependence on a number of other theoretical frameworks, as 
well as general principles that are part of the worldview of the participants, in just the 
manner suggested by Nygaard and Sorgaard (1985). 
The coherentist approach to the nature of theoretical structures is above all 
pragmatic, matching a key requirement of design science research (R. Cole, Purao, 
Rossi, & Sein, 2005; Göran Goldkuhl, 2008): within Allix’s set of super-empirical 
values a number of the values (especially those of comprehensiveness, fecundity and 
learnability) make for the requisite utility of the theory as a design science artefact.  
Although the methodological problems remain in using a trial as verification of 
a perspective, they can be dealt with by having a formal stage in the methodology that 
looks for coherence of the perspective. The problems of confirmation can therefore be 
met by establishing the expectations of research within that framework in advance, 
(including examining utility) as a test for generalisability. As with the response to the 
ethical problems discussed in the previous section, the solution lies in a process of 
verification, but again a mechanism for establishing a perspective with explanatory 
coherence is needed. This is articulated in Section 3.4.3. 
3.3.5.2 Substantiation 
Pragmatics demands that there be not only a careful consideration of the 
coherence of any design science theoretical artefacts before their use, but it also 
requires some degree of subsequent examination and review of the capabilities of the 
system before full usage in implementation.  
When a model (or modelling system) has been finalised, there still remains the 
task of seeing if it can deliver on expectations before it is used professionally for the 
purposes for which it was created. The criterion of substantiation relates to whether or 
not the modelling when employed can yield useful results (T. J. O'Leary et al., 1990). 
Substantiation of a model consists of showing that it can be used for implementation. 
Modelling systems that are not substantiated remain theoretical abstracts: they 
may meet stipulated design parameters and be coherent and yet not relate to the 
universe of discourse they are supposed to model. Since the plenum of modelling 
situations can never be exhaustive of a modelling framework, we can see that, for a  
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theory artefact at least, substantiation must be through a Gregor & Jones style 
expository instantiation which is non-hypothetical. 
DeJong (1979), distinguishes opposing operations of prediction and 
substantiation: the model predicts behaviour, which substantiation – the observation of 
the world – permits us to check. This matches the design contracts proposed by Hevner 
and Chatterjee (2010b) and implies the prediction → design → substantiation realised 
through an expository instantiation. Unless expectations are met, and the contract 
fulfilled, the theory artefact lacks justification in this regard. 
3.3.5.3 Generalisation 
Schrank and Holt (1967) add a fourth, extrinsic, validation mechanism, 
generalisation.
41 As a significant feature of any proposed theoretical structure 
generalisation concerns an important additional dimension, that of looking for generic 
utility. It fits well into the drive for utility at the core of design science: a design 
science theory must have repeatability and generalisability to be of any use (Walls et 
al., 1992). This means we can add it as a fourth task (to validation, verification and 
substantiation). Deriving from Schrank and Holt’s (1967) account we can consider 
generalisation as a matter of assessing transferability of the theoretical apparatus from 
the circumstances of investigation to other circumstances. This matches closely the 
response of Allix (2003) to the methodological problem above, in finding a coherentist 
justification for a theoretical structure. Generalisation criteria are factored into the 
coherence criteria used in this thesis, in Section 3.4.3. 
3.3.5.4 Accreditation 
The previously discussed evaluation tasks – validation, verification, 
substantiation, and generalisation – involve observation by the practitioner of both 
intrinsic and extrinsic attributes of the theory artefacts. A clear alternative route to 
justification is the involvement of design peers and domain experts in discussion 
regarding the quality of those artefacts. The same criteria are up for discussion, what is 
different is the conversation regarding those criteria. 
In the early 1990s, the mechanisms for the testing of US DoD military 
simulations were expanded to include a formalisation of the process of the human-in-
the-loop (D. S. Hartley, 1997) to make sure that the final simulation was appropriate to 
                                                      
 
41 also called external validation (Brewer, 2000)  
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the use intended. This formalisation included review by peers (Pace, 1993a, 1993b) and 
“subject-matter experts” i.e. people with domain knowledge (Pace & Sheehan, 2002), 
and was formalised as accreditation. Results from the accreditation process would lead 
to modification of either the assumption, the modelling mechanism or the set of input 
parameters, or in extreme cases, abandonment of the model altogether.  
Although the DoD formalisation was intended for numerical simulations (US 
Department of Defense, 1992), validation mechanisms for numerical simulations are 
expandable to all models (Oreskes, Belitz, & Shrader-Frechette, 1994; Sterman, Rykiel 
Jr, Oreskes, Belitz, & Shrader-Frechette, 1994), and (as meta-models) modelling 
frameworks. This means we can add accreditation as a fifth form of justification to 
verification, validation, substantiation and generalisation. Accreditation is a matter of 
presenting research to peers and subject-matter-experts with a view to incorporating 
feedback and improving the model. 
Within the confines of tertiary artefact development, accreditation is less 
applicable, because of the heavy cognitive burden that acquaintance with an unknown 
perspective places upon the accreditor (Harmon & Youngblood, 2008). Model 
accreditation generally occurs within a shared framework. What can be accredited of a 
framework is the legitimacy of kernel theory usage and of adaptation of existing 
mutable structures for consistency (Balci, Nance, Arthur, & Ormsby, 2002). 
Accordingly, presentation of work in progress at conferences and workshops for peer 
review is a suitable way of attaining a form of accreditation for tertiary and secondary 
artefacts (Hillestad, Huber, & Weiner, 1992). 
The accreditation process is discussed further in Chapter 13. 
3.3.5.5 Docking 
An additional mechanism for ongoing evaluation of secondary artefacts can be 
drawn from the modelling literature, that of docking (Axtell, Axelrod, Epstein, & 
Cohen, 1996). Docking occurs when two models, developed in parallel from the same 
assumptions using different methods or modes, are checked for congruence and mutual 
encompassing (Bontemps & Mizon, 2003; Hendry, 2011). The equivalent in the social 
sciences (triangulation) uses multiple observers to minimise observational distortion 
(Denzin, 1970). Eisenhardt (1989) also shows that multiple data collection through  
  86
different methodologies “provides stronger substantiation of constructs and 
hypotheses” (Eisenhardt, 1989 p.538).
42 
Docking was developed because of some intrinsic problems in modelling: many 
models are not capable of direct confirmation by quantitative and qualitative means, 
either through the nature of their subject (e.g. modelling climate change) or of their 
scope (e.g. complexity of massively parallel systems). In such cases docking (Axtell et 
al., 1996) is appropriate. Models can be evaluated through the process of creation of 
separate models using different mechanisms, and potentially by separate non-
communicating teams (Axtell et al., 1996). Axtell’s concern was “alignment of 
computational models", and establishing their areas of equivalence. His group’s work 
showed that congruence between two separately developed models when simulations 
were run went some way towards demonstrating the validity of the modelling 
assumptions, the modelling framework and the conclusions.
43  
Multi-method docking has been widely used, including for testing organisational 
modelling frameworks developed by single practitioners (Burton, 2003). It operates by 
comparing two separately developed yet equally principled modelling systems, which 
are evaluated individually and their descriptive outcomes compared. The critical factor 
in the docking process by a sole practitioner is the demonstrable separateness of the 
two models to be compared. In the case of meta-models being docked, what is required 
is a methodologically separate research path leading to the point of docking. That 
means starting from the same basis, two modes of representation derived from different 
philosophical traditions must be used to demonstrate the conclusion. 
Hendry’s group at Oxford (Florens, Hendry, & Richard, 1996; Hendry, 1988; 
Hendry & Mizon, 1998) developed the notion of encompassing to check for 
congruence of models – a researcher could derive confirmation from the models of 
other researchers legitimately if all the successes of other systems could be fitted 
within the new modelling framework. This means that all constructs, means of 
combining constructs (i.e. expressions written using them), and models must be 
                                                      
 
42 This may be compared with Whewell’s principle of Consilience of Inductions (Whewell, 1840, vol. 2 p. 65) in 
in ex post evaluation. 
43 Following Hesse (1966), we can argue for a common analogical relation between modelling frameworks as models 
and the perspective on which they are based: this means that (if the modelling frameworks are complete over the 
perspective) they must be mutually analogical. In turn, all derived conceptual models made with those frameworks of 
the same modelling situation must also be mutually analogical. This double mutually analogical relation can provide 
a form of confirmation of the principled nature of the perspective through analogical reasoning.  
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explicable. If two models or meta-models are congruent and mutually encompassing – 
i.e. each encompasses the other – they can be said to have docked.  
Setting up the criteria for docking, so that we can claim that two generated 
modelling frameworks are mutually encompassing and congruent, can be done here in 
terms of representational adequacy for Knowledge Representation formalisms, 
including criteria such as well-defined semantics, epistemic adequacy and notational 
convenience, are described in section 3.5. 
3.3.6 Temporal aspects of evaluation: ex ante, in medias res, and ex 
post 
Naylor et al. (1967) propose a multi-methodological approach whereby three 
different forms of verification are appropriate at different stages of research – an a 
priori examination at the outset, a capability assessment when established, and 
validation through empirical means as the last stage of establishment. They further 
propose that this stage-related validation process would be applicable to other 
situations outside economic simulation, including the development of frameworks 
similar to the current research. This coincides with the different types of validation task 
outlined by O'Leary et al. (1990) as mentioned above. We can see that these 
considerations point to a temporal aspect to evaluation, which underlies Hevner & 
Chatterjee’s (2010b) design contracts. 
There are three temporal styles of evaluation (Anthony E. Boardman, Mallery, 
& Vining, 1994; Anthony E Boardman, Vining, & Waters, 1993): ex post (after-the-
fact), ex ante (before the fact) and in medias res
44 (ongoing, either periodic or 
continuous).
45 Quantitative and qualitative approaches to evaluation are all ex post 
(EP) evaluation, and they can at best confirm an established artefact design or require 
its modification (Klecun & Cornford, 2005; Pries-Heje, Baskerville, & Venable, 2008). 
The process of design requires ex ante (EA): design requires an evaluative mechanism 
long before qualitative or quantitative appraisals can be made
￿  (Klecun & Cornford, 
2005; Pries-Heje et al., 2008). A principled research path must enable in medias res 
(IMR) evaluation at gateways at the end of each major phase in order that the final 
                                                      
 
44 The term is borrowed by cost-benefit analysis from literature, but erroneously. Baker (2001) points out that “in 
medias res” is only apt for a process that was started by another agency, and finished by that agency. The correct 
expression is “in mediis rebus”, but unfortunately the term “in medias res” is enshrined in legislation and unlikely to 
be fixed. 
 
45 Boardman et al. (Anthony E. Boardman et al., 1994) add a fourth kind of evaluation, relative between ex ante and 
in medias res, or between ex post and in medias res. It is not relevant for design evaluation.  
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prototype is worthwhile when it is testing as a completed artefact (Stoops & Beghin, 
2010; UNICEF, 1991; Vlăsceanu, Grünberg, & Pârlea, 2007; M. Williams & Williams, 
2004). 
Self-evidently this three way distinction is arbitrary, a design process can have 
checkpoints anywhere on the research path, but there are critical positions that will 
have greater significance for the researcher (M. Williams & Williams, 2004). For 
example, we can identify EA and and EP checkpoints at the start and finish of the 
research process’s core elaborative phase (Pries-Heje et al., 2008; M. Williams & 
Williams, 2004).  
Moreover, the process of evaluating secondary artefacts is in part EA, as only 
potentially successful candidates are worth testing EP. The effort involved in taking 
prototypes to the point of testing requires a recurrence of the EA evaluation long before 
the prototyping stage (Pries-Heje et al., 2008). Accordingly, evaluation becomes less of 
a single process as portrayed in standard qualitative and quantitative approaches, and 
more of a parallel research path (Vlăsceanu et al., 2007). 
3.3.7 Distributed evaluation of tertiary artefacts 
The temporal aspects of evaluation discussed in section 3.3.6 suggest that 
different forms of validation are appropriate to different stages of research. Following 
O'Leary et al. (1990) we can identify these stages as spanning a process of verification 
in artefact construction through to substantiation via implementations. The parallel 
nature of evaluative tasks is an underlying principle of Technical Action Research 
(TAR) (R. Wieringa & Moralı, 2012; R. J. Wieringa & Heerkens, 2008), where the 
roles of researcher, developer and evaluator are logically separate, while their activities 
are necessarily concurrent.
46 The logical separation of the tasks can inform the 
concurrency of tasks for a sole practitioner researcher. 
EA evaluation is necessary when establishing kernel theories, and setting up 
design contracts. EP evaluation is appropriate for consideration of the substantiations, 
with IMR evaluation required before the secondary artefacts are created, and before 
docking can occur. This means that a process of distributed evaluation, which we call 
distributed justification, must occur, although the reporting of it is kept to one point of 
                                                      
 
46 TAR itself cannot be used directly for the current research as it is concerned with primary artefact design, and is 
client-focussed in its evaluative strategy. The argumentation for TAR does however hold for design in general, and a 
fortiori tertiary design.  
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the thesis (as research report) in order that the narrative of the research is kept clear: 
evaluation is a necessary, but parallel, component of the research. 
For the current research, a number of separate but interlocking processes – 
verification, validation, substantiation, generalisation, docking of concomitant 
structures – must occur in order to achieve a reasonable expectation of overall 
justification. 
Design artefact verification should seek explanatory coherence (following 
Shanks et al., 2003; Allix, 2003 and Kleindorfer & Ganeshan, 1993). Ex ante 
validation is accomplished through examining representational adequacy (following 
Bench-Capon, 1990 and Reichgelt, 1991) at the perspective and the construct level. 
Further validation is achieved through substantiation via expository 
implementation of the design artefact by the investigator (following amongst others the 
precepts of O'Leary (1987) and O'Keefe et al. (1987), and in conformance with Gregor 
& Jones (2004, 2007)), as practitioner action research on specifically chosen 
knowledge modelling projects (following Eden & Huxham, 1996; Huxham, 2003).  
Parallel to this are the two anchoring processes of design artefact generalisation 
(following Schrank & Holt’s (1967) call for generic utility), and design artefact 
accreditation (following Pace’s (1993b) call for accrediting conversations with design 
peers and subject experts). 
By using mutually assured confirmation through the process of docking 
independently established modelling frameworks (following Axtell et al, 1996), a 
principled ex ante form of analysis can be established that warrants the production of 
trial artefacts for accreditation, and eventually other external evaluations, such as field 
testing and client oriented studies, as the final phase of TAR recommends. 
3.4  Research milestones and sets of criteria 
As we have seen in Section 3.3, this research is being conducted using 
evaluation through validation, verification, generalisation and docking, in addition to 
substantiation through expository instantiation. Additionally, it is using kernel theories 
for the research, and is making using of exemplars to provide Alexander patterns to 
guide the research.   
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This is to be accomplished following the approach to evaluation of Hevner and 
Chatterjee (2010b), wherein a design contract is established before the design is carried 
out and a set of criteria enumerated to confirm that the design goals have been reached. 
These criteria must be established in a transparent and principled manner, 
although the exposition of their establishment is orthogonal to the main research. 
Accordingly, this exposition is placed in Appendix E. This section will give an account 
of the milestones in the research, and the criteria used for reviewing or auditing each 
milestone. 
As well as the distributed justification throughout the research, there are several 
critical points of verification, validation and generalisation wherein a portion of the 
design contract will be evaluated.  
•  On the selection of the kernel theories for research in Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 12, 
(Set of criteria in section 3.4.1) 
•  In Chapters 9 and 12, on the exposition of the symbologies (Criteria set in 3.4.2) 
•  In Chapters 6 and 7, on the establishment of the framework (with ontology and 
deontology) (Sets of criteria in 3.4.3 and 3.4.4) 
•  In Chapter 10, on the exposition of the methodology (Criteria set in 3.4.3) 
•  In Appendices E and F, on the selection of the research exemplars, (Sets of 
criteria in 3.4.2, 3.4.4 and 3.4.6) 
•  In Chapter 13, on docking of the symbologies (Set of criteria in 3.4.5) 
Such a process is analogous to the familiar pre- post- and ongoing 
implementation reviews in software development. These sets of criteria are all 
appraised in Chapter 13 .This section will now give an account of each checklist. 
3.4.1 Criteria for kernel theory selection 
These sets of criteria are used for selection of a kernel theory, and are taken 
from Schiller and Mandviwalla (2007), who described the selection of kernel theories 
for design research. They are discussed in full in Appendix E.  
To enable comparison with the other sets of criteria in the current research they 
have been divided into two sets: one set serves to determine whether or not the kernel 
theory is sufficiently coherent to act as a theoretical underpinning for the research 
(Table 3.1), and the other determines the suitability of a kernel theory for the current 
research (Table 3.2).  
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The first set of criteria is concerned with the nature of the theory independent of 
its role in underpinning the current research. The two criteria are super-empirical 
values designed to check if the kernel theory is part of a vital research tradition with 
explicative power, and whether or not it in turn is based on explicit theoretical 
principles. Criteria are given in Table 3.1: Coherence Criteria for Kernel Theory 
Selection. 
 
Table 3.1 Coherence Criteria for Kernel Theory Selection 
Criterion  Questions to ask 
Robustness of kernel theory  Is it part of a cumulative tradition with explanatory power?
Quality of kernel theory  Does the kernel theory demonstrate the attributes of principled 
research?
The other set of criteria investigates the congruence of the kernel theory and the 
current research, in order to determine suitability. The criteria are given in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Congruence Criteria for Kernel Theory Selection 
Criterion  Questions to ask 
Similarity of objectives  Is the theory descriptive, normative, prescriptive, and/or 
developmental?
Appropriateness to the design 
research  Is the theory appropriate to the phenomena being studied? 
Causal structure of kernel theory  Are the kernel and design theories similar in terms of the causal 
relationship between factors and design objectives?
Similarity of perspective 
Is the perspective similar in terms of social setting, organizing 
concepts, dynamics of technical diffusion, technology, and 
workplace ideology?
 
If a kernel theory satisfies these criteria, then it is adequate to underpin a 
research program. The completed checklist for the kernel theories used in the current 
research (Reference Librarianship, Inquiry Dynamics, and Speech Acts theory) are 
given in Appendix E, Table E.1. 
3.4.2 Criteria for representational adequacy 
This set of criteria is used to assess whether or not a knowledge representation 
scheme is representationally adequate for the domain it is being used to represent. It 
derives from Bench-Capon (1990) and Reichgelt (1984). It is discussed fully in  
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Appendix E. This set of criteria is used in three places: for auditing the two Alexander 
pattern exemplars, and for the artefacts developed in the current research. 
Table 3.3 Criteria for Representational Adequacy 
Level  Criterion  Questions to ask 
Logical Level  Well‐defined semantics Does every valid expression in the 
representation have one and only one 
interpretation?
Compositionality  Can the meaning of a complex expression be 
determined on the basis of the meanings 
of the simpler expressions that make up 
the complex expression, and the way in 
which they have been syntactically 
combined?
Sound inference rules If the information that is explicitly stored in 
the knowledge base is true, then will the 
implicit information that can be retrieved 
using the inference rules be true as well? 
Heuristic adequacy  Is the representation itself capable of 
expressing the reasoning that is gone 
through in solving a problem? 
Uniformity  Is all knowledge of a given type represented 
in the same way?
Declarative representation Are the meanings of the statements 
independent of the use made of them? Are 
the representations referentially 
transparent?
Epistemological level  Relevance  Is the representation relevant to the universe 
of discourse which it serves? 
Metaphysical adequacy Are there any contradictions between the 
facts that we wish to represent and our 
representation of them?
Epistemic adequacy Does the representation provide us with the 
ability to express the facts that we wish 
to express?
Naturalness of 
Expressiveness 
Do the possible organisations of the 
representations match up with the 
potential organisation of the knowledge? 
Modularity   Is the representation system adequately 
changeable to match the kinds of changes 
possible in the knowledge to be stored? 
Granularity  Does the granularity of representation match 
the granularity found in the knowledge to 
be represented?
Alignment with the 
conceptual level 
Does the representation system support 
whatever actual primitives one chooses 
at the conceptual level?
Conceptual level  Conciseness  Is the principle of parsimony observed, both 
for notation and inferences? 
Notational convenience Is the notation system convenient to use in 
practice? 
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Level Criterion Questions to ask 
Clarity of Expressiveness Is the representation amenable to 
understanding by people, even those 
who may not be entirely immersed in the 
particular representation formalism?
 
3.4.3 Coherence criteria for an informatic research tradition 
This criteria set looks at the superempirical virtues necessary for a research 
tradition within informatics. It is based on the general notion of a research tradition 
proposed by Jacob (1987), as discussed in Appendix B, and on the coherentist account 
of truth (Allix, 2003). This set of criteria is also used in three places: for auditing the 
two Alexander pattern exemplars, and for examining whether an ex ante account based 
on them can be made for the perspective and framework being established in the 
current research. 
Table 3.4 Criteria set for informatic research tradition 
Criteria  Questions to ask 
Simplicity  Does it present a simplified account of the world that permits clear 
descriptions, explanations and predictions? 
Consistency  Does it maintain a consistent usage of terms and constructs across the 
entire exposition and usage?
Conservatism  Does it preserve as much as possible of previously existing knowledge and 
practice, or give a useful alternative account of how that knowledge or 
practice came to be?
Comprehensiveness  Does it cover all the instances and situations in the universe of discourse 
with which it is concerned
Fecundity  Can it produce new and useful descriptions, explanations and predictions?
Explanatory unity  Does it present a single set of explanatory principles that unifies diverse 
phenomena in the universe of discourse? 
Refutability  Does it make statements and predictions that can be tested/refuted?
Learnability  Does it give an easy system of explanation, a small set of simple rules to 
apply? 
 
 
3.4.4 Completeness criteria for Gregor & Jones theory artefact 
sufficiency 
This set of criteria determines whether or not an artefact has all of the attributes 
Gregor & Jones (2004, 2007). Presence of all of these attributes for an artefact is a 
sufficient condition for that artefact to be considered a theory artefact. This is discussed 
in full in Appendix E.  
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The set of criteria is used several times throughout the research: to demonstrate 
the theoretical adequacy of the perspective in the current research, to establish that the 
design theories in the exemplars are complete templates, and to establish the theoretical 
adequacy of the two symbologies developed. 
To have theoretical adequacy, a design artefact must exhibit the following eight 
attributes identified by Gregor and Jones, as shown in Table 3.5. 
 
 
Table 3.5 Set of criteria for Gregor & Jones theory artefact sufficiency 
Criterion  Questions to ask
Purpose and scope   Are they clearly stated?
Constructs   Are they described clearly?
Principles   Are principles of form and function incorporating underlying 
constructs given?
Artefact mutability   Is artefact mutability established?
Testable propositions   Is the artefact capable of producing testable propositions? 
Justificatory knowledge   Is the kernel theory which provides justificatory knowledge 
explicitly given?
Principles of implementation 
(optional) 
 Are the principles of implementing a primary artefact with the 
theory artefact given clearly and in a form that can be 
followed?
Expository instantiation 
(optional) 
 Does the exposition of the theory provide instantiations of 
primary artefacts demonstrating that it can work in practice? 
If the all attributes are given (or observable) in the exposition of an artefact, it is 
considered a valid theory artefact according to Gregor & Jones (2007). Completed 
checklists for the two design exemplars are given in Appendices C and D. Completed 
checklists for the two symbologies FERD and FERL are given in Chapter 13. 
3.4.5 Criteria for docking 
As discussed in 3.3.5.5, this thesis uses docking to confirm the perspective, to 
ascertain the mutual compassing of the two symbologies.  
Table 3.6 Criteria for Model Docking 
Criterion Questions to ask
Congruence of top level constructs 
Is there a congruence of the top‐level constructs of each 
system? 
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Congruence of construct perspective 
alignment   Is there a congruence of alignment with the perspective 
between constructs?
Congruence of construct instantiation 
alignment  Is there a congruence of constructs aligning with test 
problem entities?
Mutual encompassing of domains and 
situations  Are the domains covered and the situations to be modelled 
by each framework the same?
Intertranslatability of modelling 
expressions  Are expressions created using top‐level constructs 
intertranslatable?
 
This table is presented in completed form in Chapter 13 following the docking 
process. 
3.4.6 Appropriateness criteria for Alexander pattern selection  
This set of criteria is used to confirm that an informatic tradition selected as an 
exemplar for making an Alexander pattern is similar enough to the current research to 
be useful. This set operates in addition to the requirements for Gregor & Jones 
completeness and research tradition coherence described above. 
The appropriateness criteria require that exemplars must exhibit design artefacts 
that are functionally and teleologically comparable to those in the research being 
undertaken (Schiller & Mandviwalla, 2007). A full account of the criteria is presented 
in Appendix E, and the sets of criteria are presented in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. 
Table 3.7 Appropriateness Criteria for Exemplar Selection for Principal Research Path 
Attribute  Questions to ask 
Perspective as design goal  Does the research program begin with the intention of creating a 
new perspective as a problem solving heuristic? 
Perspective the outcome of 
metaphoric resituation 
Does the research program commence with metaphoric resituating 
of existing practices?
Perspective drawing on untried 
philosophical basis 
Does the research involve looking for new philosophical principles 
on which to base the research?
Perspective used to create 
framework
Does the research set out to create a modelling framework?
Framework used to create 
models 
Is the framework designed to create conceptual models?
Model implementable  Are those conceptual models of sufficient clarity and detail to 
permit the creation of implementation designs? 
 
Table 3.8 Appropriateness Criteria for Exemplar Selection for Secondary Research Path  
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Attribute  Questions to ask
Formal language for 
transactioning as design 
goal 
Does the research program begin with the intention of creating a 
new formal language for recording significant transactions 
within already observed communications? 
Methodology is investigation 
and typing of speech acts in 
conversation 
Does the research program commence with an analysis of typical 
conversations with turn‐taking, and classify those 
conversations using a speech acts typology?
F(P) representation of the 
generic speech acts 
Does the research program create an F(P) framework for the 
generic speech acts?
Formal language (including) 
EBNF created from the F(P) 
representation  
Does the research produce a formal language expressed as an 
Extended Backus Naur Form grammar? 
Formal language is human‐ and 
machine‐readable 
Is the formal language expressed in a way that is human‐ and 
machine‐readable?
Expository instantiations of the 
formal language given 
Does the exposition of the work include expository instantiations? 
Language adopted and used to 
some extent 
Was the final system used in production so that the efficacy of the 
approach was shown?
These criteria are both used twice in the research: the once for the selection of 
the principal or secondary design research paths, and once at the end of the design 
process, where the onus is on the researcher to show that the research did in fact have 
the telos and goal artefacts that were used to establish these appropriateness criteria.  
3.4.7 Using sets of criteria as research instrumentation  
By establishing these sets of criteria before the research is undertaken, and 
creating explicit checklists for the points of auditing in the research path, we can make 
design contracts that will give testable claims per Hevner & Chatterjee (2010b). This 
means that when the points of auditing come up, we have a clear checklist to fill in to 
evaluate whether or not the design goal has been achieved, and whether or not the 
research has been successful. 
3.5   Selection of predecessors for adapting to knowledge 
modelling context 
We saw in Section 3.2.3 the critical role of mutable artefacts in tertiary design 
artefact creation. In this section existing artefacts for three key roles in the current 
research are chosen: a diagramming system for knowledge models, a transactioning 
language for knowledge exchange, and a routine methodology for knowledge model 
creation. This section is concerned with selection of a suitable set of such secondary 
design artefacts, and the constraints on such selection.  
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3.5.1 Selection of a mutable diagramming artefact 
We have already seen in section 2.1.3.2 that there is an implicit epistemological 
stance in knowledge representation artefacts, which are seen as rivals that are for the 
most part incompatible. This means that non-generic representation systems such as 
those described in Table 2.3 cannot be used – there are existing critiques showing their 
unsuitability for genericity. What remains are therefore those candidate systems that 
offer genericity. 
Another constraint is that the artefact must be part of a strong informatic 
tradition with sufficient usage to have demonstrated both cognitive clarity and 
widespread acceptance. Ideally, there must be evident occurrences of the artefact’s 
inherent mutability: showing adaptation of the key representation systems to a new 
context. 
Two candidate representation systems with the requisite longevity, acceptance 
and mutability, with an underlying genericity are UML, the Unified Modelling 
Language (OMG, 1997) and ERM, the Entity-Relationship Model (Chen, 1976, 1977). 
That they are successful informatic traditions is incontestable (Tan, Siau, & Erickson, 
2007) and that they are based on the principle of genericity is also established for both 
UML (Diskin, 2003; Hitz & Kappel, 1999; Steimann, 2000) and ERM (Diskin & 
Kadish, 2003; Hainaut, 1989; Scheuermann, Schiffner, & Weber, 1980; Thalheim, 
1993). 
The two genericities exist at different scales: while both can be considered 
categories (Diskin, Kadish, Piessens, & Johnson, 2000; Palmer, 1996; Rattray, 1993; 
Scott, 2000), UML is intentionally a monistic formalism (Bézivin & Muller, 1999; 
Simons & Graham, 1998), while ERM is a set-theoretical formalism (Chen, 1976; 
Codd, 1990). Their attempts at universal representation offer both benefits and 
drawbacks, which are considerations for the current research. 
3.5.1.1 The unified modelling language 
 UML’s attempt to be universal has led to an increasingly wide set of constructs 
and symbols with which to represent them. The object theory on which it is based is 
incapable of a pluralistic representational formalism, and instead requires a monistic 
representational structure with late-binding qualia such as a conceptual graph or UML. 
This monism is more or less the spirit of UML – “The designers of the notation have 
sought simplicity above all” (Bézivin & Muller, 1999 p.5), which has resulted in  
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difficulty with the level of abstraction (Cruz-Lemus, Genero, Manso, Morasca, & 
Piattini, 2009; Moody & van Hillegersberg, 2009; Zito, Diskin, & Dingel, 2006), and 
has required the creation of a number of subsequent modelling subsystems that have 
worked against the reductive simplicity intended at the outset (Guizzardi, 2010; Siau & 
Cao, 2001; Simons & Graham, 1998). Additionally, this monism and the concomitant 
sublanguages has made the final UML system very complex, requiring a period of 
extended apprenticeship to learn fully, and prevents the ready subitization desirable of 
a sketching system (Erickson & Siau, 2004; Siau & Cao, 2001; Siau & Tan, 2005; Siau 
& Tian, 2001, 2005).  
Significantly this may be because the origins of the design language itself 
emerge from arbitrary engineering practices, rather than from mathematical or 
philosophical first principles (even if, per Diskin, 2000, they can be justified that way). 
UML cannot represent the universalised abstraction to which a class or an object 
belongs (Hay & Lynott, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d), but rather only the usage to 
which an instance (even a reuse of a standard instance) has been put. Simons & 
Graham (1998) describe this problem as a conflict in the purposes of the system. 
Most problems can be traced to the awkward transition between analysis and design, where 
UML's eclectic philosophy (the same notation for everything) comes unstuck. Modelling 
techniques that were appropriate for informal elicitation are being used to document hard 
design decisions; the same UML models are subject to different interpretations in analysis 
and design; developers are encouraged to follow analytical procedures which do not 
translate straightforwardly into clean designs. (Simons & Graham, 1998, p. 209) 
 
These features of the UML, although giving it great power within its design 
space, militate against it being useful for the current research.  
3.5.1.2 The Entity-Relationship Diagram 
By contrast with the UML, the ERD, or Entity-Relationship Diagram (Chen, 
1976, 1977, 2002) has a set-formalism at its heart, which places other different 
limitations on what it can be used to represent (Halpin, 1991; Kent, 1977, 1978, 1979a, 
1979b; Nijssen & Halpin, 1989). However, as we have seen, the set itself can be seen 
as a particular instance of a collectivity (Rescher & Grim, 2008, 2010), which is the 
formalism upon which the current research is to be based. We shall now investigate the 
ERD for evidence of its mutability. 
In the field of system design, there are few conceptual design tools as elegant 
and powerful as the ERD. In provided a unifying view of the interrelations of datasets, 
it serves that twin goal of any notation formalism, of sketching designs and  
  99
documenting a completed system. As is fitting for a theory design artefact (Gregor & 
Jones, 2004, 2007), it has provided a mutable artefact for data modelling with 
increased explicative power, explicitly unifying the relational (Codd, 1970), network 
(Bachman, 1969) and Entity-Set (Senko, Altman, Astrahan, & Fehder, 1973) models of 
data, and did so by openly adapting existing work (i.e. Mealy, 1967; Senko et al., 
1973).  
 
Figure 3‐5 A crow's foot notation ERD indicating that one manufacturer makes many models 
The ERD has proven mutability: there is a tradition established soon after Chen 
(1976) of modifying the ERD. For example, the “crow's foot” notation
47 (Barker, 1990; 
Everest, 1976, 2012) qualifies the relationship arc to indicate (using crow’s foot 
notation) cardinality and participation. Figure 3.5 shows a standard one-to-many 
relationship between car manufacturers and model expressed with crow's foot notation.  
Significantly, the crow's foot notation restores the simplicity of digraph 
formalism to the ERD that was a feature of the Bachman notation (Bachman, 1969; 
Bachman & Haigh, 2006; Bachman & Williams, 1964) upon which Everest's original 
database schema was based (Everest, 1974a, 1976, 1986, 2012). The present research 
will build on the crow's foot notation.
48 
The ERD is a form of digraph, with entities as nodes and relationships as edges, 
with the edges usually qualified to represent cardinality and participation of the 
relationships. With these simple tools, it is possible to sketch most databases and to 
analyse and verify the sketch: the ERD provides a snapshot of both the internal logic 
and the existential import of a database, and does it in a way that is implementation-
independent and platform neutral. The extreme simplicity of the ERD renders it 
                                                       
 
47 The crow's foot notation is the ERD variant indicating cardinality with a “crow’s foot" symbol. It was established 
independently by Everest at the University of Pennsylvania (Everest, 1972, 1974a, 1974b) and at CACI by Barker, 
Ellis and Palmer (Barker, 1990; Everest, 1976, 2012). It was popularised though its use as part of the Oracle CASE* 
methodology. It has no single authoritative name, but is called variously the Barker (Silverston & Agnew, 2009), the 
Oracle-Barker (West, 2011) the Ellis-Barker (Gordon, 2007), the Barker-Ellis (Hay, 1996), CACI (Berrisford, 2002) 
and the Crow’s-foot diagram (Halpin, 2001a). CACI is the form adopted here. The crow’s foot symbol was first used 
by Everest (1976), in his database schema, which were adapted Bachman diagrams (Bachman, 1969). 
48 Significantly for the current thesis, Everest's schema covers all three of the then dominant forms of data storage: 
hierarchical, networked and relational (Everest, 1976, 1986, 2012).  
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immediately graspable by both designer and implementer, suitable for its role in an 
iterative development process. 
All existing notations, while useful in their domain, have limitations when 
considering a generalised solution. For our purposes, the ERD has the advantage of 
grounding the model in a set of associations that match on to the erotetic (question-
answering) process we described above. The ERD has, significantly, previously been 
adapted to represent constructs that are not confined to the strictures of set formalisms 
(Susanne Patig, 2006). The ERD even has proven mutability for erotetic purposes: a 
similar reuse of the ERD is found in T. R. G. Green and Benyon (1996), who argued 
succinctly that the ERD formalism is a useful tool for mapping interactive information 
systems, both in terms of abstraction and simplification on the one hand, and the ease 
of comparing multiple accounts of the same system from participants. 
The NIST/IDEFIX extensions to the ERD (NIST, 1993) indicate aggregation, 
composition, generalisation, dependency and realisation, following the work on 
abstraction and aggregation by Smith & Smith (1977a, 1977b). Typed entities and 
relations were investigated to solve complex multimodal or multidimensional data 
modelling problems, including papers given at the 1985 conference devoted to 
extending the ERD for Knowledge Representation (Chen, 1985), concerning 
temporality (Ferg, 1985) and first order logic (Cazin, Jacquart, & Michel, 1985). Chen 
himself proposed temporal extensions (Chen, 1986) to his own formalism, as did 
Klopprogge (1981). Other extensions include fuzzy logic (Vert, Stock, & Morris, 
2002), extensibility (K.-C. Liu & Sunderraman, 1987) and multidimensionality (Hay, 
1999). The Extended ERD (Elmasri, Weeldreyer, & Hevner, 1985; Gogolla, 1994; 
Hadzilacos & Tryfona, 1997) and the Hierarchical ERD (Thalheim, 2007) added 
further categorical, geographical (GIS) and hierarchical qualifications to the model, 
while at the same time acknowledging that the extensions were similarly couchable in 
terms of English verbs and nouns (Hartmann & Link, 2007). A comprehensive 
historical survey of the range of extensions to the ERD can be found in S Patig (2006). 
 The continued life and widespread usage of the ER diagramming convention 
testifies to its continued utility (Chen, 2002), and justifies the choice of the tool for 
extension. This review demonstrates that the ERD both has the attributes of a mutable 
design artefact conforming to Gregor and Iivari (2007), and is a suitable artefact for 
adapting as a design formalism for the erotetic perspective.  
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3.5.2 Selection of a mutable transactioning language artefact 
SQL, the Structured Query Language (Boyce, Chamberlin, Hammer, & King, 
1974; D. D. Chamberlin & Boyce, 1974; D. D. Chamberlin, Gilbert, & Yost, 1981; T. 
C. Chamberlin, 1890) is an approximation of Codd's relational calculus (Codd, 1969, 
1970, 1971, 1972).
49 SQL is a declarative language that permits the description of data, 
along with specifications of subsets (SELECT), requests to add (INSERT), edit 
(UPDATE) or delete (DELETE) records and the ability to self-modify the database 
schema. It is based on a loose interpretation of the Codd tuple and domain relational 
calculi. 
SQL is the dominant data querying language (Garcia-Molina, Ullman, & 
Widom, 2011; Melton, 2006; Ramakrishnan & Gehrke, 2000; Silberschatz, Korth, & 
Sudarshan, 2006; Weinberg & Oppel, 2009) providing a unifying access to the 
database systems of all database vendors. It has evolved to acquire additional features 
during the decades since its inception by a series of standards,
50 introducing features 
such as objects and triggers (SQL:1999) and XML interaction (SQL:2003). 
Additionally there has been a parallel standard for enhancing SQL with GIS, CAD and 
multimedia features (ISO, 2000). 
SQL is created, stored and transmitted as text. In part its success is due to its 
legibility and the ease with which simple queries can be written by hand, or complex 
queries created using graphical interfaces that reverse engineer queries. 
The tradition of extending SQL is nearly as old as the language itself. 
Researchers have extended SQL in many ways, including temporal capabilities (Jensen 
& Mark, 1992; Snodgrass, 1987; Tansel & Tin, 1997; Toman, 1995); ordered domains 
(W Ng, 2001; Wilfred Ng & Levene, 1997); fuzziness (Chu & Chen, 1992, 1994; 
López & Tineo, 2006; Rodríguez, 2000); natural quantifiers (Bradley, 1981, 1983); 
genomic data (Berti-Equille & Moussouni, 2005; J. Y. Chen, Carlis, & Gao, 2005; 
Eltabakh, Ouzzani, & Aref, 2006; Tata, Patel, Friedman, & Swaroop, 2006). 
multimedia (Baral, Gonzalez, & Son, 1998; Gonzalez Hernandez, 2000; Guo et al., 
1994; J. Z. Li, Ozsu, Szafron, & Oria, 1997); geospatial data (Chan & Zhu, 1996; T. S. 
Cheng & Gadia, 1994; Egenhofer, 1989; Güting, 1988); geometry (Chan & Wong, 
                                                      
 
49 Albeit one that Codd thought insufficient compared to the power of the relational calculus (Codd, 1985, 1988; 
Codd & Strehlo, 1990, 1993) created as Alpha (Codd, 1972, 1974). 
50 SQL-86 (ANSI, 1986), SQL-89 (ANSI, 1989), SQL-92 (ANSI, 1992), SQL:1999 (ANSI, 1999), SQL:2003 (2003), 
SQL:2008 (ISO, 2008), SQL:2011 (ISO, 2011).  
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1996; Güting, 1988) and data mining (Imieliński & Virmani, 1999; Meo, Psaila, & 
Ceri, 1998). Significantly there have also been extensions by major vendors to create 
procedural capabilities, including Microsoft (1995), Sybase (1995) Oracle (1992), and 
IBM (1997). 
This review demonstrates that the SQL both has the attributes of a mutable 
design artefact conforming to Gregor and Iivari (2007), and is a suitable artefact for 
adapting as a formal language for string logic representation of the erotetic perspective. 
3.5.3 Selection of a mutable methodology artefact 
A routine methodology is an essential component of a modelling framework, 
and is thus one of the design goals of the current thesis. For the framework to be 
established here, this is a knowledge modelling methodology. We now consider 
relevant predecessors, drawing on the consolidation by Beynon-Davies (1987, 1991, 
1992) of several distinct approaches to knowledge modelling: the conventional model 
of the Stanford group (B. Buchanan et al., 1983), the KADS model (G Schreiber, 
Wielinga, & Breuker, 1993) and the adaptation of traditional software engineering 
principles for expert systems development (DeSalvo, Glamm, & Liebowitz, 1987). 
Traditionally, development of a knowledge base system is a two phase process, 
creation of a knowledge model, and operationalisation of that model (G Schreiber et 
al., 1993; B. J. Wielinga, Schreiber, & Breuker, 1992). When a real world problem is 
analysed, a model is the critical simplification that arises from the analysis that permits 
selection from among existing or novel computational and representational techniques 
(G Schreiber et al., 1993). A conceptual model (as discussed in Appendix B) provides a 
knowledge-level manipulable abstraction that can be used as the basis of design 
(Newell, 1981, 1982) (Figure 3.6). It is impossible to create a KBS directly from the 
world. 
 
Figure 3‐6 Positioning of the knowledge level model between the real world and the knowledge 
based system (after G Schreiber et al., 1993)  
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The conventional KM methodology is that established at Stanford by Buchanan 
et al. (1983). It has five design stages: identification, conceptualisation, formalisation, 
implementation, and testing (Table 3.9). 
Table 3.9 The five stage KM methodology after Beynon‐Davies (1992, p. 44) 
Stage  Name  Activity
1  Identification  Identify the problem area, define its scope and identify the resources
2  Conceptualisation  Explicate the key concepts and relationships needed to describe the 
'expertise' in a given domain.
3  Formalisation  Map the concepts and relationships into a formal representation 
suggested by some expert system building tool or language.
4  Implementation  Combine and reorganise the formal knowledge in order to define a 
prototype system capable of being executed and tested. 
5  Testing Evaluate the performance of the prototype in terms of a set of 
standards usually defined by the domain expert. 
 
Buchanan et al’s model,
51 here termed the Stanford methodology, was 
established for regularising the process whereby knowledge elicitation (or knowledge 
acquisition) was used to make expert systems and other knowledge-based systems. 
Although not explicitly based on traditional SDLC methodologies, there is 
considerable alignment between them (Beynon-Davies, 1987; Chou, 1993; De Salvo, 
Glamm, & Liebowitz, 1987; Iglesias, Garijo, Gonzalez, & Velasco, 1996; Tran, Low, 
& Williams, 2005). A summary of this alignment is shown in Table 3.10. Because of 
this alignment, several authors have suggested the incorporation of significant SDLC 
features absent in the Stanford methodology.  
Table 3.10 The five stage Stanford KE methodology after Beynon‐Davies (1987, p. 19), De Salvo 
et al. (1987) and Chou (1993, p. 381) 
Stage  Stanford  SDLC
1  Identification  Identification
2  Conceptualisation  Systems Analysis
3  Formalisation  Systems Design
4  Implementation  Implementation
5  Testing Testing
 
                                                      
 
51 Sometimes known as the Hayes-Roth method after the lead editor of the collection in which it first appeared.  
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DeSalvo et al. (1987) and Beynon-Davies (1987) both propose the addition of 
standardised SDLC documentation tasks to the standard approach. This addition 
permits an orderly separation of the investigator from the design process, and inures 
against system catastrophes. The documentation should be at least partially written 
using a formal language from modelling (preferably one in common use, such as the 
ERD or Data Flow Diagram). Also missing from the Stanford model are feedback 
loops in the evaluation phases: Beynon-Davies (1987) and De Salvo et al. (1987) also 
independently proposed the formalised incorporation of feedback cycles to permit 
design and model improvement.  
The Stanford methodology’s focus on instances and individual domain expertise 
however crucially limits its amenability to knowledge repurposing, causing brittleness 
of systems and limited applicability (Recio, Acuna, & Juristo, 1999). The KADS 
project (G Schreiber et al., 1993) introduced reuse of existing material and proposed 
standardised knowledge base systems (KBS) modules specifically designed for reuse 
(e.g. the reuse of inference structures through a knowledge-level typology) to help 
overcome this limitation. However KADS's atemporality militates against its capability 
for merging with SDLC practices, and even when merged with the SDLC tradition (as 
done by Beynon-Davies) it lacks a cyclicity for model/prototype/trial/production.  
Rather than restricting the consideration of knowledge base design to the 
“ambiguous notion” of KBSs such as expert systems, expert database systems and 
production systems, (Motta, 1999, p. 1), it seems preferable to see all systems of 
encoding facts, opinions or beliefs about the world as components of knowledge bases 
This broader ambit for potential knowledge sources obviates unnecessary reconversion 
of existing systems, and takes into account the expertise embedded in those systems 
(such as adherence to work and professional practice codes, design standards and legal 
systems). 
Again, this review demonstrates that the Beynon-Davies KR methodology both 
has the attributes of a mutable design artefact conforming to Gregor and Iivari (2007), 
and is a suitable artefact for adapting as a methodology for developing conceptual 
models of knowledge systems. 
3.5.4 Usage of mutable artefacts 
The artefacts selected will be employed in the development of the framework 
both as a means of substantiation and docking, and as a useful design goal in and of  
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themselves, since the selection of such artefacts as candidates for the new framework 
increases the likelihood of adoption. The candidates chosen here – the ERD for a 
diagramming system, SQL for a transactioning system, and the standard KE 
development methodology – have met these criteria, being suitable for their purpose 
and demonstrably mutable. 
It is possible that other artefacts may have proved equally useful for these 
purposes, but as long as the candidates chosen meet the suitability and mutability 
criteria, they are sufficient to the purpose. 
In the next section, 3.6, the choice of exemplars is made for Alexander patterns 
for design research.  
3.6  Establishing the design research patterns 
This section discusses the creation of a design science research method from 
exemplar research traditions, and lays out the remaining sections of the thesis 
according to the path thus established. The artefact docking methodology adopted 
requires a principal and a secondary (validating) research path forking from a common 
basis. These research paths are created according to the Pattern Language approach 
advocated by Gregor & Jones (2007).  
This section examines the two Patterns chosen as intellectual predecessors. What 
is required of a research pattern is a research path with artefactual and procedural 
guidance for a previous piece of successful research that approached the same problem 
space. The kernel theory drawn upon in the exemplar is not germane, and will 
generally be different. Likewise non-essential details such as team makeup, nationality, 
endowment or duration. The principle here is of prior research as a heuristic. 
3.6.1 Establishing the design research pattern for the principal 
research path 
The Gregor & Jones pattern language for theory creation mandates principled 
selection of an exemplary intellectual predecessor to create the (Alexander) pattern for 
the research. The principal exemplar chosen is the Language/Action Perspective 
(Flores & Ludlow, 1980; Weigand, 2006; Winograd & Flores, 1986) or L/AP. L/AP 
has established an informatics perspective, and contingently a framework within that 
perspective, and subsequently proceeded to build real-world systems within the  
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framework with a range of demonstrable implementations
52. The selection process is 
set out in Appendix C, rather than the body of the thesis as the detail involved is 
outside the main research path. 
Stated briefly, the Language/Action Perspective created a new perspective for 
modelling office systems, bringing in the deontological dimension (rights, obligations, 
promises and sanctions). It accomplished this by using the metaphor of inter-person 
communication to reimagine office automation. The communications were classified 
using a speech acts taxonomy, and a messaging system created called the Coordinator 
to organise all communication. This sequence meets all the appropriateness criteria for 
exemplar selection outlined in Table 3.7 and allows an Alexander pattern to be derived. 
The Alexander Pattern clearly shows the stages of invention (involving 
metaphoric analysis, perspective creation through kernel theory selection), elaboration 
(involving establishing constructs, making a representation language, developing a 
routine methodology) and substantiation (making expository instantiations that 
substantiate the theoretical and theory-derived research claims). These stages are 
described in Figure 3.7.1, and are given in full in the treatment given in Appendix C.  
The principal research path will aim to deliver all of the goal design artefacts 
(Perspective, Framework consisting of ontology, deontology, symbology and 
methodology), and thus answer the four research questions. For the docking 
justification, another research path using a different kernel theory is needed, and that is 
described in the next section. 
3.6.2 Establishing the design research pattern for the secondary 
research path  
The docking justificatory mechanism described in section 3.3.5.5 requires two 
separate methodological approaches to the design of a conceptual modelling 
framework. This in turn requires a secondary Alexander pattern to be constructed, one 
that builds on the erotetic perspective, but which has a different design goal and a 
                                                      
 
52 Other candidate systems that could have been used are Organisational Semiotics (R. K. Stamper, 1973, 1977a, 
1977b, 1978, 1985), Simula (Brandt & Knudsen, 1996; Dahl, 1962; Dahl & Nygaard, 1963, 1965; Handlykken & 
Nygaard, 1981; Kristensen, Madsen, Møller-Pedersen, & Nygaard, 1985, 1995; Nygaard & Dahl, 1966, 1981), 
Gestalt Programming (Ross, 1956, 1959, 1960, 1977; Ross & Schoman Jr, 1977), Frames (Bobrow & Winograd, 
1977; R. Brachman & Schmolze, 1985; Gennari et al., 2003; Karp, 1992; Minsky, 1974; Roberts & Goldstein, 1977) 
and Smalltalk (Goldberg & Kay, 1976; Daniel Ingalls, 1981; Dan Ingalls, Kaehler, Maloney, Wallace, & Kay, 1997; 
Kay, 1967, 1969, 1993; Kay & Goldberg, 1977). These all follow the same trajectory and pursue similar design 
goals, so they could also have served as exemplars. The number of potential exemplars suggests that the approach to 
wicked problem solving by perspective creation using metaphoric analysis is a widespread phenomenon. The 
justification for the choice of the L/AP is given in Appendix E.  
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different theoretical underpinning. The selection of this exemplar is less complex as it 
required to do no more than demonstrate the creation of a formal language to describe a 
series of restricted conversation. Once again, the selection process is set out in 
Appendix D, rather than the body of the thesis as the detail involved is outside the 
main research path. 
The template chosen was Moore’s Formal Language for Business 
Communication (R. C. Moore, 1995; S. A. Moore, 1996, 1998; S. A. Moore & 
Kimbrough, 1995).  
Stated briefly, Moore also chose an inter-office conversation as metaphor for 
business communication. Designed as a system for automating the exchange of bids 
and offers in electronic commerce, it was developed as a language that continues to 
evolve. Once more, the Alexander Pattern clearly shows the stages of invention, 
elaboration and substantiation. These stages are described in Section 3.7.2, and are 
given in full in the treatment given in Appendix D. 
3.7  Laying out the research path according to the research 
patterns 
We can now describe the logic of the design research following the derived 
Alexander patterns, constructing a cross-functional flowchart (Rummler & Brache, 
1995; Sharp & McDermott, 2001) that shows the common initial research and the two 
alternative Pattern-derived research paths (Figure 3.9).  
The research begins with a position common to both Alexander patterns, that of 
the reconsideration of a wicked problem through metaphoric analysis of the 
underpinning perspective (shown in the central “swim lane” of Figure 3.7). The ground 
of the metaphor in the current research is a real life examination of a common 
knowledge-seeking question and answer conversation, the research librarian reference 
interview. This is covered in Sections 1.2 and 2.3 (with the identification of the 
problem), Sections 2.4 and 2.5 (with the discussion of the reifying and erotetic 
metaphor based perspectives) and Chapter 4 (with the discussion of knowledge seeking 
erotetic conversations). 
There are two research paths following from the common beginning, a principal 
path (the left hand swim lane in Figure 3.7) using the kernel theory of erotetic logic 
(Belnap, 1963) and sketch logic (Wells, 1990), and a second validating research path 
(the right hand swim lane in Figure 3.7) that uses Speech Act Theory as kernel theory  
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(J. L. Austin, 1962) and string logic (Wells, 1990). Both have invention, elaboration 
and substantiation phases, which are shown aligned in Figure 3.7.  
The two research paths pass control back to the project (the central swim lane in 
Figure 3.7) for a final docking phase, where the two representation systems are 
examined for mutual encompassing. 
We now examine the two research paths in detail, and the final common docking 
and evaluation portion of the project, with reference to Figure 3.7. 
3.7.1 Principal research path 
The principal research path is path derived from the Language/Action 
Perspective, and occupies Chapters 5 though 11. It is represented by the left-hand 
swim-lane in Figure 3.9, where the three stages of the path, invention, elaboration and 
substantiation, are shown together with their component tasks. 
3.7.1.1 Principal research path invention 
The research path for the thesis continues the common invention phase into a 
treatment of using the kernel theory of Rescher’s epistemology of inquiry dynamics, 
and operationalises that epistemology to develop a complete erotetic perspective for 
knowledge modelling.  
First, responding to a perceived problem in the world, with a metaphor 
intentionally and explicitly being used to re-examine the perspective in which that need 
is embedded (in the common path, in sections 1.2 and 2.3). Then, the researcher finds a 
useful substitute metaphor for perspective of problem – here the question and answer 
metaphor (in the common path in sections 2.4 and 2.5), grounded as reference 
interview (in the common path in Chapter 4) – and the perspective is adapted to new 
metaphor (also in the common path in Chapter 4). 
At this stage the research path leaves the common path. Next, a kernel theory is 
located in order to underpin new perspective – here, erotetic logic is borrowed from a 
philosophical discipline to assist the re-creation of that perspective (carried out in 
Chapter 5).  
Finally, there is a formal statement made of the perspective, in such a way as to 
permit a modelling framework to be created (also carried out in Chapter 5). 
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Figure 3‐7 The two research paths and their three phases: invention, elaboration and 
substantiation 
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3.7.1.2 Principal research path elaboration 
The process of elaboration takes the ideas formulated for a solution and 
elaborates them into usable constructs and frameworks. In the pattern, Elaboration 
comprises of four steps. Firstly, the existing practices and artefacts are mapped onto the 
perspective. For the current research this involved operationalising of Rescher’s 
epistemology using and adapting mutable artefacts from successful informatic 
traditions (Chapter 6).  
Next, a generic model of is made of entities, and their relations. For the current 
research, the Rescherian epistemology is generalised to make a generalised construct 
set to model knowledge, providing the ontology and deontology of the erotetic 
framework (Chapter 7). A fully detailed account of the core constructs, a typed 
Functional Entity, is presented in Chapter 8.  
The next step in the pattern is to create a sketch logic mechanism. In the current 
research, a generalised diagram system adapted from the ERD called the Functional 
Entity Relationship Diagram (FERD) is established (Chapter 9). 
The last step is to develop a methodology for making conceptual models with 
the framework. In the current research, a generalised knowledge modelling 
methodology called the Functional Entity Representation Methodology (FERM) is 
presented, adapted from the standard knowledge engineering research path (Chapter 
10).  
3.7.1.3 Principal research path substantiation 
The third phase of the pattern is substantiation, the creation of expository 
instantiations to show that proposed constructs are workable in practice. In the pattern 
derived from LAP, substantiation involves four steps: finding suitable test situations, 
applying conceptual modelling tools to make conceptual models, making 
implementation design, and making implementations and checking compliance.  
In the current research, there is a continuously presented set of expository 
instantiations, in the form of five running case studies. These provide the first part of 
the substantiation.  
The second part consists of a dedicated chapter, Chapter 11, consisting of 
analyses of a set of complex knowledge systems. Substantiation involves practitioner 
action research, with feedback to the design process leading to modification of the 
modelling artefacts.  
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3.7.1.4 Principal research path summary 
At the end of the substantiation phase, control of the research is passed back to 
the common path for docking and evaluation. Although the process of verification and 
validation is continuously performed throughout the research, and is part of the 
argumentation process, the design contract is evaluated in a dedicated evaluation 
chapter, Chapter 13, after the docking phase has been completed. 
The complete research path is shown in Figure 3.8, summarised from Appendix 
D.  
 
Figure 3‐8 The Alexander pattern for the primary research path derived from the 
Language/Action Perspective 
3.7.2 Secondary research path 
Independently, the validating research path, based on the Formal Language for 
Business Communication (FLBC), is entirely discussed within Chapter 12. It is 
represented by the right-hand swim-lane in Figure 3.9, where again the three stages of 
the path, invention, elaboration and substantiation, are shown together with their 
component tasks. 
3.7.2.1 Secondary research path invention 
The invention phase continues with a speech acts analysis from the same basis in 
invention (the reference interview described in Chapter 4), but with elaboration 
culminating in a modelling language system, the FERL. Beginning with a dialogic 
speech-acts analysis of the reference interview, it creates a formalised account of the 
conversational paths that are available to the participants.  
3.7.2.2 Secondary research path elaboration 
The elaboration phase begins with Moore structures version of the formal 
conversations (S. A. Moore, 1993), converted into a F(P) representation. The F(P) 
expressions are then used to create a knowledge transactioning language derived from 
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SQL called the Functional Entity Relationship Language (FERL). The language is 
defined using an EBNF grammar, and a full language is described.  
3.7.2.3 Secondary research path substantiation 
Since the implementation and utilisation of a transactioning language is beyond 
the scope of a thesis, a complete set of substantiations is inappropriate. The pattern has 
expository instantiations based on model conversations, and the research takes this 
approach by building representations of the five continuous case studies in the form of 
FERL declaration section scripts.  
Additionally, the research presents some sample conversation section scripts for 
likely knowledge transactions. 
3.7.2.4 Secondary research path summary 
  At the end of the substantiation phase, control of the research is passed back to 
the common path for docking and evaluation. Again, although the process of 
verification and validation has been continuously performed throughout the research, 
and is part of the argumentation process, the design contract is evaluated in an 
evaluation chapter, Chapter 13, after the docking phase has been completed. 
The full research path is shown in Figure 3.9, summarised from Appendix E. 
 
 
Figure 3‐9 The Three stages of the Alexander pattern derived from the Formal Language for 
Business Computing 
3.7.3 Docking phase of the project 
In the docking phase discussed in Section 3.3.5.6, the two knowledge 
representation systems – the FE structures described in FERD and realised using 
FERM, and the FERL declaration section scripts – are examined to see if they are 
mutual encompassing. This is incorporated in the evaluation chapter, Chapter 13.  
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3.7.4 Contract evaluation of the project 
The project has been carried out under the auspices of design science, with a 
view to creating and fulfilling a design contract. To that end, sets of criteria were 
established in Section 3.4. At the conclusion of both research paths and the docking 
phase, the sets of criteria are evaluated in Chapter 13, and reported in tabular form. 
3.8  Summary 
This chapter has described the design science approach used in this thesis to 
developing tertiary and secondary artefacts, in order to create the perspective and 
concomitant modelling framework for the current research.  
The chapter began with a recapitulation of the research questions and the design 
artefact goals, placing them within the context of design science theory artefact 
research, Wartofksy’s (1976) conception of tertiary artefacts, and Gero’s (1990) 
conception of creative design research. It demonstrated the vital role of precedent in 
tertiary artefact design: how kernel theories, intellectual predecessors and mutable 
existing design artefacts inform the design process.  
The chapter investigated the way in which a tertiary design can be evaluated 
using established techniques of model confirmation: validation, verification, 
generalisation, docking (model alignment) and substantiation. 
Criteria sets applicable to reviews at milestone phases of artefact development 
were introduced, to be used at appropriate evaluation points in the research. 
The chapter considered the literature for candidate mutable artefacts for 
adaptation to the new perspective, selecting the ERD, SQL and the standard KR 
development cycle.  
Criteria for the selection of research patterns were established, and the 
Language/Action Perspective and the Formal Language for Business Communication 
were chosen as the patterns. A research path and outline of the thesis was described 
using these two patterns.  
The principal research path, detailed in Chapters 5-10, uses erotetic logic and 
category theory as kernel theories, and develops the erotetic perspective, 
operationalising the perspective as QA artefacts, generalising those into the functional 
entity framework, and describing the FERD, and the FERM.   
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The secondary research path, described in chapter 12, uses speech acts as a 
kernel theory and develops FERL. 
The next chapter will begin the work of creating the principal design goal, the 
erotetic perspective, by considering the research librarian reference interview as a 
ground for the conceptual metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS RESOLVED INQUIRY. 
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Chapter 4  
 
The Metaphoric Ground for the Erotetic 
Perspective 
 
4.1  Chapter overview 
This chapter is concerned with the establishment of a ground for the cognitive 
metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS RESOLVED ENQUIRY, which was described in Chapter 
2. Metaphors need to be constructed on a ground: the semantic content that is familiar 
illuminating the unfamiliar. To illuminate the cognitive metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS 
RESOLVED ENQUIRY so that we can understand the appropriate connotations for it, 
we need a familiar (or familiarisable) everyday example of resolved inquiry. 
 The research librarian reference interview in Library Science
53 has been shown 
Taylor (1962, 1968) to be the only human conversation that is obligated to conform to 
Mackay’s question-based formalism for information (MacKay, 1960). This chapter 
formally examines the reference interview as a ground for the KNOWLEDGE IS 
RESOLVED ENQUIRY metaphor, and considers how the metaphor can guide 
thinking about what is required to store encoded knowledge, to retrieve it on call, and 
to determine if the resulting answer is satisfactory. 
4.2  An erotetic perspective for modelling knowledge 
This section briefly reprises the discussion at Section 2.4, which introduced the 
erotetic perspective for conceptual modelling of knowledge. The erotetic perspective 
(based on the cognitive metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS RESOLVED ENQUIRY) holds 
that to know something is to have the ability to answer a question about it, rather than 
the resource-based perspective (based on the cognitive metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS A 
RESOURCE) which holds that to know something is to own a thing that is 
“knowledge”. 
                                                      
 
53 We are using the name “Library Science” rather than the widely used terms “Information Science” or 
“Library and Information Science” to avoid confusion with the name “Information Systems”.  
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What this means for knowledge modelling is that modelling the ability a system 
has to answer questions is equivalent to modelling the knowledge existing within the 
system. A system's ability to cope with present or future knowledge needs will 
therefore be based on the knowledge capacity it has, or the knowledge capacity it can 
acquire either through cooperation or purchase. A system can be graded as competent 
if there is congruence between knowledge needs and knowledge capacities. To model a 
system's knowledge needs is likewise simplified: it consists of modelling those things 
about which the system will need to ask questions.  
Establishing a conceptual modelling framework for knowledge systems 
therefore becomes a matter of developing constructs, modelling languages and methods 
for recognising and representing the knowledge needs and capacities in the systems, of 
evaluating the congruence between them, and determining the deontic relationships 
holding between them. 
For example, planning for future knowledge needs involves getting assurance 
from those controlling access to the knowledge capacities and those in a position to 
judge current and potential needs, and confirming a deontic relationship between them 
(R. K. Stamper & Lee, 1986) so that the capacity remains, and the needs are not 
exceeded. That capacity assurance involves such things as currency of literature, 
replacement of departing expertise or general competency training, and recruiting 
personnel or subsystems to cope. The needs assurance would involve minimising 
changes in the rates of change of needs, or predicting changes of the categories or 
domains of the knowledge need: all standard tasks for planning. 
In language, metaphors are constructed on a ground, which is the familiar used 
to illuminate the unfamiliar. It means we know what details are significant for 
understanding the connotations of the metaphor, and which are irrelevant. Lauer (2001) 
suggests drawing on Mackay’s question-based formalism for information (MacKay, 
1960); but does not give details for a ground for such a metaphor. Taylor (1962, 1968) 
demonstrates how the reference interview in Library Science is the only human 
conversation that is obligated to conform to Mackay’s formalism. Belkin & Vickery 
(1985) show that the reference interview seen as an information-seeking conversation 
serves as a model for all information seeking behaviour connected with a library. As 
such it provides an appropriate ground for a QA perspective on knowledge. In the next 
section (4.3) we shall describe the reference interview, and subsequently in Section 4.4  
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we shall discuss how the reference interview is sufficient as a metaphoric ground for 
the erotetic perspective. 
4.3  The research librarian reference interview 
To serve as a ground for the erotetic metaphor we now describe the nature of the 
reference interview in Library Science. In this section we establish the connotations of 
the metaphor, to set out the expectations for constructs and methods within the erotetic 
perspective. In Section 4.3.1 we introduce the basic nature of the QA conversation that 
makes up a reference interview. In Section 4.3.2 we examine the significance of 
Gricean cooperation for the reference interview, in 4.3.3 we discuss the role of 
collation in QA response, in 4.3.4 knowledge reuse in the reference interview, in 4.3.5 
describe turn-taking in QA conversation, and in 4.3.6 consider the nature of cognitive 
authority in research librarianship. 
4.3.1 The nature of the reference interview 
Research librarianship has traditionally been modelled on a question and answer 
format: a patron expresses a need for knowledge and the librarian then sets about 
finding an answer using the materials at hand in the library (including such sources as 
abstracts, encyclopaedias, review guides, anthologies, indexes and latterly online 
repositories). Careful rules are involved with these processes: the quest for an answer 
ends when the answer satisfices the knowledge need (Matthew Locke Saxton & 
Richardson, 2002). 
This interaction between the patron seeking knowledge and the research 
librarian is formalised as a reference interview (M. Hutchins, 1944). A reference 
interview is a five stage inquiry process (C. A. Bunge & Bopp, 1995): 
1.  Opening an interview 
2.  Negotiating question 
3.  Searching 
4.  Communicating the information with user 
5.  Closing the interview 
The patron initiates the interview, which is considered to fall into one of several 
standard interview types; these types range from ready reference enquiries (looking for 
a particular fact) and referral-seeking (looking for a source of government or private 
assistance) through to information brokering (collating information from a number of  
  118
sources) and research questions (questions involving an extended conversation 
elucidating the information need). The vocation of the research librarian has been a key 
part of the rise of scientific librarianship (C. A. Bunge & Bopp, 1995). 
The core task is responding to the research question (Taylor, 1962, 1968) which 
actualises the erotetic formalism of Hamblin (1958), in that every fact can be seen as 
the response to a question, and that any particular answer might satisfy any number of 
questions (Taylor, 1962, p. 394). All research questions consist of a subject and a query 
(Derr, 1984, pp. 186-187), typed (Derr, 1984, p. 187; White, 1990, 1998) according to 
some typology (such as Graesser’s: A. C. Graesser & Hemphill, 1991; Otero & 
Graesser, 2001). The question is answered through a process of satisficing an 
information need (Belkin & Vickery, 1985; Derr, 1983). A representation of the 
research question must also include the context of enquiry (White, 1981, 1983, 1985). 
4.3.2 The cooperative nature of the reference interview 
The reference interview itself is a Gricean cooperative conversation (Dewdney 
& Michell, 1997) and the responses conform to the conversational maxims of Grice 
(1975, 1978). The interview has a particular conversational path that is adhered to: it 
begins with the process of question clarification, and culminates in a check for 
satisficing (Park, Li, & Burger, 2010).  
A cooperative response from the research librarian also involves the potential for 
topic substitutions in answering – where a direct match for the subject request cannot 
be made, a cooperative response is sought instead: the librarian’s training guides him 
or her through substitution pathways – identifying works on greater or smaller ranges 
of topic, general texts covering themes significant to the enquiry, etc. This ability to 
establish substitutability of knowledge was considered core to professional 
librarianship from its beginnings (Bliss, 1933; Ranganathan, 1931). 
4.3.3 Collation in the reference interview response 
A cooperative response to a complex research question requires deconstruction 
(Diamond & Pease, 2001; IFLA Study Group on Digital Reference, 2008), factoring
54 
                                                      
 
54 Also knowledge factorisation. Knowledge factoring derives from semantic factoring in information 
retrieval (Perry, 1953) and information measurement (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). It operates 
by analogy to the process of factoring in mathematics, (recursively) breaking down semantic concepts 
into simpler components, e.g. schoolgirl into juvenile, feminine, pupillary… The chief difference with  
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(Jolley, 1973 p. 88; R. A. Swanson & Holton, 2005), and consequent assembly of a 
single answer from constituent answers made to the resulting questions (Matthew L 
Saxton, 2006; Matthew Locke Saxton & Richardson, 2002). This process of merging 
several different sources, and exercising professional judgement to summarise or 
contrast the sources, is called collation (Alafiatayo, Yip, & Blunden-Ellis, 1996). 
Collation may require the summarising or seeking agreement between multiple 
resources, in effect providing a recursive response. 
While the practice of collation is a significant part of the research librarian’s 
work, and has not been supplanted by the rise of search engines (Janes, 2003; Rettig, 
2003, 2006), there is no single established library science abstraction for the task itself 
(Cornelius, 2004; Floridi, 2004a; Herold, 2004; Hjørland, 2005; Radford & Budd, 
1997; Svenonius, 2004; Zwadlo, 1997). This thesis takes the social epistemological 
stream established by Egan and Shera (Egan & Shera, 1952; Furner, 2004) as the 
theoretical justification of library science, consistent with the community of knowing 
proposed by Walsham (2005) that is the informatic tradition to which the current 
research belongs. 
The significance of the practice of answer collation for the current research is 
that many cases of question posing require an articulated response, with an intentional 
compositional role on the part of the respondent. 
4.3.4 Knowledge reuse in the reference interview 
A key attribute of the research librarian’s task it to synthesise knowledge for the 
enquirer based on the knowledge available (D. R. Swanson, 1977). This manifests 
itself in two ways in library science. Firstly systematic bibliography requires that the 
books are subject-classified to greatest possible degree in order that multiple access 
points to their content be enabled (Ranganathan, 1931). This means that the knowledge 
in any library amounts to much more that the number of actual volumes in it. 
Secondly, an important part of collections development policy for research 
libraries is to anticipate potential requests for knowledge (C. A. Bunge, 1970). This 
means that research libraries must keep a large store of generalised sources of 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
between information and knowledge factoring is that it is part of the processing of requests at the 
knowledge level rather than at the symbol level.  
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knowledge, although only some of those sources will ever be used (C. A. Bunge, 
1970).  
Knowledge reuse from multiple sources that has been generalised to include the 
possibility of a generic knowledge creation methodology from what its proponents call 
“undiscovered public knowledge” (R. Davies, 1992, 1993a, 1993b; D. R. Swanson, 
1986; D. R. Swanson & Smalheiser, 1996). This generic methodology has been shown 
to operate in practice (R. Davies, 1993b; D. R. Swanson, 1986). 
The significance of this for the current research is the reality of knowledge 
repurposing in the regular activities of the research librarian, as opposed to a secondary 
opportunistic activity. 
4.3.5 Turn-taking in the reference interview 
The reference interview is not a single question answer pair. After the librarian 
has answered in a co-operative manner, the patron either will know more, will need 
more information in order to know more (because some terms in the answer are 
unknown) or will contest the answer.  
The reference interview can be formalised as a dialogue (sensu Moore, 1992), in 
that the provision of an answer will not necessarily mean the end of the reference 
interview or the satisfaction of the patron (Doherty, 2006). It is also not a linear 
conversation, as there can be revision of belief states, and revisiting earlier questions in 
the light of those revisions. The classic statement of the potential courses of the 
conversation is: 
[…] continued dialogue on the ramifications and structure of the subject 
will define, expand, narrow, and qualify the enquiry (Taylor, 1968, p. 128) 
In informatic terms the reference interview is formally a continuous 
conversation (sensu Pask, 1975, 1980) taking a course directed towards the patron’s 
knowing more (Ford, 2004).  
The courses the interview can take are, however, limited. Firstly, the 
conversation is marked by turn-taking (sensu Sacks et al., 1974), with the librarian both 
guiding the patron cooperatively, and by offering choices of standardised paths for 
knowledge (Hannabuss, 1989). These paths are the subject of both institutional and 
personal preparation on the part of the librarian. There are also pragmatic restrictions 
on what is acceptable (discussed in 4.3.2). The termination of the interview is the result  
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of either the bounds being overstepped (judged by the librarian) or the question being 
answered (judged by the patron). 
When we consider the erotetic perspective based on a reference interview, this 
dialogical nature will be significant. 
4.3.6 Cognitive authority in the reference interview 
A key part of the reference interview is the preparedness of the research librarian 
to answer questions: this is (as described above) in terms of training, but also in terms 
of collections development – the prior assembly of materials to anticipate the needs of 
the library patrons. Librarianship as a profession is concerned with the organisation and 
curation of collections to just such a purpose. 
This role is acknowledged with a professionally conferred cognitive authority 
(P. Wilson, 1983) within society. Librarians are trusted to select what material is to be 
stored or encoded and handed out in response to requests for knowledge. In return, they 
are required to develop skills to assist others in their learning. According to Wilson’s 
(1983) theory of cognitive authority individuals learn most of what they know not from 
experience (first-hand knowledge) but by being told things (second-hand knowledge). 
What makes the profession of librarianship significant is that its specialisation is in the 
curation of second-hand knowledge. This curation involves the archiving, organisation 
and prioritisation of encoded knowledge. This means that library schools must train 
with a particularly generalised deutero-learning (Argyris & Schön, 1974) in mind. 
In return for undergoing professional training, the librarian is given a position of 
trust as to deciding the bounds of any reference interview, such as effort or cost 
expended, the legitimacy of a request for knowledge, and the sufficiency of an answer. 
The librarian, for their part, must acknowledge failure, incapacity or ignorance, and be 
able to professionally refer to other sources of knowledge as appropriate. 
The significance of cognitive authority for the erotetic perspective on knowledge 
is the formal acceptance of the reply to a question within a system that has been 
established for question answering, and the incorporation of learning into such a 
system. It also provides us with a model for how a knowledge system acquires 
knowledge, and how such a system can place restrictions on the dissemination of that 
knowledge.  
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4.4  The sufficiency of the reference interview as metaphoric 
ground 
The previous sections have shown that there exists an established, principled and 
pragmatic tradition of the reference interview within library science, that derives 
theoretical justification from established erotetic traditions, and that models a 
cooperative question-and-answer conversation between the inquiring library patron and 
the responding research librarian. We have shown the sufficiency of the reference 
interview to illustrate the nature of a QA knowledge seeking conversation. 
For our purposes, the reference interview connotatively generalises to an 
abstract information need within a social context possessing an organised capacity to 
satisfy that need (Belkin & Vickery, 1985). It is a typed request for knowledge on a 
subject within a context. Accordingly, the erotetic metaphor can be expressed: to know 
something is to be able to satisfy a need to know that thing. Consequently, to represent 
knowledge is to represent the ability to answer a knowledge need. Both the knowledge 
and its representation are to be placed within an appropriate context that permits the 
satisfaction of the need. 
4.5  Summary 
This chapter has presented the research librarian reference interview as a ground 
for the KNOWLEDGE IS A RESOLVED INQUIRY cognitive metaphor, to illuminate 
what is required to store encoded knowledge, to retrieve it on call, and to determine if 
the resulting answer is satisfactory.  
The chapter has shown the connotations of the metaphor, including the 
expectations and obligations of the participants, the role of cooperation and collation in 
preparing answers, and the turn-taking and role-taking that is involved in participating 
in a QA conversation. Drawing on established library science research, it was 
established that to represent knowledge is to represent the ability to answer a 
knowledge need. 
From this point in the research, the two paths are followed. The principal 
research path that uses Rescherian epistemology to present a formal account of the QA 
conversation (in Chapter 5), preparatory to operationalising the QA formalism (Chapter 
6) and developing the Functional entity framework (Chapters 7 to 10), and 
substantiation with case studies (Chapter 11) The secondary research path takes the 
reference interview and uses Speech Acts analysis to establish the knowledge exchange  
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transactioning language FERL (Chapter 12). The two research paths rejoin in the 
docking process in Chapter 13. 
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Chapter 5  
 
Formalising the Erotetic Perspective 
 
5.1  Chapter overview 
This chapter formalises the erotetic perspective to address the first research 
question for the thesis: is the erotetic perspective on knowledge theoretically legitimate 
as a paradigm for metamodelling?  
In Chapter 2 we proposed the erotetic perspective as an alternative to the 
reifying perspective for informatics, based on the conceptual metaphor 
KNOWLEDGE-IS-RESOLVED-INQUIRY. In Chapter 4 we demonstrated that the 
research librarian reference interview, as an idealised knowledge-seeking question-and-
answer conversation, provides a sufficient ground for that metaphor. However, neither 
the usefulness or richness of a metaphor can underpin scientific discourse in a rigorous 
way. We showed (Section 2.5) the necessity for a single epistemological framework 
that can account for the different levels and typologies (both intrinsic and extrinsic) of 
erotetic activity, in order to legitimise the erotetic perspective, and to give a single 
unifying theoretic model covering instances of questions and answers, types of 
questions and answers, and how they give rise to higher order erotetic communities of 
knowing (Walsham, 2005). 
As discussed in Section 3.2.3.1, theory design artefacts require kernel theories 
for justificatory knowledge. This chapter presents, as a kernel theory for the erotetic 
perspective, an established erotetic epistemological program: Rescher’s inquiry 
dynamics (Rescher, 2000a). We give an account of Rescher’s epistemology, in the 
form of necessary features of erotetic structures at different levels, presented as 
numbered criteria in such a way as to permit the identification of parts of the current 
research and the constructs it develops with the necessary features described by 
Rescher.  
We begin with an account of the role inquiry dynamics plays in the current 
research (Section 5.2), then describe its essential features (Section 5.3), including 
questions as constructs in erotetics, necessary features of answers and QA Pairs, and 
conclude with an account of how QA exchanges can give rise to communities of  
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enquiry. Section 5.4 summarises the implications of inquiry dynamics for the erotetic 
perspective. 
5.2  The role of Rescher’s inquiry dynamics in the current 
research 
Rescher’s inquiry dynamics (Rescher, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1995, 
1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001a, 2004, 2006, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c) is a multi-
decade epistemological project investigating the implications of considering human 
intellect as being based on enquiry. We discussed in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.5.1 how 
Rescher's inquiry dynamics is a fully comprehensive epistemological program based on 
erotetic logic ranging from simple question-answer pairs to active massively 
distributed communities of inquiry, acting as a repository for a dynamic form of 
knowledge.  
A full account of Rescher's inquiry dynamics is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Put simply, Rescher holds that 
[…] knowledge-acceptance and question-resolution are interrelated in a condition of 
conjoined significance. For questions and answers stand in reciprocal coordination: the 
statement with the inquiry that provokes it; the proposition with the interrogation. (Rescher, 
2000a, p. 3) 
According to Rescher, the development of knowledge in individuals and in 
society involves resolved inquiry: an individual poses a problem about the world and 
resolves it through investigation. It begins with the analysis of simple erotetic 
exchange, through courses of inquiry, and emerges as communities of inquiry, which 
function as Walsham’s communities of knowing (Walsham, 2005). 
The account of knowledge described in Sections 2.4 and Chapter 4 – that to 
know something is to be able to satisfy a need to know that thing, together with its 
corollary, that to represent knowledge is to represent the ability to answer a knowledge 
need – require a single formalism to permit the principled creation of an erotetic 
knowledge modelling framework. To amount to resolved inquiry, it is not sufficient for 
just any exchange of question and answer to occur: there are strictures for behaviour 
necessary before the outcome can be said to be productive of knowledge.  
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Descriptive adequacy (Chomsky, 1957, p. 286)
55 requires of the current research 
that both the elements of the kernel theory, and those constructs derived from it, are 
able to account for those existing question-and-answer constructs, and represent all 
other informatic practices as well. Chapter 2 showed how question-and-answer 
constructs are found at seven levels in a manner that, consistently and holarchically 
across the levels, is descriptively adequate in this regard.  
This section will now show how knowledge as dynamic inquiry, the erotetic 
epistemological hierarchy created by Rescher, can provide a consistent theoretical 
structure for the erotetic perspective, such that a verifiable set of constructs can be 
built. 
This remainder of the chapter gives a brief account of the significant points of 
inquiry dynamics that bear on a theoretical underpinning of the QA metaphor.  
5.3  Essential features of Rescher’s inquiry dynamics 
For the purposes of analysis, we can usefully separate the essential features of 
inquiry dynamics into three sections: those essential features of questions and the 
questioner, including the context within which the question is asked (Section 5.3.1); 
features of answers to those questions and of question-answer correlation (5.3.2); and 
features of question-answer aggregations at different levels (5.3.3). 
5.3.1 Essential features of questions in inquiry dynamics 
Rescher holds (Rescher, 2001a, pp. 21-22) that certain basic requirements are 
needed for a QA Pair to amount to an inquiry. For the purpose of the current research, 
this is significant because we need to know what counts as a question for the purposes 
of modelling, not only in the instance, but also for the classes of questions necessary 
for an erotetic modelling to proceed. Rescher shows that questions are necessarily 
typed, existing within a continuous context of enquiry, relying on presuppositions and 
expecting an answer. All of these criteria must be true of any generalised erotetic 
representation. Additionally, the use of inquiry dynamics as a kernel theory is only 
legitimate if all of these criteria are employed in the construction of the erotetic 
framework. 
                                                      
 
55 Descriptive adequacy (Chomsky, 1957, p. 286) requires that for all situations that the user of the 
framework is likely to encounter within their universe of discourse, the framework will be adequate to 
making a clear, unambiguous and executable description.  
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Rescher gives a set of essential components of an erotetic epistemology, which 
we summarise briefly below. These are presented as a numbered list to permit 
unambiguous reference to them in Chapter 6, where they are operationalised, and 
Chapter 13 where adherence to the kernel theory is confirmed. Italicised terms are 
Rescher's. 
A1  The question (and the questioner) is presumed sincere (Rescher, 2001a, p. 21).  
A2  The questioning requires a benign cognitive environment (Rescher, 2001a, p. 21).
56 
A3  The question must be expressed within a common, shared universe of discourse 
between the enquirer and respondent (Rescher, 2001a, p. 22). 
A4  The question must be based on true presuppositions, within the shared universe of 
discourse (Rescher, 1982, p. 133; 2001a, p. 22).
57 
A5  Questions are asked on the presupposition that there exists an answer for them 
(Rescher, 1982). 
A6  Questions will be of an intrinsic type based on their mode of formulation (Rescher, 
2003). 
A7  Questions of the same type will have the same type of answer (Rescher, 2003). 
A8  The questioner must accept at the outset certain pragmatic and social limitations to the 
subject and extent of their questioning (Rescher, 2001a, p. 22).  
A9  The questioner must be willing to accept a well formed answer (Rescher, 2000a, p. 3). 
A10  The questioner must be open to epistemic change by incorporating the content of an 
answer if well-formed and comprehensible into their existing knowledge (Rescher, 
2009b, p. 30)
58 
A11 Questions  are  either  simple or complex and only simple questions can be answered 
(Rescher, 1982). Simple questions ask for one piece of information about a given topic 
for a given relation: as such they are notatable. 
A12  Well formed complex questions are exfoliable (Rescher, 1982), that is they permit 
reducibility to a sequence of simple questions. 
                                                      
 
56 In other words, it must be asked by a sane person, of a sane person, within a context in which a 
questioners has a right to question and expects a truthful reply. This is a separate formulation to Grice’s 
cooperative answering (Grice, 1969, 1975, 1978), but towards the same (Kantian) purpose. 
57 “A presupposition of a question is a thesis (or proposition) that is entailed by each and every one of its 
admissible explicit answers. Its presuppositions enter into the very way in which the question is 
formulated.” (Rescher, 1982, p. 133) 
58 Failure to do so is to be venially ignorant.  
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A question construct developed within the current research erotetic design 
framework must satisfy all twelve of these conditions. There are also specific 
requirements for acceptable answers to an inquiry, which are considered next. 
5.3.2 The nature of answers and QA Pairs in inquiry dynamics 
Answers within the erotetic perspective have certain features in order that they 
contribute towards learning, and therefore the growth of knowledge. Significantly, 
Rescher shows that questions standardise, creating mappable classes of questions, for 
which the stored plena of knowledge provide the basis for a community’s knowledge 
on the topic to which the questions apply. Mapping these standardised questions and 
answers provides the basis for erotetic knowledge modelling. 
These are also presented as a numbered list to permit unambiguous reference to 
them in Chapter 6 and 13. Italicised terms are Rescher's. 
B1  Firstly, the answer must be appropriate and correlated, i.e. correspond to the subject 
matter of the question in a useful way (Rescher, 2001a, p. 21). This ensures the answer 
is about the question. 
B2  The answers will be manifest as collectivities (collections of values with a truth value 
that provide the answer satisfaction) (Rescher & Grim, 2008).
59 
B3  The answer has to be intentionally formed – an oracular answer that happens to be 
correct is not a correct answer (Rescher, 2009c, p. 6).  
B4  The correctness must be demonstrable, i.e. have backing in both facts and rationale 
(Rescher, 2009c, p. 6). 
B5  The answers will have truth conditions determined by available knowledge and how 
that knowledge was acquired (Rescher, 2000a). These truth conditions can be true of the 
entire collectivity itself as well as values in the collectivity (Rescher, 2004, p. 7). 
B6  All questions have a cost, and a utility, and these factors determine which sources of 
answers will be asked (Rescher, 1989, p. 12).  
B7  All answers are a result of the those answers being made available (Rescher, 1989, p. 
10), which effectively restricts access to answers. 
B8  Respondents will all have an authority to answer those questions (Rescher, 2009a) in 
two senses: epistemic (sufficient knowledge to answer the question) or practical (the 
                                                      
 
59 Collectivities are plenum-theoretical structures, which are collections of values that do not necessarily 
conform to set-theoretical conditions (i.e. they can be ordered, structured and repetitive), but still obey the 
other rules for set theory and are manipulable with the standard set operations. They are also category 
theoretic.  
  130
right to answer or not answer).  
B9  Other things being equal people choose the best available answer (Rescher, 1989, p. 
82). 
B10  The answer will be entailed by the question and the available knowledge (Rescher & 
Grim, 2008, p. 3): that is, the possible collectivities of values that can count as an 
answer to a particular question asked at a particular time is determined by that question. 
That entailment will vary according to the time asked depending on that knowledge 
(Rescher, 2000a, p. 9). 
B11  The answer will be of a kind depending on the kind of question posed (Rescher, 2004, p. 
xiv). The number of possible kinds of questions is limited both intrinsically by the 
nature of questions and extrinsically by the domain of enquiry (as we have seen in 
2.5.2.7).
60 
B12  A question can be simple or complex (Rescher, 2000a, p. 42). A simple answer only has 
one component, a single typed question. A complex question can be made up of a 
number of questions (possibly recursive) which require a single answer. If the question 
is complex, then the answer will be complex 
B13  An answer can be epistemically or ontologically complex (Rescher, 1998, p. 8).
61 
B14  Complex answers are resolved through question regression (Rescher, 2000a, p. 42). 
B15  Answers are invoked by the questions at the level of the gestalt expression, with any 
internal operations only called upon as explanation (Rescher, 2000a, p. 42; Rescher & 
Oppenheim, 1955). This means that the complexity of answers will very often be hidden 
by the operation of regression. A gestalt may be decomposed for consideration, but the 
answer will apply to the gestalt not the values it comprises. 
B16 Answers  will  be  manifest as collectivities regardless of their being simple or complex 
(Rescher & Grim, 2008). 
Once more, an answer construct within the erotetic design framework being 
constructed in the current research must satisfy all of these conditions to be adequate to 
the task.  
                                                      
 
60 Significantly, making a typology of the kinds of questions and answer helps classify representations. 
61 Epistemic complexity derives from the circumstances of asking and answering, and there are three 
forms: descriptive (the amount needed to adequately answer), generative (the number of instructions) or 
computational (the time and effort required). Ontological complexity derives from the nature of the 
question and answer, and is found in six forms: constitutional (number of constituents), taxonomic 
(heterogeneity of components), organisational (number of combinations), hierarchical (number of levels), 
operational (number of modes of operation), and nomic (number of laws in operation). The erotetic 
modelling framework being constructed must be able to account for all of these forms of complexity.  
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A third set of additional requirements for constructing erotetic conversations out 
of conforming questions and answers, i.e. sequences of conforming questions and 
answers, is discussed next. 
5.3.3 QA Pairs as the basis for a community of inquiry 
Questions and their answers, when conforming to the strictures of the 
Rescherian erotetic epistemology described in the previous two sections, amount to 
gestalt Question-Answer pairs (QA Pairs), which result in the growth of knowledge 
and of individuals within the community. This is vital to the current research, as it is 
only by having a declarative abstraction for Walsham’s community of knowing that we 
can model knowledge in the wild by use of standardised questions. 
Again, these are also presented as a numbered list to permit unambiguous 
reference to them in Chapter 6, where they are operationalised, and Chapter 13 where 
adherence to the kernel theory is confirmed. Italicised terms are Rescher's. 
C1  All cognitive activity fits into common structures called processes (Rescher, 2000c, p. 
10). A question-answering process with commonality between all the subjects that can be 
asked of the same subject is a question-agenda (Rescher, 2000a).  
C2  Questions in a question agenda will standardise (Rescher, 2000b) around questions of the 
same type asked on an area of interest. These standardised questions will have the same 
form, type, truth conditions and so forth. 
C3  Conforming QAs give rise to shared knowledge based on inquiry that is representable in a 
formalised manner, through a standard path towards greater understanding through the 
erotetic cycle “from presuppositions to question to answer to implication thereof” 
(Rescher, 2000a, p. 44) which forms the new set of presuppositions and the basis for the 
next questions to be asked.  
C4  Each answered question will result in cognitive progress (Rescher, 2001a, p. 23), i.e. a 
change in the mental state of the enquirer, or of the general knowledge of society. 
Progress is measured by the new questions that can be asked of an area of interest 
(Rescher, 2000c).  
C5  Inquirers, as a result of cognitive progress, become responders: someone able to respond 
to a question has already asked it themselves before (Rescher, 1998) 
C6  Inquirers in one circumstance may be respondents in another (Rescher, 1982) 
C7  Individual question-and-pairs are part of greater courses of inquiry: sequences of 
questions leading to further questions (Rescher, 2000a, p. 44).  
C8 Inquiry  is  dialectic (Rescher, 2000a, p. 42): the answer returned will either lead to a 
terminus of the conversation through satisfaction with the answer, or to a further enquiry  
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(Rescher, 2001a, p. 24).  
C9  There may also be grounds to judge that the source of answers is inadequate (Rescher, 
1988, p. 80). This can arise through informational under-determination (i.e. ignorance). It 
can also arise through unsatisfactory answers due to incorrect informative determination 
(i.e. error) or informational over-determination (i.e. inconsistency). This will alter the 
course of the inquiry by undermining the perception of authority on the part of the 
respondent. 
C10  Just as the answer is entailed by the initial question, so the outcome is an implication of 
the answer, forming overlapping question-answer-outcome (QAO) triplets (Rescher, 
2000a, p. 44).  
C11  Multitudes of such QAO triplets make up communities of inquiry (Rescher, 2004, p. 108), 
with questioners becoming answerers as a result of their learning. The same answers 
satisfy repeated similar questions, and repositories of such answers constitute the 
resources of communities of inquiry. Knowledge about a subject at any time is determined 
by the questions that can be asked of a subject, and of those questions, which ones are 
open questions (Rescher, 2000c). 
C12  A community’s knowledge is the plenum (Rescher & Grim, 2008 ) of all possible 
available answers based on accumulated experience (2001a, p. 25).
62 
By conceptualising the community of inquiry in this way, Rescher gives us a 
formalism for representing knowledge as an emergent process from discrete erotetic 
conversations. By having a typed, formalised, domain-centric erotetic learning 
conversation as the building block for those conversations Rescher provides a single 
theoretical framework for modelling representable knowledge at the levels of storage, 
need and system. 
5.4  Inquiry dynamics and the Erotetic Perspective 
Inquiry dynamics presents a coherent and comprehensive erotetic epistemology 
that accounts for observable features of knowledge and its communication through 
                                                      
 
62 A plenum is a special formalism devised by Rescher & Grim to represent the totality of values from 
which collectivities can be drawn (Rescher & Grim, 2008, 2010): it permits consideration of the 
representation of pluralities in areas where set theory has failed owing to inherent shortcomings or 
paradoxes. Rescher and Grim created the notion intentionally to permit the representation of "totalities of 
facts, states of affairs, truths, propositions, and sets" (Rescher & Grim, 2008, p. 2). A fuller list in Rescher 
& Grim (2010) is: 
- things/entities/individuals/items/objects 
- ordered sets 
- structured inventories 
- segmented agendas (for discussion or deliberation)  
- actualities and possibilities 
- truths/facts/states of affairs  
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learning, through the emergence of styles of QA Pairs and the emergence of those pairs 
as communities of inquiries. It shows the role of QA conversations in learning at the 
individual, group and community level, and how that learning can fold back into the 
community as deutero-learning. Moreover, Rescher shows how representation of the 
entailment between standardised question and answer pairs is sufficient to represent 
symbolically the knowledge of a community. 
Rescher’s inquiry dynamics can thus be shown to be a coherent intellectual 
tradition that is appropriate to the current research. The set of criteria for kernel theory 
sufficiency and appropriateness, described at 3.4.1, is evaluated successfully for 
inquiry dynamics. This is shown in Chapter 13, along with the other sets of criteria 
used in the current research. 
The research question: is the erotetic perspective on knowledge theoretically 
legitimate as a paradigm for metamodelling? can accordingly be answered in the 
affirmative.  
5.5  Summary 
This chapter has presented a kernel theory of erotetic epistemology to support 
the erotetic approach to knowledge that was established in Chapter 2, and which was 
given a metaphoric ground (the reference interview) in Chapter 4. It has shown how 
Rescher's inquiry dynamics provides a consistent theoretical account of how 
knowledge can be built up from simple agreement between question and answer in an 
informative question-and-answer pair, up through levels of increasing concurrency, 
historicity and co-operation into a high level community of enquirers, the equivalent of 
Walsham's community of knowing.  
The chapter described features of well-formed questions and answers: the nature 
of well-formed questions; the nature of well-formed answers and QA Pairs and how the 
continuous interaction of questions and answers gives rise to the community of 
enquirers.  
This has accomplished the first research goal of the thesis, to present a 
principled account of an erotetic perspective. 
The next chapter (Chapter 6) will show how established information systems, 
library science and knowledge management practices can be used to operationalise this 
account of knowledge, preparatory to using it (in Chapter 7) to establish an erotetic 
framework for modelling knowledge systems. 
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Chapter 6  
 
Operationalising the Erotetic Perspective 
 
6.1  Chapter overview 
This chapter describes the constructs that are used to permit conceptual 
modelling within the erotetic perspective on informatics and KM.  
The necessary features of Rescher’s account of knowledge – knowledge as a 
question-and-answer dialogue between an informed, sincere questioner with an inquiry 
and a cooperative domain expert respondent – are operationalised as constructs using 
standard informatic approaches. This is done by reusing existing constructs where 
possible to conform with the best practices of creative design research. 
In Section 6.2, there is a brief discussion as to the purpose and process of 
operationalising a perspective. In Section 6.3 we operationalise formalised erotetic 
conversation using standard informatic techniques as the Cooperative QA Pair 
construct. In Section 6.4 we operationalise the apex level, Rescher’s community of 
inquiry as Walsham’s (2005) community of knowing. 
In the following chapter, Chapter 7, we show that the Cooperative QA Pair 
construct is an instance of a categorial relationship, and demonstrate how it can be used 
to establish the core modelling construct of the thesis, the Functional Entity. 
6.2  Operationalising a perspective 
In Chapter 5, Rescher’s epistemological hierarchy was described showing what 
is theoretically required of an erotetic form of knowledge at each level from simple 
question and answer up to the community of enquiry. Rescher’s inquiry dynamics 
provides the kernel theory for the erotetic perspective. 
In establishing a perspective, the conceptualisation process precedes the act of 
operationalising the ideas as constructs (Denzin, 1970). New concepts permit 
"previously unexplored avenues of action" (Denzin, 1970, p. 38) and this is 
accomplished through operationalising those concepts, which then provide a 
"framework within which emergent propositions are placed" (Denzin, 1970).   
  136
The development of operationalising constructs proceeds by the specification of 
attributes in a representational construct (Hempel, 1965 p.168) which have the 
character of theoretical systems. We showed in Chapter 2 that there were existing 
erotetic practices in informatics traditions, even if they have often been described using 
resource-inspired terminology. The artefacts from these traditions are called upon and 
resituated within the erotetic perspective to operationalise the Rescherian erotetic 
epistemological hierarchy. 
The principle of evaluation by distributed justification described in Chapter 3 
requires that each level of the informatic hierarchy be presented as a theorem in order 
that it is shown to be a verified step, even though some of these theorem statements are 
effectively Wittgensteinian ladders. Additionally, the core artefacts within the erotetic 
perspective must build on established artefacts to be grounded in accepted practice, so 
each step in this justification must have a pragmatic basis in existing informatic 
artefacts. For example, the theorem regarding the essential cooperative nature of an 
instance of an answer is expressed as a theorem, grounded in the cooperative database 
principles of Lee (1978) and Gal (1988), which use the kernel theory of the philosophy 
of language of Grice (1975, 1978). 
6.3  Operationalising the QA Pair 
In this section the basis of the erotetic perspective, the cooperative question-and-
answer pair, is described.  
6.3.1 The simple QA Pair as matching well-formed formulae 
At its simplest, a Rescherian inquiry is a QA Pair, consisting of a well-formed 
question posed by a sincere enquirer
63 and a corresponding answer given by a 
competent respondent
64 (Figure 6.1). A question is said to be answered (or equivalently 
the answer is said to be the correct one) if the answer is relevant and true. 
                                                      
 
63 Rescherian criteria A1-A4 
64 Rescherian criteria B1, B3, B8  
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Figure 6‐1 A simple idealised QA Pair 
We operationalise Rescher’s QA Pair by using the erotetic logic system of 
Belnap (1963) developed to formalise information retrieval. Erotetic logic holds that a 
question entails the answer (Belnap, 1963; Hamblin, 1958); that is, if the question is a 
well formed formula (WFF), and the state of knowledge
65 permits an answer, then the 
answer is determined by the question. Expression 6.1 shows this ideal relationship for 
question Q and answer A. 
  (6.1) 
Pragmatically, this entailment corresponds directly with Robinson's (1965) 
description of the core problem in knowledge retrieval: 
Given an interrogative sentence, how does one recognize a matching sentence that supplies 
an answer? (J. J. Robinson, 1965, p. 1) 
Robinson's simple QA format matches the question and answer on common 
terms: the question "What is A?" and the answer "That thing is A" match because of 
the commonality of "is" and "A".
66 
Belnap operationalised the problem of question and answer matching (Belnap, 
1963, 1966) by treating both question and answer statement as categories expressed as 
matrices with named elements. 
                                                       
 
65 A communally held knowledge source will ideally contain all possible answers to a class of questions. 
66 There are actually three ways in which the same question can be asked, familiar to compilers of data 
queries: “list the things that are A” (enumerative), “is there anything that is A?” (existential) and “how 
many things are there that are A?” (quantitative). For the purposes of initial discussion we limit ourselves 
to the enumerative. Robinson's example is an instance of enumerative where only one suitable answer is 
found. 
Q  A 
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The simplest definition of the q-a relationship for which-questions is in terms of matrices 
and substitution: from the question 'which thing is an A?' we recover the matrix 'x is an A', 
and then define the answers as any substitution thereof. (Belnap, 1966) 
A statement (and therefore a satisfactory answer) is a WFF with no free 
variables, and a question is accordingly a WFF with one free variable. Answering a 
question then becomes a matter of finding a value to substitute for the free variable; the 
type of question asked will depend on which variable is free. Expression 6.2 shows 
such a question answering for a three variable exchange. For elements W, S and A, the 
question "which thing is an A?", and the answer "x is an A" is given as: 
  (6.2) 
This representation works independently of the kind of question being asked, or 
the subject domain being investigated. Questions cannot have more than one free 
variable as that would render them ambiguous. The current research limits the 
questions to three element matrices or triples, consisting of an instance, a value and a 
linkage. This can be represented by the triple: 
  (6.3) 
The symbolic form of the QA Pair (Q and A) and their triples are equivalent, 
and we discuss them in the symbolic form to investigate how to operationalise their 
Rescherian qualities. We can describe the QA Pair in Theorem 6.1 
A Question and Answer pair QA is a pair of WFFs each with instance, 
value and linkage variables. The question is a triple with a free named 
variable, an answer is a matching triple with the free variable fixed.   
  Theorem 6.1 
In the erotetic perspective, the QA Pair form the basis of the knowledge key and 
entailed knowledge image, the basic constructs of knowledge exchange.
67 The pair 
itself is called a knowledge call. We shall come back to return in more formal detail to 
these ideas in section 7.2.5. 
                                                      
 
67 Using familiar terminology from databases and discrete mathematics, a key is essentially a querying 
term drawn from one set of values which automatically determines an image (i.e. a corresponding series 
of values from the knowledge base 
W,?, A   W,x, A 
I, V, L  
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6.3.2 QA entailment direction 
While a question entails the answer, an answer does not determine the question 
asked, as the same answer can be given to any number of questions. Expression 6.4 
shows this ambiguity for answer A and questions Q1 to Qn. 
  (6.4) 
Nor does a particular question (as phrased in a given situation, i.e. at a time and 
place) always have the same answer (Rescher, 2000a, p. 9), since it is the intent of the 
question, in a context, that determines it. Expression 6.5 shows this relationship for 
questions Qs1 to Qsn and answers As1 to Asn in situations S1 to Sn.  
  (6.5) 
Rescher calls this relationship (between questions and answers) a question-
agenda (Rescher, 2000a, 2004)
68: this is operationalised in the erotetic perspective as a 
series of affine knowledge calls, making a knowledge dependency, again which we 
revisit in section 7.2.5. 
6.3.3 Answers as Informatic Collectivities 
As the outcome of an inquiry, an answer is a nullity, a singleton or a plurality of 
values. However, from B2 and B15 in (Section 5.3), an answer cannot be represented 
adequately as a set because of the nature of answers: having an internal structure, 
domain and typology, and potentially inherent order, nesting or repetition of values. 
Such features preclude set representation. An answer can instead be abstracted as a 
collectivity: 
[…] a collection of items whose content is specified in terms of conformity to some 
condition, either extensionally via an inventory of some sort or intensionally through a 
defining membership feature (Rescher & Grim, 2008, p. 3) 
                                                      
 
68 Rescherian criterion C1 
A  Q1 Qn 
Qs1  As1
Qs2  As2

Qsn  Asn 
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 By formalising an answer as a collectivity
69, the requisite structure, type and 
potential order can be included in representations and algebraic expressions using 
plenum theory (Rescher & Grim, 2008, 2010). 
In the erotetic perspective, the answers as collectivities are drawn from the plena 
that represent all the possible collectivities that could be given as answers to a class of 
questions (i.e. questions on the same topic) in all situations. Expression 6.6 restates 
Expression 6.1 showing the plenum: 
 
(6.6) 
Consequently, the answers to the same question posed in different situations are 
members of the same plenum. Expression 6.7 re-presents Expression 6.5 showing the 
plenum: 
  
(6.7) 
Expression 6.8 shows this generalised: the set of all possible questions on topic 
T leading to answers A1 to An which constitute a plenum of answers. 
   (6.8) 
Any informatic construct that can hold a representation for these formulae will 
generally be adequate to the task of operationalising a Rescherian erotetic pair
70 in the 
strictest sense, but may not, however, be fully sufficient, as discussed next.  
Operationalising the erotetic perspective requires the operationalising not only 
of questions and answers, but also of the sets of questions and the plena of the 
collectivities that constitute their answers. This problem is prefigured by investigators 
(Earley, 1973, 1974; Yager, 1981) looking for data abstractions that are alternatives to 
the set-base representation of the relational model, yet still functioning at the relational 
level (Earley, 1973) – these include including bags (Rulifson, 1970), arrays (K. E. 
Iverson, 1962), and trees (Haines, 1965). The meta-descriptions “abstract data type” or 
indeed “relational level abstraction” do not describe any common properties apart from 
data-containment. 
                                                      
 
69 Rescherian criterion B2 
70 Rescherian criteria B1 and B3 
Q  A  aQ a    
Qs1 Qsn   As1  Asn      aQ a    
Q  qT q   A1  An      aQ a     
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We can operationalise Rescher’s collectivity
71 by proposing an informatic 
collectivity which is a unifying abstraction for these various abstract data types by their 
telos: producing a populated data structure on request according to their system 
specification. The nature of the data structure is determined by the context rather than 
by use of a stored type indicator. 
We can describe an informatic collectivity as Theorem 6.2. 
An answer A to a question Q will consist of an informatic collectivity: a 
specific, context-defined ADT that will be populated (for an answerable 
question) or a null structure (for an unanswerable one).  Theorem 6.2 
All knowledge capacities within the erotetic perspective will be modelled as an 
informatic collectivity. (From this point forward an informatic collectivity will be 
called simply a collectivity.) 
6.3.4 The cooperative QA Pair 
The QA Pair at its simplest is not the same as an erotetic conversation: for that 
to occur there must be a deontic dimension concerning the obligation to give a correct 
answer that is not misleading (Kimbrough, Lee, & Ness, 1984). Deontics gives us rules 
for behaviour within a system, justifications for those rules, and reasons why we 
should obey them. In IS, the rules accepted for conversational behaviour are those 
codified by Grice (1975). Grice states that in order for a conversation to proceed, 
participants should: 
…make [their] conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which [they] are 
engaged. (Grice, 1975, p. 45) 
Grice terms this the cooperative principle.
72 
Grice elaborates the cooperative principle in a set of conversational maxims
73 
(Grice, 1975) setting out the ways in which the deontic component of a QA Pair is 
                                                      
 
71 Rescherian criterion B2 
72 Rescherian criterion A1 
73 There are four maxims, corresponding to Kant’s maxims (Kant, 1788, p. A66). There is the maxim of 
quantity : participants should be as informative as is possible, giving as much information as is necessary, 
and no more (Grice, 1975, p. 45); the maxim of quality: participants should be truthful, and not give 
information that is either false or unsupported by evidence (Grice, 1975, p. 46); the maxim of relation: 
participants should stay relevant to, and say things that are pertinent to, the conversation (Grice, 1975, p. 
46); and the maxim of manner: participants should be as clear, brief, and orderly as is possible, while 
avoiding obscurity and ambiguity (Grice, 1975, p. 46).  
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formed. One who abides by the conversational maxims can be said to be a cooperative 
respondent. 
Lee (1978) describes a cooperative QA Pair built on the conversational maxims, 
one that necessarily gives a cooperative answer where a misleading or empty answer 
would be the literally correct one.
7475 
The propositional content of a cooperative answer – either direct or indirect – is 
the Gricean conversational implicature (Grice, 1975, p. 44) of the question. In 
traditional logic, the existential import of a proposition (Russell, 1905) refers to the 
denotation of things in the world by the affirmative statement of that proposition. 
Conversational implicature is the sum of all connotations about the world arising from 
the cooperative answers to a sincere question on a particular topic.  
Gricean implicature forms the basis for Clark and Haviland’s given-new 
contract (H. H. Clark & Haviland, 1977), which Lee (1978, p. 392) relies upon for the 
connotative content of the cooperative answer. The given-new contract in conversation 
concerns the informational content of affirmative declarative sentences: 
In all languages […] declarative sentences convey two kinds of information. (1) 
information the speaker considers given – information he believes the listener already 
knows and accepts as true, and (2) information the speaker considers new – information he 
believes the listener does not yet know. (H. H. Clark & Haviland, 1977, p. 3) 
That is, the informational content is additional information within the utterances 
intended to be given to the listener. 
Clark and Haviland only consider declarative sentences. Lee applies the given-
new contract to the erotetic entailment of Belnap (1963) laying out the parallel nature 
of proposition and questions in syllogism. Demonstrating that a question entails an 
answer if it is well-formed, Lee shows that given some information and a well-formed 
question, new information must emerge, if the respondent is abiding by the Gricean 
maxims. 
 a question presents 'given' information in the form of presuppositions (as do declarative 
sentences), and makes a request for some particular body of 'new' information. (R. M. Lee, 
1978, pp. 392-393) 
                                                      
 
74 In situations where a literally correct answer will be misleading or insufficient, a cooperative 
respondent will reply to the intended question with an indirect answer. For example, the indirectly correct 
answer to the question “Do you know where the post office is?” is not the literal “Yes”, but a description 
of how to get to the post office. A cooperative answer will also include additional information, when a 
direct answer might be misleading: for example mentioning that the post office is currently closed, or that 
the route to the post office is inaccessible. 
75 Rescherian criterion B1  
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thereby making the Belnapian entailment a cooperative one. 
The same motivation applies to the process of consulting a database: a 
cooperative answer is one that adheres to the Cooperative Principle, providing an 
indirect answer to a sound question where a direct answer (i.e. one answered in strictly 
the same terms) would be misleading. Lee proposes that every question entails the 
answer set, regardless of whether the respondent knows the answer or not. 
Conversational implicature operationalises Rescher’s erotetic entailment.
76 The given-
new contract for the cooperative answer operationalises Rescher’s erotetic cognitive 
progress.
77 
Finally, Lehnert (1975, 1977, 1978, 1981) shows that what counts as an 
appropriate answer to the same question may be different when asked on separate 
occasions, and by different questioners. This is because over and above cooperation, 
appropriate answers require satisficing heuristics to be appropriate. Answers will 
depend on state-assessment, contextualising and attention to focus. 
This means that there are additional principles to the conversational maxims 
involved in a cooperative erotetic conversation. 
1.  There must be a commitment to accepting a cooperative answer (S. J. Kaplan, 
1981) is an intrinsic part of well-formed question
78.  
2.  There must be a recognised cognitive authority on the part of the respondent (P. 
Wilson, 1983): this is a combination of expertise – having the competence to 
answer – and political – being in an acknowledged role that should respond and 
can decide whether to respond, and being willing to always answer to the best of 
ability, or alternatively acknowledge incapacity (Fritch, 2002; Fritch & 
Cromwell, 2001).
79 
3.  There must be a mutual understanding as to the bounds of cooperation, what 
counts as timely, germane, succinct, a good summary, what subjects are 
permitted etc.
80  
4.  There must be a squaring away – an explicit process of establishing the common 
knowledge – before the Gricean maxims could operate (Joshi (1982). These are 
                                                      
 
76 Rescherian criterion B9 
77 Rescherian criterion C4 
78 Rescherian criterion A5 
79 Rescherian criteria B3 and B8 
80 Rescherian criterion A5  
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considered a requirement for cooperative systems (Chu-Carroll & Carberry, 
1994; Gaasterland et al., 1992; Gal, 1988; Gal & Minker, 1988; Joshi, 1982) and 
match up to the implicit social/professional relationship of the reader and 
librarian discussed previously.
81  
Although modelling knowledge systems using a Lee/Grice cooperative 
formalism will involve accepting that the squaring away phase would always happen it 
also gives us the basis for a suitable abstraction for a generalised request for 
knowledge.  
We can state Lee’s cooperative QA Pair as Theorem 6.3. 
For the enquirer E (with given knowledge) and the expert respondent R, 
asking question Q with constraining value V entails cooperative answer A 
containing plurality of new values P.  Theorem 6.3 
We can represent this as a simple digraph as in Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6‐2 A cooperative QA Pair 
Significantly, the extent to which the cooperative pair depends on the situation 
in which it is created and preserved is such that even a slight variation in that situation 
may mean that the necessary conditions for the QA relationship no longer hold, and the 
erotetic principle of implicature no longer applies. What is necessary is a form of 
informatic contract (R. K. Stamper & Lee, 1986) ensuring that the system itself 
contrives to maintain the proper deontic status, while informing the user of the 
conditions under which the implicature holds. The erotetic perspective requires a form 
of informatic contract, the knowledge contract, which is discussed below in section 
7.2.4. 
                                                       
 
81 Rescherian criterion A5  
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6.3.5 QA Pairs as Toulminian data and claim 
Both the question and the answer within a QA Pair rest on many assumptions 
and sets of facts, as well as accepted paradigmatic modes of thought and presumed 
laws of reality (Rescher, 2001a). In representing the truth value of statements, their 
common discourse and their underlying paradigmatic assumptions, we can draw on 
Toulmin’s analysis of the nature of an “expert answer” to a “clear question” (Toulmin, 
1958, p. 15), which he formalised as a claim.  
Toulmin’s model of informal argumentation is based on the observation that no 
matter in what discourse an argument is found, there will be field-invariant and field-
dependent components (Toulmin, 1958, p. 15). Toulmin delineates the field-invariant 
components as the phases within an argument (e.g. question, answer, response) and 
role of particular statements within the argument (e.g. claim, backing, rebuttal).  
Figure 6.3 shows Toulmin’s argumentation structure. It can be read as claim C is 
justified by data D (since there is warrant W, on account of backing B), subject to 
qualification Q, unless we have to take account of reservation R. 
Figure 6‐3 A Toulminian Qualified Argument with Rebuttal (after Toulmin 2003) 
The cooperative implicature previously described can be used with Toulmin’s 
formalism since the claim is conceived of an answer to a question, contingent on given 
data. Lyytinen (2009) points out that it extends the idea of data to “anything that can be 
brought to bear in support (as evidence) while making a knowledge claim (2009, p. 
716)”. The implicature of these data are the encoded forms of knowledge (Gregor, 
2006, p. 617; Gregor & Jones, 2004, p. 90; Potter, 2008, p. 28). Both the data and the 
claims are institutional facts that afford encoding. Cooperative implicature maps 
directly to the cooperative QA Pair described in Theorem 6.3.   
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The value V and the type T are the equivalent of the contextualised data D in the 
Toulminian system, and the entailed plurality of values P in an answer based on the 
designated heuristic, are the equivalent of matches to the claim. 
Consequently, there is a pragmatic substantiation of values that have been 
theorised up to now, in accordance with an established academic tradition making use 
of the Toulminian argumentation form. It permits a theoretically justified yet pragmatic 
account of the components necessary to set up a question-answering system, that must 
be accounted for in any erotetic formalism: the design of the system (together with its 
concomitant expertise), the background expert knowledge, the bounds and constraints 
on the final answer. Later sections will show that the qualifications and rebuttal also 
have equivalencies in truth contingency and bounds-setting respectively. The 
equivalences are shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Equivalences between Gricean and Toulminian Frameworks 
Gricean QA Pair  Toulminian Argumentation 
Question value V  Data D
Answer A  Claim C
Expertise implicit in system design  Warrant W
Hedging (in 6.3.8.2)  Qualifier H
Bounds (in 6.3.8.1)  Rebuttal R
Expertise underpinning system  Backing B
 
We can describe the substantiated QA Pair (as Theorem 6.4) by adding a 
secondary clause to Theorem 6.3. 
For the question value V and implicated answer plurality P in a QA Pair 
as per theorem 6.3, there will be a corresponding series of values in data D 
and warranted claim C conforming to Toulmin, justified by the domain 
expertise with qualifications and within stated bounds.  Theorem 6.4 
We can represent this as a holarchic digraph (Figure 6.4).  
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Figure 6‐4 QA Pair as Toulminian argument 
The consequence of this correspondence is that, for the purposes of representing 
the QA Pair, we can look at representing the contextualised data and the source of the 
claims together with the warrants that underpin the claims, a construct we shall call the 
Question/Data-Answer/Claim pair (Q/D-A/C pair). This operationalises the Rescherian 
need for rationale and backing.
82  
6.3.6 Typed cooperative QA Pairs 
Chandrasekaran characterises the relationship between components within 
knowledge systems as typed according to generic task (Bylander & Chandrasekaran, 
1987; Chandrasekaran, 1986a, 1986b, 1988, 1989; Chandrasekaran & Johnson, 1993). 
Intelligent systems for Chandrasekaran involve nodes of expertise in continuous 
reliance on typed communication with other nodes that have agreed to act within an 
accepted role, and such systems being in turn seen as single nodes within a greater 
system.  
Such a system can be seen as adhering to similar patterns as Pask’s 
conversational and conversational mesh heuristics. The continuous multiple 
participations of individuals or components within knowledge systems form 
conversational meshes (Pangaro, 2001; Pask & Pangaro, 1981). Pask’s conversation 
theory (Pask, 1972, 1975, 1980; Pask, Kallikourdis, & Scott, 1975; Pask & Pangaro, 
1981; Pask, Scott, & Kallikourdis, 1973) provides us with an operationalisation of the 
inherent typing of cooperative QA Pairs. 
                                                       
 
82 Rescherian criteria B4  
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We can recognise that the intrinsic typing of questions (from the Belnapian 
intrinsic typing of triples) and the extrinsic typing of answering mechanisms (from 
Pask’s participant heuristic typing) will inform Lee’s cooperative conversation. We can 
combine these to arrive at a typed cooperative conversation, stated as Theorem 6.4 
For the enquirer E (with given knowledge) and the expert respondent R 
with Heuristics repertoire {H1 … Hn}, asking question Q with constraining 
value V and anticipatable type T entails cooperative answer A containing 
plurality of new values P in expected form F.   Theorem 6.4 
We can represent this as a simple digraph as in Figure 6.5. 
 
Figure 6‐5 A Typed QA Pair 
This typed cooperative QA Pair operationalises Rescherian erotetic answer 
kinds.
83 We revisit the aspect of Pask's and Chandrasekaran's theories regarding 
emergent community below in section 6.4.1, where the emergence of a community of 
knowing is discussed. We will investigate the emergent typification from the coaction 
of intrinsic and extrinsic types in section 6.3.11. 
6.3.7 Holarchic typed cooperative QA Pairs 
The interrelated nature of the erotetic collectivities means that values returned 
are themselves calling on other sources of knowledge in a network of erotetic 
implicature. 
We saw in the discussion of the reference interview (in section 4.3.3) how 
factoring and collation was often a feature of a cooperative response to complex 
reference questions. If either question or answer is deemed to be complex, then the 
typed, cooperative QA requires a more complex modelling formalism. A number of 
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answers must be obtained and collated according to rules depicting merging practices 
and constraints. Such a process is required to be referentially transparent to the 
processes that employ it, as the original answer material should not be distorted by the 
process of retrieval. 
The idea of factoring (Jolley, 1973) within knowledge systems is an established 
practice in IS, for elicitation and representation (e.g. Bourne et al., 1989; Garner, 1987; 
Moulin & Mineau, 1992), modelling (e.g. A. Borgida, 1986; A. T. Borgida & 
Greenspan, 1980; Rech, Decker, Ras, Jedlitschka, & Feldmann, 2007), decision 
support (e.g. Vanthienen & Snoeck, 1993), question-answering systems (e.g. Berwick, 
1987; P. Clark & Porter, 1997a) and co-operative systems (Mineau, Stumme, & Wille, 
1999; Moulin & Mineau, 1992). 
Complex answers requiring such factoring must be modellable as simples and 
nests simultaneously for complex knowledge systems. This type of behaviour must be 
modelled as a holon (Checkland, 1988; Koestler, 1969): at each level the QA Pair 
looks like a simple typed cooperative QA, but can always be the result of a series of 
nested such QAs, the results being collated to serve as a single answer. Such holarchic 
answer-factoring includes (e.g.) the answer requires a summary or derived information, 
or where there is an expectation of dissent and a qualified summary is required.￿ 
Consequently, there must be a representation for both the constituent responsive 
subsystems and for the process of collation which permits them to be represented as a 
simple single response. Moreover, this holarchic nature means that the answers being 
factored will (on their decomposition) appear as questions to their components. This 
will be a recursive semblance no matter how deep the factoring is.  
We note that this system of collations is also typed, in addition to the holarchic 
QA Pairs’ existing typing. 
We can describe the holarchic, typed cooperative QA Pair by adding a 
secondary clause to Theorem 6.4, to get Theorem 6.5:  
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For the enquirer E (with given knowledge) and the expert respondent R 
with Heuristics repertoire {H1 … Hn}, asking question Q with constraining 
value V and anticipatable type T entails cooperative answer A containing 
the plurality of new values P in expected form F; where the question 
cannot be answered by a single, isolated respondent, the answer will be a 
referentially transparent factoring to collated sub-responses, each of which 
may have the features of the uppermost QA Pair.   Theorem 6.5 
We can represent this as a holarchic digraph as in Figure 6.6. 
 
Figure 6‐6 Collated holarchic cooperative typed QA Pair 
This typed holarchic cooperative QA Pair operationalises a Rescherian erotetic 
complex answer.
84 Significantly for the current research, this holarchic nature means 
that in situations of complexity the respondent entity becomes itself the enquiring 
entity. We shall return to this in the discussion of the functional entity in Chapter 7. 
6.3.8 QA Pairs and Mixins – Hedges and Pragmata 
There must be some way of indicating the extent to which we can say with 
certainty that a statement is true or not. Toulmin describes the necessary presence of 
qualifications in even simple affirmative statements (Toulmin, 2003). That means for 
any answer given, there must be (at least a neutral) way of describing the scope of the 
answers, and the extent to which the answers can be relied upon. Accordingly, a 
substantiated QA Pair will have an inherent qualification of the plurality of values 
contained in the answer. This would include partial or fuzzy membership of sets or 
applicability of denotation, and also the imprecision or ambiguity of values, locating an 
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informatic representational tradition for the Rescherian inevitability of conditions in 
inquiry.
85 
There are also qualifications at the gestalt level: things that are true of 
collections (such as order, bounds, coverage) that cannot be observed at the item or 
value level (Rescher & Oppenheim, 1955). This kind of qualification represents the 
specification of a universe of discourse, or the nature of the gestalt such as inherent 
temporality, sorting order, rank and so forth. Additionally there are also qualifications 
at the gestalt level regarding applicability and bounds (Rescher & Oppenheim, 1955): 
similarly, Toulmin seeks to represent the applicability of an argument through the 
specification of rebuttals (Toulmin, 2003, p. 93). 
A mechanism is needed for operationalising and thereby modelling these 
features of the erotetic perspective, and of accommodating the requirements of 
Toulmin’s model in a corresponding manner, in order that the Toulmin model be 
sufficient for operationalising the erotetic perspective in the manner described in the 
previous section. 
In linguistic pragmatics there are metalinguistic operators (Weinreich, 1963) 
that qualify sentences (and their propositional import) in just such a manner. Such 
operators are a universal feature of language: 
for every language ‘metalinguistic operators’ such as English true, real, so-called, strictly 
speaking, and German eigenlich, and the most powerful extrapolator of all – like – function 
as instructions for the loose or strict interpretation of designata, 1963 #31908 p.130» 
Two major types of these operators are relevant to investigating truth conditions 
and qualification: discourse organisers which direct the overall meaning of 
conversation (Biber & Conrad, 1999; Gómez-González, 2001b; Seliger, 1971, 1972) 
and hedges which modify the literal meaning of utterances (P. Brown & Levinson, 
1987; Fraser, 1975; Lakoff, 1972; Zadeh, 1972). Both of these types of operators have 
a direct bearing on how we may operationalise Rescher’s requirement for an accurate 
representation of the truth conditions of answers. 
6.3.8.1 Discourse organisers 
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Discourse organisers (Seliger, 1971, 1972) direct the overall meaning of 
conversations, including their bounds and orientation (Biber & Conrad, 1999; Gómez-
González, 2001b). There are two forms of discourse organisers  
1.  Bounds-setting organisers – those that set the bounds of applicability, 
intended ranges of meaning, invocation of institutional facts, cost, privilege, 
opportunity cost and so forth (Seliger, 1971). 
2.  Orienting organisers – those that establish orientation, such as temporality, 
inherent order or rank, or graduation in significance (Gómez-González, 
2001a, 2001b). The significance of such organisers is that they indicate the 
impossibility of set-representability of a series of values, since sets are by 
definition order-free (section 6.3.3).  
Such organisers can be seen as functions that modify the significance of the 
subsequent utterances (Biber & Barbieri, 2007). This functional application 
corresponds with the gestalt level qualifications. To distinguish the erotetic usage from 
the purely linguistic role, discourse organisers will be called pragmata (singular 
pragma) after Aristotle (ca 340 BCE 14B). 
6.3.8.2 Hedges 
Hedges are a linguistic and mathematical mechanism for qualifying values and 
set-membership (Lakoff, 1972; Zadeh, 1972).
86 Hedging makes use of grammatical and 
sentential forms to indicate that the literal meaning of the propositional content is 
insufficient for its comprehension. 
If someone says “a dolphin is sort of a fish”, they are taking the false proposition 
“a dolphin is a fish” and indicating (through “sort of”) an acknowledgement that “a 
dolphin” has a fuzzy membership of the set of fishes. There is a pragmatic sense in 
which “a dolphin is sort of a fish” is “truer” than “a cow is sort of a fish”: Zadeh 
(1972) and Lakoff (1972) propose that such metalinguistic operators are one form of 
hedge, providing a means of expressing fuzzy membership, qualifying the speech act 
using terms like essentially, technically, actually, strictly, in a sense, practically, 
virtually, regular etc. to indicate the manner in which the fuzzy set-membership is 
acquired or must be interpreted. 
                                                      
 
86 The hedging approach was an outcome of joint research between Zadeh (1972) and (Lakoff, 1973) 
although the two researchers never co-published.  
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Lakoff suggests (Lakoff, 1972) that there is a more general class of hedges to 
investigate beyond the application to fuzzy logic. Zadeh (1972) provides a complete set 
of hedge representations using the fuzzy calculus and Hartnett (2004) gives a list of 
terms used for these hedging types in scientific discourse:  
appraisal, epistemic status, evaluation, evidentiality, intensity, modality, qualification, 
stance, or vagueness (Hartnett, 2004, p. 355) 
These hedges make the discourse more accurate and reliable by indicating where 
instances are inaccurate or unreliable (Meyer, 1997).  
A different class of hedge, the socio-pragmatic hedge, is principally concerned 
with politeness – by saving face, lessening pain, engendering a sense of achievement 
(P. Brown & Levinson, 1987). Other researchers (e.g. Caffi, 1999; Flowerdew, 1991; 
Fraser, 1975; Kasper, 1992; Skelton, 1988) have sought to include the linguistic 
features of mitigation as forms of hedging – minimising blame, shifting responsibility, 
conveying regret. All of these hedges represent an extrinsic force on the utterance 
itself, rather than the propositional content, and cannot be a fuzzy calculus equivalent 
as per Zadeh (1972) and Lakoff (1972). Significantly, such hedges can qualify the 
types that Zadeh identified, so are included in the modelling presented in this thesis. 
6.3.8.3 Mixins 
Toulminian qualification such as pragmata and hedges can be seen as functional 
modifications of existing values, statements, selections of values and pluralities of 
values. This qualification is an essential component of knowledge relations, although it 
is quite often present in a neutral, affirmative manner. The standard term in AI research 
for these forms of qualification is mixin
87. We use the term mixin for all forms of 
Toulminian qualifications, hedging and pragmata. 
Mixins will be present in all claims returned to the enquirer as representing the 
qualifications and truth conditions. However, they are also present in the entirety of the 
source of the plurality which the claims represent a selection.  
 We can describe the qualified QA Pair (Theorem 6.5) by adding a secondary 
clause to Theorems 6.3 and 6.4: 
                                                      
 
87 The ice-cream vendor terms flavour (for the inherent qualities) and mixin (for the universal addenda) 
introduced in the LISP research tradition to provide such a distinction (Moon, 1986; Weinreb & Moon, 
1978, 1980). A mixin is a class of items whose functionality can be applied to all other objects within the 
domain of discourse to enhance their functionality additively.  
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For the substantiated holonic QA Pair as per theorems 6.3 and 6.4, there 
will be a qualification either explicit or implicit, of all values, expressions 
of attribution or belonging, and selections of items of interest within the 
universe of discourse; together with a statement of bounds either explicit or 
implicit, for applicability, ownership, currency or access at those levels. 
  Theorem 6.5 
This has already been illustrated in section 6.3.7. 
By their nature, there is no absolute set of mixins that can be given: they are 
cognitive constructs that can always be invented or modified. 
6.3.9 QA Pairs as categories 
We saw in section 6.3.1 that Belnap (1963) envisaged the Q→A relationship as 
a categorial one, and used categories to derive a periodic classification of QAs through 
coaction. We now investigate the nature of those categories further.  
We saw in section 6.3.2 that the QA Pair was representable as the entailment of 
Toulminian claims by data. We also saw (in section 6.3.3) that a question can be seen 
as an instance of the set of all such questions that can be asked, and an answer can be 
seen as a collectivity that is a member of the plenum of all entailed answers. 
Additionally we saw that the actor in the role of respondent can in some circumstances 
become an enquirer simply through referential transparency and the complexity of the 
original enquiry. That means plenum-membership and representation is necessary for 
both parts of the Q/D-A/C pair. Questions and answers accordingly instantiate the sets 
and plena from which they come respectively. 
We can state that these relationships between the question as data, and the 
answer as claim (since it is entailed) is one between an independent value and a 
dependent value, i.e. a function. Since the set of claims includes the empty claim, there 
will be a mapping between every possible datum and a claim. 
Dampney et al (C.N.G Dampney, Johnson, & Deuble, 1993; C N G Dampney et 
al., 1991) show that the interdependencies in such complex systems are best 
represented as categories sensu category theory (Barr & Wells, 1990; Lawvere & 
Schanuel, 1991). A category is a mapping between two collections of values – a 
domain and a co-domain (see Figure 6.7). Categories form the basis of an alternative  
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form of proof to propositional logic called sketch logic
88 (Wells, 1984, 1990). 
Categories, when established, should permit the chaining of reasoning, establishment 
of identities, commutations and associativities. In particular, Dampney et al.
89 have 
shown that the Entity-Relationship family of diagrams can be shown to be statements 
of proof within the categorial framework. 
 
Figure 6‐7 QA Pair as Category 
A categorial account of the hedged, pragmatised, co-operative, holonic, typed 
QA Pair simplifies the abstraction of both the independent question/data and dependent 
answer/claim as member of collections, with the implicature between them shown as a 
mapping (see Figure 6.8). 
 
Figure 6‐8 QA Pair as Category 
If the question is simple, and all possible answers have set-compliant answers 
that are members of a set of values, then we can follow the Dampney & Johnson model 
to create a simple Q/D-A/C pair as in Figure 6.9 
                                                       
 
88 As opposed to the traditional form of logic, in this context referred to as string logic, 
89 The Dampney and Johnson research programme at Macquarie University (C. N. G. Dampney & Johnson, 1995; 
C.N.G Dampney & Johnson, 1999; C.N.G Dampney et al., 1993; C N G Dampney et al., 1991) is one of four 
independent research programmes that established this relationship – the others were Diskin and Kadish at the 
University of Latvia (Diskin, 1995; Diskin & Cadish, 1995a, 1995b), Riessen and Steegmans at Leuven in Belgium 
(Piessens & Steegmans, 1995, 1997), and Duval at Fourier in Grenoble (Duval & Sénéchaud, 1994). This research 
derives from the work of Dampney and Johnson in its representative components.  
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Figure 6‐9 Quasi‐entity constructs (after Dampney et al. 1991) 
However, the entity’s nature (as a set) is insufficient for the erotetic perspective: 
what is needed is an extension of the Dampney & Johnson model for a set of Q/D 
values mapping to a collectivity of A/C values, instantiated by a set of data calling a 
collectivity of claims. This is also a category, but is sufficient to represent all Q/D-A/C 
pairs.  
We can describe the categorial QA Pair (6.6) drawing on Theorems 6.3-6.5: 
For the substantiated, qualified and bounded holonic QA Pair as per Theorems 
6.3, 6.4 and 6.5, there is a categorial abstraction Q→A.  Theorem 6.6 
We can represent this as a holarchic digraph (Figure 6.10). 
 
Figure 6‐10 Categorial Q/D→A/C pair (a er Dampney et al. 1991) 
Dampney & Johnson’s justification of the ER diagram formalism by category 
theory, and their conclusion that the ERD is a legitimate form of representing 
categories was followed by a call for greater complexity of systems representation 
using non-set extensions to the ERD (C.N.G Dampney et al., 1993). In the next three 
sections we describe how this representation has been accomplished in the current 
research, using an extension of both the Entity and the Relationship components of the 
ER that are compliant with the categorial QA Pair. 
6.3.10 A classification of the cooperative QA Pair 
As we saw in 2.4, Questions and Answers can be classified using either intrinsic 
or extrinsic typologies. Intrinsic ones arise from the formulation of the questions, either 
grammatically or from reasons of logical form. Extrinsic ones arise from the situation 
of their usage, either through temporal situation or institutional contextualisation.   
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In this section we will see how the creation of a mechanism for answering 
question brings with it a three-part typology based on the form of storage, and how the 
usage of a Belnapian triple structure imposes a three part intrinsic typology based on 
the location of the free variable. This typing is important to establish for questions in 
general, since any core constructs within the framework will specifically inherit this 
typing. 
6.3.10.1 Modes of question answering 
The standardised answers proposed by Robinson in Section 6.3.1 (“A is B”) are 
presented by the knowledge capacity as collectivities that obscure their internal nature. 
The three classes of questions can be cross-classified by the manner in which the 
knowledge capacities have been organised internally. 
Although presented as collectivities, the values themselves are encoded into 
representational forms as described in section 2.3.2. The knowledge dependency 
created by the question regardless of its type will exist within knowledge capacity
90 
that will have its own particular characteristics. The construct noetica (D. J. Pigott, 
Hobbs, & Gammack, 2004b; D. J. Pigott et al., 2005) has been proposed to refer to all 
the materials, whether in digital form or as real world documents, procedures and 
practices, that provide the basis for knowledgeable answers. 
Robinson's standardised answers (“A is B”) can thus be seen as noetic simples, 
which are combined with each other to make richer and more complex representations 
of the world. The noetic simples can be organised according to exactly three distinct 
principles:
91 
1.  Shape: Alignment resulting from commonality of structure and domain, leading 
to regularisation 
2.  Granularity: Clustering resulting from commonality of values and value 
applicability, leading to aggregation 
3.  Scope: Interrelation resulting from commonality via interconnected networks, 
leading to contextualisation 
                                                      
 
90 An existing knowledge capacity for analysis, a putative knowledge capacity for planning purposes. 
91 These three principles form the vertices of a 4 dimensional conceptual space termed the noetic prism, 
(see Pigott et al., 2004, 2005) with a fourth dimension, complexity, measuring their import. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the prism further here the vertices of scope, granularity or shape 
remain useful constructs to distinguish knowledge gathering modes for question answering.  
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Again, it is important to note that there can inherently be only three kinds of 
organising principle, with any apparently more complex organisation being reducible 
to a vector sum of two of more of these. Higher order organising structures within the 
noetica are created through an ad hoc process of interaction, or prepared in advance to 
facilitate interaction, as found in the classic typed knowledge resources of databases, 
spreadsheets and frames. These familiar typed knowledge resources embody greater 
scope, granularity or shape respectively (D. J. Pigott et al., 2004b). 
We can make the identification here between the categories described by Belnap 
(1966) and Dampney’s (C.N.G Dampney & Aisbett, 2004; C. N. G. Dampney & 
Johnson, 1995; C.N.G Dampney et al., 1993) approach to formalising the existential 
dependency in information provision using category theory. A category comprises a 
domain, a codomain and a mapping function (we repeat Figure 6.11 for convenience). 
 
Figure 6‐11 The generalised category comprises the mapping between a domain D and a co‐
domain C. 
We can therefore identify three forms of question-answering determination 
which match up with three organising principles and three categorical components: 
  Instance-dominant determination is informed by shape, found in constraining the 
category domain 
  Value-dominant determination is informed by granularity, found in constraining the 
category co-domain 
  Link-dominant determination is informed by scope, found in constraining the 
category mapping function 
Since all three forms of determination are category-theoretic, but of a different form, 
they are susceptible to categorial manipulation, and are consequently candidates for the 
coaction matrix described in section 6.3.5.3. 
6.3.10.2 Types of question asking 
In section 6.3.2 we presented the standard triple (I,V,L) for the answer as 
Expression 6.3. The questions that we can ask contain constraints that automatically 
entail a series of instances based on the commonalities between the QA triples. All  
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possible answers have the fixed variables in common, and the answer is a series of 
triples with the fixed values in common. However, we also know that questions have 
intrinsic types created by the mode of their formulation (Rescher, 2003, p. 1) 
Since we have defined a valid question as a well formed triple in which there is 
exactly one free variable, we can see that their mode of formulation permits exactly 
three types of question: 
  (6.9)
  (6.10)
  (6.11)
for x, y and z as free variables for I, V or L respectively.
92 
These three types of question are all that is possible: there are only three 
possibilities for free variables in a Belnapian triple. A question with two free variables 
cannot be answered, as there is a Cartesian product of possible answers (Hamblin, 
1958). In practice, the respondent would have to ask the questioner for clarification, 
requiring one of the unknowns be given (J. D. Moore, 1995). A question with three 
free variables would be no more than the generic form of such a question.
93 
The three forms of question each creates a distinct and intrinsic entailment given 
by possible substitutions for the unknowns: each entails a particular knowledge call, 
with unique features. We call the three classes of entailment after the unknowns they 
present in the question: instance-dominant, value-dominant and linkage-dominant 
entailment respectively. (This operationalises Rescherian Criteria A6 and A7.) 
We can generalise the relationship between the instances, values and linkages as 
a mapping function between the instances and the values: as Expression 6.12. 
                                                      
 
92 This intrinsic typology is prefigured by Whately (1827) who identifies the first (predicate-centred) and 
third type (copula-centred), omitting the second as not being concerned with a known subject, and 
limiting the third type to confirmation. Likewise, Sperantia (1936) identified them as terminal and the 
relational interrogative judgements. Hare (1949) extends the third type to "which one of" type questions. 
Prior & Prior (1955) identify this omission but do not label it. Robinson’s form of the abstract data-
seeking question is of the second type. 
93 Other types of wh- questions described (in section 2.5.2) can be seen to be forms of these three – when 
becomes “which time”; where becomes “which place”; who becomes “which person”; “what” becomes 
“which one of” etc. 
?,V,L   x, V,L 
I,?, L   I, y, L 
I, V,?   I, V, z  
  160
  (6.12) 
Following the three expressions 6.9 to 6.11 we can express three constraints of 
the mapping functions from A into B as questions: 
 
All A where F of A is X, expressed as  
“which F of A has the value x?” (6.13) 
 
All B where B is the F of x, expressed as  
“what x exists such that its function F is B?” (6.14) 
 
All A and B where there is an x map from A to B, 
expressed as 
“is there a link x between A and B?” (6.15) 
for x as independent variables for B, A or F respectively. The answers to each of these 
questions is a triple that satisfies the constraint, and will be of the same order (i.e. have 
the same fixed for free named variable substitution). We now look at these entailments 
in detail, and see what kind of answers satisfy these constraints. 
In instance-dominant entailments, the instances entail the answer. Expression 
6.13, F(A,x), is a request for matching on a specimen value: it translates as “what 
values x do we find as F-values for A?” (a request which is generally met in the derived 
forms “Is there an A with an F-value of x′?” or “What A′ exist such that their F-value is 
x′?”). Here there is a direct and unambiguous entailment of instances based on a 
specification of their attributes. Any answer involves direct data dependency, existent 
locating a value in a list of values, and returning the identifier attached to the stored 
value (William Ward Armstrong, 1974). Access to values is direct and unmediated. 
In value-dominant entailment, the values entail the answer. Expression 6.14, 
F(x,B), translates as “what x exists such that it has an F-value of B?”. The values 
which we are seeking must match the question, but do not necessarily have a clear 
indication of what entities may be entailed: any answer will involve a process of 
informatic colocation or clustering with respect to the original value on the basis of 
coextensitivity (Dunsire, 2002, 2004). Access to values is indirect and implied.  
With linkage-dominant entailment, the linkages entail the answer. Expression 
6.15, x(A,B), translates as “is there a function x such that it gives B for A?” 
(generally met with as the derived form “Is there a link x′ between A and B?”). This 
entailment can be either where we know two things exist and we are trying to find what 
links them, or where we know what links to look for, but do not know what the linked 
instances are. Any answer will involve the articulation of networks of values with 
FA , B 
FA , x 
Fx , B 
xA , B  
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respect to the original value on the basis of connectivity (McGee, 1974). Access to data 
is mediated and logically-linked. 
It is important to note that there can inherently be only three types of 
entailments. While analysis will present entailments that appear to be more complex, 
the algebra of argument will show that they reduce to two or more instances of these 
three types, either recursively through the substitution of a new constraint set for the 
entailment, or else combined through the set-based operations on union, intersection or 
disjunction on the individual entailments. Significantly, such a recursive web of 
entailments is what would be expected of the knowledge level, where objects are 
infinitely defined in terms of each other (Rosenbloom, Newell, & Laird, 1989). 
This typification satisfies the needs of a typed category-theoretical system 
(Figure 6.12). For our typed entailments, we can see a generalised category for 
Newell’s symbol layer: 
Domain → instance 
Co-domain → value 
Function → linkage 
and for the entailments acting as constraints on each of these components of the 
symbol layer, we can have a typed categorial representation (Figure 6.12). 
 
 
 
Figure 6‐12 The three categorial components of symbol layer propositions – instance, linkage 
and value – as a typed category‐theoretical system. 
Since all three these entailment types are also category-theoretic, they too are 
susceptible to categorial manipulation, and are consequently candidates for the 
coaction matrix we describe next. 
6.3.10.3 A coaction matix of question asking and answering 
We can now examine how question-answering pairs can be considered 
according to these types of entailment and the organising principles present in the 
noetica. Since there are three mechanisms at work in both question formation and 
question answering, we can use a coaction matrix (Haskell, 1949) to map the 
linkage
instance value 
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possibility space created by the combinatorial outcome of the question-asking 
classifications.  
Formally, with knowledge-seeking questions, what is passed from the inquiring 
system to the responding system is a question mode (detailing which question type is 
being given) and a key (which is a 2-tuple of the two givens for the question). What is 
returned (the answer) is a collectivity of entailed “A is B” attribute-value statements, 
which is always delivered within the context of the mode-and-key combination. Those 
collectivities have a declarative nature only to be found in the knowledge level, the 
onus is on the responding system to create such rich collections. 
There is thus a question-answering process which is informed significantly for 
each one of these ordering principles for each one of these question types, which 
results in a 3 × 3 scheme, with a categorisation informed by two axes (Table. 6.2). (The 
nine QA Pairs named in the matrix will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7.) 
Table 6.2 A typology of QA Pairs formed by the coaction of knowledge seeking questions and 
knowledge gathering mechanisms. 
Forms of Knowledge Gathering Mechanisms 
Shape‐dominant   Granularity‐dominant  Scope‐dominant 
Forms of 
Knowledge 
Seeking 
Questions 
Instance‐dominant  Standard Relation  Standard Recursive  Constitutive Recursive 
Value‐dominant  Absolute Aggregative  Intensional Aggregative  Fuzzy Aggregative 
Linkage‐dominant  Ontological Connective  Networked Connective  Ruleset Connective 
 
Looking at Table 6.2 in detail, we can see that the three rows present the forms 
of question entailment: 
1.  Instance-dominant seeking is knowledge seeking of set membership via 
directly matching values in the prepared structure. In Robertson’s terms, this 
is finding out about things that have B as a value for a given attribute 
(including an identifier). Because they call for value-predication in this way, 
we term them predicative questions. 
2.  Value-dominant seeking is knowledge seeking within a universe of discourse 
membership for co-extensive values. In Robertson’s terms, this is finding out 
about things that have similar values regardless of prepared structure. Because 
they call for a value-centric aggregation, we term them aggregative questions.  
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3.  Linkage-dominant seeking is knowledge seeking within a universe of 
discourse for things that can be connected either directly or mediately to a 
presented value, through the discovery of candidate links. In Robertson’s 
terms, this is finding out about things that are subsequently attached to 
discovered links. Because they call for a focus on connections to a designated 
datum, we term them connective questions. 
The three columns indicate forms of knowledge gathering mechanisms: 
1.  Shape-dominant response is knowledge gathering directly from the 
constraining variable. The three shape-dominant forms (standard relation, 
absolute aggregative and ontological connective) provide an unmediated 
answer. 
2.  Granularity-dominant response is articulated knowledge gathering from the 
constraining variable. The three granularity-dominant forms (standard 
recursive, intensional aggregative and networked connective) all provide an 
answer at one remove, because the answering processing must look for 
instances which have a shared value with the constraining variable. 
3.  Scope-dominant response is mediated knowledge gathering from the 
constraining variable. The three scope-dominant forms of question-answering 
(constitutive recursive, fuzzy aggregative and ruleset connective) all provide 
an answer by starting with a value and applying rules to determine 
membership of answer collectivity. 
We can now consider some generalisations as to how the two axes determine the 
knowledge relation types. This coaction permits a categorisation of the knowledge 
relations that we find in knowledge systems. The nine resulting knowledge question-
answering types will be generalised as typed functional entities in section 7.2.6.  
The rows in Table. 6.2 determine how the enquiring systems come to ask the 
questions. This is a concomitant of the principle of the unknown substitutability in the 
basic question-making format discussed above. Each of the question-answering types 
in the row has a commonality of entailment based on their being either instance-
dominant, value dominant or linkage-dominant. 
All instance-dominant questions seek potential set-membership within 
acknowledged sets via directly matching values in prepared knowledge structures. All 
present as a key an attribute for all members of the set, and seek either a confirmation  
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of existence or a tuple representing identities and attributes for a value or range of 
values. 
All value-dominant questions potentially seek anything with co-extensive 
recorded values in the universe of discourse, regardless of set membership. (Set 
membership can be added as an additional constraint.) The results are mediated back to 
instances from the discovered values before being returned. Value-dominant questions 
present as a key any recorded attribute, but as a pair – a measurement and a frame of 
reference, and seek either confirmation of existence of any recorded value at that point, 
or potential instances of interest. 
All linkage-dominant questions seek to contextualise instances or values through 
the discovery of interconnections to any recorded instances in the universe of 
discourse, regardless of connection type. (Limitations as to which links are of interest 
can be added as an additional constraint.) Discovered instances can be returned 
directly, while discovered values must be mediated to instances. Linkage-dominant 
questions present as a key comprising a pair, one element of which is a designator of 
instance or value, and the other either an instance or a value as appropriate. The 
questions seek either confirmation of existence of any connection to key, or a graph 
structure containing a map of the network of discovered values. 
The columns in Table. 6.2 determine how the responding systems come to 
present the answers. This will be through the mechanism of ad hoc higher order noetic 
structures, or of prepared structures that have been optimised for such questions. Each 
of the question-answering types in the columns will have a commonality of structural 
principle because of their being based in shape-dominant, granularity-dominant or 
scope-dominant structures.
94 
All shape-dominant knowledge answering mechanisms have direct entailment 
from the key. They all provide an immediate unambiguous answer, because at some 
point previously a value has been recorded against an instance. 
All granularity-dominant knowledge answering mechanisms have articulated 
entailment from the key passed to them. All provide an answer at one remove because 
the mechanism returns co-extensive values, and the responding system must then 
retrieve or construct matching instances to make those values intelligible. 
                                                      
 
94 Note that all noetic structures will always from first principles have all three vertices significant to 
some extent, it is the dominant vertex that informs the answering process.  
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All scope-dominant knowledge answering mechanisms have some form of 
mediated entailment from the key presented to them – mediated through either a series 
of paired identities, linked values, or applied rules. All provide an answer by starting 
with values or instances and locate connections of significance to the enquirer, 
applying reasons to determine membership of the answer set. 
6.3.10.4 The significance of the QA typology for the erotetic perspective 
We have now demonstrated an emergent periodic typology based on a coaction 
of intrinsic and extrinsic typological forces. What this means is that we may have an 
expectation in any process using well-formed QA exchanges. In Chapter 7, when we 
introduce the Functional Entity as a construct for the QA categories, we may 
accordingly predicate this typology of the FE. 
6.3.11 Summary of QA Operationalising Process 
We have now operationalised the question and answer pair sufficiently to 
represent the QA instances in a principled manner, using established informatic 
principles. We have established that they represent entailed knowledge (or a 
knowledge gap, i.e. ignorance).  
We have demonstrated their conformance with categories, represented by 
triples: three position matrices, with a named variable for instance, value and linkage. 
A question is a triple with a free variable; an appropriate answer is a matching triple 
with the free variable fixed. 
We have shown that the answers to satisfy the questioner have to be cooperative, 
and given from a position of authority. 
We have established that QA Pairs are typed. Questions are typed according to 
their formulation, and this typology is represented in three forms of knowledge 
seeking. Answers are entailed, typed collectivities that are holarchic, and reflect the 
noetic formulation of their assembly. This is represented in three forms of knowledge 
gathering. We have shown how well formed QA Pairs are therefore classifiable by the 
coaction of the seeking and gathering types. 
We have shown that QA Pairs conform to the nature of Toulminian data claim 
pairs, and that they conform to the various informatic qualities of such pairs, including 
warrant, background and qualification (hedged and pragmatic), even when the 
qualification is neutral or affirmative.   
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A feature of inquiry dynamics not yet discussed is the emergence of 
standardised QA types from the circumstances of their usage in a community of 
inquiry
95. In the next chapter we shall demonstrate this standardisation, showing that 
the QA categories can be formalised as a pair of Functional Entities linked by a 
Knowledge Relation, the core construct set of the Functional Entity framework. The 
final part of this chapter now considers the emergence of complex systems from the 
continuing conversations of which QA are elements. 
6.4  Communities of Knowing and Erotetic Conversations 
Locating knowledge in a dynamic process of interaction makes a clear break 
with the schools of thought that view knowledge as a static resource or object. 
Walsham’s description of a Community of Knowing is based on a communicative 
model of knowing, wherein knowledge exists at both the communitarian level (via 
Giddens’ construct of mutual knowledge) and the individual level (via Polanyi’s 
construct of personal knowledge). Rescher’s equivalent community of inquirers further 
focusses on the development of knowledge through progressive inquiry. 
A Community of Knowing can be shown to be the systemic emergence from the 
massive co-existence of simple question-and-answer pairs (QAs). We have seen how 
Rescher’s erotetic hierarchy can be formalised to permit the holarchic representation of 
knowledge as functional entities. 
This section is concerned with showing how such communitarian models of 
knowledge are representable as interrelating Rescherian standardised QA Pairs, and 
operationalising the remaining constructs of Rescher’s erotetic hierarchy given in 
section 5.4. Representation in this manner is how Walsham holds that computerised 
aspects of knowledge management can be achieved (Walsham, 2002, 2004, 2005). 
6.4.1 QARs and the Knowledge Response 
The move from QA Pairs to QA-based conversations requires a means of 
interconnecting them. This is done by consideration of the response the questioner has 
to the answer given by the person or system who answered the initial question. 
In practice, QA Pairs provide the first two parts in a QAR (Question-Answer-
Response) structure. On receiving an answer, the questioner evaluates the answer and 
                                                      
 
95 Rescherian criterion C2  
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formulates a response, completing that structure (J. D. Moore, 1995). This has been 
operationalised as an advisory dialogue by Moore (J. D. Moore & Paris, 1993). 
Only the questioner can determine if the answer is satisfactory (J. D. Moore & 
Swartout, 1991a, 1991b). If the answer is unsatisfactory, the questioner can ask for 
clarification, expansion or explanation. New information received from the answer 
leads to a new question, which is the first part of a new QAR triplet. Alternatively, the 
questioner can accept the answer as appropriate. In absence of a response, there is a 
default of acceptance (J. D. Moore, 1995). 
Expansion requests (requests for further information based on information in the 
answer) represents the beginning of learning in Paskian conversational meshes (Pask, 
1971), here termed erotetic conversations. Erotetic conversations are logically 
perpetual, with a generative cycle of QAR triples occurring, with the response 
becoming the question component in a new QAR triple, resolving to 
QAR→QAR→QAR = QAQAQAR 
with the final response being an acceptance. Since the absence of a response is 
taken to be an acceptance response, we can see that an erotetic conversation could also 
resolve to 
QAR→QAR→QAR = QAQAQA 
A consequence of this is that any isolated QA Pair may be at the beginning of an 
erotetic conversation, at its end, or mid-conversation. 
Additionally, a QAR series can lead to branching, with an answer leading to 
multiple questions. QAR conversations can be seen as a continuous branching QAR 
knowledge-space, as seen in Figure 6.13.  
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Figure 6‐13 The QAR Branching making a QAR knowledge space 
It is this cascading branching aspect of a question-and-answer model of 
knowledge that particularly excites Lauer (2001, p44), with cascading question-answer 
sequences potentially leading to potential discoveries, which much better represents 
knowledge in practice. 
The four possible cases for a knowledge response (following Pask) are an 
expression of satisfaction, a new (related) question, a request for expansion on the 
answer based on its component values, and a request for clarification as to the 
components of the answer. 
Formalising this, we can say that every QA Pair is contextualised within a series 
of QAR exchanges, a knowledge response will direct the flow of the erotetic 
conversation to either further action or termination of the erotetic conversation.  
By placing the QAR triplets within the context of a greater continuous dynamic 
conversation comprising any number of such QA triplets concurrently occurring, a 
travelling conversation (T. Nishida, 2002) emerges. His model has been implemented 
in various systems demonstrating the possibilities of responsive conversational 
agents.
96 
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6.4.2 Common knowing as QAR sets 
Within any human community there will be continuous QARs: this is because 
QARs are the only way in which learning can happen (Bromberger, 1992b). 
“Questions have one basic function, the asking for information not already in our 
possession” (Bromberger, 1992b p.86). For Bromberger, learning comprises QA 
exchanges between learning and knowing participants (Bromberger, 1992b): the 
enquirer (learning) asks a question of the respondent (knowing), to initiate the 
exchange of knowledge.  
Any human community which permits learning will thus be a host to the 
continuous occurrence of QAR activity, existing at the communitarian level in 
Walsham’s model of knowledge.  
Continuous QA/QARs are present because of the existence of purposeful 
intelligible discourse; it is also the way in which culture is preserved from one 
generation to the next (Egan & Shera, 1952). This is particularly true in the case of 
indigenous ways of knowing, where there are no alternatives in the form of text or A/V 
recordings (Ali & Brooks, 2009; Gill, 2007; Heimbürger, 2008; W. Li, 2010). This is 
also the way in which large scale cognitive tasks function within communities of 
cooperative individuals (E. Hutchins, 1996). 
Classes of QA participants will emerge: these exchanges will occur between 
regularisable classes of stakeholders (or systematic proxies for them) as either 
enquirers or respondents, which will give rise to communities of inquiry (Rescher, 
2004). The roles played will determine both the kinds of expertise needed by a system 
and the situations for learning within a system. These participants (and the classes they 
instance) can have multiple roles within knowledge systems both as enquirers and 
respondents. The mutability and multiple usage of sources of knowledge discussed 
earlier means that one source of expertise will be called on a number of times, while an 
enquirer will potentially call on a number of respondents to satisfice a need to know 
(Dietz, 2003, 2006). 
The QA process will be recursive: the nature of all questions is that they involve 
recursive answers (Harrah, 1973), that is, those answers that have potentially multiple 
nested sources. These sources will aggregate at naturally occurring levels (M. Bunge, 
1960, 1977a; Emmeche, Køppe, & Stjernfelt, 1997; Onuf, 1995; Simon, 1962) and 
these levels provide points of attachment for information retrieval (Foskett, 1977; 
Huckaby, 1993). If factual, QA exchanges will regularise at all levels from simple  
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interchanges between individuals to complex interchanges between multiple 
participants to communities of knowing, and have been observed and formalised at 
each of these levels (Emmeche et al., 1997; Onuf, 1995; Simon, 1962). 
There will be observable regularities in the QAs in sufficiently large populations 
of QA exchanges, so called “frequently asked questions”. The QAs will have an 
emergent, regularisable typology: the repeated questions (as a repeated discourse) will 
be subject to a Case Grammar (Fillmore, 1968, 1975) — that is to say, there will be an 
emergent typology of questions. This emergent typology will be modellable with a 
domain ontology (Ernst, Storey, & Allen, 2005), which will then determine a set of 
modelling rules for all QA-formalised knowledge systems. The topics of all of the QAs 
within a community will amount to the totality of the culture of the community, as 
everything within a community’s culture is passed on by teaching, and hence by QAs 
(J. F. Berry & Cook, 1976; I. Davies, 1970; Lambe, 2011b; Rescher, 2004)). 
Mapping the occurrence of QAs, featuring their types, subjects and participants, 
will amount to a map of the system. Mapping an organisation as a system of knowing 
can begin by mapping these generalised exchanges: complex systems can be 
effectively modelled as a system of holarchic subsystems. 
6.5  Summary 
This chapter operationalised Rescher’s erotetic account of knowledge — 
knowledge as a question-and-answer dialogue between an informed, sincere questioner 
with an inquiry and a cooperative domain expert respondent — using existing erotetic 
artefacts within existing informatic traditions.  
Rescher’s epistemology arises from well-formed question and answer pairs, 
through a process of standardisation of those QA Pairs to communities of inquiry. We 
have given a principled description of the typed holarchic cooperative question and 
answer pair (QA Pair), beginning with the simple categorial representation of Belnap, 
and shown the collectivity-based nature of entailed cooperative answers. We have 
demonstrated how categorial accounts of knowledge seeking question asking and 
knowledge gathering question answering gives rise to a coaction matrix of intrinsic 
(asking) and extrinsic (answering) typing. This categorially based typology informs all 
questions and their standardisations. We have shown that answers are, in addition to 
being typed, always holarchic and always qualified by hedgings and pragmata (even if 
the holarchy and qualification is unnoticed in general practice).   
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We then showed how a conflux of interrelated QA Pairs give rises to Walsham's 
community of knowing, and demonstrated that the standardised QA Pair is 
representationally adequate to the task of modelling knowledge.  
This chapter has gone some way towards establishing a major component, the 
ontology, of the modelling framework that is the second major research goal of thesis. 
To complete the ontology, a declarative account must be given of the standardised QA 
Pair to identify the core constructs of the modelling framework. These are the 
Functional Entity and the Knowledge Relation, and will be explored in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 7  
 
Establishing the Functional Entity Framework 
 
7.1  Chapter overview 
In this chapter we develop a modelling framework for knowledge based on the 
operationalised QA Pair construct developed in Chapter 6, which has established a 
simple ontology for the erotetic perspective.  
This chapter now describes the Functional Entity and the Knowledge Relation – 
the core constructs of the erotetic framework – as a generalisation of the typed 
holarchic cooperative QA Pair. It uses standard tools of erotetic logic and linguistics to 
make a fully typed and qualified ontology for the modelling framework. 
Section 7.2 presents the derivation of the Functional Entity and Knowledge 
Relation from the QA Pair. It includes a catalogue of the species of functional entity 
pairs that can arise, and the ways in which they can be qualified (sensu Toulmin), using 
the established tools of erotetic logic and pragmatics to finalise this ontology. This 
typology covers the 9 standard occurrences of functional entities. 
Section 7.3 completes the typology, by presenting an account of how the 
functional entity framework can be used to represent special cases where the 
straightforward erotetic form requires qualification. These cover a further 6 
occurrences of functional entities, plus the representation of pragmatic and hedged 
qualifications of all functional entities, as well as collation forms of functional entity 
combination. 
We will argue that this framework permits the representation of all encoded 
knowledge sources. 
7.2  Establishing the Functional Entity 
In this section we show how QA Pairs are instances of categorial functional 
entity pairs joined by a typed knowledge relation, which are the core constructs of the 
erotetic perspective. The functional entity is a representation of the generalised answer 
to regular questions on a topic of significance for a person or an organisation, and is an 
abstraction that sits in between the instances of knowledge representation (recorded at  
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an atomic level) and the communitarian sharing of knowledge (experienced at the 
holistic level). The knowledge relation is the utilisation of one functional entity by 
another, which acts as an abstraction for questioning.  
The functional entity, as the final operationalising of the Rescherian 
epistemology, must be shown to be the generalisation of all possible answers to 
questions on all subject, while at the same time it must be shown to be part of a 
supervening web of knowledge that is a representation of the community of knowing. 
They occupy a median position (as standardised questions) in Rescher’s inquiry 
dynamics, represent generalisable knowledge (and a fortiori encoded) knowledge. 
In Chapter 5, Rescher’s epistemological hierarchy was described showing what 
is theoretically required of an erotetic form of knowledge at each level from simple 
question and answer up to the community of enquiry. As shown in Chapter 6, 
Rescher’s generic inquiry is typed, complex and part of a web of other inquiries, and 
each individual question and answer pair will be an instance of a class of inquiry. The 
functional entity, as the informatic construct built from the Rescher’s theoretical 
abstraction must exhibit those features. 
We now examine how encoded knowledge (Blackler, 1995) is the functional 
equivalent of a stored answer. 
7.2.1 Answers, long duration messages and Knowledge Affordances 
For an erotetic perspective to inform standard approaches to the storage and 
retrieval tasks in informatics, there needs to be a bridge between the short-term nature 
of the QA dialogue, and the long term nature of storage and retrieval. In particular, 
there needs to be an account for how the “stored answer” to an as-yet-unasked question 
can be modelled using QA as a metaphor. 
Heilprin’s model of information communication (Heilprin, 1961, 1972b, 1972c) 
discussed in section 2.5, enables the logical construction of information repositories for 
use in servicing a field of knowledge. A “repository of answers” that predates the 
questions posed, significantly operationalises a knowledge plenum that contains all 
possible answers to a class of questions (Rescher & Grim, 2008), and will also provide 
answers to many other classes by acting as a knowledge source. A knowledge source 
will contain the answers to any number of classes of questions. Identified classes of  
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potential or actually asked questions provide the knowledge affordances (Beynon-
Davies, 1997) of the knowledge source.
97 Since knowledge affordances may be 
holarchic, they may also arise from knowledge sources that have been collated. 
Drawing on McGrenere & Ho (2000), we can identify three significant features of a 
knowledge affordance: 
1.  A knowledge affordance exists relative to the knowledge needs of a 
conversational participant. 
2.  The existence of a knowledge affordance is independent of the participant's 
ability to perceive it. 
3.  A knowledge affordance does not change as the needs and goals of the 
participant change. 
This legitimises the identification of the knowledge affordance independent of 
the original need for which it was created. We identified in section 2.3.1 the problem of 
multiplicity and mutability of knowledge, as described by (e.g.) Bearman (1988) in his 
discussion of the art-scholarly database. The assemblage of values, brought together to 
answer one set of questions (for Bearman, a catalogue of paintings in an institution), 
brings about any number of additional knowledge affordances as to materials, 
ownership, value etc. wherein the original purpose of assembly is of minimal 
importance. 
To say that a system has the capacity to answer a question asked of it, is to say 
that it has both the knowledge source that contains the values needed for the answer 
and a knowledge affordance that gives structured, terminable access to them. 
Modelling knowledge capacities therefore involves eliciting knowledge-answering 
capability at both the knowledge source and knowledge affordance levels, but the 
actual conceptual models must deal directly with the knowledge affordances. 
7.2.2 Functional entities 
We are concerned with modelling the connection between the expressed 
knowledge need and the expressed knowledge capacity as a dynamic erotetic 
                                                      
 
97 Beynon-Davies is drawing on the ideas expressed in (R. Anderson & Sharrock, 1993), where organisational 
learning is limited by the affordances offered by the Institutions. A knowledge affordance is a special limited case of 
dynamic affordance (Cook & Brown, 1999 ), which is concerned with a greater amount of material, including the 
knowledge born of ad hoc and unstructured interaction with the world by individuals. This thesis is concerned with 
conceptual modelling of knowledge systems, planning for access to structured knowledge; a structured knowledge 
affordance is necessary for a planned systematic access to the knowledge. Ad hoc and unstructured knowledge (and 
therefore the complete set of dynamic affordances) are consequently outside the scope of the research.  
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conversation. We have seen that the capacity is a reliable knowledge affordance that is 
available, appropriate and that corresponds to the knowledge need. The internal 
mechanism of the knowledge affordance as answer-provider is immaterial to the 
model, apart from requirements of reliability and truthfulness. It is a “black box” from 
the vantage point of the questioner. We know that there is an internal state within the 
black box that gives rise to the answering; something that takes the declarative 
mechanism and converts it into a procedural process. The questioner does not need to 
know about this conversion and reconversion in order to understand the answer.  
In systems theory such a black-box mechanism is known as a reliable, relatively 
isolated system (RIS) (Greniewski, 1960, 1965). RISs are systems where all that is (or 
can be) known externally are the responses to any input by the system, the repertoire of 
states and the trajectories of paths within it. The answering system has very few 
characteristics in the abstract — a name, a single pattern for a repertoire and a small set 
of responses. The trajectories are paths that describe the creation of tuples derived from 
any input key set. By using such encapsulations, the mechanisms to articulate the 
answers become referentially transparent (Søndergaard & Sestoft, 1990) to the 
questioner, that is to say they react to the questions in the same manner as the 
underlying system. 
What is needed in order to operationalise this conception of referential 
transparency is a way of representing both the collectivities and their implicature-based 
dependencies in a manner similar to the set-determined entities (Codd, 1969) and 
functional dependencies (William Ward Armstrong, 1974) of the relational mode.
98 
This can be achieved by combining and extending the domain entity of Gammack 
(1987b, 1987c) and the informational dependency of Grimes (1988). 
In Codd’s 12 principles (Codd, 1974) we find the idea that an entity can be a 
subsystem for which basic considerations of responsiveness to data can be met. In 
Codd (1999) the semantic aspect of such subsystems is shown to be the optimal level 
for description and manipulation. Although not strictly entities sensu Chen (1976) the 
entities in Codd’s account behave in a systems-theoretical manner as if they were 
entities. Date points out that this is the behaviour of views and queries in the relational 
model — they are virtual entities, since a view is “a named relation whose value at all 
                                                      
 
98 Significantly, the original conception of entity and relationship of Mealy (1967) took as prototypes a number of 
collectivities, such as genealogical data, wherein a flat order-free set is insufficient.  
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times is the result of evaluating a certain relational expression at the time in 
question”(Date, 2005, p. 16).
99 
We can therefore make the case that any logically-defined subsystem that 
provides referential transparency, and which provides a schema and a tuple for a given 
key, and which has a consistent degree and cardinality behaves as an entity. It will thus 
be functionally the equivalent (within the context of the ER model) of an entity, and we 
may call such a logical subsystem a Functional Entity. 
There is a useful precedent for formalising the functional entity in the research 
tradition of expert systems, which were also based on erotetic logic (Earnest et al., 
1974; Charles L. Forgy, 1974; Shortliffe & Buchanan, 1975). Although answers arising 
from erotetic conversations was the model for the first generation expert systems, the 
value-centric nature of the systems (lacking context) created problems of brittleness, 
unstructured development, and difficulties in maintenance (update, insertion, deletion) 
(J.-M. David, Krivine, & Simmons, 1993; EC2). Steels’s (1987) conception of a 
second generation of expert systems modelling “deep knowledge” addressed these 
problems by proposing domain-focussed rather than fact-focused knowledge bases. 
Additionally, the second generation systems require expertise to be distributable 
(Garner, 1987; Steels, 1987). This requires that they are heterogeneous networks (J. G. 
Gammack, 1987b, 1987c; Vittal et al., 1993), with abstractions having a typology that 
reflected the expertise to which they were suited, rather than comprising identically-
formed peers with a different knowledge base (J. G. Gammack, 1987a). Such 
heterogeneous networks of stored knowledge sources conform to Rescher’s 
cooperative inquirers. 
Gammack’s conceptualisation of the domain-entity as an abstraction not 
inherently context bound (J. G. Gammack, 1987b, 1987c) and supporting different 
representational levels, implies that a variant on the entity relationship formalism can 
be used to represent abstractions for modelled domains. Formulated for practical utility 
as selective abstractions from an underlying plenum, dimensionalised, cluster and 
pairwise entity relationships can be modelled in a uniformly encoded notation. The 
abstraction also permits the reuse of domain-entities in a wider project of commodified 
knowledge engineering incorporating (distributed) expert opinion, data repositories and 
                                                      
 
99 A relation is the equivalent of an entity in Date’s terminology.  
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lay knowledge and thus such domain entities can co-operate through participation in 
the formation of wide-area knowledge interrelationships.
100 
In order that the collectivities be represented by domain-entity-like structures, 
the additional requirements discussed in this section — cooperation, holarchy, 
referential transparency, pragma — have to be considered. The resulting enhanced 
domain entity, which we term the Functional Entity, provides the basis for the 
knowledge modelling framework that is the goal of the current research taking into 
account these additional requirements. 
7.2.3 Knowledge Relations 
The form of interrelationship between domain entities (and therefore between 
functional entities) is more than a value-based entailment as found in Armstrong’s 
functional dependencies (William Ward Armstrong, 1974; William W Armstrong, 
Nakamura, & Rudnicki, 2004), even when those are formally extended.
101 
Sali & Székely (2008) and Agier et al (2011) have shown how knowledge 
representation requires the dependency to be semantic and contextual. This is a known 
component of the construction of discourse. Chafe (1965, 1972) shows the necessity of 
semantic implication – i.e., that the presence of some tokens necessitates others. Evens 
& Smith (1978) describe lexical relations in language, showing how one word entails 
another. Within a discourse this is how meaning is apportioned, like operation binding 
order in algebra and arithmetic. This semantic implication helps core meaning survive 
generalisations and randomness (Chafe, 1972).  
Smith (1985) shows that information needs can be expressed as multivalued 
dependencies, and holds it true of all relations. Grimes (1988) extends Smith's 
conception, establishing that such dependencies are a universal feature of language, 
and conform to the abstraction of relation. He posits that  
lexical information [...] can be put into relational form by allowing certain types of 
information to appear in distinct contexts (Grimes, 1988, p. 167) 
Grimes formalises this as information dependency: 
                                                      
 
100 These ideas were used in the design of the LUST (Bolger, Wright, Rowe, Gammack, & Wood, 1989), IDIOMS (J. 
G. Gammack, Fogarty, Battle, Ireson, & Cui, 1992; J. G. Gammack, Fogarty, Battle, & Miles, 1991) and DUCK (J. 
G. Gammack & Jenkins, 1996, 1997; J. G. Gammack & Stephens, 1997) KBS projects. 
101 E.g. for bags (sensu L. Robinson & Levitt, 1977) for complex systems (Koehler, 2008; Koehler & Link, 2008)  
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one kind of information is said to depend on another kind of information if at any point in 
time a fact of the independent kind determines one or more facts of the dependent kind 
(Grimes, 1988, p. 168) 
Grimes’s approach is concerned with the interrelation of corpora and terms/rules 
relating to them: this interrelation involves a dependency based on denotation of the 
fact as further facts.
102 To operationalise Rescherian erotetic dependency, this 
interrelation needs to be extended in three ways: firstly, we are concerned with the 
connotation of the enquiry; secondly we need to include encoded beliefs, opinion and 
expert judgements as well as facts. A third extension addressed, deontic considerations 
is discussed later in this section. 
This extended information dependency we term the knowledge dependency. 
And, as the information dependency underpins the information relation between 
conventional entities (Grimes, 1988, p. 168), so the knowledge dependency underpins a 
knowledge relation between functional entities (Figure 7.5). 
 
Figure 7‐1 A Functional Entity pair 
Within a knowledge relation, there will be an independent functional entity and 
a dependent functional entity, by virtue of the knowledge dependency. That is, for 
something recorded in the independent functional entity, there will be things known in 
the dependent function entity. 
We can identify the independent functional entity as the knowledge need and the 
dependent functional entity as the knowledge capacity. As a knowledge need, the 
functional entity concerned will have to comprise a set of values coherently presented. 
As a knowledge capacity, the functional entity concerned will be a plenum that is 
accessible as a knowledge affordance. Figure 7.6, featuring the independent knowledge 
need and the dependent knowledge capacity, can be seen as the equivalent of Figure 
7.5. 
                                                       
 
102 Additionally, there is the context specific denotation of professional field specific denotations, wherein the 
conventional denotation (Kvam, 2007) is not applicable, but a contextualised denotation applies instead.  
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Figure 7‐2 Need→Capacity as a Func onal En ty pair 
7.2.4 Knowledge Contracts 
The description of the knowledge relation and its concomitant functional entities 
has been couched in the abstract. However, the knowledge relation must be expressed 
in a pragmatic context, and this requires a set of operational rules for establishing and 
using the knowledge relation throughout the life of the system being modelled. 
Implicit in the construction of both the domain entity and the information is a 
deontic dimension: in order that the erotetic perspective operate co-operatively, that is, 
to extend the given/new contract from a conversation to a social role, and therefore to 
an informatic role when it is part of a modelled system, there must be an explicit set of 
norms in place (see section 6.3.4). 
The tutorial contract
103 (Pask, 1971) is an agreement, either tacit (and assented 
to by accession to the role) or explicit (as part of the negotiation process) whereby the 
respondent not only promises to conform to a role and concomitant behaviour, but also 
to continue in that role and behaviour for a period of time – that is, to be reliable in that 
role. In other words, once the grounds for expertise, domain, access etc are established, 
the enquirer can continue to ask questions knowing that they will be responded to in an 
anticipatable manner (until a formal contract-ending notice is given, or a specified 
contract term expires). Only by having a tutorial contract in place can the process of 
enquiry occur, and therefore fulfil the Rescherian inquiry model. 
Pask’s formalism can be extended from a simple conversational model (wherein 
agents conform to behaviour for the purpose of instruction) to the level of functional 
entities and knowledge relations, by having a tacit knowledge contract built into the 
declaration of a knowledge capacity. Once a knowledge relation has been described 
(subject to the pragmata, see section 6.3.8.1) it is considered to be in force unless terms 
of expiry occur. 
                                                       
 
103 Pask means by this the contract regarding the practice of instruction, not a tutorial in the sense used by 
Universities.  
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This is the equivalent of an acknowledgement of the ceteris paribus clause 
underpinning all assertions in discourse, that they are true other things being equal 
(Meehl, 1986). If other things are not equal, we find that the answers made can be 
compromised by several factors in the world, for example knowledge sources being out 
of date, incomplete, untimely in delivery, or untruthful (see section 6.3.4). The 
knowledge contract has to assure the enquirer that the ceteris paribus clause holds. 
Drawing on these underpinning presuppositions, at a minimum, therefore, the 
knowledge contract needs to present a statement regarding: 
• Sincerity – all interactions will be taken at face value and fulfilled to the greater 
possible extent. 
• Comprehensiveness – all results must be returned, so that the enquirer is not troubled 
by representability. 
• Timeliness – all results must be delivered in near-real time so that the enquiry is 
reliable. 
• Repeatability – all results must be consistent for the same answer resource (save for 
instance where randomness is an intentional factor). 
7.2.5 Functional Entity, Knowledge Relation and Knowledge Contract 
Drawing the previous three sections together, we can describe the functional 
entity, knowledge relation and knowledge contract (Theorem 7.1) by reference to 
Theorem 6.6: 
For the categorial Q→A pair per theorem 6.6, the QA conversation and its 
implicature can be represented as occurring between two functional entities, the 
knowledge need and the knowledge capacity, connected by a knowledge 
relation, which in turn is mandated by a knowledge contract subject to the 
described bounds.  Theorem 7.1 
Drawing on the standard expressions of discrete mathematics, we can say that 
instances of the knowledge relation are knowledge calls, comprising a key (i.e. a 
collectivity drawn from FEn as a set of values) which automatically determines an 
image (i.e. a corresponding series of members of FEd as a collectivity
104) through the 
                                                      
 
104 Potentially a null, a singleton or a totality, all of which count as special cases of collectivity  
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knowledge dependency according to the conditions prevailing in the circumstances 
asked.  
We can consequently construct a knowledge call (7.2) by reference to Theorem 
7.1: 
For the knowledge relation N→C as per Theorem 7.1, a knowledge call Ko→Io is 
an instance, on an occasion O from key Ko to image Io.  Theorem 7.2 
This can be expressed by restating Expression 6.8 with both sides of the 
expression as members of plena, in Expression. 7.1. 
(7.1) 
for key K and image I. 
The key→image pair itself provides the abstraction for the QA Pair as it is used 
for knowledge representation. The knowledge call inherits the type, mode, hedging and 
pragma of the knowledge relation: every well-formed QA Pair within a knowledge 
system will conform to the pattern of the knowledge call.  
A single knowledge relation will have any number of knowledge calls within it: 
the entailment is at the knowledge relation level, so any identifying value from the 
independent functional entity can serve as a key, and the question asked will determine 
what values from the dependent functional entity may serve as the image. 
As an example, the question “Who wrote The Compleet Molesworth? and 
answer “Geoffrey Willans and Ronald Searle” is a title→author knowledge call, which 
instantiates the book→author knowledge relation. “Who wrote books published in 
1958?” and “who was published by Max Parrish in 1958?” will be year→author and 
publisher+year→author knowledge calls respectively, but will both instantiate the 
book→author knowledge relation. 
Systematic knowledge modelling requires the modelling of QA Pairs through 
documentation of the appropriate knowledge relations. 
7.2.6 Typed knowledge relations 
We now have the complete account of the Functional Entity and the Knowledge 
Relation. It is, however, monotonic: what is needed is a way of expressing the qualities 
of knowledge relations that reflects the typology of the QA Pairs that comprise the 
Knowledge Calls that the FE/KR constructs comprise. We saw in section 6.3.10 that  
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the coaction matrix made by the intrinsic typing of questions and the extrinsic typing of 
answers created nine standard forms of the knowledge seeking QA Pair. 
Accordingly, the QA Pairs can be seen as instances of Functional Entities joined 
by Knowledge Relations, with the dependent FE necessarily being typed extrinsically 
according to the internal construction of the Knowledge Capacity, and the independent 
Functional Entity making a intrinsically typed Knowledge Call. When seen this way, 
every occurrence of a Functional Entity in use will have a particular situating within 
this periodic classification (Haskell, 1949), depending on the Knowledge Relation. 
Analysis and subsequent representation of that occurrence is essential to creating 
models within the Erotetic Perspective. 
The coaction matrix given in Table 6.2 can be redrawn showing knowledge 
needs and capacities, with the map of possible occurrences of the Functional Entities 
shown (Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1 A typology of Functional Entities formed by the coaction of knowledge needs and capacities. 
Forms of Knowledge Capacities 
Shape‐dominant  Granularity‐dominant  Scope‐dominant 
Forms of 
Knowledge 
Need 
Predicative  Standard Relation  Standard Recursive  Constitutive Recursive 
Aggregative  Absolute Aggregative  Intensional Aggregative  Fuzzy Aggregative 
Connective  Ontological Connective Networked Connective  Ruleset Connective 
 
As each Knowledge Capacity can be reused for many different questions, so 
each FE can be the dependent FE in many different KRs. Pragmatically this will be 
limited due to ease of use, but this multi-aspectual nature of Knowledge Affordance is 
fundamental to the role of knowledge resource repurposing in KM. In theory, however, 
there is no actual limit to the multiplicity of Knowledge Affordances. Consequently 
there can be no such thing as an “Intensional Aggregative FE”, but rather a FE that is 
being utilised within an Intensional Aggregative Knowledge Relation that gives it that 
aspect. In practice, however, we do refer to such an instance in those terms for 
simplicity. 
We will present a full account of these types of functional entity in use in 
Chapter 8. .  
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7.3  Special Cases for Entailment 
The nine functional entities discussed in the typology discussed above are all 
based on the assumption of traditional propositional form, following the ideas of 
standard traditional logic that explicitly underpin the relational model as formulated by 
Codd (1990). Three factors in describing knowledge relations make this assumption 
problematic: the representation of unknown information, the description of the 
modality (likelihood, trustworthiness, conjecture) of the knowledge relation, and the 
representation of inherent complexity all defy traditional propositional form. 
However, these issues are crucial to defining and representing knowledge. The 
erotetic framework has to be able to represent just such details over and above the 
cases already outlined, in order that the solution satisfy the complete problem space of 
representable knowledge. 
This section looks at the way in which functional entities can be observed that 
can resolve these issues. 
7.3.1 The Problem of Unknown Information 
There are two clear ways in which the problem of unknown information can 
arise. One is where the instance, value or linkage in the question is immaterial, and has 
to be constructed in an ad hoc manner. The other is where the knowledge capacity is 
known to exist but (either temporarily or permanently) is not immediately observable. 
We call these two forms the non-Aristotelian and Cartographic respectively. 
7.3.1.1  Non-aristotelian functional entities 
We first consider the problem of representing knowledge where the principles 
upon which the propositional forms are based fall short. Codd himself found that in 
some situations it was in fact partial or missing information that required 
representation. In a series of papers (1986, 1987; 1993) he worked around the issues 
that arose when he wanted to extend these capabilities to empty sets or missing values 
in a series of papers within the bounds of the traditional forms (e.g. portraying NULLs 
as operations on values of unknown statuses). 
The traditional (or Aristotelian) form of logic rested on three principles – of 
identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle – called the “Laws of Thought” 
(Boole, 1854), and we generally need to ensure that these hold when we are 
constructing higher order noetic artefacts from knowledge repositories. But situations  
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arise where we have to store noetic simples that seem to contradict these principles. In 
a conventional situation, the process of reasoning with the existing knowledge would 
break down here. But knowledge workers can, and regularly do, make the best of the 
data to proceed to build higher order noetic structures. What is needed is a mechanism 
for showing how this process can be modelled and anticipated, and how it can fit into a 
greater FE framework with essential differences showing. 
Fortunately there is a tradition in logic, called non-Aristotelian logic, of 
examining the consequences of contradicting these laws, after the fashion of non-
Euclidian geometry or non-Newtonian physics (Bradford Smith, 1919). We represent 
the knowledge relations based on these principles with non-Aristotelian functional 
entities.
105 
Non-Aristotelian functional entities stand for encoded knowledge without 
existentially correlating entities, yet invoked as images by key entailment. As there are 
three laws of thought, so there are three functional entities concerning them. And as the 
laws can be mapped to the parts of the proposition (instance, value and linkage), we 
can identify three non-Aristotelian knowledge relations for each of the knowledge-
seeking question forms. We know that the non-Aristotelian knowledge relation is 
entailed as a set and valid for involvement in high level declarative form, but the set 
contains what are effectively instances of which relations can be predicated. 
7.3.1.2 Cartographic functional entities 
Some aspects of holarchic systems will be unavailable for observation according 
to the stance of the modeller/observer. In such cases, the functional entities will be 
occluded according to that stance: it will still entail images from a given key, but the 
nature of the key-entailment will not be (completely) known. 
We can term this kind of functional entity a cartographic functional entity, 
because it concerns a representational mapping of the system, rather than the system 
itself. These functional entities have a single purpose, representing occlusion, which is 
to conceal a portion of a greater model, to simplify it, and thus make it comprehensible. 
In such cases the type of entailment is known, but the black-boxing of the knowledge 
source is complete. We can even have experience of successful knowledge calls 
                                                      
 
105 It should be note that this approach to such propositional conflict follows in the path of both the Cybernetics and 
General Systems theory movements in the 1950s. Holl (2007) and Jutoran (2005) both draw attention to the 
congruence between Korzybski (1994) and Bateson (1994; Pias, 2003).  
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without the details becoming apparent: the black-boxing can be complete yet still give 
values. 
Pragmatically, too, there is a requirement for occlusion: there is a point at which 
visual complexity of the schemata mitigates the utility of the diagram. A diagram of 
any complex system (a wiring diagram, a tube map, or a flowchart) has an upper limit 
(the so-called Deutsch Limit) on what can be shown.  
Simplicity is a principal component of any diagramming system (Moody, 2002, 
2009a, 2009b, 2010), particularly with regard to the design and comprehension of 
conceptual models (Moody, 2010; Shanks, Nuredini, et al., 2003; Shanks, Nuredini, 
Tobin, Moody, & Weber, 2010) and for the evaluation of visual programming systems 
(Alan F Blackwell, 2008; Alan Frank Blackwell et al., 2001; T. R. G. Green, 1989; T. 
R. G. Green & Blackwell, 1998). 
7.3.2 The problem of unintended knowledge capacities 
Unintended knowledge capacities are a paradox, as only intentional answers are 
valid (Rescher, 2009c, p. 6). However, they are an unintended result of the process of 
systems that automatically reflect the world in which they are situated. 
All systems when running have unintended consequences (Merton, 1936). For 
informatics system, a significant unintended consequence is informating (Zuboff, 1988, 
p. 11), the process whereby the operation of an informatics system produces 
information about the world automatically and unintentionally. The process of 
informating makes places, people and events visible that would otherwise not be 
visible. It increases the quantity of the known about any given situation, and in doing 
so potentially increases the noise in any communication about that situation, and 
destabilises situations that rely on them (Kling, 1995; Laskowitz, 1994; Trosow, 2004). 
Informating has two consequences for the erotetic perspective and the modelling 
framework. One is misleading knowledge capacity, and the other is an extra set of 
knowledge affordances. 
Misleading knowledge arises by adding extra possible correct, though 
misleading, answers to a question posed to a system. Informated values undermine the 
presupposition that all knowledge systems aspire to be cooperative, even if in practice 
it is unobtainable (Gaasterland et al., 1992). Any aggregative or connective functional 
entity that has access to this data about the system   
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All knowledge systems, once encoded and recorded, accrue values associated 
with the existence of the records, regardless of the form of recording (either type of 
system or whether or not they are digital records). These can be in the form of (e.g.) 
logs, catalogues, schema and permission systems. Patterns can emerge from these 
occurrences that are not otherwise noticeable. 
The benefits of these accrued values are what we can call institutional 
knowledge affordances, assertions about those systems, owing to the institutional 
nature of those values (Robert M Colomb, 2004). These affordances can comprise 
collectivities of these meta-values concerning the provenance of the systems (the order 
of recording or altering values), the application or alteration of names or labels for 
those repositories, and the context of the system (ownership, operators, events). These 
three affordances map onto the three forms of knowledge capacity given in the 
coaction matrix, and are amenable to consideration as functional entities according to 
the knowledge affordances made. Since they are affordances without intention, they are 
not on their own proper knowledge capacities. They must be first made into knowledge 
capacities through a process of encapsulation. 
This consequence is highly significant as it is these knowledge affordances that 
permit usages such as the discovery of health trends (Friedman, 1989), terrorist threats 
(Waugh, 1989) and educational success (Peled & Rashty, 1999). It affords the general 
so-called“knowledge mining” activity (Houtsma & Swami, 1995; J. Lin et al., 2003; 
Lita, 2006; Vicedo & Mollá, 2001). 
7.3.3 Modality of Knowledge Dependency: Mixins as universal 
Functional Entity modifiers 
We saw in section 6.3.8 that Toulminian qualification was an essential 
component of knowledge relations, although this was quite often present in a neutral, 
affirmative manner. Conventional propositional forms are either true or false, and so 
are insufficient for the complexities of knowledge representation. Knowledge 
modelling has a requirement for representing modal qualities of relations, for 
representing the conditions under which the relations may be available, or the durations 
for which they hold. These are metalinguistic operators, which we divided into hedges 
and pragmata. We discuss them briefly here in the context of the Functional Entity 
framework. 
Pragmatic mixins represent the pragmata, which are metalinguistic operators 
setting or organising the bounds of discoursefor a functional entity. Hedging mixins  
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represent hedges, which are metalinguistic operators describing systematic 
qualification of values within functional entities. 
The non-standard knowledge entailments discussed above can be accommodated 
by incorporating the mixins as functions orthogonal to the knowledge relation. This 
means that all modal or institutional qualification of the knowledge call can be 
represented as a mixin. 
A consequence of this is that there is no limit to the number or kinds of mixins -- 
they represent the range of possible knowledge rather than a core essential set. In 
Chapter 8, we shall include a brief survey of both pragmata and hedges likely to be 
encountered. 
7.3.4 Complexity and Collations 
We described the holarchic nature of the QA respondent system in section 6.3.7. 
In particular we saw how the decomposability and substitutability of knowledge meant 
that a question that was answered successfully by a single respondent may well have 
been responded to by an answering system that involved many functional entities 
acting in concert, through a process of collation. 
Collation for knowledge synthesis is only one form of the general process of 
using more than one functional entity to give a final apparently singular, knowledge 
affordance. Other considerations, such as reliability, expediency or load-spreading, will 
also require collating operations.
106 
Self-evidently, there are types for such operations; for example some needed 
operations would be: 
  The system could ask both and construct a union of results 
  The system could ask both and conclude from their logical composition 
  The system could ask both and pick one and only one 
  The system could ask both and ask them to come to consensus 
Wiederhold (1992) makes the high level distinction between using one source at 
a time, or using many resources concurrently. We can use Wiederhold’s distinction to 
                                                      
 
106 Collation-like operators in current use are IDEF1X’s discriminators (Federal Information Processing Standards, 
1993), the ERD’s OR and AND (Elmasri & Navathe, 1989), CACI’s exclusion, subtype and supertype constructs 
(Barker, 1990), ROOMS’s events (Selic, Gullekson, McGee, & Engelberg, 1992) and BPM’S gateways (OMG, 
2006).  
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describe two broad types of forms of collation found in the literature: mediation
107 
where one only out of a number of different functional entity is used, and composition 
(Ossher, Kaplan, Harrison, Katz, & Kruskal, 1995) where the image from more than 
one functional entity is used through a reduction operation. 
Mediation collations consult a number of functional entities one at a time, 
stopping according to a rule, and producing a single image. Mediation is referentially 
transparent to the image; in other words the functional entity typology, as well as any 
mixins and many of the pragmata, will be passed through the mediation process 
unaltered. We can usefully identify two forms of mediating collations: isomorphic 
mediation collations (which mediate multiple versions of the same functional entity), 
and anisomorphic mediation collations (where the mediation does not depend on 
similarity). 
Composition collations take a number of functional entity images concurrently 
and produce a single image. Unlike mediation, composition (which makes use of all of 
the collated function entities) is not referentially transparent. 
7.3.4.1 Collations and Knowledge Dependencies 
In recognising the holarchic nature of answers, we recognise the need for 
representing the answer as a whole and as a complex (this is owing to the nature of the 
holon). Like the mixins, as a construct they are orthogonal to the knowledge relation, 
and as a holon will appear identical to a functional entity, even if (in practice) there is a 
non-realtime articulation of a knowledge call. The logical outcome of this holarchic 
nature is that collations themselves can be stacked, making trees of knowledge calls, 
but resulting in a single knowledge image returned. 
As with the knowledge mixins, there is no limit to the number or kinds of 
collation -- they represent the usage to which knowledge is put rather than a core 
essential set. In the next chapter we shall include a brief survey of collations likely to 
be encountered. 
                                                      
 
107 Called selection by Ossher (1996)  
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7.4  Summary 
In this chapter we have finalised the ontology of the erotetic modelling 
framework, by developing the functional entity and knowledge relation formalisms as 
generalisations of the typed holarchic cooperative QA Pairs described in Chapter 6. 
The first section examined the process of preparation for question-answering, 
and showed that the generalisation of question answering could be made into the 
categorial knowledge relation between two functional entities. It described a 
classification for the functional entity, derived from the basic erotetic form of 
corresponding simple questions and answers with one unknown, which was first 
introduced in section 6.3.10. 
The second section used established tools of pragmatics to give an account for 
how the standard typed knowledge relations can all be consistently qualified in practice 
to represent special cases where the straightforward erotetic form requires 
qualification. These cover a further 6 occurrences of functional entities, plus the 
representation of pragmatic and hedged qualifications of all functional entities, and 
collation forms of functional entity combination. 
This final qualified typology for the Functional Entity gives an ontology which 
permits the representation of all encoded knowledge sources as co-domains of typed 
categories, together with the framework deontology guiding its use in practice. In 
Chapter 8 we shall give a full descriptive account of the ontology, and provide the first 
framework substantiation by expository instantiation.  
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Chapter 8  
 
The Functional Entity Framework 
 
8.1  Chapter overview 
Chapter 7 provided an account of the Functional Entity, as a categorial 
abstraction of the typed holarchic cooperative QA Pair. It presented the FE typology, 
based on the coaction of the classification of questions and answers. It also presented 
the need for non-Aristotelian, and Cartographic functional entities to represent those 
systems where imperfect knowledge had to be represented. This chapter gives a 
complete exposition of the Functional Entity ontology with the framework deontology 
to guide its use in action.  
The chapter contains a catalogue of the fifteen functional entities, as established 
in section 7.2.6, together with the secondary constructs to permit hedging and 
pragmatics, and the representation of complex knowledge structures. It includes 
substantiation by expository instantiations for each type of functional entity, drawing 
on particular problem spaces for illustration that will be revisited as complete examples 
in the chapters on the Functional Entity Relationship Diagram (FERD, Chapter 9), the 
Functional Entity Relationship Methodology (FERM, Chapter 10) and Functional 
Entity Relationship Language (FERL, Chapter 12). 
The fifteen types of functional entities are detailed in section 8.2. All functional 
entities can be qualified by either pragmata or hedging: these are grouped as mixins, 
and are described in section 8.3. The holarchic nature of some functional entities is 
represented through mediation and composition: these are grouped as collations, and 
are described in section 8.4. 
8.2  The fifteen types of Functional Entity 
This section introduces the fifteen possible types of functional entities: the nine 
formed by the coaction matrix in section 7.2.6, the three non-Aristotelian functional 
entities, and the three cartographic functional entities. 
There are nine standard functional entities based on the coaction of the types of 
knowledge needs and the types of knowledge capacities: they are grouped according to  
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the typology of the knowledge need: instance-dominant or predicative (section 8.2.1), 
value-dominant or aggregative (section 8.2.2) and linkage-dominant or connective 
(section 8.2.3). 
The two special forms of knowledge capacities are employed in conditions of 
partial knowledge: these are the non-Aristotelian functional entities (section 8.2.4) and 
cartographic functional entities (section 8.2.5).  
8.2.1 Predicative Functional Entities – Instance-dominant 
In all instance-dominant functional entities there is a direct and unambiguous 
entailment of structurally self-similar instances based on a specification of their 
attributes or identifiers. This entailment may be immediate, via recursion, or articulated 
through secondary attributes. As a group we term them predicative functional entities. 
Generally, all of the predicative functional entities can be implemented with a 
relational database, although the standard recursive and constitutional recursive 
questions may require some kind of stored procedures to operate. 
To illustrate predicative functional entities in practice, we consider the problem 
of a knowledge base supporting the problem of locating and fitting a speciality third 
party supplier-sourced spare part for a car, and getting it installed by a franchise-
certified service centre, where the part was itself a component of a subassembly that 
was in use in many different marques and models (Figure 8.1). 
 
 
Figure 8‐1 Rich picture of problem: cars, parts and installation 
 
The system would need to inform us of which inventoried parts amounted to the 
same actual part, inform us of alternative subassemblies, and locate a suitable service  
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centre where there was a trained and certified mechanic.
108 We therefore need to show 
the relationships among a car manufacturer, a model of a car, a spare part for that 
model, and a service organisation that can get the part fitted under warranty. 
8.2.1.1 Standard Relation Functional Entity 
The standard relation functional entity (standard relation for short) occurs 
when there is a set of entailed instances as an answer to a query. This conforms to the 
conventional relationship the relational model, as described by Codd (1969), and 
expressed using ER diagrams as described by Chen (1976). 
When we ask “what records match this criterion?” we are entailing the tuple that 
is a standard subset of the table, view or stored query. 
In the example shown in Figure 8.1, each actual car is of particular model made 
by a manufacturer. Each manufacturer makes many models, each of which had many 
instances of actual car. That is, there are a standard one-to-many relationship between 
model and car, and between manufacturer and model. 
The knowledge call needs to give the model of a particular car is: 
car VIN → model 
which instantiates the knowledge relation: 
car → model. 
Likewise, the knowledge call needs to show who the manufacturer of a 
particular model car is: 
model id → manufacturer 
which instantiates the knowledge relation: 
model → manufacturer. 
The standard relation functional entity models this knowledge relation. 
8.2.1.2 Standard Recursive Functional Entity 
The standard recursive functional entity occurs when knowledge is represented 
in terms of part/whole relationships that are structurally self-similar. A great deal of 
knowledge is recursive in form while still remaining instance-entailed. This is because 
                                                      
 
108 Make, model and marque are implied by car in Figure 8.1.  
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of the relative ease conceptually of representing the world in terms of 
meronym/holonym (part/whole) relationships.
109 Components of knowledge systems 
providing such answers are modelled using the standard recursive functional entity. 
In the example shown in Figure 8.1, the question “is this spare part available for 
this model?” can be represented by a standard recursive functional entity. Each car can 
have parts replaced, but the spare parts themselves are made up of subassemblies, each 
of which quite frequently can be purchased separately, and if only a larger part is 
available, sometimes that will be purchased to acquire a component or subassembly 
within that assembly. The parts or subassemblies themselves can often fit many 
different models and even marques of cars. 
The knowledge call needs to show that either the part is show that either the part 
is available from some sources, or else a subassembly exists that will contain the 
needed part, that is available from those sources. This knowledge call is: 
part id → part source id 
which instantiates the knowledge relation: 
part → part source. 
The standard recursive functional entity models this knowledge relation. 
Some sample standard recursive knowledge calls are: 
  “Which hospitals have burns units?” 
  “Which schools cater for special needs students?” 
  “Which kit comes with a transformer?” 
8.2.1.3 Constitutive Recursive Relation Functional Entity 
The constitutive recursive functional entity occurs where there is a rule 
determining the links between parent and child instances, and the nature of the 
relationships among parent and child in the hierarchy differs for each. This kind of 
recursion involves different relationships between the parent-child relationships in the 
hierarchy: while it can still be implemented with a relational database, it may require 
some kind of stored procedures to operate. 
                                                      
 
109 Note that we are not discussing hierarchies and ontologies here, only those cases where there is an 
entailed instance indexical to other entailed instances.  
  195
This is an articulated form of recursion of shape-dominant sources of 
knowledge, where there is a rule determining the links between relational versions. In a 
true recursive relationship the link between the parent and child instance is identical no 
matter how many times the data relation is called, and only involves one entity. 
However, it is possible to have a different subtype of membership at each level, and in 
such cases we need extra details at every parent-child component of the hierarchy to 
tell us what values exist. This means that in getting an answer we have to pay heed to 
the subtype from which the information is derived. Importantly, the individual records 
may not be true peers in their attributes, as subtypes may differ in these regards. 
Components of knowledge systems providing such answers are modelled using the 
constitutive recursive functional entity. 
In the example shown in Figure 8.1, the question “which company could fit the 
spare part?” seeks an answer pertaining to expertise, which would reside in a 
technician, employed by a service centre which may be part of a chain or franchise, or 
a division of a company. The qualification of the particular service group would 
depend on whether or not it had such a technician, but the nature of the recursion will 
depend on the different structures the organisations have in place. 
The knowledge call needs to show whether a particular service group would be 
certified to fit the part depending on whether or not a branch somewhere had a 
qualified technician:  
part id → service group id 
which instantiates the knowledge relation: 
  part → service group. 
The constitutive recursive functional entity models this knowledge relation. 
Some sample constitutive knowledge calls are: 
  “Has anyone in your organisation got experience with rabies?” 
  “Do I have any Basque speakers in the maintenance or service divisions?”  
  “Would a Level 2 pay-rise affect head-office more than Bunbury division?”  
  “Am I complying with equal-opportunity employment policy company wide, and 
are there trouble spots?”   
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  “Why is there more total money sponsoring second division teams than first 
division – more sponsors or larger amounts?” 
8.2.2 Aggregative Functional Entities – Value-dominant 
Value-dominant functional entities occur when the instances are determined by 
values, but where those instances are not necessarily self-similar. All value-dominant 
questions potentially seek anything with co-extensive recorded values in the universe 
of discourse, regardless of set membership.
110 They ask: “what things have the 
consistent attribution of value B applicable to them?”. As a group we term them 
Aggregative Functional Entities. 
The attribution can be general (“what exists there?” or “what happened then?”, 
or indeed “what happened there and then?”). It can also be particular (“what is green 
there?”, “what was the value of the Yen yesterday?” or “what was 34°C there and 
then?”). This information draws its value from the interpolation of information – the 
values either in between known values, or the values between known points. 
In exploring material with value-dominant questions, we might be trying to 
determine causal relationships, searching for clusters or outliers in a population, 
looking for trends in a series, or even requiring prediction or extension beyond known 
material. This is in general an enquiry as to the import of the field at a given 
designation. Typically such material is investigated using spreadsheets, statistical or 
epidemic databases, or GIS. 
To illustrate aggregative functional entities in practice, consider the problem of a 
knowledge base supporting environmental emergencies such as chemical spillages 
(Figure 8.2). 
                                                      
 
110 In relational terms, this would mean that the records entailed are not necessarily part of the same 
entity.  
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Figure 8‐2 Rich picture of problem: chemical spill from a truck rollover  
 
The system would need to inform us of the distribution, the substance involved, 
the threat to the environment, the closest response team, the police station within 
whose jurisdiction it lies, any dwellings or public buildings under threat, the correct 
action to take, any special expertise needed, etc. Additionally, some information is 
dependent on others – the closest response team, for instance, would be the closest 
competent team dependent on the type of spillage. 
Unlike the predicative examples, the aggregative scenario is not straightforward 
to implement in a standard relational model, but will require services to be farmed out 
to dedicated systems. Statistical or GIS packages are frequently the only way to 
achieve this goal. 
8.2.2.1 Absolute Aggregative Functional Entity 
The absolute aggregative functional entity occurs when knowledge is 
represented as values expressed in absolute terms, within a universal static framework 
(such as latitude-longitude pairs, dates in the Gregorian calendar). In such cases, the 
results are absolute irrespective of position or occasion of enquirer. Typical questions 
would be “what flora exists in this location” or “are there recorded break-ins in the 
area”. 
In the chemical spill example represented in Figure 8.2, we might ask “where is 
the accident spill distributed?” a question of the sort frequently employing a GIS. 
There are many possible answers to this question in purely physical terms: location can 
be a square centimetre, a hectare, or a square kilometre (in fact all three can be correct 
at the same time) but a footprint is also a location, as is a block, a paddock or a suburb. 
This information is needed to find out if there are schools in danger, if there are prized  
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environmental resources in the vicinity, which is the appropriate police station and 
similar questions regarding co-extensivity and co-location. 
It should be noted that an action of location at the higher level doesn’t 
necessarily have meaning for greater precision, and a single instance of location at a 
lower level has no implication for the spread or direction of any particular regional 
phenomenon. It does however have an absolute framework: it is uniquely identifiable 
in terms of a world coordinate system, and is the same regardless of enquirer. 
The knowledge call needs to give details as to the distribution of the problem: 
spill id → distribution area 
which instantiates the knowledge relation: 
spill → distribution. 
The absolute aggregative functional entity models this knowledge relation. 
Some sample absolute aggregative knowledge calls are: 
•  “Do I live in a wealthy/crime-ridden suburb?”  
•  “What was the mean share price for that week?” 
8.2.2.2 Intensional Aggregative Functional Entity 
The intensional aggregative functional entity occurs when the significance of a 
knowledge call derives from its being instantiated in a moment or a place, of both 
observer and of defined point/time. Just as there will always be the tallest mountain, or 
the longest river, so there will always be an answer (even if a tied answer) for the 
question. Intensional aggregative questions and their answers are tethered to the 
instance, and will depend on an immediate analysis of the population, relative to the 
problem encountered. 
In the example represented in Figure 8.2, a necessary question to ask is “where 
is the nearest response team?” Here, the answer is based on the situation, and is relative 
to the problem encountered. The question is really – “which is the response team that is 
equipped to deal with this situation, and which is closest in terms of travel rather than 
actual location?”. This answer is a relative one depending on the rest of the set, and 
possibly involving tradeoffs (a closer, less-equipped team may be sufficient). 
The knowledge call needs to give the closest response team capable: 
spill location+spill type → response team id  
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which instantiates the knowledge relation: 
spill → response team. 
The intensional aggregative functional entity models this knowledge relation. 
Some sample intensional aggregative knowledge calls are: 
•  “Is there a vegetarian restaurant near my new house which is near a theatre?” 
•  “Where is the nearest bus-stop?”  
 
8.2.2.3 Fuzzy Aggregative Functional Entity 
The fuzzy aggregative functional entity occurs when knowledge is represented in 
terms of the fuzzy logic paradigm (Kosko, 1993; Yen & Langari, 1999; Zadeh, 1965). 
This is where answers require determining if values are members of fuzzy sets, 
invoking a kind of rule mediation to determine to which kind of phenomenon the value 
amounts to. This means that values are deliberately rounded according to a series of 
quanta/steps to force membership of an aggregative boundary at the point of 
observation. 
In the example represented in Figure 8.2, the question “what is the appropriate 
response strategy?” requires an answer involving preset ranges for rapidity of 
spreading, age of spill, area or distribution of spill, commonality of spill, resilience of 
environment to spill chemicals, and so forth; fitting the values into a matrix of rules 
and thresholds. 
Here, the answer gives which subrange of a pre-established value range it falls 
into, in terms or either or both of quantitative and evaluative (subjective) analysis. Here 
we could be asking a question like “How serious is this crisis?”. Such a question will 
involve fitting the values returned into a matrix of rules and thresholds. 
The knowledge call needs to give the most appropriate response strategy: 
spill details → response strategy id 
which instantiates the knowledge relation: 
spill → response strategy. 
The fuzzy aggregative functional entity models this knowledge relation. 
Some sample absolute aggregative knowledge calls are:  
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•  “Which of these locations is an accident black spot?” 
•  “Are there children in this class with learning difficulties?” 
•  “Do children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds tend to be bullies?” 
8.2.3 Connective Functional Entities – Linkage-dominant 
Linkage-dominant functional entities occur where the identification of either 
values or instances (or both) determine a new collectivity of either values or instances 
(or both). What is sought are the other instances of the same set to which the denoted 
instances are connected. As a group we term them Connective Functional Entities. 
These are knowledge calls that ask “what things can this initial link be chain-
linked to?” Here there is no useful general application, because everything is linked to 
everything else in innumerable ways. Such questions are found in all systems of 
knowledge that can be represented by a graph. (e.g. networks, stars and trees). Uses 
include classification schemes and rules, family trees, and epidemic contact charts. 
Networked material is notoriously difficult to corral and control: graphs are by 
their very nature one of the n-P hard problems of computer science. The rules of 
entailment and consistency across graphs are likewise difficult to ascertain: some 
systems (like an old-fashioned evolutionary tree) can have a clear terminus by 
definition. Others have a practical limit of knowledge (ancestor charts for instance) 
since only so much is known and can be known. Others still such as contact networks 
are limitless, since they propagate out to unmanageable (if predicable) numbers very 
quickly indeed. Finally, representing some sense of strength of connection may also be 
necessary.
111 
To illustrate connective functional entities in practice, we can consider the 
problem of identifying and tracking the advance of an infection in a population, and 
treating or quarantining the infection cases (Figure 8.3). 
                                                      
 
111 Tobler's law states that "everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than 
distant things" (Tobler, 1970, p. 235).  
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Figure 8‐3 Rich picture of problem: epidemic control 
 
The system would need to inform us of the distribution of cases and contacts, 
the best experts to consult, and any possible treatments. 
Again, the connective example scenario is not straightforward to implement in a 
standard relational model, but will require services to be farmed out to dedicated 
systems. Special packages for ontology representation, epidemiology or expert systems 
are frequently the only way to achieve this goal. 
8.2.3.1 Ontological Connective Functional Entity 
The ontological connective functional entity occurs where there is a hierarchical 
relationship between instances in a knowledge representation based on attributes that 
are pre-established as significant, with predetermined methods of establishing set 
membership. Ontologies, subject classifications and naturalistic taxonomies are found 
here. Knowledge workers have to deal with classificatory systems frequently, and the 
ability to indicate this kind of consultation is vital. The Harmonized Trade Index, the 
WHO Infectious Disease Classification and the various library classifications systems 
(Dewey, UDC, LCSH) can all be represented by ontological connective functional 
entities. Ontologies organise known identities in relation to each other, so it is the 
identity that is linked (in whatever way) to the key. The secondary part of the key 
concerns the link form (parent, sibling, ancestor and similar). 
In the epidemic example represented in Figure 8.3, we are concerned with 
classifying a disease in order to access knowledge already held regarding it. 
Classifications represent an ontological discussion of the world, so such a question 
involves asking where in a pre-established ontological scheme the disease fits.   
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Here, the knowledge call needs to give the infection classification: it could be 
expressed as “Which WHO classification group is the infection under?”, and is 
formalised as: 
infection name → WHO classification id 
which instantiates the knowledge relation: 
infection → WHO classification. 
The ontological connective functional entity models this knowledge relation. 
Some sample ontological connective knowledge calls are: 
•  “Are there any books that are more general on this subject?” 
•  “How well is compiler design represented in the library?” 
•  “How will the latest round of trade talks affect my machine part exports?” 
8.2.3.2 Networked Connective Functional Entity 
The networked connective functional entity occurs where there is an association 
between entities within a dataset, and the number of instances entailed by the key 
connection can vary to an indeterminate degree. There may be no reason for the 
network over and above the shared value: they are linked by a momentary shared time 
and space (or topological space) and that is sufficient membership for a set of answers. 
In the example represented in Figure 8.3, a necessary question to ask is “whom 
has this (infected) person contacted, and whom might they have been infected by?”, a 
question which implies a network of contacts, and through those, further contacts still. 
Epidemics manifest themselves as cases, representable simply as a one-to-many 
relationship. Epidemic knowledge bases rely very heavily on such questions and their 
answers. When tracking an infection back to “Patient Zero”, or finding the source of 
food poisoning in a supply chain, a connection-based knowledge base provides the 
infrastructure for recording the instances and eventualities of an epidemic. 
The knowledge call needs to give the possible origin of infection and possible 
subsequent reinfection. It could be phrased as “Who has this person been in contact 
with and in which countries and by which routes?”, and is formalised as: 
person name → contact network names 
which instantiates the knowledge relation:  
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person → contacts. 
The networked connective functional entity models this knowledge relation. 
Some sample networked connective knowledge calls are: 
•  “Do you supply your smartphones to retailers in Perth?” 
•  “What is the source for the argument in this book?”  
•  “What is the shortest bus journey to Daglish?” 
•  “Do I have any convict/royal/famous ancestors?”  
 
8.2.3.3 Ruleset Connective Functional Entity 
The ruleset connective functional entity occurs where values and instances are 
associated by chains of logical reasoning. The answers here can be set goals, or 
implicated instances, or likely values: the most significant thing is that unlike the other 
two forms of question there is a process of reasoning before the network can be 
created. 
Expert systems (either inferential or production) can be modelled as ruleset 
connective functional entities: a large number of pre-established facts and rules are 
recorded so that when the expert system encounters a new set of facts, the reasoning 
can be carried out automatically. 
In the example represented in Figure 8.3, we are interested in potential 
treatments, based on stored medical and clinical knowledge. Treatment information 
can be delivered either through prompted queries of the old fashioned expert system 
kind, or of a rule production system. The answer will draw on the conjunction of the 
existing values and this stored knowledge. 
The knowledge call needs to give the best treatment for the infection, based on 
the infection identification, and the age and health of the patient. It could be phrased as 
a “What is the best treatment for this epidemic?”, and is formalised as: 
infection details+person condition → recommended treatment 
which instantiates the knowledge relation: 
infection → recommended treatment. 
The ruleset connective functional entity models this knowledge relation.  
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Some sample ruleset knowledge calls are: 
•  “Is this individual taboo for marriage or even conversation with that individual?” 
•  “Can this pallet load of chemicals be stored with the rest of the items in this 
container?” 
•  “Is this individual a person of interest with respect to this crime?” 
8.2.4 Non-Aristotelian Functional Entities 
This section concerns Non-Aristotelian Functional Entities – functional entities 
that stand for encoded knowledge without existentially correlating entities, yet which 
are invoked as images by key entailment. We discussed in section 7.3.1.1 how the non-
Aristotelian knowledge relation is entailed as a set and valid for involvement in high 
level declarative form, but the set contains what are effectively instances of which 
relations can be predicated. We also demonstrated that as the laws of thought (Boole, 
1894) can be mapped to the parts of the proposition (instance, value and linkage), we 
can identify three non-Aristotelian knowledge relations for each of the knowledge-
seeking question forms. 
To illustrate non-Aristotelian functional entities in practice, we can consider the 
problem involved in investigating nesting sites of threatened birds. There are 
bibliographically accessed records of historic nesting sites in shires. The shire 
boundaries have moved, and the potential nesting sites are hypothesised as suitable 
because of a similarity measure with known nesting sites. (Figure 8.4). 
 
 
Figure 8‐4 Rich picture of problem: bird nesting sites 
The system would need to inform us as to historically recorded positions of 
where an endangered bird has been sighted, and which current jurisdiction holds such 
records. The knowledge base has a repository for recorded evidence, which is stored  
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with bibliographical references. It would have to represent hypothetical data for the 
purposes of making judgements, with likelihood given for those judgements. 
Once more, the non-Aristotelian example scenario is not straightforward to 
implement in a standard relational model, but will require services to be farmed out to 
dedicated systems. 
8.2.4.1 Contiguous non-Aristotelian Functional Entities 
Contiguous non-Aristotelian functional entities are instance-dominant functional 
entities where the identities of the instances cannot be assured through time. They are, 
however, still entailed as identity. Contiguous non-Aristotelian functional entities 
occur when the nature of an unchangeable (an identity) is fractured or fragmented. 
They represent situations where the law of identity   is violated. 
In the example illustrated in Figure 8.4, there is a contiguous non-Aristotelian 
functional entity required to represent shires for location of woodland communities 
suitable for bird nesting. If records are kept of observations at a shire level, and the 
boundaries (being political entities) change, then the fact of a hatching flock being 
observed in a region would have a value depending on where the boundaries were for 
that period of time. 
The knowledge call needs to return the shire that has had administrative 
ownership of a community through the years. It could be phrased as a “What shire 
looks after this bushland community?”, and is formalised as: 
community id → shire name 
which instantiates the knowledge relation: 
community → shire. 
The non-Aristotelian contiguous functional entity models this knowledge relation. 
Some other usages of the contiguous non-Aristotelian functional entity are: 
•  “Clumping and cleaving” in biological taxonomy, where families and genera are 
fused and separated by experts. For example, the Marri was formerly in the 
genus Eucalyptus, and is now in Corymbia (Hill & Johnson, 1998; L. A. S. 
Johnson, 1976). Statistical data recorded for these genera will be predicated over 
A  A 
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time to a varying extent even though the definition of the genera concerned have 
not changed.
112  
•  A terrace house divided into flats, strata titled, then converted back to a house 
may well have different history for insect spraying treatment for the period of 
division. Strata titling and apartment subdivision or joining-up will mean that 
there might not be a record of individual apartments being treated, even though 
the treatment events occurred within their confines. 
•  Shifting shire boundaries may mean that council permission for works are 
variably applicable. 
•  Historical and legal databases have to be able to contain knowledge statements 
made with regard to paracontiguous identities such as nations and colonies that 
no longer exist, classes of people that have been removed (e.g. slaves, serfs or 
villeins). 
8.2.4.2 Emergent non-Aristotelian Functional Entities 
Emergent non-Aristotelian functional entities are value-dominant functional 
entities, where the late binding nature of the value makes for a potentially changing 
significance for that value. Even though a value without any context is meaningless in 
a conventional sense, they are nonetheless entailed as values. 
Emergent non-Aristotelian functional entities occur when we change the telos of 
a recorded value. They represent situations where the law of non-contradiction 
 is violated. This means that such considerations as domain and range 
(including type, storage, keying, null-permission, choice of lookup) are lost, while new 
significance (comparison with other values, new null values, new key-dependence) is 
granted. 
In the example illustrated in Figure 8.4, there is an emergent non-Aristotelian 
functional entity required to enable a reference library for recording accounts of 
nesting sites, including contemporary records, manuscripts, correspondence, wills and 
testaments, scholarly articles, reports, surveys, interviews and newspaper clippings. 
                                                      
 
112 On occasion there may be a clumping and a subsequent reversal (i.e. re-cleaving), causing even greater 
problems for knowledge representation: the weed Bridal Creeper Asparagus asparagoides was for 6 years 
classified under a different specially created genus as Myrsiphyllum asparagoides, until reverting on a 
subsequent taxonomical investigation (Batchelor & Scott, 2006; Stansbury & Scott, 1999). 
 P  P  
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With a bibliographic system, a repository of templates is used to assign late-binding 
labels to values in order to make a set of attributes. Up to the point of combination, the 
values have a standardised slot address but no final semantic significance. Changing 
the type of reference changes the meaning of the value. In a sense, a bibliographic 
database is a table with a late binding schema for each record, and preservation of the 
template list as a metaschema is paramount to the correct usage of the preserved 
values.  
The knowledge call needs to give the reference details for a community 
observation. It could be phrased as a “What are the details for the reference containing 
this observation?”, and is formalised as: 
observation id → reference details 
which instantiates the knowledge relation: 
observation → reference. 
Additional common usages involving the non-Aristotelian functional entities are 
the activities termed “data mining” and “text mining”. They are designed to repurpose 
values gathered for a different context but needed in a new context. With text mining, it 
is more obvious that the original semantic context has gone, but there is an equally 
complex knowledge context framing with the numerical form of data. As discussed in 
section 7.3.2 all recorded knowledge offers an institutional knowledge affordance that 
permits repurposing of knowledge (termed “knowledge mining”). 
8.2.4.3 Abductive non-Aristotelian Functional Entities 
Abductive non-Aristotelian functional entities are linkage-dominant functional 
entities, where the linkage is conjectural. There are no linkages per se, but they are 
hypothesised for the purposes of research, so they are still linkage-entailed. 
Abductive non-Aristotelian functional entities occur when we need to represent 
the different items within the knowledge system that we are assuming (in the absence 
of proof) are linked in some way. They represent situations where the law of excluded 
middle   is violated. 
Examples of such candidate links might be Graesser knowledge arcs such as 
causes, implies, enables, is a member of (Otero & Graesser, 2001). 
In the example illustrated in Figure 8.4, there is an emergent non-Aristotelian 
functional entity required to hypothesise links between potential nesting sites and 
P  P 
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plants that provide suitable hollows. We have an assumed (unproven) set of links 
between plant communities and nesting birds, which sit alongside the established links, 
and need to show them in absolute terms. 
The knowledge call needs to give the identities of potential nesting sites in 
designated stands. It could be phrased as a “What nesting sites exist in this area based 
on these observations?”, and is formalised as: 
observation id → nesting site possibility  
which instantiates the knowledge relation: 
observation → nesting site. 
A broad general usage of the abductive non-Aristotelian functional entity would 
be to represent a call on a link-exploration system such as a Bayesian database. 
8.2.5 Cartographic Functional Entities – Occluded  
This section concerns Cartographic Functional Entities – proxy functional 
entities needed to represent other functional entities that are occluded owing to the 
observer/designer stance. We discussed in section 7.3.1.2 how they were necessary to 
represent occluded functional entities in knowledge systems. We can observe that there 
are three ways in which the cartographic functional entity can arise: as representing a 
remote system outside the immediate system, as the greater systemic whole, and as 
simplifying reduction of a subsystem. These occlusions are of the same form regardless 
of whether the occlusion was temporary, role-based or permanent. 
We illustrate the three cartographic functional entities with the example of a 
library circulation system for a university. Patrons of the library are students, staff or 
alumni. The system has a modular loans processing subsystem, and is part of a greater 
library management system. It would draw on external systems (such as staff, student 
and alumni records systems) to provide a guarantee of eligibility, and it would be 
called upon by the loans system in its turn (Figure 8.5). 
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Figure 8‐5 Rich picture of problem: authenticating library patrons 
This example illustrates three kinds of cartographic functional entities, described 
next. 
8.2.5.1 Remote Cartographic Functional Entities 
All models will have calls to essential systems that are outside the current 
design, or for which details are not available. It is in the nature of systems is that some 
of the effective subcomponents are always going to be hidden or outside the control of 
the system under consideration, modelling them as black boxes. This might be for 
reasons of security, or it may well be that one of a number of equifinal systems would 
be called upon depending on the circumstances. Either way, it is the fact of the system, 
not the system itself, that would be included in the model. Following the naming 
practices of the distributed simulation system (Beaver, Brasch, Burdick, Butler, & 
Downes-Martin, 1992), we can call this a remote cartographic functional entity. 
In the example given in Figure 8.5 above, the systems that provide eligibility 
guarantees (i.e. the staff, student and alumni systems) are remote cartographic 
functional entities. The knowledge call needs to give the fact of eligibility and any 
termination date for an individual applying for new membership. It could be phrased as 
“Is this person eligible to borrow books from the library?”, and is formalised as: 
person name → eligibility 
which instantiates the knowledge relation: 
person → external record. 
8.2.5.2 Folded Cartographic Functional Entities 
We have observed (in sections 2.5.1.8 and 6.3.6) that knowledge systems are 
holarchic: this means that they must be capable of being modelled declaratively (i.e. in 
the knowledge level) at every level with the same design rules, so that the telos of the 
system is apparent in the diagram of the system at that level. Operating at the  
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knowledge level, the declarative nature of subsystems means that they are occluded; 
modelling at that level is an appropriate abstraction. Following Jensen & Mark (1992) 
and separately Dori (1995) we can call such operations folds. We therefore call these 
functional entities folded cartographic functional entities. 
In the example given in Figure 8.5, the loans systems that will call upon the 
identity is a folded cartographic functional entity. The knowledge call needs to give the 
loan details for any patron. It could be phrased as “What is the loan history for this 
person?”, and is formalised as: 
person id → loan history 
which instantiates the knowledge relation: 
person → loan subsystem. 
 
8.2.5.3 Exofolded Cartographic Functional Entities 
The representation of any system will always be holarchic, that is it will be 
representing a system that is part of a greater system (necessary from the tenets of 
system theory). Consequently there has to be a means of showing how the system 
serves as a component within the greater whole. Since knowledge systems are (as a 
network of subsystems) effectively infinite, there must be a way of representing the 
roles that even very large subsystem have with each other and the greater whole within 
which they are included. Such an abstraction – that is, a conception of the model as 
existing with a greater, modellable holon – is the inverse of the folded functional 
entity, which we can call (following the principle in chemistry) an exofolded 
cartographic functional entity. 
In the example given in Figure 8.5 above, the library maintenance systems that 
will call upon the patron record is an exofolded cartographic functional entities. The 
knowledge call needs to give the informatic obligations placed on the patron record 
when made, such as fundraising or levying fines. It could be phrased as “Is there a 
supersystem calling on this?”, and is formalised as: 
person id → library supersystem 
which instantiates the knowledge relation: 
person → library supersystem.  
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8.3  Knowledge Mixins: Functional Entity qualification 
Knowledge modelling has a requirement for representing modal qualities of 
relations, for representing the conditions under which the relations may be available, or 
the durations for which they hold. We saw in 6.3.8 that Toulminian qualification was 
an essential component of cooperative answers, although this was quite often present in 
a neutral, affirmative manner. There is a need to distinguish between the inherent 
functional entity qualities and these potential qualifications. We use the construct mixin 
to represent Toulminian qualification, and identified three kinds of mixins orienting 
pragmata, bounds-setting pragmata, and hedgings.  
We saw in section 7.3.3 that such qualification is inherited from the typed QA 
Pair to the functional entity/knowledge relation pair that generalises it. By using mixins 
to qualify functional entities and knowledge relations, the intricacy of all encoded 
knowledge can be represented. The possibility of layered mixin qualification of 
knowledge dependencies means that the nuances of different knowledge representation 
can be expressed by the FE framework's meta-representational schema. 
By their nature, there is no absolute set of mixins that can be given: they are 
cognitive constructs that can always be invented or modified. We can, however, make 
a short catalogue of the two classes of mixins as a guide to what is involved with their 
usage. 
8.3.1 Pragmatic Mixins 
Pragmatic mixins represent the pragmata, which are metalinguistic operators 
setting or organising the bounds of discourse. They operate at the gestalt level, that is, 
they are true of a functional entity, not of values within the functional entity. We saw 
in section 6.3.8 above that pragmatic mixins could be discourse orienting or discourse 
bounds setting. Orienting mixins are pragmata that describe the way in which the 
discourse was to be understood, while bounds-setting mixins are pragmata that describe 
rights, access, completeness and cost. 
8.3.1.1 Orienting Mixins  
Orienting mixins indicate the presence of a natural frame or sequence within a 
system for which values are being recorded, for all referenced discourse. This section 
lists some examples of orienting mixins.  
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Order is an orienting mixin, and represents the natural sequence of recording 
values within a system. By its essential nature, the data store in conventional relations 
is considered to be order-neutral, or ordered for display only by a primary key, or a 
designated collation sequence. If a faithful reflection of the order in which the records 
arrived is required, then what is needed is some mechanism (such as an internal 
timestamp) that ensures that the order-of-arrival is preserved. Logged stock exchange 
data is optimised for up- and down-tick evaluation because it occurs in natural order, a 
feature exploited by database systems such as kdb+ (Garland, 2004) or A+ (Girardot, 
1990). 
Framing occurs when a set of values have a context that gives meaning over 
and above the general context of recording that is inherent in every set of recorded 
values. The inherent context includes considerations such as telos, observer, occasion. 
Framing indicates that words or values have special significance over and above 
ordinary usage. 
Words have special significance when they have connotations that are non-
conversational, such as: 
•  Terms from a limited set such as a thesaurus, authority file or technical lexicon 
•  Terms of art such as jargon or special local usages 
•  Specific proper names such as names of works of art, countries, companies, or 
people 
Numbers have special usage when they are locations within a frame of 
reference, or are values on a scale. Frames of reference include: 
•  Geolocation systems such as latitude/longitude pairs, or map references 
•  Classification systems such as Dewey (Saeed & Chaudhry, 2002) or UDC 
numbers (Rayward, 1967) 
•  Attitudinal scales such as those of Thurstone, (1927a, 1927b, 1927c), Likert 
(1932) or Guttman (1950). 
  Ordering and framing can occur in a significant order, which we can term 
Ordered framing. This occurs in situations such as a collection of values matching 
geospatial coordinates, or timed waypoints, as for example the trace of a GPS would 
present as waypoints over a journey.  
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  Values that are measurements require not only a frame of reference, but also a 
recognised abstract reference system. There is also a context of the recording 
mechanism (observer, instrument, measurement standard, conditions prevailing at the 
time of recording and so forth). This also means that they will not only have a value, 
but also a tolerance/precision value. When linking two systems between which there is 
a mismatch in the accuracy with which something is measured, the joined images will 
have the worst accuracy. For instance if one system has a time stamp and another a 
date stamp on the point of recording, the overall system is reduced to the lower 
accuracy (here the date stamp). 
Values that have been translated from one measurement system to another are 
considered to have been adapted. Adaptation is used to represent scaled or measured 
values presented by a functional entity than have been converted from one system of 
units to another (e.g. Fahrenheit to Celsius) or one attitudinal scale to another (e.g. 
from Likert- or Thurstone-scaled values to Guttman-scaled values). Adaptation is 
necessary to permit composition collators (Ossher et al., 1995; Ossher et al., 1996) 
where inconsistent value sets are to be combined in some way (section 8.4). 
8.3.1.2 Bounds-setting Mixins 
Bounds-setting mixins all establish a set of bounds for all discourse referred to. 
Bounds in this sense can mean limitations (temporality, privilege or cost), or they 
obligations (deontics). Again, it is not possible to enumerate all bounds-setting mixins, 
so we list a few common examples. 
Temporality qualifies the availability of a functional entity (in terms of times of 
day, or periods of availability). 
Privilege qualifies the availability of a functional entity in terms of rights of 
access. This can refer to standard access rights (as per operating systems) or social 
rights (in terms of rights given by status in a socio-cultural setting). 
Cost qualifies the availability of a functional entity in terms of cost of access to 
it. This can be in terms of actual payment, or of subscription, or in terms of limited 
numbers of access to a system during a set time. 
Deontics qualifies the usages of images taken from a functional entity. A deontic 
requirement might limit the reuse, or the interpretation of values. It might also require 
(as per the GNU General Public License) certain transferred deontic attributes to 
derived images.  
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8.3.2 Hedging Mixins 
Hedging mixins represent hedges, which are metalinguistic operators describing 
systematic qualification of values within functional entities. 
Hedges are cumulative with functional entities as with error calculation in 
experimental results: the poorest quality hedge will dominate any joined images and 
provide the overall hedging, whether it be accuracy, currency, evidentiality or 
likelihood. Again, it is not possible to enumerate all hedging mixins, so we list a few 
common examples. 
Currency describes how current values in a functional entity are, or when they 
are expected to be updated. The worst currency in joined images will provide the 
overall currency, as the overall resulting image will inherit the worst reliability.  
Likelihood qualifies images drawn from a functional entity using probabilistic 
means. The least probable outcome will determine the overall image likelihood. 
Evidentiality represents issues of trust, experience, or consistency for a 
knowledge relation. By their nature, relations are value-neutral, so the trustworthiness 
of the material stored cannot be inferred from the values alone. We can borrow a 
feature of natural languages termed evidentiality (De Haan, 2005) which indicates how 
the knowledge was acquired (directly-experienced first-hand, second-hand, common 
word, folklore), how trustworthy it is (experiential, reliable, trusted, unreliable, 
uncertain, gossip, conventional understanding) and permanence (short-term, long-term, 
changed-daily). 
Conjecture is used to represent whether the relation is known, conjecture, or one 
of a set of alternate conjectures. Sometimes we are working with hypothesised values 
rather than known existent ones. As Mackay (1951) said information must not only be 
about “what is the case”, it must also be about that “which is believed or alleged to be 
the case”. The question about the latter are not of the form “Is there…?” but rather of 
the form “Might there be…?”.
113  
                                                      
 
113 This is different from asking a knowledge system to come up with candidate instances – all nine of our 
Aristotelian knowledge relations, in asking the responding system to come up with an answers will 
always logically provide a set of candidates, even if it is a set of one candidate or an empty set (indicating 
nothing found). It is also different from the kinds of constructed instances, values and links encountered 
with the non-Aristotelian functional entities, where there is not an actual instance, value or link, but 
contingent usage is made of the knowledge store as if there was. The kind of hypothesised knowledge  
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Negation is used to represent an inversion of values presented by a functional 
entity. For instance, it is possible that a list of acceptable foods for guests would be 
defined by the ingredients to be omitted (such as pork, meat or peanuts). Legal drugs 
are defined by exclusion rather than inclusion (Esponda, 2005).  
8.4  Knowledge Collations: Functional Entity unification 
Collating is a function of semantically rich answering systems whereby multiple 
answers can be rendered to appear as one answer. We saw in sections 6.3.6 and 7.3.4 
how this is a concomitant of the existence of complex questions and their being 
answered by complex answers, but it is also the outcome of needing to pay attention to 
multiple voices and viewpoints in knowledge representation, either sequentially (using 
mediation collations) or concurrently (using composition collations). 
As was the case with mixins, there cannot be an absolute set of collations 
enumerated: they are sociopragmatic constructs that can always be invented or 
modified. We can, however, make a short catalogue of the two classes of collations as 
an illustration as to what is involved with their usage. 
8.4.1 Mediation Collations 
Mediation collations (or mediations for short) consult a number of functional 
entities one at a time, stopping according to a rule, and producing a single image. 
Isomorphic mediation collations mediate multiple versions of the same functional 
entity, and anisomorphic mediation collations do not depend on such similarity. 
8.4.1.1 Isomorphic Mediations 
Isomorphic mediation collations operate on the principle of having multiple 
versions of the same functional entity, or between functional entities that are equifinal. 
Some examples of isomorphic mediations are given here. 
Fall-back mediation occurs when the answer is selected from a nominated 
system, with other systems called upon when the nominated system fails (times out, 
crashes, is unavailable). 
Media fall-back mediation is used to ensure an answer, so that when an 
automated system has failed, there can be recourse to a manual system or an interview. 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
relations proposed in the conjectural mixin do not have a stored identity, but are adduced from the 
existence of stored simples.  
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Version rollback mediation is used if an answer is not present in one system, 
there is recourse to an earlier version of the same collectivity. 
Succession mediation is used if an initial answer is insufficient or is an empty 
collectivity, the answer arises from a series of consultations that continues until the 
query telos is satisficed. This would occur in cooperative systems. 
Rotate mediation cycles through multiple sources, one capacity after another in 
a predetermined series, to permit their individual consultation. This can be to ensure 
variety or to minimise load on one capacity. 
Roster mediation allocates a capacity from a set of candidate capacities, 
depending on particular time/location, according to a predetermined schedule. 
8.4.1.2 Anisomorphic Mediations 
Anisomorphic mediation collations occur where the similarity of the functional 
entities is not an issue. Although some anisomorphic mediations are created with an 
intention to access diverse functional entities (such as selection or rule-based 
mediations) some can be functionally isomorphic (for instance, primacy or bid 
mediations could work equally well with similar or equifinal functional entities). Some 
examples of isomorphic mediations are given here to illustrate their application. 
Rule-based mediation occurs when a set of rules is applied to determine which 
of a series of functional entities is appropriate to use, and the image is retrieved from 
that functional entity.  
Selection mediation occurs where the knowledge image used is selected from a 
number of options presented as a list. 
Bid mediation occurs where the knowledge image used comes from the cheapest 
or most cost effective functional entity (e.g. auctions or tenders). 
Primacy mediation occurs where the image used comes from the fastest replying 
functional entity. 
Priority mediation occurs where the image used comes from the most reliable. 
8.4.2 Composition Collations 
Composition collations (or compositions for short) take a number of functional 
entity images concurrently and produce a single image. Unlike mediation, composition  
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(which makes use of all of the collated function entities) is not referentially transparent. 
Some examples of composition collations are given here. 
A Conjunction composition merges the content of multiple functional entities 
through intersection or union.  
A Disjunction composition differentiates the content of multiple functional 
entities through relative or absolute difference. 
The composition for Consensus merges multiple functional entities through a 
socio-political process. 
The Confirmatory composition uses one or more secondary functional entities 
to confirm the query results arising from a primary functional entity. 
In Supersession composition, earlier views of the relevant domain are available 
through requests, either for comparison or history.  
8.5  Summary 
This chapter has given a complete exposition of the Functional Entity ontology, 
in the form of a catalogue of the fifteen functional entities, and the secondary 
constructs mixin (to permit hedging and pragmatics) and collation (to permit the 
modelling of complex knowledge). Throughout the chapter we also presented the 
framework deontology, giving the reason for using different FE/KR pairs in different 
situations. Finally, it has included substantiation by expository instantiations for each 
type of functional entity.  
This has completed the first two components of the modelling framework, the 
ontology and the deontology. What is left is establishing the framework symbology 
(for representing the functional entities in practice) and the framework methodology 
(for giving instructions on how to develop models using the system). The following 
two chapters present the framework symbology derived from existing informatic 
practice: the Functional Entity Relationship Diagram or FERD (in Chapter 9), and 
Chapter 10 presents the framework methodology, the Functional Entity Relationship 
Methodology or FERM. 
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Chapter 9  
 
The Functional Entity Relationship Diagram 
(FERD) 
 
9.1  Chapter overview 
This chapter establishes the Functional-Entity Relationship Diagram, or FERD; 
a sketching system for designing and documenting complex knowledge systems. The 
FERD is created by building on the constructs established in Chapters 6-8, and enables 
simple usage of the functional entity framework in creating conceptual models of 
knowledge. It further provides a category theoretic legitimisation of the erotetic 
perspective.  
FERDs are a digraph, with nodes representing functional entities and edges 
representing the knowledge relations between them. Modified heads and tails of these 
edges indicate the type of functional entity 
The creation of the FERD symbology completes the third component of the 
design framework which is the second major goal of the thesis, following the ontology 
and the deontology presented in Chapter 8. 
In accordance with the recommended procedure for developing theory artefacts 
by adapting existing practices (as discussed in section 3.3.2), we adapt the crow’s foot 
form (Barker, 1990; Everest, 1976) of the Entity Relationship Diagram (Chen, 1976, 
1977) to the erotetic perspective by extending its ambit to all sources of encoded 
knowledge.. 
This chapter first discusses the research justifications for the role of FERD in the 
erotetic perspective (section 9.2). This is followed (section 9.3) by the complete 
symbology for the FERD mapped back to the account of the functional entity 
framework given in Chapter 8.  
The case study examples used in Chapter 8 are all represented in FERDs 
illustrated here.  
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9.2  Research justifications for the FERD 
There are two justifications for the establishing the FERD: one is the practical 
goal of enabling simple usage of the erotetic perspective, and the other is a category 
theoretic legitimisation of the perspective. This section briefly discusses those 
justifications. 
9.2.1 Category theoretic legitimisation of the Erotetic Perspective 
The logical justification arises from the role that the FERD itself plays in the 
development of the erotetic perspective. In addition to a claim of increased facility 
given by notation (discussed next), there is a parallel development in arguing for a 
logic of graphical signs.  
As well as the standard proof from written symbols (“string logic”), Wells 
(1984) amongst others has drawn on category theory to propose a logic of graphical 
representation (“sketch logic”) to create proofs and demonstration in purely graphical 
form. As Diskin (2000) puts it: 
Any diagram with precise semantics (to be described in mathematical terms) 
actually hides a sketch in a suitable signature of markers. (2000 p.2) 
 
Sketch logic has been used to justify many of the standard formalisms of IS 
including Entity-Relationship Diagrams (ERDs) (C. N. G. Dampney & Johnson, 1995; 
Diskin & Kadish, 1997; Diskin et al., 2000; M. Johnson, Rosebrugh, & Wood, 2002) 
and UML (Dingel, Diskin, & Zito, 2008; Diskin, 2005a), while Lu (2004, 2005) and 
Colomb et al. (R.M Colomb & Dampney, 2005; Robert M Colomb, Dampney, & 
Johnson, 2001) have shown how typed categorial frameworks are a unifying 
explicative framework for the disparate elements involved in knowledge modelling. 
Being able to explore question-and-answering systems in a categorially justified 
diagramming system provides an additional mode of proof to the designer. 
The sketch logic embodiment of the erotetic perspective provides one path 
towards its legitimisation. By demonstrating that Dampney & Johnson’s suggestion 
(C.N.G Dampney et al., 1993; C N G Dampney et al., 1991) that the ERD can be 
extended in a principled manner to model knowledge, we provide a legitimising 
conceptual modelling tool for the functional entity. In particular, sketch logic has 
superior representational capabilities when dealing with categories that are not pure 
sets (Wells, 1984 p.3), which is the rationale of the current research.   
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If a conceptual representational scheme can be losslessly represented by 
categories, and categorial manipulations of those constructs result in valid 
representations, then it is a form of confirmation of adequacy of the underlying 
representational scheme (Lu, 2004, 2005). Just as the graphical logic of the FERD 
derives from sketch logic/category theory, representability of the functional entity 
features play the legitimising role that the ERD plays in the relational model. The 
sketching out of qualified digraphs of the FERD is the equivalent to making declarative 
categorial statements, and FERD designs are forms of proof of the interrelation of 
knowledge constructs in systems. 
9.2.2 A pragmatic legitimisation: the role of diagramming in a design 
framework 
There is a pragmatic need to show in a simple way the features of the constructs 
established in the erotetic perspective in Chapter 6. Within the informatic research 
tradition, the ERD is an established successful design tool: the ERD’s simple digraph 
representation formalism represents the functional dependency that underlies the 
principle of normalisation. The FERD can play a role in sketching out knowledge base 
designs in the same way that the ERD works in data analysis by showing functional 
dependency, cardinality and participation. 
The FERD takes the simple digraph representation formalism of the crow's foot 
ERD, and extends it with type qualification, to indicate the knowledge dependency 
between functional entities. Clear representation of the dependency is critical to 
creating models of knowledge systems at the knowledge level.  
The role that a diagramming system plays in design is critical, and being able to sketch 
out designs for problematic knowledge systems affirms the erotetic perspective’s 
sufficiency for describing the world. Iverson's Turing lecture “Notation as a tool of 
thought” (K. Iverson, 1980) stresses the explorative nature of conceptual-level problem-
solving, and the role that notation plays in that iterative process. Mathematical, 
geometric and algebraic systems are perhaps the most abstract of notation systems, but 
the notational symbologies of chemists, physicists or meteorologists play just as 
important a role in the stages of their thought development (K. Iverson, 1980).  
To properly plan and monitor a knowledge system based on the erotetic 
perspective, therefore, we need a formalism that enables us to manipulate the system at 
the highest possible level. The FERD provides such a formalism, and permits the high  
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level manipulation of designs for knowledge needs and capacities, expressed as 
functional entities. 
9.3  The Functional Entity Relationship Diagram symbology 
The Functional-Entity Relationship Diagram (FERD), comprises a set of 
extensions to the industry standard Entity-Relationship Diagram (ERD) established by 
(Chen, 1976, 1977). The diagrams (Functional-Entity Relationship Diagrams, or 
FERDs) consist of nodes representing these functional entities, edges representing the 
knowledge relations between them, and modified heads and tails of these edges to 
indicate the type of functional entity. Figure 9.1 shows the complete FERD symbology. 
The formalism encompasses a standard ERD. Where the additional features are 
not required, standard ERD representation is used, since (as we established in section 
8.2.1.1) the coaction of the instance entailment and the shape-dominant knowledge 
resource produces a conventional entity (the upper left-hand cell in Table 9.1, Standard 
Relation).  
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Figure 9‐1 The complete FERD Symbology. 
The following section lists all of the edge variations grouped by kind, the 
supplementary symbols for mixins, and the mechanism for showing collation, together 
with a rationale for the choice of symbol. The section order follows the same structure 
as chapter 8, but here the discussion concerns the diagrammatic conventions. To avoid 
repetition, the text assumes familiarity with the corresponding section in Chapter 8. 
9.4  Symbology for the Fifteen Types of Functional Entity 
As with Chapter 8, we begin with a discussion of the fifteen types of functional 
entity, before considering mixins (in section 9.5) and collations (in section 9.6).   
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9.4.1 A symbology for the Predicative Functional Entities 
All three Aristotelian predicative FEs involve direct entailment through 
functional dependency (section 8.2.1). Accordingly symbols derive from the standard 
crow’s foot ERD symbology which in turn represents a functional dependency (per 
William Ward Armstrong, 1974). We now discuss the three symbols. 
9.4.1.1 A symbology for the Standard Relation Functional Entity 
The standard relation FE is represented by the two possible conventional ERD 
relationship indicators – a plain line for single participation, and the standard crow’s 
foot symbol for potentially multiple participation as shown in Figure 9.2. 
 
 
Figure 9‐2 The standard relation FE indicating multiple participation. 
Figure 9.3 shows the standard relation FE in use, per the car parts example 
(section 8.2.1). Note that both ends are relational FEs, one (manufacturer) indicates 
single participation, the other (model) multiple participation. 
Model Manufacturer
 
Figure 9‐3 The standard relation FE in use – A manufacturer makes many models of car. 
9.4.1.2 A symbology for the Standard Recursive Functional Entity 
The standard recursive FE (involving parts and sub-parts) involves a relationship 
of transitive closure (i.e. a sub-part can only be reached through its parent sub-
assembly). The symbology is a chevron to indicate its nested nature, as shown in 
Figure 9.4. 
 
Figure 9‐4 The standard recursive FE. 
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Figure 9.5 shows the standard recursive FE in use, per the car parts example 
(section 8.2.1) above. 
Spare part Model
 
Figure 9‐5 The standard recursive FE in use – a car model can use a part assembly or a single 
part within that assembly as a replacement part 
9.4.1.3 A symbology for the Constitutive Recursive Functional Entity 
The constitutive recursive FE involves nested attributes that are accidental 
(rather than essential), and may well be transitory. The symbology is half a chevron (as 
per the standard recursive FE) and half an inverted chevron, to indicate both the nesting 
and the articulation (Figure 9.6). 
Figure 9‐6 The constitutive recursive FE.  
Figure 9.7 shows the constitutive FE in use, per the car parts example (section 
8.2.1) above. 
Specialised
Service
Group
Spare part
 
Figure 9‐7 The constitutive FE in use: a specialised car part requires fitting at a particular service 
centre depending on the training of staff. 
 
 
 
9.4.1.4 The car parts example as a FERD 
We can now revisit the example in section 8.2.1 above, and sketch these 
functional entities and their knowledge relations in a single FERD, shown in Figure 
9.8.  
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Spare part Model Manufacturer
Specialised
Service
Group
Car Supplier
 
Figure 9‐8 The FERD for the car parts example, showing usage of all three kinds of predicative FEs. 
 
Figure 9.8 illustrates the three forms of predicative FE within a single system. 
This scenario shows the relationships among a car, its model, its manufacturer, a spare 
part for that car, a supplier for that part, and a specialised service group that can fit the 
part.  
9.4.2 A symbology for the Aggregative Functional Entities  
All three aggregative FEs involve indirect entailment through co-extension 
(section 8.2.2). Accordingly, their symbols are drawn from existing representations for 
co-extensivity. 
9.4.2.1 A symbology for the Absolute Aggregative Functional Entity 
The absolute aggregative FE involves the inclusion of all values of interest 
recorded that are co-located with the key (section 8.2.2.1). The symbol is an arc drawn 
across the relation line, as shown in Figure 9.9. The symbol is inspired by contour lines 
on maps (such as elevation contours or isobars) that represent such aggregative co-
extension. 
 
Figure 9‐9 The symbol for the absolute aggregative FE. 
Figure 9.10 shows the absolute aggregative FE in use, per the chemical spill 
example (section 8.2.2). 
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Distribution Spill
 
Figure 9‐10 The absolute aggregative FE in use – a chemical spill impacts an area surrounding it 
in absolute terms. 
9.4.2.2 A symbology for the Intensional Aggregative Functional Entity 
The intensional aggregative FE involves the inclusion of all values of interest 
recorded that are co-located with the key, measured in relative (rather than absolute) 
terms (section 8.2.2.2). The symbol is a diamond drawn across the relation line, as 
shown in Figure 9.11. The symbol is inspired by the Chen relational diamond, since the 
knowledge relation uncovers multiple unknown intensional relations (per Palopoli, 
Pontieri, Terracina, & Ursino, 2000). 
Figure 9‐11 The symbol for the intensional aggregative FE. 
Figure 9.12 shows the intensional aggregative FE in use, per the chemical spill 
example (section 8.2.2). 
Closest
Response
Team
Spil
 
Figure 9‐12 The intensional aggregative FE in use – a spill incident should be attended to by the 
closest competent response team. 
9.4.2.3 A symbology for the Fuzzy Aggregative Functional Entity 
The fuzzy aggregative FE involves the inclusion of all values of interest 
recorded that can be co-associated with the key in a fuzzy set (section 8.2.2.3). The 
symbol is a half-cloud drawn across the relation line, as shown in Figure 9.13. The 
symbol is inspired by the cloud set which combines fuzziness and likelihood 
(Neumaier, 2004; Wierman, 2010). 
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Figure 9‐13 The symbol for the fuzzy aggregative FE. 
Figure 9.14 shows the fuzzy aggregative FE in use, per the chemical spill 
example (section 8.2.2). 
Spill Response
Strategy
 
Figure 9‐14 The fuzzy aggregative FE in use – an spill incident should be addressed by the 
appropriate response strategy. 
9.4.2.4 The chemical spill example as a FERD 
We now revisit the example in section 8.2.2, and sketch the aggregative 
functional entities and their knowledge relations in a single FERD, shown in Figure 
9.15. 
Distribution Spill
Response
Strategy
Closest
Response
Team
 
Figure 9‐15 The FERD for the chemical spill example, showing usage of all three kinds of 
aggregative functional entities. 
Figure 9.15 illustrates the three aggregative FEs within a single knowledge 
system. This scenario shows the relationships between the chemical spill, and the 
environmental assets nearby, the closest response team, and the appropriate response 
(in terms of severity). 
9.4.3 A symbology for the Connective Functional Entities 
All three connective FEs involve articulated entailment through connectivity 
(section 8.2.3). Accordingly, their symbols are drawn from existing notations for 
connectivity.  
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9.4.3.1 A symbology for the Ontological Connective Functional Entity 
The ontological connective FE involves the entailment of all ancestors and 
descendants of the key value within an ontological hierarchy (section 8.2.3.1). The 
symbol is a half-rectangle drawn across the relation line, thereby making the standard 
shape of a tree generation; this is shown in Figure 9.16. 
Figure 9‐16 The symbol for the ontological connective FE. 
Figure 9.17 shows the ontological connective FE in use, per the epidemic example 
(section 8.2.3). 
Classifcation Epidemic
 
Figure 9‐17 The ontological connective FE in use – an epidemic is classified according to a 
classification scheme. 
9.4.3.2 A symbology for the Networked Connective Functional Entity 
The networked connective FE involves the entailment of all values to which the 
key value is connected (section 8.2.3.2). The symbol is a bow tie drawn across the 
relation line, as shown in Figure 9.16. The symbol is inspired by the semijoin operators 
of the relational algebra, as used for ad hoc query exploration in distributed data by 
Bernstein and Chiu (1981). 
Figure 9‐18 The symbol for the networked connective FE. 
Figure 9.19 shows the networked connective FE in use, per the epidemic example 
(section 8.2.3). 
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Patient
contact
Case
 
Figure 9‐19 The networked connective FE in use – a case and the individuals the person has had 
contact with. 
9.4.3.3 A symbology for the Ruleset Connective Functional Entity 
The ruleset connective FE involves the entailment of all values to which the key 
value may be linked following the application of a rule or series of rules (section 
8.2.3.3). The symbol is a sigma drawn across the relation line, as shown in Figure 9.18. 
It is inspired by the propositionally based select operators of the relational algebra, as 
extended by Ullman (1985) for expressing logical queries. 
 
Figure 9‐20 The symbol for the ruleset connective FE. 
Figure 9.21 shows the ruleset connective FE in use, per the epidemic example 
(section 8.2.3). 
Treatment Epidemic
 
Figure 9‐21 The ruleset connective FE in use – an epidemic is treated according to a set of rules 
based on local conditions. 
9.4.3.4 The epidemic example as a FERD 
We can now revisit the epidemic example (section 8.2.3), and sketch the 
connective functional entities and their knowledge relations in a single FERD, shown 
in Figure 9.22.  
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Figure 9‐22 The epidemic example as a FERD showing all three kinds of connective FEs in use. 
Figure 9.22 illustrates the three connective FEs within a single knowledge 
system. This scenario shows the relationships among an epidemic, a case of the 
infection and the individuals with which the infected individual has interacted, the 
classification of the disease which accesses generalised knowledge, and the preferred 
treatment for the disease. 
9.4.4 A symbology for the Non-Aristotelian Functional Entities 
All three non-Aristotelian FEs (section 8.2.4) have ideographic symbols chosen, 
in the absence of any clear precedents in the literature. 
9.4.4.1 A symbology for the Contiguous non-Aristotelian Functional Entity 
The contiguous non-Aristotelian FE involves the entailment of all candidate 
identities linkable to the key value as an attribute, without the assumption of temporal 
or spatial contiguity (section 8.2.4.1). The symbol is a sigmoidal growth curve drawn 
across the relation line, indicating the appearance, disappearance, and potential re-
appearance of associated identity; this is shown in Figure 9.23. 
Figure 9‐23 The symbol for the contiguous non‐Aristotelian FE. 
Figure 9.24 shows the contiguous non-Aristotelian FE in use, per the 
endangered birds example (section 8.2.4).  
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Community Shire
 
Figure 9‐24 The contiguous non‐Aristotelian FE in use – assumed continuous shire 
administration of community 
9.4.4.2 A symbology for the Emergent non-Aristotelian Functional Entity 
The emergent non-Aristotelian FE involves the entailment of known values from 
a key value with a late-binding significance according to use (section 8.2.4.2). The 
symbol is a pair of framed entities drawn across the relation line, indicating the late-
binding nature of the functional entities; this is shown in Figure 9.25. 
 
Figure 9‐25 The symbol for the Emergent non‐Aristotelian FE. 
Figure 9.26 shows the emergent non-Aristotelian FE in use, per the endangered 
birds example (section 8.2.4). 
Community Reference
 
Figure 9‐26 The emergent non‐Aristotelian FE in use – references to the community being 
delivered as labelled references. 
9.4.4.3 A symbology for the Abductive non-Aristotelian Functional Entity 
The abductive non-Aristotelian FE involves the entailment of all potential 
identities through hypotheses drawable from the key values as criteria (section 8.2.4.3). 
The symbol is a sinusoidal curve drawn lengthways along the relation line, indicating 
the being/becoming of the potential identity; this is shown in Figure 9.27. 
 
Figure 9‐27 The symbol for the abductive non‐Aristotelian FE. 
Figure 9.28 shows the abductive non-Aristotelian FE in use, per the endangered 
birds example (section 8.2.4).  
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Figure 9‐28 The abductive non‐Aristotelian FE in use – the potential nesting habitats for an 
endangered bird based on criteria presented. 
9.4.4.4 The endangered birds example as a FERD 
We can now revisit the endangered birds example (section 8.2.4), and sketch the 
three non-Aristotelian functional entities and their knowledge relations in a single 
FERD, shown in Figure 9.29. 
Nesting habitat Community
Reference
Shire
Bird Plant
Figure 9-29 The endangered birds example as a FERD, showing all three kinds of non-
Aristotelian functional entities in use. 
 
Figure 9.29 illustrates the three non-Aristotelian FEs within a single knowledge 
system. This scenario shows the relationships between records of plant communities, 
local governments and bird-nesting habitats. 
9.4.5 A symbology for the Cartographic Functional Entities 
All three cartographic FEs (section 8.2.5) involve find typical representation on 
plan and charts. Accordingly, the symbols are drawn from similar usages on familiar 
charts. 
9.4.5.1 A symbology for the Remote Cartographic Functional Entity 
The remote cartographic FE involves the entailment of identities in a remote 
system according to the key (section 8.2.5.1). The symbol is a circle drawn across the  
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relation line inspired by the externality/continuation symbol on plans and flow charts; 
this is shown in Figure 9.30. 
 
Figure 9‐30 The symbol for the remote cartographic FE. 
Figure 9.31 shows the remote cartographic FE in use, per the library 
administration example (section 8.2.5). 
Admin
System
Library borrowing 
identity
 
Figure 9‐31 The remote cartographic FE in use – the library patron identity is underwritten by 
an external administration system 
9.4.5.2 A symbology for the Folded Cartographic Functional Entity 
The folded cartographic FE involves the entailment of identities within an 
occluded subsystem according to the key (section 8.2.5.2). The occlusion can be 
temporary (for convenience) or for reasons of restricted access. The symbol is a folded 
paper triangle drawn across the relation line as shown in Figure 9.32. 
 
Figure 9‐32 The symbol for the folded cartographic FE. 
Figure 9.33 shows the folded cartographic FE in use, per the library 
administration example (section 8.2.5) 
Library borrowing 
identity
Loans
System
 
Figure 9‐33 The folded cartographic FE in use – the library patron identity calls on the loan 
subsystem 
9.4.5.3 A symbology for the Exofolded Functional Entity  
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The exofolded cartographic FE involves the entailment of identities in a remote 
system according to the key (section 8.2.5.3). The symbol is a dashed double circle 
drawn across the relation line; as shown in Figure 9.34. The symbol represents the 
invisible greater whole of the system being modelled. 
Figure 9‐34 The symbol for the exofolded cartographic FE. 
Figure 9.35 shows the exofolded FE in use, per the library administration 
example (section 8.2.5) 
Library borrowing 
identity
Entire Library 
system
 
Figure 9‐35 The exofolded cartographic FE in use – the library patron identity is called upon by 
the rest of the library system 
9.4.5.4 The library administration example as a FERD 
We can now revisit the library administration example (section 8.2.5), and 
sketch the three cartographic functional entities and their knowledge relations in a 
single FERD, shown in Figure 9.36. 
External
Admin
System
Library borrowing 
identity
Loans
System
Entire 
Library 
System
 
Figure 9‐36 The library administration example showing the use of all three kinds of 
cartographic functional entities. 
Figure 9.36 illustrates the three cartographic FEs within a single knowledge 
system. This scenario shows the relationships between the borrower entity, the 
warranting external system, the entire library supersystem and that loans system which 
is a part of the patron system.  
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9.5  A symbology for Mixins 
We saw in section 8.3 that pragmata and hedges (referred to collectively as 
mixins) always exist for functional entities, even if they are neutral and affirmative. 
FERDs require a mechanism for indicating that there are pragmata and hedges present 
that might make a difference to the semantic significance or connotation of the 
knowledge responses from the FEs. This is not to say that they alter the values in those 
responses, but rather that they inform the reader of the diagram that the values given do 
not simply have surface meaning. 
The mixin is indicated with a small symbol placed on the rectangle of the FE 
and a text gloss next to the symbol. We established that there were three kinds of 
mixins
114: orienting, bounds-setting and hedging. Consequently, we need a symbol for 
each of those three categories. The gloss indicates the type within the category. 
Where there are nested mixins, they are placed on a subsidiary smaller, round-
cornered rectangle on the knowledge relation line. Nested mixins can be of different 
categories (section 9.5.4). 
9.5.1 A symbology for Orienting Mixins 
Orienting mixins are designated by an arrow, →, as shown in Figure 9.37. This 
diagram represents one of the examples in 8.3.1.1, privilege, where a functional entity 
has share prices being recorded in the order in which they occur. 
Share prices
Order  
Figure 9‐37 A functional entity bearing the symbol for orienting mixins. 
Figure 9.38 shows the use of a nested mixin, which shows that there are two 
orienting, one indicating intrinsic order, the other indicating that the values are 
measurements (monetary value as measurement). 
 
Figure 9‐38 The FE Share prices with two serial orienting mixins 
                                                      
 
114 The three kinds of mixin, although derived from two grammatical phenomena, are represented the 
same way in FERDs as functionally they have the same effect on the FEs they qualify.  
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9.5.2 A symbology for Bounds-setting Mixins 
Bounds-setting mixins are designated by a small square, □, as shown in Figure 
9.39. This diagram represents one of the examples in section 8.3.1.2, where a table of 
expenses is restricted in access. 
 
Figure 9‐39 A functional entity bearing the symbol for bounds‐setting mixins. 
Figure 9.40 shows the use of a nested mixin, which shows that there are two 
bounds-setting mixins, one indicating security, the other indicating that the values in a 
response have bounds of currency (temporality in 8.3.1.2), i.e. that there is a constraint 
on how up-to-date they are. 
 
Figure 9‐40 The FE Expenses with two serial bounds‐setting mixins 
9.5.3 A symbology for Hedging Mixins 
Hedging mixins are designated by the “proportional to” version of the Greek 
letter alpha, ∝, as shown in Figure 9.41. This diagram represents one of the examples in 
section 8.3.2, where a functional entity indicating risk is hedged for fuzzy values. 
Risk
Fuzzy
 
Figure 9‐41 The Risk functional entity bearing the symbol for hedging mixins. 
Figure 9.42 shows the use of a nested mixin, depicting a functional entity, Risk, 
hedged twice – one hedge indicating fuzziness, the other indicating negation of the 
values. 
 
Figure 9‐42 The symbol for hedging mixins.  
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9.5.4 Combining mixins in FERDs 
As remarked at the beginning of the section, it is possible to have mixins of 
different types serially applied to a functional entity. Figure 9.43 shows such a case 
where a functional entity Risk is qualified first by a hedging mixing (stating that all 
values are fuzzy), then by a bounds-setting mixin (describing how up-to-date the values 
are) and finally an by orientating mixin (indicating that the values are all measure 
units) 
 
Figure 9‐43 The Risk functional entity qualified serially by a hedges, bounds and orientation. 
9.6  A symbology for Collations 
We saw in section 8.9 that there are a number of situations in which more than 
one functional entity will be collated together to present as a single functional entity. 
FERDs require a mechanism for indicating this process of collation is occurring. Since 
there are two broad categories of collations – composition and mediation – we need a 
symbol for each of those categories.  
The CACI variant of the ERD (which features the crow's foot edge) has 
representational symbols for several entity combination mechanisms for subtype, 
supertype and exclusive participation. In CACI ERDs, exclusion is depicted by an arc 
cutting across the relationship lines, while supertype and subtype is depicted by 
drawing the participating entities within a larger entity box. We make use of these 
diagramming conventions to represent the two forms of collation here. 
9.6.1 A symbology for Mediation Collation 
Mediation (which uses only one functional entity at a time) is depicted with a 
CACI-style arc. The form of mediation is indicated with a label. Absent the label, the 
constructs will have the original CACI meaning, exclusion.  
Where there are additional informative details (such as priority, order, 
trustworthiness) then they can be indicated on the knowledge relation. 
As all mediation collations are represented in the same manner, one illustration 
suffices. Figure 9.44 illustrates a knowledge system which enables the works of 
authors to be located in a library – the priority is to locate in Australia (using TROVE)  
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and the fallback (if there isn’t a copy in Australia) is to search in WorldCat. The 
numbers 1 and 2 indicate the order of fallback. 
 
Figure 9‐44 A FERD featuring a fallback mediating collation. 
9.6.2 A symbology for Composition Collation 
Composition (which makes use of all of the collated function entities) is 
depicted (CACI-style) in a larger box. The form of composition is indicated with a 
label. Absent the label, the constructs will have the original CACI meaning, either 
supertype or subtype.  
Where more information is available for the enclosed functional entities, the 
details are written over the box. 
There are three forms of representation for collation of functional entities, which 
are owing to the problems arising from two-dimensional representation of nested 
structures. As all composition collations are represented in the same manner, there is 
only need for one illustration of each of these three forms.  
The standard form uses the box as described above. Figure 9.45 shows this 
mode of operation. 
Figure 9.45 illustrates a composition collation, featuring a mashup system to log 
the materials usage for a music teaching class. Materials are gathered together for any 
sound recordings, books, sheet music and instruments needed. It is in effect a union of 
dissimilar structures, collated into a single functional entity, Teaching Aid, that 
presents them as a linear list. The emergent non-Aristotelian nature of recordings, 
books and sheet music is lost, and the resulting knowledge image appears as a 
conventional data entity.  
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Class
Recordings
Books
Sheet music
Instruments
Teaching aids (Union Conjunction)
 
Figure 9‐45 A FERD featuring a union conjunction composition collation. 
In circumstances where diagramming complexity or functional entity reuse 
precludes the enclosing of the FE rectangles, a rectangular yoke represents 
(metonymically) the enclosure, as shown in Figure 9.46. 
LarderItem Garden Plant
Ingredient 
(Union Conjunction)
MuseumItem
Decoration 
(Union Conjunction)
Meal
Display
 
Figure 9‐46 A FERD featuring two union conjunction composition collations. 
Figure 9.46 shows the use of two separate composition collations with one 
functional entity in common. In this example, we see the plants in the garden of a 
monastery, represented by the functional entity Garden Plant, being used for food and  
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for decoration. As part of the Decoration union conjunction composition together with 
Museum Item, there is a knowledge relation with Display, representing a historical 
account of altar displays. As part of the Ingredient union conjunction composition 
together with Larder Item, there is a knowledge relation with Meal, representing a 
historical account of menus served. 
A particular usage of the bracket form is where a single functional entity is 
subject to reinterrogation: a secondary knowledge relation as part of the knowledge 
factoring. For instance, a contiguous non-Aristotelian FE could be in turn treated as a 
standard recursive FE. No legend for the collation is necessary, as the purpose is self-
evident, as shown in Figure 9.47. 
 
Figure 9‐47 A FERD featuring a single reinterrogated composition 
In 9.47, an architectural description is either of a significant building with a 
history of subdivision are merging, or of a component part of such a building. 
9.7  Summary 
This chapter has presented the Functional Entity Relationship Diagram, or 
FERD; a symbology for the Functional Entity framework. Building on the constructs 
established in Chapters 6-8, a sketching system for designing and documenting 
complex knowledge systems based on the established ERD diagramming tradition was 
presented. A full account of the symbology was given, together with a derivation of the 
symbols. Throughout the chapter we presented substantiation through expository 
instantiations of the same examples presented in Chapter 8. 
The diagramming system serves to permit sketch representations of the FE 
framework, which accomplishes several aims. Firstly, it provides a practical facility to 
the framework for designers. Secondly, it offers a confirmation of the categorial nature 
of the FE framework, following the suggestion of Dampney (C. N. G. Dampney & 
Johnson, 1995; C.N.G Dampney et al., 1993; C N G Dampney et al., 1991) that a 
categorial system would have exactly that power. Finally, the categorial representative 
capability provides a confirmation of the FE framework as a complete representational 
system.  
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The establishment of a symbology also brings the completion of the FE 
framework closer, and with it the satisfaction of the second research question. The final 
component of the framework, the Functional Entity Relationship Methodology 
(FERM), is presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 10  
 
The Functional Entity Relationship Methodology 
(FERM) 
 
10.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter introduces the Functional Entity Relationship Methodology 
(FERM) a process for creating FE models from analyses of complex knowledge 
systems. FERM lets us create conceptual models of complex knowledge system, using 
the FERD representation systems established in Chapter 9. 
FERM is the fourth and final component of the modelling framework which is 
the second major research goal of the thesis. The completion of the framework also 
resolves the second research question: How can the erotetic perspective be 
operationalised into a framework of explicit constructs for knowledge modelling? 
In accordance with best practice of developing tertiary design artefacts, the 
Beynon-Davies structured knowledge engineering methodology (Beynon-Davies, 
1992) is adapted here to serve as the design methodology for the Functional Entity 
framework. The justification for selecting the Beynon-Davies methodology as a 
suitable artefact for adapting was given in section 3.5.3. 
In section 10.2 we discuss the rationale and process of adapting the Beynon-
Davies methodology, in 10.3 we give an complete account of FERM, and in 10.4 we 
discuss the significance of FERM for the FE Framework. 
10.2 Adapting and operationalising Beynon-Davies's 
knowledge engineering methodology 
The Functional Entity Relationship Methodology (FERM) is the routine artefact 
design methodology the Functional Entity framework uses to create conceptual models 
of knowledge. It is developed by taking a mutable secondary design artefact, the 
Beynon-Davies knowledge engineering research methodology (1987, 1991, 1992), and 
adapts it to the requirements of the erotetic approach.  
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In section 3.5.3, we discussed the Beynon-Davies methodology, which 
incorporated many of the features of the SDLC into a structured knowledge 
engineering development lifecycle, drawing on both the standard Stanford 
methodology (B. Buchanan et al., 1983) and the KADS approach (J Kingston, 1992; G 
Schreiber et al., 1993; Wallyn, Barthelemy, & Brunet, 1989; B. J. Wielinga et al., 
1992). The Beynon-Davies methodology has the same five general phases as the 
Stanford methodology, but incorporates iteration of the implementation and testing 
phases to permit prototyping and feedback. We repeat Table 3.10 here as Table 10.1 to 
show the alignment. 
Table 10.1 The five stage Stanford KE methodology compared with the SDLC, after Beynon‐Davies 
(1987, p. 19), De Salvo et al. (1987) and Chou (1993, p. 381) 
Stage  Stanford SDLC
1  Identification  Identification
2  Conceptualisation  Systems Analysis
3  Formalisation  Systems Design
4  Implementation Implementation
5  Testing  Testing
Significantly, Beynon-Davies leaves his methodological design open to enable 
further features that other investigators consider necessary. This section considers such 
additions as are necessary to serve the purpose of designing and constructing 
knowledge systems using the erotetic perspective. 
Beynon-Davies’s methodology (and its tributary systems) assume the 
KNOWLEDGE IS A RESOURCE conceptual metaphor. Consequently his 
methodology is reconsidered, and re-expressed, in terms of the KNOWLEDGE IS 
RESOLVED INQUIRY conceptual metaphor, for the purposes of adaptation. 
Further, given the need to extend the notion of knowledge-based systems to 
include all systems that encode and preserve knowledge; Beynon-Davies’s approach is 
extended to permit this broader design ambit. 
There are also some necessary modifications to Beynon-Davies’s methodology 
so that it can conform to the strictures of design science, and principled construction of 
design artefacts (Appendix B), which have led to improved design science-influenced 
SDLCs such as Peffers & Tuunanen (Peffers & Tuunanen, 2005; Peffers et al., 2006; 
Peffers et al., 2008). The following features of theses methodologies need to be 
incorporated over and above his considerations of feedback and repurposing.   
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Firstly, evaluation of design artefacts should conform to the principles of 
artefact evaluation as discussed in section 3.3.2: appropriate evaluation mechanisms 
should be considered for a knowledge model. In particular the methodology should 
conform to the idea of a design contract, following Hevner and Chatterjee (2010b), as 
that is the only way of ensuring that a design artefact has been successfully created. 
That is to say, there must be a mechanism established at the beginning of the 
development process to ensure that the design goals are reached. This enables 
adequacy checks at the implementation design level, before any code is written or any 
licenses obtained. 
Conformance with the standard Peffers and Tuunanen DSRM (Peffers & 
Tuunanen, 2005; Peffers et al., 2008) is also necessary, as designing knowledge 
artefacts must conform to best practice artefact design. The implicit feedback process 
from testing to design needs to be made explicit, and there is necessarily a 
communication process in conformance with Peffers & Tuunanen, who have 
communication as the final component of their DSRM. This means that there must be a 
sixth and seventh stage to the methodology.  
An adapted seven stage Beynon-Davies methodology is given in Table 10.2 . 
Table 10.2 The seven stage adaptation of the Beynon‐Davies methodology  
1  Identification 
2  Conceptualisation
3  Formalisation 
4  Implementation
5  Evaluation 
6  Feedback to design
7  Communication
The Beynon-Davies methodology with stages mapped to the Peffers and 
Tuunanen DSRM is shown in Figure 10.1. The stages align, although the Feedback 
loop is part of the upper arcs rather than a stage.  
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Figure 10‐1 Beynon‐Davies’ methodology as a Peffers & Tuunanen DSRM (Peffers et al., 2008) 
Finally there needs to be a recognition that the SDLC itself has changed from 
the time that Beynon-Davies (1987, p. 19), De Salvo et al. (1987) and Chou (1993, p. 
381) were adapting knowledge methodology to best practice system design. In 
particular, there needs to be an adoption of the incremental and iterative approach 
(Larman, 2004; Larman & Basili, 2003) to stages 4, 5 and 6 shown in Table 10.3, 
rather than a single pass. This reflects the necessity for revisiting the design at three 
points in the development cycle: at the initial implementation design, after a prototype 
has been constructed, and then after the prototype has been converted to a full working 
system. This makes a more complex, nested design cycle. 
Table 10.3 The seven stage iterative adaptation of the Beynon‐Davies methodology  
1  Identification     
2  Conceptualisation    
3  Formalisation     
4  Implementation Design  Prototype construction Production construction 
5  Implementation Design 
Evaluation 
Prototype Evaluation Production Evaluation 
6  Implementation Design 
Feedback 
Feedback from Prototype Feedback from Production 
7  Communication    
However, even this outline leaves an eighth and final stage, of feedback from the 
peer review, implicit in the structure. 
The first three stages involve work at the knowledge level rather than the symbol 
level, which leads to a reconceptualisation of the methodology into 3 broad phases: 
Analysis Operationalisation Selection of types and tools Appliction of design contract Documentation
Sole entry 
point for 
research
Communication Evaluation Identification
Problem-
centred
Conceptualisation Formalisation Implementation
Feedback 
  247
knowledge level work, an incremental iterative implementation phase with three 
epicycles and a final communication phase. This can be unfolded into the structure 
shown in Table 10.4. 
Table 10.4 The five phase epicyclic adaptation of the Beynon‐Davies methodology  
A. Knowledge Level work 
A1  Identification
A2  Conceptualisation
A3  Formalisation
B. Implementation Design epicycle
B4  Implementation Design
B5  Implementation Design evaluation
B6  Feedback to design or model
C. Prototyping implementation epicycle
C4  Prototype implementation
C5  Prototype evaluation
C6  Feedback to design or model
D. Production implementation epicycle
D4  Installation implementation
D5  System usage evaluation
D6  Feedback to design or model
E. Communication 
E7  Communication
E8  Incorporation of feedback
This is the structure of FERM. Note that this methodology encompasses all of 
the activities (implicit and explicit) of Beynon-Davies methodology. The remainder of 
this chapter is an exposition of FERM. 
10.3 FERM: the Functional Entity Relationship Methodology 
This section gives a complete description of FERM. The entire methodology is 
outlined in Table 10.5 and features a five phase design.  
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Table 10.5 The FERM structure 
Stage  Name  Activity
A. Knowledge level work 
A1  Identification  Identify the telos of the system in terms of usages, knowledge 
domains, expertise and user population; establish goal of 
knowledge‐level design‐contract; identify significant knowledge 
needs 
A2  Conceptualisation  Conceptualise knowledge needs as questions; identify the 
possible sources of answers to those knowledge needs as 
knowledge capacities; establish points of knowledge‐level 
design‐contract
A3  Formalisation  Operationalise the needs and capacities as Functional Entities 
joined by Knowledge Relations 
B. Implementation design epicycle 
B4  Implementation Design  Document needs and capacities as FERD for system 
B5  Implementation Design 
evaluation 
Check for fulfilment of design goal contract in terms of goal; 
check for representational adequacy in terms of needs and 
capacity per design contract
B6  Feedback to design or 
model 
Address shortcomings with modified design
C. Prototyping implementation epicycle 
C4  Prototype 
implementation 
Create prototype according to the implementation design 
documented in the FERD; specify potential systems; represent 
the needs, capacities as FERL
115, and give sample FERL 
expressions for instances of QA
C5  Prototype evaluation  Check for design adequacy and usability
C6  Feedback to design or 
model 
Address shortcomings with modified design
D. Production implementation epicycle 
D4  Installation 
implementation
Create working installation 
D5  System usage 
evaluation 
Monitor usage of final system for utility and design goal 
satisficing
D6  Feedback to design or 
model 
Address ongoing utility and adequacy issues where possible 
 E. Communication 
E7   Communication Documentation of system, and publication of relevant research 
material to obtain peer accreditation
E8  Incorporation of peer 
review 
Feedback to the design process at the various levels of the 
results of publication and peer review
                                                      
 
115 We introduce FERL in chapter 12, and eventually incorporate it (after docking in Chapter 13) into the 
FE Framework. Consequently, we show where FERL usage would occur in the FERM lifecycle, but do 
not use it in the expository instantiations.   
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The initial section of FERM incorporates three knowledge level work stages, 
identification, conceptualisation and formalisation, which identify and formalise needs 
and capacities. The knowledge level work is followed by an iteration through three 
implementation phases, each one comprising a three stage design ⇒ evaluation ⇒ 
feedback epicycle. The three passes of the epicycle are for implementation design, 
prototype and production. The cycle completes with a communication phase. 
We will now examine each of these phases in detail, drawing on the car parts 
example used already in Chapters 8 and 9, and presented initially in section 8.2.1.
116
 
10.3.1 FERM Knowledge Level phase 
The first development phase, involving knowledge level work, involves the 
classic knowledge engineering problem analysis steps, the creation of conceptual 
models for problem solutions, and the documentation of the conceptual models using 
FERD and FERL. This section assumes familiarity with the standard processes of 
conventional knowledge elicitation and analysis as expressed in the literature on 
contemporary KM/KE tools such as CommonKADS or Protege (John Kingston, 
Shadbolt, & Tate, 1996; J. K. C. Kingston, 1998; A. T. Schreiber, Crubezy, & Musen, 
2000; Guus  Schreiber et al., 1999). 
10.3.1.1 Phase A1 identification 
The first stage of the methodology involves a high level consideration of the 
telos (or teloi) of the knowledge system. This will comprise the ultimate knowledge 
needs for the organisation or persons using the system. Its satisficing is the basis of the 
top-level design contract. 
Identification involves a survey of what is needed to be known in order that the 
system can provide the details needed to meet the goals. There must also be a survey of 
the capacity of either subsystems or external systems to provide the necessary 
knowledge: this is sensu Motta (1999), with all traditional IS sources being included. 
Using the car parts example from section 8.2.1, we can observe the telos, the 
needs and capacities, and consider the contract. 
                                                      
 
116 To fully analyse each of the five running examples from chapters 8 and 9 knowledge systems is 
beyond the scope of this thesis: it will suffice to demonstrate that the methodology accounts for all the 
required steps. This chapter will focus on the car parts example  
  250
•  The goal is one of advising a car repair centre as to the supplying and fitting a 
spare part to a car, for a given pool of cars, for a given area, and also providing a 
suitable location for fitting that part. 
•  The knowledge needs in this example are for identifying and sourcing a car part, 
and for finding a technician capable of installing the part under warranty. The 
capacities are identifying manufacturer, locating parts and sourcing expertise 
within service centres. 
•  The design contract will require that timely and reliable location of parts for all 
cars within the pool is possible, for a designated geographical range. 
The model of the system, and the design implementation, the prototype and the 
production implementation must meet the contract design goals. Following the path of 
KADS and CommonKADS this can involve an analysis of additional subsidiary teloi. 
These will also feature in the design contract. 
The analysis will prompt looking for the significant forms of knowledge: this 
involves looking for domain knowledge, strategic knowledge and control knowledge 
(G Schreiber et al., 1993). For example, the car parts system will involve automotive 
knowledge, and rules for skill certification. Background knowledge of the automative 
design domain will be necessary in order to understand the nature and type of cars and 
their components. 
There may also be subsidiary knowledge systems: for instance any system with 
administration needs a personnel component, any system with an inventory needs a 
stocktaking component and any system with customers needs a form of CRM. 
Knowledge system with such components will have domain, strategic and control 
knowledge for each of these. The car parts example would have all of these features. 
10.3.1.2 Phase A2 conceptualisation 
The conceptualisation phase abstracts the knowledge needs as questions, and the 
knowledge capacities as answers to those questions, couched as generic question-and-
answer conversations. This enables the alignment of capacities (as answers) with needs 
(as questions) as erotetic conversations. At this point in the development process gaps 
in the ability to meet knowledge needs are identified, as well as under- or unutilised 
knowledge capacities. 
For the car parts example, the questions can be phrased:  
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•  Who makes car Model, of marque Marque year Year? 
•  What is the price and availability of part PartID for car Make, Marque, Model, 
Year? 
•  Is there a service centre with a qualified technician with the certified skills to fit 
this part in Town? 
The answers can be phrased: 
•  Car Make, Model, Year was made by manufacturer Manufacturer. 
•  Part PartID for car Marque, Make, Model, Year, is available on Weeks weeks 
ordering from Warehouse warehouse at cost $Cost. 
•  Person Person, of service centre CentreName can fit part. 
These questions and answers are matched together to make conversations. For 
this example there is a trivial matching up, for more complex knowledge systems there 
may well be collated (potentially nested) knowledge capacities within the system. 
There will also be knowledge reuse of either internal or external knowledge capacities. 
10.3.1.3 Phase A3 formalisation 
The formalisation phase operationalises the questions/needs and 
answer/capacities as Functional Entities and Knowledge Relations. This involves the 
identification of the type of the knowledge relations as identified, and any mixins or 
pragmata that may exist. This is expressed as informal descriptive phrases. 
Informally, the car parts example can involve: 
match car maker with car model 
match part location with car part 
match service centre with car part 
and so on for the other needs and capacities. 
The resultant matched conversations are the basis for the implementation design 
expressed as a FERD or a FERL declaration, which is described in the next section. 
10.3.2 FERM Implementation Design epicycle 
The Implementation Design Epicycle involves the creation and evaluation of an 
implementation design, and the consequent feedback from the design. The 
implementation design is a fully expressed conceptual model expressed as a FERD.  
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As an artefact, the implementation design permits the evaluation of a design 
prior to the commencement of implementation, by checking features against the design 
contract specification. 
This implementation design phase (B4) involves the construction of an 
implementation of the needs and capacities described as a conversation in the 
formalisation phase.  
The car parts example has already been depicted using a FERD as Figure 9.8, it 
is repeated here as Figure 10.1. 
 
 
Figure 10.1 A FERD for the car parts example 
Alternatively, we can use the FERL (to be shown in section 12.7.1): 
CAPACITY(Manufacturers EXPECT Table *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY ManufacturerNo 
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY FIELDS(Marque, NamePlate, Model, Year))  
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : CarParts")) 
NEED(ManufacturerDetails EXPECT Table *  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY FIELDS(Marque, NamePlate, Model, Year)) 
MATCH(ManufacturerEnquiries ManufacturerDetails Manufacturers 2) 
The Implementation design evaluation phase (B5) checks for fulfilment of 
design goal contract in terms of goal. This involves checking for representational 
adequacy in terms of needs and capacity per design contract. 
The Feedback to design or model phase (B6) passes lessons learned back to the 
design and modelling process, to address any shortcomings. 
10.3.3 FERM Prototyping epicycle 
The Prototyping Epicycle conforms to the standard KBS prototyping 
methodology described by Beynon-Davies (1991, 1992), with the added feature of 
evaluation per design contract, as well as the standard evaluation for utility and 
usability. 
The results from any evaluation would be filtered back to the prototype via the 
implementation design documents.  
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As the car parts example is an expository instantiation, a prototype 
implementation is outside the scope of this thesis, so is not included. 
10.3.4 FERM Production epicycle 
The Production Epicycle conforms to the standard KBS post-prototyping 
methodology described by Beynon-Davies (1991, 1992). 
The handover point of the working implementation within the Beynon-Davies 
methodology has (in FERM) an additional feature, the revisitation of the design 
contract by the system commissioner, which would inform the monitored usage of final 
system for utility and design goal satisficing. 
As with the prototype, a production implementation is outside the scope of this 
thesis, so is not included. 
10.3.5 FERM Communication phase 
The Communication phase involves communication as expressed by Peffers & 
Tuunanen (Peffers & Tuunanen, 2005; Peffers et al., 2008). This includes peer 
accreditation in journals and at conferences, so that the disciplinary knowledge base is 
added to with the lessons learned from the project.  
It is not possible to represent this phase for an expository instantiation. 
10.4 Significance of FERM in the FE Framework 
The completion of the FERM is significant for the FE Framework and the 
research project generally for two reasons.  
Pragmatically, the creation of the FERM gives the FE framework a practical 
means for designing conceptual models of complex knowledge systems that is based in 
a solid informatic tradition. FERM’s stepped iterative path ensures that creation of 
conceptual models is a straightforward process with built-in feedback loops and 
checkpoints for quality assurance. 
In terms of the research project, the FERM provides the methodology that 
completes the FE Framework, joining the already established ontology, deontology and 
symbology established in Chapters 6-9. 
Anticipating the formal appraisal of the design contract in Chapter 13, we can 
now revisit the second research question: How can the erotetic perspective be 
operationalised into a framework of explicit constructs for knowledge modelling? and  
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state that it has been answered through the creation of the design goals. Additionally, 
the third research question: Can the Erotetic Perspective and its constructs seamlessly 
encompass existing Knowledge Representation and Conceptual Modelling practices? 
can also be answered in the affirmative, as all four components – the ontology, the 
deontology, the symbology and the methodology consist of existing mutable artefacts 
adapted successfully to the erotetic perspective. 
The remaining research question, Can the erotetic framework produce 
representationally adequate implementation designs across different situations? 
requires sophisticated expository instantiations over and above the running cases that 
have been used in Chapters 8 and 9 as well as the current chapter. The next chapter, 
Chapter 11, will investigate three complex knowledge systems to address this last 
research question. 
10.5 Summary 
This chapter introduced FERM, the Functional Entity Relationship 
Methodology, a design methodology for using the functional entity construct, together 
with the FERD representation symbology, to model knowledge systems. FERM is the 
fourth component of the modelling framework which is the second major research 
goal, and completes that framework. In doing so, the second research question has been 
answered. 
The chapter included an expository instantiation of the method, demonstrating 
the production of a model for one of the running examples used in Chapters 8 and 9 to 
substantiate the erotetic framework. There are three further detailed demonstrations of 
FERM in action in Chapter 11, which has three worked cases of modelling complex 
knowledge systems. These cases will provide the substantiation for the FERM 
methodology. 
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Chapter 11  
 
Substantiation 
 
11.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter contains a substantiation of the complete FE framework with three 
expository instantiations modelling complex knowledge systems, in addition to the five 
running examples that were instantiated in chapters 8, 9 and 10. 
Substantiation of theoretical constructs is carried out through expository 
instantiations, both hypothesised and derived from case studies. The major 
substantiation activity is carried out in this chapter, in the form of three real world 
case-studies. There have been minor substantiations in Chapters 8, 9 and 10 to illustrate 
and inform the constructs and modelling framework as they were introduced. This is in 
conformance with the nature of developing theoretical design artefacts (Gregor & 
Jones, 2004, 2007).  
11.2 The role of substantiation in distributed justification 
Substantiation is a matter of confirming whether expository instantiations of a 
solution delivers predicted results. Specifically, the prediction is that the erotetic 
perspective and the functional entity conceptual modelling framework constructed 
within it will be descriptively adequate to the task. 
Gregor & Jones (2007) mandate an expository instantiation of any theory 
artefacts within design science research, as 
an instantiation such as a prototype can be seen as serving a communicative purpose in 
illustrating the design principles that are embodied within it (2007, p. 330). 
This chapter contains three FE conceptual models of knowledge systems. They 
have been chosen to reflect the different types of modelling, for existing or for 
proposed systems. Firstly, models can serve as a plan of an existing system that has 
been created to observe, measure or predict behaviour. The first case study, analysis of 
the Box-Ironbark knowledge system is a plan of an existing system. 
Secondly, models can also serve as a blueprint for a proposed system, enabling 
conception of anticipated needs, and choice among known available mechanisms for  
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realisation of those needs. The Dream Home database extension (case study 2) is a 
good example of such a blueprint, as the pedagogical nature of the database system 
gives the opportunity for exploring the possibility space of the business knowledge 
based system domain. 
The third case study combines these two approaches to modelling by making a 
plan of an existing system that had come about in an ad hoc manner, with a view to 
automating and introducing messaging support. 
Each case study will go through the first four phases of the FERM, to the point 
of implementation design, which satisfices the need for an expository instantiation. 
These four phases are Identification, Conceptualisation, Formalisation, and 
Implementation design. 
11.3 Case study 1: the Box-Ironbark Ecological Thinning 
Trial 
This case study serves as an analysis of an existing system, modelling the FE 
Framework, the Box-Ironbark Ecological Thinning Trial. This is an existing wide-area 
knowledge management system, the informatic representation of the Box-Ironbark 
Ecological Thinning Trial coordinated by Parks Victoria. This project was described in 
J.Patrick Pigott, Gammack, Pigott, and Hobbs (2009). 
11.3.1 Identification and Conceptualisation 
The project involved coordinating a number of different organisations and 
systems, with expertise of a specialist nature, distribution of the responsibility for data 
and reporting amongst organisations. It is a wide area system with respect to both data 
catchment and knowledge usage. 
In the Box-Ironbark thinning trial, treatments were applied to selected plots for 
different sites, which were monitored using repeated measurements such as species 
cover and growth. Each site was located in Parks Victoria Reserves containing Box-
Ironbark forests that were logistically feasible (J.P. Pigott, 2009; J.P. Pigott et al., 
2008). Observations were made from these measurements, and then evaluated by 
expert groups, whose constitution changed over time, and which were drawn from 
either organisational offices or individual experts. The participation of the 
organisations changed as individuals moved between them, according to their internal 
structures (J.P. Pigott, 2009).   
  257
11.3.2 Formalisation 
We can now discuss each of the functional entities in the model. We represent 
the Classification of the vegetation as an ontological connective FE. By linking the 
selected instances of vegetation into the Classification FE, we are requesting of an 
ontological framework the situating of the specimen in the standard Linnean taxonomic 
scheme, represented in the HISCOM system, the Australia-wide authority. 
The Vegetation is represented by a conventional entity, and is recorded as point 
data in a GIS system, that also contains details of the plots that were chosen for the 
trial. Plot is represented by an absolute aggregative FE, because while the areas are 
identified by the known tree specimens, the plots are the level at which the results are 
to be presented. This points to a particular feature of aggregative FEs, the risk of 
inapplicability of measurement. Something that is true of the whole may not be true of 
the part; for instance tree density will not necessarily be true of the roads running 
through the area plot.  
The details of the treatment trials are recorded externally (in a series of 
spreadsheets, by the foresters on the ground) and are tabulated in a series of tables in a 
Microsoft Access™ database. This is represented by the standard entity Treatment in 
Figure 12.1.  
Because of the number of recordings involved, it is not possible to do real-time 
querying of Treatment to get derived statistical information. In consequence of that, 
dedicated processing time has to be allocated every time a new set of data comes in, 
and the processed data is stored as Observations in a separate set of tables in another 
database, represented as an intensional aggregative functional entity. This means that 
rapid response to querying data is possible, but the results of that querying cannot be 
directly tied back to individual items within the source data, and there is no guarantee 
that the result will be representative of any particular measurement. 
The summaries in Observation have been used by various authorities and 
individuals to write reports over time, and the reports have fed back in an adaptive 
scientific management life cycle, as discussed in Pigott (2009). Because of the varying 
nature of the scientific establishment in the State of Victoria and the movement of 
scientific professionals between organisations, as well as in and out of the workforce, 
the origin of the expertise and of the reports generated varies through time. The experts 
are consulted at a collective level, represented by the non-Aristotelian contiguous FE 
Experts Group. This is represented by the constitutive recursive FE Expert. The  
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Observations are published in reports authored jointly by the Expert Group, and are 
recorded in the non-Aristotelian emergent FE Publication. 
11.3.3 Implementation Design 
The FERD of the Box-Ironbark ecological thinning trial is shown in Figure 15.1. 
 
Figure 11‐1 The FERD of the Box‐Ironbark ecological thinning trial. 
11.3.4 Summary for Box-Ironbark Ecological Thinning Trial case 
We can see from this example how a wide area knowledge catchment and 
reporting system, involving several informatic systems and multiple professional 
jurisdictions, can be modelled clearly in one diagram, showing the distribution of 
observation and understanding from planned measurement to final report.  
11.4 Case study 2: Dream Home database extensions 
This study follows up on some extant puzzles cases originally prepared as part 
of a set of guest lectures in a postgraduate course on advanced database modelling. The 
cases were designed to extend a standard pedagogical data model with non-relational 
knowledge needs for students used to working within the Object Relational and 
Relational Model conventions. As such they make a suitable candidate for the 
exploratory aspect of knowledge modelling here.   
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11.4.1 Identification and Conceptualisation 
Dream Home is a teaching model database designed by Connelly & Begg (2004) 
for illustrating the design decisions made in constructing databases. It describes 
properties for rent in Glasgow and its suburbs, with a record of owners and renters. 
The example lists conventional entities such as property for rent, rental 
agreement, client, lease, owner. The database as described serves the staff for recording 
properties, listing them for advertisements, managing leases and enabling clients 
(potential renters) to find ideal rental accommodation. 
A branch needs to keep a list of property it manages (and owners it manages 
them for) and be able to inquire about those owners. It will need to keep a list of the 
clients it will either be managing in rental, or be actively finding homes for. When a 
client requests accommodation, the system should be able to give candidate dwellings 
for them. 
The extensions for modelling include keeping a record of maintenance (such as 
spraying or painting) for apartments that have been subdivided or conjoined, so the 
dwelling-instance applicability of the maintenance may be non-continuous. Another 
extension maintains a GIS-oriented amenities system recording the proximity to 
desirable amenities such as schools, shopping centres or public transport. Potential 
clients will need a credit check from an external agency. There is also a proposed 
expert system that works with clients' preferences for accommodation, including 
affordable rent, necessary features of dwelling and amenities needs. 
11.4.2 Formalisation 
We can now discuss each of the functional entities in the model. Most of the 
functional entities are synonymous with those described in Connelly & Begg (2004),
 so 
this section will be content with describing the additional functional entities. The 
FERD in the next section contains all of the functional entities. 
We represent the knowledge dependency of PropertyForRent with respect to 
maintenance by using a contiguous Non-Aristotelian FE. Maintenance (such as wiring, 
plumbing, painting or pest control) based on the actual occurrence of events within 
buildings, while the owned dwelling space can be the result of subdivision and 
conjoining of sections dwellings (i.e., rooms being made into apartments, walls being 
knocked through to make larger rental areas) and there cannot be a necessary direct 
data dependency in the traditional Armstrong sense (William Ward Armstrong, 1974).  
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What is needed is a functional entity that will present the contiguity of maintenance 
history at the proper (though fictive) granularity, providing a reference point for 
maintenance records. Another consequence of that history is that there may be a 
recursive meronymic (part-of) relationship as dwellings change hands and are 
reconstructed. This is represented by a recursive contiguous Non-Aristotelian 
knowledge relation with PropertyForRent. 
Amenities and their catchments (i.e., the area for which they provide services) 
can be represented by a Relative Aggregative functional entity, Amenity. The 
knowledge dependency from PropertyForRent is created by the fixed geolocation of 
the property. The knowledge dependency realises such questions as “where is the 
nearest train station?”, “is there a halal butcher in one of the nearby shopping centres?” 
or “Is there public space nearby for exercise?”. 
The knowledge relation between the amenities and PropertyForRent provides 
the value content for the advisory system, which is represented by a Ruleset functional 
entity Recommendation. This works with the ideal rental accommodation specified by 
Preference to provide lists of suitable available accommodation, and would be realised 
as some sort of expert system. Recommendation draws on Amenity through 
PropertyForRent to act as the fact base for the recommending engine.  
The need to find the creditworthiness of any potential clients is represented by a 
External Cartographic functional entity, CreditCheck. This would be provided by a 
general credit agency, with a knowledge dependency determined by a key based on 
personal details. Since the inner workings of the external system would be opaque to 
the user, the functional entity would have a qualifying mixin indicating that the values 
were inferred from the key, and not directly entailed from an identifier.  
The Owner disjunctive composition collated FE provides ownership details for 
the rental property, providing an encapsulation for the two entities with ownership 
capability, PrivateOwner and BusinessOwner. An owner can be a person or a business, 
but not both.  
The Placement conjunctive composition collated FE record the placement of a 
property listing either in a newspaper or on the web. 
11.4.3 Implementation Design 
The FERD of the Dream Home database extensions is shown in Figure 11.1.  
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Figure 11‐2 The FERD for the Dream Home extensions 
11.4.4 Case summary for Dream Home database extensions 
This example shows how an existing database schema (and ERD structure) can 
be incorporated into a knowledge base, with additional functional entities providing 
non-relational knowledge relations. 
11.5 Case study 3: translation support knowledge base 
This case study is concerned with setting up a library to facilitate translation of 
programming instructions in a multilingual programming language. This was a real-
world problem that arose during the course of the author's professional work, and the 
design was used to create a library system.  
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11.5.1 Identification and Conceptualisation 
The context for this case study is the ICT and library support for multi-target 
translation of several thousand ICT terms for a multi-lingual programming language. 
Support was needed for the translation in the form of specialised software for the 
translation machines (including specialised editors and web browsers, translation 
software, special fonts, dictionaries and grammar checkers), access to online resources, 
identification of library resources (dictionaries, thesauri of technical terms, translated 
manuals, corpora of teaching materials) and a network of support organisations and 
experts. The base need of the translator was to find candidate terms, phrases and 
colloquialisms for particular operations or structures (such as ordered queue, or shuffle, 
or pop). It was also required to check for combinations of terms that might cause 
offence to or give rise to mirth in the target populations. 
This case was problematic in that it had to fit in with existing work practices 
with no disruption to them, while systematising the support that was needed. A 
knowledge base for assisting the work of translation was needed on a project basis, 
with material scheduled to be procured in time for anticipated use, as well as 
synchronisation of tasks with availability of external expertise, and offers of support 
from outside organisations.  
In practice, this knowledge base was partly one of conventional access to 
sociocultural and translational materials, giving an access to the culture of computing 
in other cultures, and partly one of procurement and scheduling. The basic need for the 
translator and the support staff was to make up a “translation kit” for languages, 
frequently organised at the language family or regional level. This would mean a set of 
books, software, prior work and access notes to currently available volunteer experts. It 
would also mean reloading of prior work, and scheduling a briefing for incorporation 
of previous work with the software designers. 
Part of the additions to the workflow was systemic creation of documents, and a 
versioning system for the completed work with granular feedback at the different levels 
of work. Material worked on had to be logged into a version control system to enable 
the translation work to be fed back into the software development work, so that the 
feasibility of the translations could be checked continuously. The work was then fed to 
external experts in order that the work be appropriate for the target user base.  
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11.5.2 Formalisation 
We can now discuss each of the functional entities in the model. We represent 
the target translation languages using the standard relational functional entity 
TargetLanguage, which contains all the necessary identifying features for working 
around difficulties in creating multi-lingual term-sets. TargetLanguage is linked to an 
ontological connective functional entity, LanguageAtlas, containing general details 
about the language families to which the languages belong and the difficulties that the 
languages as a group present.  
TargetLanguage links to a standard relational function entity, Lexemes, which 
contains the individual tokens begin translated. Lexemes functions as an associative 
entity between TargetLanguage and another standard relational function entity, 
Opcodes, that is the set of all operator codes within the programming language. 
Opcodes are represented in use by code fragments, represented by the standard 
relational functional entity Examples, and individual opcodes are located within a 
programmatic ontology, which is represented by an ontological functional entity, 
Discourse.  
The translator tools are assembled in a collated union conjunction functional 
entity Workspace that uses certain rules to attach different resources based on 
availability (such as generic translation resources in the absence of a dictionary)  
The collated conjunction functional entity Workspace which presents as a 
ruleset connective functional entity, embodying encoded rules manually entered as 
hard links. The collated functional entities include a library system, represented as the 
emergent non-Aristotelian functional entity ReferenceWorks. (This is instantiated by 
the pre-existing Isis Database system, and includes digital material.) The collation also 
subsumes an emergent non-Aristotelian functional entity, Notes, containing a list of 
memo on the language or language family as applicable, including details of former 
research. The final subsumed function entity is Software, which is a standard relational 
functional entity enabling the installation of software. 
An internal messaging system provided Messages, represented by a networked 
functional entity that was presented as a mini-bulletin board. Messages linked to the 
lexeme, opcode and language functional entities. It linked to Messengers, which 
collated three standard relational functional entities: Users, listing all the internal users, 
and Experts, listing external individual experts and Organisations, which listed  
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external organisational expertise. An articulated linkage permitted the knowledge 
dependency of the Isis references to the expert functional entities. 
11.5.3 Implementation Design 
The FERD of the Translation Support Knowledge Base is shown in Figure 11.2. 
 
Figure 11‐3 The FERD for the Translation Support System 
 
11.5.4 Summary for Translation Support System case 
This example shows how an existing operational knowledge system, which 
draws on a number of different knowledge resource and media forms can be modelled 
using the erotetic framework, and how that model can then be used to plan for a 
potentially disruptive change to the system.  
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11.6 Significance for the establishment of the Erotetic 
Perspective 
Gregor & Jones (2004, 2007) mandate expository instantiations as part of the 
process of theory design artefact creation. The current thesis has presented expository 
instantiations in the form of eight running case studies throughout Chapters 8 and 9, 
which will also be run in Chapter 12 for the establishment of FERL. However, the 
expository instantiations were not embedded in the real world practices of analysis and 
conceptualisation, and they were not brought about through the application of FERM, 
which only used one of the running case studies. 
By examining three complex knowledge systems drawn using the complete 
FERM stages and creating implementation designs for all three, the FE framework has 
been shown to be adequate to the task of conceptualisation, the FERD has been shown 
adequate to the task of representation and FERM has been shown adequate to the task 
of facilitating those tasks. 
11.7 Summary 
This chapter conducted an evaluation of the erotetic perspective using 
substantiation through expository instantiation (per Gregor & Jones, 2007). 
It presented three expository instantiations, in the form of complex knowledge 
systems in need of modelling, substantiating both FERD (as documentation system) 
and FERM (as an approach to carrying out modelling). The case studies were taken 
from real-world examples, and from a range of situations to test the FE framework in 
as wide a range of possibilities as was feasible within the confines of the research 
project. They were also drawn from three kinds of situations – mapping, extension and 
a combination of both – to show that ex ante, in medias res and ex post usage of the FE 
framework was practicable. These provided positive substantiation as to the 
representational adequacy of the perspective, the framework in general, and FERD and 
FERM specifically. 
The next chapter presents the development of the secondary research path, and 
creates the Functional Entity Relationship Language (FERL), from a different kernel 
theory to the FE/FERD framework established in Chapters 5-10. In Chapter 13, the two 
systems will be docked in accordance with the methodology established in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 12  
 
The Functional Entity Relationship Language 
 
12.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter describes the Functional Entity Relationship Language (FERL), a 
system for modelling the flow of knowledge in a question and answer conversation. 
The language provides an alternative symbology for the erotetic modelling framework 
to the sketch logic FERD described in Chapter 9.  
It continues the secondary research path from the description of the knowledge-
seeking reference interview given in Chapter 4. The reference interview is analysed 
using Speech Act Theory (J. L. Austin, 1962) in order to develop FERL. 
Developing FERL has two purposes: one is to develop a textual representation 
for knowledge transfer in learning, establishing a principled Extended Backus Naur 
Format (EBNF) grammar as the first stage in writing a brokering software system for 
knowledge management. The other is to provide an alternative justification for the 
constructs developed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, and the FERD system developed in 
Chapter 9. This will then enable a docking justification of the erotetic perspective.  
The chapter begins with a research justification for FERL, followed by a 
recapitulation of the research path established in section 3.6.2, and a summary of the 
salient points of Speech Act Theory needed to serve as a kernel theory in the current 
research. FERL itself is adapted from SQL, which was chosen as a candidate mutable 
artefact in section 3.5.2.  
The rest of the chapter follows the three phase secondary research path 
established in section 3.6.2: an invention, an elaboration and a substantiation phase will 
each be stepped through in accordance with that research path.  
In the invention phase (12.5) the speech situation of the reference librarian 
research interview is analysed for speech acts and turn-taking. In the elaboration phase, 
this analysis is subsequently used to develop a formal language for describing the QA 
dialogues. The language is defined using an industry-standard EBNF grammar, which  
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can be used for stipulating well-formed knowledge needs and capacities and 
knowledge transfer messages, as well as tools for processing those messages.
117 In the 
substantiation phase, the chapter revisits the examples in Chapters 8 and 9, presenting 
the FERL expressions for them as expository instantiations. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the role of FERL within the current 
research and the Functional Entity framework. 
12.2 Research justification for FERL 
There are two research justifications for FERL, one theoretical and one practical. 
The theoretical justification is the need is for an alternative representation of the 
erotetic perspective to enable docking with FERD. The pragmatic justification is to 
provide a useful knowledge transactioning language for the erotetic perspective.  
12.2.1 FERL for docking 
To review, this thesis uses the docking method of evaluation (section 3.3.5.5), 
which consists of examining two models or modelling systems for mutual 
encompassing, but using a different kernel theory and a different mode of presentation. 
Previous chapters in this thesis have established an erotetic perspective for knowledge 
modelling, based on the metaphor of KNOWLEDGE-AS-RESOLVED-INQUIRY 
(Chapter 2), and showed (Chapter 4) how resolved inquiry is embodied in the reference 
interview. The kernel theory then used was Rescher’s enquiry dynamics, which 
enabled a principled account of the erotetic perspective to be established. From this 
perspective we have derived the necessary constructs for knowledge modelling (in 
Chapter 7), i.e. typed functional entities, typed knowledge relations and collating 
mechanisms for them.  
This chapter develops a formal language for representing the transactions 
involved in the exchange of knowledge within the erotetic perspective, and when 
finished will be checked for mutual encompassing with the FERD artefacts. 
12.2.2 FERL as a formal language for knowledge exchange 
The other, pragmatic, reason for developing FERL is to have a formal language 
adequate to the task of representing all forms of encoded knowledge transfer. 
                                                      
 
117 A full FERL manual is presented in Appendix F.  
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Formal languages are used to rationalise and automate discourse, thereby 
disambiguating words, and imposing a logical structure on the possible paths that can 
be taken within the discourse (Nagel, 1934). This makes the discourse suitable for 
representation within a computer, and a fortiori suitable for modelling (Ian I Mitroff, 
1973). Speech Acts Theory (J. L. Austin, 1962) is used when the discourse is 
sociocultural: formal languages for such discourse are created by making an analysis of 
the speech acts inherent in the situations where such discourse arises (Schiffrin, 1994). 
A formal language can be created by analysing conversations considered typical 
of a speech situation, to establish common utterances, and then representing those 
conversations as F(P) expressions.
118 The resulting formal language is adequate to 
represent any speech events that conform to that speech situation.  
Viewing knowledge as resolved inquiry means that we can operationalise stored 
knowledge as representable by a system of typed collections termed functional entities 
which are connected by functional dependencies termed knowledge relations as 
defined in Chapter 6. 
The functional dependency describes an implicature of values in one functional 
entity from another. Modelling knowledge transfer requires representing both the set of 
values in the source functional entity (cast as the inquirer) and the set of values 
implicated (cast as the responder), finalised by a confirmation/resend request message 
back. 
Informatic implicature is modellable as long term communication (Heilprin, 
1972a, 1972b, 1972c), obeying rules for instigation, answer and feedback (with 
correction). We have seen (in section 6.3.4) that this implicature conforms to the given-
new contract (H. H. Clark & Haviland, 1977; Haviland & Clark, 1974). By modelling 
the implicature of functional dependency using speech acts, we can establish a formal 
language that represents that implicature.  
SQL, the Structured Query Language (Boyce et al., 1974; D. D. Chamberlin & 
Boyce, 1974; D. D. Chamberlin et al., 1981; T. C. Chamberlin, 1890) was chosen in 
section 3.5.2 as a mutable artefact to adapt to the erotetic perspective. In accordance 
with the practices of developing tertiary design artefacts, in this chapter we adapt SQL 
by extending its ambit to all sources of encoded knowledge.  
                                                      
 
118 F(P) is explained later – it essentially refers to the illocutionary Force of a Proposition in Speech acts theory.  
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By the same token, SQL has capabilities that are not (for now) of interest in this 
research. For the purposes of analysis, we can use Uexkull's distinction between 
effector and perceptual tools (Uexkull, 1934, p. 6) in considering the current FERL 
capabilities. Perceptual tools enable observation of the world, and effector tools enable 
manipulation of the world. As the purpose of creating FERL is to dock with FERD, 
only the perceptual tools – the querying subset of SQL – is required. The question of 
operators for FERL that are effector tools is discussed in the section on further research 
in the conclusion, Chapter 14.
119 
12.3 A research path for creating a formal language 
In section 3.6.2 we described a research path to create a formal language for the 
erotetic perspective, based on Moore’s (1993) Formal Language for Business 
Communication. The research path involves undertaking a speech act analysis of the 
speech situation of learning through question and answer with feedback (i.e. Moore’s 
dialogue model, 1993) . 
We identified the following phases and steps within those phases: 
Phase One: Invention 
1.  Identify the significant communications within a speech situation ex ante 
2.  Represent them using the Moore five-part structure for speech acts 
Phase Two: Elaboration 
1.  Represent these communications as elementary expressions using the 
F(P) framework 
2.  Create a formal language, expressed as an EBNF grammar for 
representing the significant communications 
Phase Three: Substantiation 
1.  Test the adequacy of the representation with simple test cases 
2.  Test the adequacy of the representation with complex test cases 
These phases are discussed in section 12.5, 12.6 and 12.7 respectively. However, 
before the invention phase can commence it is necessary to briefly review the relevant 
aspects of Speech Acts Theory.  
                                                      
 
119 The distinction made in the SQL standard between the two sublanguages in SQL, the Data Manipulation 
Language (DML) and the Data Description Language (DDL), is not of use here as the function of enquiry, including 
SELECT and UNION, are part of the DML.  
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12.4 Speech acts analysis and formal language construction 
This section discusses speech acts, and how they can be used to create formal 
languages for informatics. It discusses general speech acts (12.4.1), their classification 
(12.4.2), dialogic accounts of speech acts (12.4.3), illocutionary pre-conditions (12.4.4) 
and hedging and pragmata (12.4.5). 
12.4.1 Speech Acts Theory 
The notion of speech acts was established by Austin (1962) to distinguish 
conventional descriptive speech (i.e. speech where words are used to describe the 
world) from performative speech (i.e. speech where words are used to change the 
world). Speech acts such as commands, requests, promises or officiations amount to 
actions with social and political consequences, even though all that has actually 
happened is the utterance of words by the individual performing the actions. 
Utterances have two components (J. L. Austin, 1962): the topic of the utterance 
(the utterance’s propositional content), and the speaker’s attitude towards those words 
(the utterance’s illocutionary force). For instance “you ate the last biscuit” is prima 
facie descriptive, but in general understanding is held to be a reprimand of someone’s 
behaviour. Likewise “it will rain tomorrow” is held to be a statement of belief not of 
fact (John R Searle, 1968).  
Speech acts theory is binding within informatic disciplines because the 
illocutionary force of a speech act is a second-order message (R.G D'Andrade & Wish, 
1985). A second-order message (Bateson, 1955) is one in which metacommunication 
occurs: speech acts contain both the message (the propositional content) and language-
coded instructions on how we are to understand that message. 
Searle (1969) develops a logic of illocutionary force, equivalent to propositional 
logic and modelled on Frege’s logical form. It reduces natural sentences to elementary 
sentences (John R. Searle & Vanderveken, 1985 p.2, after Frege’s Elementarsätze). 
Searle maintains that in any utterance the illocutionary force overrides the force of 
logic: the common propositional utterance is at heart an expression of belief, while 
other derived utterances on the same subject can be seen as variations in the 
illocutionary force on that propositional content. For example, the sentences “will you 
stand up?”, “are you standing up?”, “I order you to stand up”, “you are going to stand 
up” and “I wish you would stand up” can all be shown to possess a core propositional  
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content “you stand up” and illocutionary force indicators through word order or 
ancillary words. Searle (1969 p.31) expresses this in a canonical form as: 
  (10.1) 
 for propositional content P and illocutionary force F.
120 By using this notation form, it 
becomes possible to distinguish between (e.g.) the utterance U1 promising to not do 
something: 
  (10.2) 
 
and U2 not promising to do something 
 
(10.3) 
Using the F(P) framework, the examples given above can be represented using 
illocutionary forces request, enquire, command, predict, hope with the same 
propositional content “you are standing up”
121 (designated Y):  
“will you stand up?” ⇒ Request(Y) 
“are you standing up?” ⇒ Enquire(Y) 
“I order you to stand up” ⇒ Command(Y) 
“you are going to stand up” ⇒ Predict(Y) 
“I wish you would stand up” ⇒ Hope(Y) 
The propositional statement “you are standing up” itself is an assert 
illocutionary force, so the simple proposition would be stated: 
“You are standing up” ⇒ Assert(Y) 
This distinction of illocutionary force from propositional content can be used to 
follow the path of a topic through a dialogue: 
“How many players are in a cricket team?” ⇒ Request(C) 
“There are 11 players in a cricket team” ⇒ Count(C)  
                                                       
 
120 Searle (1969 p.31-2) actually makes two forms, one is F(P) for the most general case and F(RP) for R the 
reference and P the predication. However, the usage in the IS, AI and KM communities ignores this (philosophical) 
distinction and uses the U=F(P) form. Moore (1993) has called this simplified form the F(P) framework, a 
terminology that has been generally accepted (Daskalopulu & Sergot, 2002). Both the terminology and the 
simplified canonical form have been adopted in this thesis. 
121 This restatement is confusing because of the English language use of the verb “to be” to state present action, the 
“are” in “you are standing up”. In the Fregean Germanic form, “Sie aufstehen” lends itself more naturally to the 
canonical form.  
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Sometimes the utterance is little more than the expression of illocutionary force, 
with the conversational context supplying the propositional content: 
“Have I enough money here for a cup of tea?” ⇒ RequestConfirm(T) 
“Yes” ⇒ Confirm(T) 
A further contribution of speech act theory to disambiguate conversation is the 
notion of an indirect speech act, wherein the utterance bears no prima facie connection 
with the speech act intended (Grice, 1969). Co-operative conversation (in a Gricean 
sense) would require paying attention to the intended speech act rather than the literal 
meaning (Grice, 1975). The utterance “It’s warm in here” has the meaning “Please 
open the window”. Many questions are indirect speech acts, such as:  
“Do you know where the toilets are?” ⇒ Request(L) 
“The toilets are over there.” ⇒ Assertive(L) 
where the answer “Yes” would be uncooperative.  
By expressing complex sociocultural speech situation in these elementary sentences, 
and by selecting the significant recurring illocutionary forces on recurrent generalised 
propositional content, a formal language for the speech situation can be created. 
Generally, the correct level of abstraction will permit the creation of a very small set of 
elementary sentences. For example, most Language/Action Perspective analyses 
produced formal languages of less than 20 words (see Appendix D). 
With regard to the QA Pairs that form the metaphoric guide for the current 
research a question “Was John here earlier?” and a matching answer “Yes, John was 
here earlier” differ in illocutionary force. When we are considering if an answer is 
relevant to a question, we do so by looking for a commonality of propositional content 
between the question and the answer. Thus a formal language respecting the variety of 
QA forms arising in a knowledge transfer conversation can be abstracted independently 
of the subject matter under discussion (S. A. Moore, 1993).  
12.4.2 Types of Speech Act 
Speech Act theory differentiates between the syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
aspects of speech acts (D. H. Hymes, 1972 p.57): that is (respectively) between the 
classification of speech situations on the one hand and the classes of speech acts on the 
other. Given the role that illocutionary force plays in speech acts, Searle (1975b) 
(following J. L. Austin, 1962) stresses that the illocutionary point should be used to  
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classify speech acts, since the illocutionary point is the dominant characteristic which 
gives a speech act a role in discourse, over and above considerations of truth or falsity, 
or of the role in a chain of argument.  
Speech acts are classified as assertive, directive, commissive, expressive, 
effective, or verdictive (See 10.1) using the taxonomy of Clark
122 (1996 p.136) and 
following generally accepted practice for speech act analyses of reference interviews 
(Dewdney & Michell, 1997; Schiffrin, 1994; White, 1998). 
Table 12.1 Illocutionary Act Taxonomy according to Clark (1996) 
Illocutionary act  Illocutionary point
Assertives   to get the addressee to form or attend to a belief
Directives   to get the addressee to do something
Commissives   to commit the speaker to doing something
Expressives  to express a feeling toward the addressee
Effectives  to change an institutional
1 state of affairs.
Verdictives  to determine what is the case in an institution
Note. 1 This usage of institutional refers more to a speech community that a conventional institution: we 
may distinguish (e.g.) between baptism (which belongs in a speech community) and ship‐baptism (which is 
part of an institution within that speech community) 
In essence, questions are considered directives, answers are considered 
assertives, and acknowledgment is considered expressive. The pre-conditions for an 
erotetic conversation also involve an accepted obligation to answer in a Gricean 
cooperative manner, which is a commissive. Considerations as regards to rights to 
know, or acceptance of a given answer, are verdictives.  
Significantly for the current research, the act of referencing the speech of 
another in an utterance (which is the bulk of the professional utterance of the reference 
librarian) is not a separate category of speech act (Nastri, Pena, & Hancock, 2006): it is 
considered locutionary rather than illocutionary, being referentially transparent to the 
original (Krifka, 2009). Consequently, utterances that are made which relate the 
utterances of a third party are referentially transparent to those utterances, and, unless 
hedged, have the same illocutionary representation. 
                                                      
 
122 There is no standard speech acts taxonomy (Kissine, 2011). “Despite its problems, the scheme is useful as a gross 
classification and for its widely accepted nomenclature. I shall use it for both” Clark (1996 p.136) In this thesis, 
when the original author has used a synonymous term from another classification, such as representative for 
assertive, the term from Clark’s taxonomy will be used, (and the original term placed in a footnote  
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12.4.3 Turn-taking and Adjacency Pairs: Speech Acts in Context 
By examining the performative aspects of the utterances in speech events, we 
come to understand the situations in which they occur (D. H. Hymes, 1977), and can 
create formal languages to describe the social consequence of the behaviour of 
individuals in communication (Habermas, 1981).  
Significantly for the current research, the use of speech-act derived formal 
languages gives us an insight into the nature of conversation, and in particular dialogue 
(i.e. the conversation between two speakers). Conversation involves turn-taking (Sacks 
et al., 1974) according to specific cultural norms (A. Pomerantz, 1984).  
Turn-taking is an essential component of conversations. In the context of 
dialogue and turn-taking, speech acts can be part of utterance-response match-ups 
called adjacency pairs (E. A. Schegloff & Sacks, 1969). 
In particular, semantic and social roles mandate particular forms of response to 
particular utterances, such as acknowledgments being required for instruction or 
command. Analysis of dialogue requires attention to the likely pathways through such 
adjacency pairs. In some situations, the secondary part of an adjacency pair will 
become the first half of a new adjacency pair, and so on. Conversational repair occurs 
when there is failure of illocutionary intent: speech events use various repair 
mechanisms to put the conversation on track. In particular, repair makes use of special 
adjacency pairs that ask for clarification, confirmation or teachback (Bunt, 1989). 
Finally, speech acts are vectored (Harrah, 1994): they have a directionality that 
is semantically significant within the context of the conversation. This vectoring 
reflects the relative authority (social, political, moral), knowledge (educator, examiner, 
parent) or role (confessor-penitent, client-lawyer, chairman-panellist). This means that 
within any given conversational context, some utterances are permitted and even 
expected. In some cases, a sociolinguistic affordance limits the number of permissible 
utterances. 
All of the features described in this section conform to Moore’s dialogue model 
of the QA Pairing (J. D. Moore, 1995), which provides the basis for the QA metaphor 
in the current research.  
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12.4.4 Illocutionary pre-conditions within conversational pre-
sequences 
Austin (1962) describes several felicity conditions that must be met for an 
utterance effectively to achieve its illocutionary goal. These include the sincerity 
condition (i.e. that the individual uttering actually has intent that matches the 
illocutionary force), the essential condition,
123 the preparatory conditions
124 and the 
sociocultural conditions pre-exist that make the illocutionary goal possible). 
When considering speech events, these conditions have to be established for all 
actors in the conversations involved (Grice, 1975, 1978).
125 The sincerity condition is 
operationalised as Grice’s maxims of conversation, discussed in section 6.3.2. The 
relationship between the propositional content in a question-and-answer pair forms the 
basis of Clark’s given-new contract (H. H. Clark & Haviland, 1977), as discussed in 
section 6.3.4. Additionally, a basic frame-establishment is necessary to ensure that an 
essential common ground is held between the conversationalists, ensuring 
comprehension (H. H. Clark & Haviland, 1977) (see section 6.3.2). 
Identifying these speech act features in knowledge seeking QA practices is 
necessary in order to establish a formal language for representing functional entities 
and knowledge relations. 
12.4.5 Hedging and illocutionary force 
Some speech acts contain a third-order message that informs the recipient over 
and above the second-order (illocutionary) significance and the primary propositional 
content. These are the hedging meta-linguistic operators discussed in section 6.3.8. 
These may be expressed in the canonical form for hedge illocutionary force as: 
  (10.4) 
where Expression 10.1 is wrapped by a hedging function H.  
The examples used in the discussion of hedging in section 6.3.8 can be 
expressed in the F(P) framework as: 
  “A dolphin is a sort of fish”  ⇒   Fuzzy(Assertion(DolphinIsAFish) 
                                                       
 
123 i.e. that the individual uttering expects that the illocutionary goal be met 
124 i.e. that propositional content is appropriate per Searle (1969) 
125 As the discussion of the work of Speech Acts theorists in Chapter 6 within the principal research path is was 
serving as kernel theory for the predecessor work described there, it is legitimate to point to that section, rather than 
repeating the analysis in this research path.  
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  “He is very tall”  ⇒   Maximal(Assertion(TallPerson)) ) 
The pragmata meta-linguistic operators can also be expressed using the F(P) 
framework as Expression 10.5: 
  (10.5) 
where Expression 10.4 is wrapped by a pragmatic limitation function L. 
Hedges and pragmata are an important component of all speech events, and 
speech analysis must take into account hedging force when examining discourse. 
12.5 Invention phase – establishing the solution through 
speech acts analysis 
This section provides a speech acts analysis of the reference interview, based on 
the existing analyses of reference librarianship in the literature (Belkin & Vickery, 
1985; Budd, 2006; Dewdney & Michell, 1997; Hannabuss, 1989; Schiffrin, 1994; 
White, 1998). It will be used to establish a typed enumeration of the principal speech 
acts involved. 
The current research is informed by the metaphor of KNOWLEDGE AS 
RESOLVED INQUIRY, as embodied in the form of a reference interview. The 
common research path forked after Chapter 4 into the principal and secondary research 
paths, after the discussion of the reference interview (which provides the ground for the 
metaphor used in the principal research path).  
12.5.1 Reference QA Pairs as institutional dialogue 
QA Pairs are seen in erotetic logic as isolates, with the question and answer pair 
corresponding in terms of the propositional content they frame (called the topic of the 
QA Pair), and with the context of the erotetic speech event assumed as neutral (Figure 
12.1).
126
Figure 12-1 The abstraction of the QA Pair 
                                                       
 
126 This QA Pair is also the beginning of the discussion at 6.2.1, where it was seen as insufficient for the Rescherian 
erotetics. 
Q A Abstraction Q = question
A = answer 
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This idealised account is insufficient for an instantiation of a QA Pair as 
representing an inquiry regarding institutional facts (Blair & Gordon, 1991; 
Demolombe & Louis, 2006; Hagman & Ljungberg, 1996; Lagerspetz, 2006; 
Emmanuel A Schegloff, 1992; Zuckerman & Merton, 1971). 
Instead, the QA Pairing must conform to the notion of institutional common 
understanding, which in turn requires an acceptance of roles and obligations. These are 
the felicity preconditions necessary for the reference interview to occur. This means 
that the roles for both patron (enquirer) and librarian (informant) must be established, 
along with a common understanding of the rules for both. 
What is needed instead of the simple two-part model of the interview is some 
reflection of its institutional situating. A reference interview occurs when a library 
patron asks a reference librarian for information: either a request for a source of 
knowledge, or a request for a piece of knowledge. The reference librarian does not 
(necessarily) know the answer to the question, but has skills to take questions and find 
answers using the bibliographic tools at their disposal. 
The participants in a reference interview (patron and librarian) are already in a 
Gricean co-operative position, with common knowledge structures meaning that there 
must be an implicit establishment of grounds between the library and the potential 
clientele that the librarian must serve: this can be considered the capacity to answer 
questions. The expectation that patrons will ask questions can be generalised to the 
need to ask questions: institutionally, they ask for an ongoing form of assistance in 
their enquiries (Hannabuss, 1989). There must be some degree of concinnity between 
the capacity and need as part of the institutional situating of the QA Pair component of 
the reference interview (Figure 12.2). 
 
Figure 12‐2 The institutional account of the QA Pair 
C N M
Conversation
Institutional
facts
Establishment
Q = questioner
A = answerer
C = capacity
N = need
M= match
Q A
Ask
Respond
Feedback 
  279
We now look at this two stage model of the reference interview using speech acts 
analysis 
12.5.2 The preconditions of the reference interview as commissive 
speech acts 
Expressing a capacity is an institutional commissive speech act: the librarian as 
proxy for the knowledge undertakes to present knowledge when asked, within certain 
guidelines established by the organisation. Additionally, in large or specialist libraries 
with concomitant specialisation of the knowledge resources, the implicit commissive 
speech act can be more than a general promissory notification, it can indicate a 
willingness to answer questions on a certain subject. 
We can identify hedges in the commissive performative: chiefly that the answers 
are only available to people within the client base. Other less obvious limitations 
concern the nature of the knowledge returned, for instance, answers involving 
statistical values will have a lag time, and representability of the universe of knowledge 
will be restricted according to the library’s selection policy. There will also be 
pragmatic limitations: occasions when information can be sought, membership expiry 
limiting the right to ask, legal restrictions as to material available, cost of inquiry etc.. 
Performative utterances can have more than one illocutionary force, and answers 
made ex officio are verdictive as well as assertive. Collation of materials is an essential 
part of reference librarianship: part of the capacity as expressed (and therefore part of 
the commissive performative) is the undertaking to collate material as required to suit 
the purpose of the enquiry. However, all answers, not just collated ones, have this 
verdictive illocutionary force, as such institutional judgements are made within every 
answer in a reference interview. This means that there is a hedged, pragmatised 
verdictive embedded in all answers, but it is trivial for most of them. 
The patrons (as a class) participate in a generalised erotetic directive requiring 
assistance: Institutionally, the class of patrons are expressing an ongoing need to know 
unspecified information. Corresponding with the special library considerations, a class 
of typed knowledge need could be hypothesised. This parallel need and capacity 
pairing will be narrowed down as the necessity arises. An animal behaviour specialist 
in a veterinary science library would be such a narrowing, further narrowing would 
occur should the need for information on (e.g.) horse behaviour become important.  
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Once again there will be pragmatic and hedging considerations. The pragmatic 
details correspond – the period of membership, the willingness to pay, the right to 
know. The hedging considerations will be reversed – it will be a matter of what lag 
time, representability etc. is acceptable to the patron class. 
These roles are reflected in the idealised opening of a reference interview, where 
the patron asks a generalised question seeking knowledge – a directive, and the 
librarian makes the assurance of willingness and capability – a commissive.  
This type of pre-sequencing is essential for all question-and-answer 
conversations. It enables the conversation to start, and includes identification of the 
relevant positions. For example, the roles of knower and learner in a dialogue QA Pair 
are seemingly reversed in an examination QA Pair (Stenström, 1988), with the 
knowledgeable individual affecting ignorance for the purposes of evaluation. An 
agreement as to the immediate contextualisation of the question is necessary for that 
QA to have meaning (Bunt, 2000). 
A final institutional performative is the judgement of adequacy: the institution or 
its proxies must make decisions continuously as to whether or not a perceived 
knowledge need can be met with existing capacity. This judgement must be made at 
the levels of generality and specificity in terms of staff skill and knowledge, training, 
collection policy and digital content subscription. This process amounts to a verdictive 
performative, which we for present purposes can term match: the adequacy judgement 
will be carried out in terms of the matching up of needs and capacities. Once again, the 
same criteria of hedging and pragma will apply. 
In summary, we have a hedged, pragmatised commissive performative on the 
part of the library, and a hedged, pragmatised directive performative on the part of the 
patron, and such commissives and directives are aligned through a hedged, pragmatic 
verdictive. Table 12.2 condenses this analysis using Moore’s observational structures.  
Table	12.2	Moore	observational	structures	for	the	establishment	of	the	reference	interview	
Act  General/ Specialised Capacity General/ Specialised Need Match of Needs and Capacities
Speaker  Library/ librarian  Patron(s) Institutional proxy/ proxies
Listener  Patron(s)  Library/ librarian Stakeholders 
Illocutionary 
Force 
Commissive  Directive  Verdictive 
Content  General capacity/ specialist 
knowledge 
General need/ specialist need Pointers to needs and capacities
Context  Reference interview establishment
  
  281
12.5.3 The speech acts in the reference interview proper 
We now look at speech acts in the reference interview proper. At its simplest, 
the patron asks the librarian a question, the librarian answers, and the patron 
acknowledges. The reference interview conversation is a question-answer-response 
(QAR) narrative (Murphy, 2005). 
The patron asks a question, which is a directive speech act. The librarian’s 
replies depend on the circumstance of both the nature of the question asked and the 
capability of the librarian to answer.  
In considering the speech event, turn-taking is self-evidently necessary for the 
process of answering (Hannabuss, 1989). However, there are many possible adjacency 
pairs:  
•  Question about subject ⇒ Answer about subject 
•  Question about subject ⇒ Profession of ignorance about subject 
•  Question about subject ⇒ Statement about no right to know about subject 
•  Question about subject ⇒ Promise to find out about subject  
•  Question about subject ⇒ Request for clarification about meaning or point of 
question 
This set of adjacency pairs matches up with the question answering typologies 
discussed in section 2.5.2.5. While we can classify all of the responses as answers, 
there is a wide range of speech acts: some are commissive (“I will find out…”), some 
are assertive (“The answer is…”), some are verdictive (“You have no right”), and some 
are directive (“Can you clarify what you mean by…?”).  
The answers, whichever type they may be, can sometimes form the first part of a 
new adjacency pair of speech acts, e.g. of gratitude, request for amplification, 
protestation of right, further request etc, as appropriate. Some of those speech act 
responses might in turn lead to further adjacency pairs as illustrated in Figure 12.3. 
Tracing knowledge-seeking dialogues depends on classifying and observing these 
conversational turns. All of the paths form QAR triplets: this is because in the 
reference interview the patron effectively decides when the process stops. The dotted 
arrows in the Figure 12.3 all lead from QAR triplets to new QAR triplets.  
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Figure 12‐3 Adjacency pairs in sequence forming conversational turns  
Once again there are hedging and pragmatic considerations: the patron will have 
an acceptable level for hedging in the answer, and the librarian will have a derived 
hedging level from the material drawn upon. The rights and institutional enablement of 
the patron will set pragmatic limitations to the enquiry. Built into the answer they may 
also be collating operations, and these will in turn have hedging values built into them. 
Constructing the Moore observational structures for the reference interview 
proper is more laborious than for the pre-sequence owing to the number of paths 
possible. These are shown in the set of tables immediately below. The initial question 
is shown in Tables 12.3, Tables 12.4-12.5 has the possible answer forms and 
illustrative responses. 
Constructing an exhaustive set of conversational paths is a necessary part of the 
Moore approach to designing a formal language through speech acts. Only by account 
for all of the conversational paths can representational adequacy be assured.  
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Table 12.3 Moore observational structures for the initial question of the reference interview 
Act  Question 
Speaker  Patron 
Listener  Librarian 
Illocutionary Force  Directive 
Content  Subject matter of enquiry 
Context  Reference interview conversation 
 
Table 12.4 Moore observational structures for answer A and responses of the reference interview 
Act  Answer A with information  Response A.1 with thanks  Response A.2 with request for more 
Speaker  Librarian  Patron  Patron 
Listener  Patron  Librarian  Librarian 
Illocutionary 
Force 
Assertive  Expressive  Directive 
Content  Subject matter of enquiry 
Context  Reference interview conversation 
 
Table 12.5 Moore observational structures for answer B and responses of the reference interview 
Act  Answer B with no information  Response B.1 with acceptance  Response B.2 with request for substitute 
Speaker  Librarian  Patron  Patron 
Listener  Patron  Librarian  Librarian 
Illocutionary 
Force 
Assertive  Expressive  Directive 
Content  Subject matter of enquiry 
Context  Reference interview conversation 
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Table 12.6 Moore observational structures for answer C and responses of the reference interview 
Act 
Answer C with promise to 
inquire further 
Response C.1 with 
acceptance
Response C.2 with 
declination 
Response C.3 with request 
for further details
Speaker  Librarian  Patron Patron  Patron
Listener  Patron  Librarian Librarian  Librarian
Illocutionary 
Force 
Commissive  Expressive  Expressive  Directive 
Content 
Subject matter plus pragmatic 
details 
Subject matter of enquiry 
Context  Reference interview conversation 
 
Table 12.7 Moore observational structures for answer D and responses of the reference interview 
Act  Answer D with denial of information  Response D.1 with acceptance
Response D.2 with request for reasons/ 
reconsideration
Speaker  Librarian Patron Patron
Listener  Patron  Librarian Librarian
Illocutionary 
Force 
Verdictive  Expressive  Directive 
Content  Subject matter plus institutional rules  Subject matter of enquiry 
Subject matter of enquiry plus overriding 
reasons
Context  Reference interview conversation 
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Table 12.8 Moore observational structures for answer E and responses of the reference interview 
Act  Answer E with Request to clarify/focus shift Response E.1 with resignation Response E.2 with restatement/new focus
Speaker  Librarian  Patron Patron
Listener  Patron Librarian Librarian
Illocutionary 
Force 
Directive  Expressive  Directive 
Content 
Subject matter plus modifications to elicit 
further details 
Subject matter of enquiry  Restatement subject matter of enquiry 
Context  Reference interview conversation  
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This has outlined all the major conversational paths shown in Figure 12.3. Other paths 
are possible, but would be chiefly concerned with pragmatic variations on the paths shown, 
so have not been represented here. 
This completes the analysis, enumeration and typology of the speech acts involved in 
the reference interview. By demonstrating the two-phase nature of the reference interview, 
identifying all the significant conversational paths and assigning illocutionary types to the 
generalised utterances on those paths, it has been possible to create the Moore observational 
structures preparatory to a creating a formal language for their representation. 
Moving from the invention to the elaboration phase, we can now use this analysis and 
its conclusions to create the constructs necessary to establish the formal language for 
representing knowledge transactions  
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12.6 Elaboration phase – developing the language from the 
analysis 
We now use the speech acts analysis performed in section 12.4 to make a formal 
language. A formal language is created by defining an EBNF grammar, which here must be 
based on a set of F(P) expressions for the principal speech acts.  
Initially we shall create the F(P) expressions for the Moore tables above. When that is 
completed, the EBNF is constructed.  
12.6.1 F(P) representation of the speech acts 
The research pattern mandates an F(P) simple expression set of speech acts to be 
performed: we established an extended F(P) formalism (expressed in Expression 10.5 which 
extends the F(P) form to include hedging and pragmatics). 
12.6.1.1 State-based F(P) expressions 
The first step in the research path is to make an expression set for the preconditions 
for dialogue described in section 12.5.2. 
Capacity = PragmaSet(HedgeSet(Commisive(Subject Area))) (10.6) 
Need = PragmaSet(HedgeSet(Directive(Subject Area))) (10.7) 
Match = PragmaSet(HedgeSet(Verdictive(Subject Area))) (10.8) 
These three expressions describe the necessary speech acts that go into the 
establishment of conditions to permit the dialogue to occur. 
12.6.1.2 Interaction-based F(P) expressions 
The second step in the research path established by Moore is to make an expression 
set for the actual dialogue QAR triplets described in section 12.5.3: 
Question = PragmaSet(HedgeSet(Directive(Subject Area))) (10.9) 
Answer1 = PragmaSet(HedgeSet(Directive(Subject Area))) (10.10) 
Response1.1 = PragmaSet(HedgeSet(Expressive(Subject Area))) (10.11) 
Response1.2 = PragmaSet(HedgeSet(Directive(Subject Area))) (10.12) 
The remaining QAR triplets have a similar form, since the pragmata that vary with 
them convey the extra content (this is difficult to express with the standard Moore pentuplet, 
owing to an absence of hedging and pragma in that system). To illustrate, answer B and its 
two responses in 10.3 can be shown: 
Answer2 = PragmaSet(HedgeSet(Directive(Subject Area))) (10.13)  
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Response2.1 = PragmaSet(HedgeSet(Expressive(Subject Area))) (10.14) 
Response2.2 = PragmaSet(HedgeSet(Directive(Subject Area))) (10.15) 
Having completed the Moore structures for both pre-sequence and situation, it is 
possible to create the formal language FERL. 
12.6.2 A formal language for representing knowledge seeking 
We can now describe the Functional Entity Representation Language (FERL) that is 
the formal language for representing the QAR process. Following the research pattern 
established by Moore, this will be done using a standard EBNF grammar (ISO, 1996; 
Scowen, 1993, 1998; Wirth, 1972, 1973, 1977; Zaytsev, 2012) and complementary syntax 
diagrams (Wirth, 1972, 1973). The syntax diagram for the top level operators is shown in 
Figure 12.4. The complete set of syntax diagrams is given in Appendix F. The complete 
EBNF is given in section 12.6.3. 
 
Figure 12‐4 The top level of the FERL EBNF 
We know from the analysis made in the invention phase that there must be two forms 
of expression to represent the division of performatives into pre-sequence and recurrent 
types. This is reflected in a high-level division of any FERL expression into a division for 
establishing the pre-conditions (the static Declaration division) and one for describing the 
actual transactions (the dynamic Conversation division).  
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A declaration division is mandatory for a well formed FERL message. The contents 
of the declaration division are then called upon from within the conversation division: 
FERL = Declaration [Conversation]. 
This is shown as a syntax diagram in Figure 12.5. 
 
Figure 12‐5 Declaration section preceding the optional Conversation section within a FERL message 
12.6.2.1 The Declaration Section 
The declaration section may contain many instances of declaration statements: 
Declaration = {Declaration_Statement}‐ 
This is shown as a syntax diagram in Figure 12.6. 
 
Figure 12‐6 The declaration section contains many declaration statements 
There are three kinds of declaration statements: Capacity, Need, and Match. This is 
represented by the EBNF: 
Declaration_Statement = 
Capacity_declaration|Need_declaration|Match_declaration. 
and is shown as a syntax diagram in Figure 12.7. 
 
Figure 12‐7 Three kinds of Declaration statements 
A more detailed description of the FERL declaration section operators is outside the 
direct thesis structure, but the complete FERL manual in Appendix F provides a full account 
as well as a detailed example of the operator in action. 
Capacity statements declare the capacity of a knowledge system to respond to 
enquiries about a subject, corresponding to the commissive establishing speech act described 
in section 12.5.2 above. They begin with the CAPACITY operator.   
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An example of a capacity statement can be drawn from the standard example in 
section 8.2.1: the following code declares a capacity to answer questions about car 
manufacturers. 
capacity(Manufacturers expect table *  
offer(determination identifier key ManufacturerNo 
determination identifier key fields(Marque, NamePlate, Model, Year))  
source(database "ODBC : CarParts")) 
This declares a capacity called Manufacturers, which can answer questions about the 
manufacturer of a car if given a Manufacturer ID, or alternatively if given a car Marque, 
NamePlate, Model and Year. More details on the capacity declaration are found in section 
Appendix F. 
Need statements declare an anticipated form of enquiry about a subject, 
corresponding to the directive establishing speech act described in section 12.5.2 above. 
They begin with the NEED operator. 
An example of a need statement can also be drawn from the standard example in 
section 8.2.1: the following code declares a need to ask questions about car manufacturers. 
need(ManufacturerDetails expect table *  
determination identifier key fields(Marque, NamePlate, Model, Year)) 
This declares a need to identify car manufacturers based on supplied named 
variables:Marque, NamePlate, Model and Year. More details on the need declaration are 
found in section Appendix F. 
Match statements declare a match between a previously declared capacity and need, 
corresponding to the verdictive establishing speech act discussed in section 12.5.2 above. 
There cannot be a conversation section in the message if a corresponding Match statement 
has not declared. Match statements begin with the MATCH operator. 
An example of a match statement can also be drawn from the standard example in 
section 8.2.1: the following code makes a match between the need and capacity statements 
declared in the previous two code snippets. 
match(ManufacturerEnquiries ManufacturerDetails Manufacturers 2) 
This statement asserts a match between the declared Need ManufacturerDetails and the 
declared Capacity ManufacturerEnquiries. More details on the need declaration are found in 
Appendix F.  
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That concludes the possible operations in the declaration section of a FERL script. In 
the next section we will discuss the operations that reside in the conversation section.  
12.6.2.2 The Conversation Section 
The optional conversation section comprises one or more Question ⇒ Question 
Consequence sequences. These are sequences in which a question is asked of a declared 
capacity, and a subsequent outcome of actions dependent on the type of question asked and 
the knowledge state of the system on the particular inquiry. 
A Question statement uses the QUESTION operator, corresponding to the continuing 
declarative performative in section 12.5.3 above. The consequence comprises answer and 
response statements (see below). These recurring Question ⇒ Question Consequence 
sequences correspond to the QAR speech act triplets described in section 6.4.1. This is 
represented by the EBNF: 
Conversation = {Question_statement [Question_consequence]}‐. 
This is shown as a syntax diagram in Figure 12.8. 
 
Figure 12‐8 A conversation consists of any number of Question Statement => Question Consequence 
Pairs 
As mentioned in section 12.4.3, a question consequence consists of a paired Answer 
statement and Response statement. An Answer statement uses the ANSWER operator, 
corresponding to the various performatives identified as Answer A (assertive), Answer B 
(assertive), Answer C (commissive), Answer D (verdictive) and Answer E (directive) 
performatives identified in section 12.5.3 above. The Response statement uses the 
RESPONSE operator, which corresponds to the many Response operators identified in the 
Moore tables. 
The syntax suggests that the response is optional. This is stated in that way to permit 
highly reliant systems to have an implicit Response E.1 answer accepted with thanks in the 
absence of a response. This is represented by the EBNF: 
Question_consequence = {Answer_statement [Response_statement]}‐. 
This is shown as a syntax diagram in Figure 12.19.  
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Figure 12‐9 Paired Answer and Response statements within the Question consequence section 
These examples serve to show the main features of FERL: a full exposition of the 
FERL language is given in Appendix F. The full EBNF for the language is presented in 
section 12.6.3. 
We can now proceed to the substantiation phase of the research pattern, creating 
expository instantiations using the same cases as in chapters 8 and 9. 
12.6.3 The complete FERL EBNF 
This section contains the entire EBNF for FERL, including definitions of operators 
and constraints. Portions of the grammar are derived from the SEQUEL BNF definition in 
Chamberlin & Boyce (1974) and the SQL92 BNF definition in Melton & Simon (1993 
pp.481-527). The constraints section is based on that of Interbase as written in IEBNF by 
Calibri (2006).  
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FERRL = Declaration [Conversation]. 
Declaration = {Declaration_Statement}. 
Declaration_Statement = Capacity_declaration|Need_declaration|Match_declaration. 
Capacity_declaration ='CAPACITY' '(' Capacity_name Capacity_content[ Hedge_clause][ Pragmatics_clause]')'. 
Capacity_content = (Capacity_content_item | Collation_clause). 
Collation_clause = 'COLLATE' '(' Collation_content ')'. 
Collation_content = Collation_list Capacity_content {', ' Capacity_content}. 
Capacity_content_item = Expectation_clause Field_clause Determination_clause [Hedge_clause] Sourcing_clause. 
Need_declaration = 'NEED' '(' Need_name Need_content[ Hedge_clause][ Pragmatics_clause]')'. 
Need_content = [Expectation_clause][Field_clause][Determination_clause]. 
Match_declaration = 'MATCH' '(' Match_name Need_name Capacity_name [Pragmatics_clause] ')'. 
Conversation = {Question_statement [Question_consequence]}. 
Question_statement = 'QUESTION' '(' Match_name Question_content')'. 
Question_content = [Expectation_clause][Field_clause][Constraint_clause] [Focus_clause] [Order_clause]. 
Question_consequence = {Answer_statement [Response_statement]}.  
Answer_statement = 'ANSWER' '(' Answer_content ')'. 
Answer_content = (Success_clause|Failure_clause|Extend_clause|Denial_clause|Clarify_clause). 
Success_clause = 'SUCCESS' [Expectation_clause][Field_clause] Value_set. 
Failure_clause = 'FAILURE' Failure_code [Failure_message][Field_clause]. 
Extend_clause ='EXTEND' Extend_list Pragmatics_clause [Value_set] Suggestion_clause. 
Suggestion_clause = 'SUGGESTIONS' '(' {Key_constraint_clause} ')'. 
Extend_list = 'FOCUS'|'RELAX'|'ONTOLOGY'|'META'. 
Denial_clause ='DENIAL' Denial_code [Denial_message]. 
Clarify_clause = 'CLARIFY' Clarify_code [Clarify_message] [Value_set]. 
Response_statement = 'RESPONSE' '(' Response_content ')'. 
Response_content = 'ACCEPT'|'EXPLAIN'|'CLARIFY'|'RESUBMIT' Pragmatic_clause|Response_extend_clause. 
Response_extend_clause ='EXTEND' Extend_list Pragmatics_clause Key_constraint_clause. 
Collation_list = 'CONJUNCTION'|'DISJUNCTION'|'SUCCESSION'|'CONSENSUS'|'ALTERNATION'|'SUPERSESSION'. 
Focus_clause = 'FOCUS' '(' (Focus_items_list Number['%']|Focus_values_list Field_clause|Focus_choice_list Criteria_clause) ')'. 
Focus_items_list = 'TOP'|'MIDDLE'|'BOTTOM'|'QUARTILE'|'SD'|'THIN'|'RANDOM'. 
Focus_values_list = 'UNIQUE'|'TYPIFY'|'EXEMPLIFY'|'HEAD'|'WINNOW'. 
Focus_choice_list = 'FILTER'|'LOCATE'|Neighbour_list. 
Neighbour_list = 'NEIGHBOURS'|'CHILDREN'|'GRANDCHILDREN'|'PARENTS'|'PARENTGEN'|'ROOT'|'TERMINI'. 
Hedge_clause = 'HEDGE ' Hedge_list [' OF ' Hedge_value] ['ON ' Field_clause]. 
Hedge_list = 'ORDER'|'ACCURACY'|'LIKELIHOOD'|'EVIDENTIALITY'|'CONJECTURE'|'DEONTICS'|'TEMPORALITY'. 
Offering_clause = 'OFFER' '(' Determination_clause {, Determination_clause} ')'. 
Sourcing_clause = 'SOURCE' '(' Source_type_list '"' Source_content '"' ')'. 
Source_type_list = 'Database'|'Spreadsheet'|'Statistical'|'Knowledgebase'|'Ontology'|'LogicBase'|'RuleBase'|'GIS'. 
Expectation_clause = ' EXPECT ' Expectation_list. 
Expectation_list = 'TABLE'|'POOL'|'GRAPH'|'AMORPHISM'|'OCCLUSION'. 
Determination_clause = ' DETERMINATION ' Determinata_list [Key_clause].  
Determinata_list = 'IDENTITY'|'VALUE'|'NEXUS'.  
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Key_constraint_clause = Key_Clause Criterion. 
Key_clause = ' KEY' '(' Key_name ['AS ' Value_type_list] ')'. 
Pragmatics_clause = ' PRAGMA' '(' Pragmatics_statement {Pragmatics_statement} ')'. 
Pragmatics_statement = Pragmatics_list '(' Criteria_clause ')'.  
Pragmatics_list = ('PERMISSION'|'AVAILABILITY'|'COMMENCEMENT'|'EXPIRATION'|'COST'). 
Order_clause = ' ORDERED ' Field_clause ["DESC"]. 
Constraint_clause = ' CONSTRAINT' '(' Criteria_clause ')'. 
Field_clause = ' FIELDS' '(' ( '*'  
| Field_name ['AS ' Value_type_list] {',' Field_name ['AS ' Value_type_list]} )')'. 
Value_type_list='Integer'|'Float'|'Real'|'Date'|'Time'|'Moment'|'Boolean'|'Ternary'|'Text'| 
'Currency'|'Position2'|'Position3'|'Waypoint'|'Memo'|'Document'|'Image'|'Vector'|'Sound'|'Video'. 
Criteria_clause = Criterion {(' OR '|' AND ') Criteria_clause }. 
Criterion= Value_literal ( [' NOT '] ( Between | Like | In | Compare | Containing | Starting ) |' IS ' [' NOT '] ' NULL ') |  
(' ALL '|' SOME '|' ANY ') '(' Field_clause ')' | ' EXISTS' '(' select_expression ')' |  
' SINGULAR ' '(' select_expression ')' | '(' Criteria_clause ')' | ' NOT ' Criteria_clause. 
Between= ' BETWEEN ' Value_literal ' AND ' Value_literal. 
Like= ' LIKE ' Value_literal [' ESCAPE ' Value_literal ]. 
In= ' IN ' '(' Value_literal { ',' Value_literal } | Field_clause ')'. 
Compare= operator ( Value_literal | '(' select_one_field ')' ). 
Operator= '=' | '<' | '>' | '<=' | '>=' | '<>'. 
Containing= ' CONTAINING ' Value_literal. 
Starting= ' STARTING ' [' WITH '] Value_literal. 
Value_literal= '"' { Unichode_char } '"'| Name. 
Integer_literal= 0 |{ Integer }. 
Capacity_name= Name. 
Need_name= Name. 
Match_name= Name. 
Field_name= Name. 
Collation_name= Name. 
Alias_name= Name. 
Key_name= Name. 
Denial_code = Integer. 
Clarify_code = Integer. 
Failure_code = Integer  
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12.7 Substantiation phase – using FERL to represent the 
knowledge system examples 
The research path for FERL requires a substantiation phase involving expository 
instantiations of the language defined.
127 In this section, the running examples from 
previous chapters) are used to demonstrate the use (and thereby the adequacy) of 
FERL. 
12.7.1 The Car Parts example in FERL 
The three predicative functional entities presented in section 8.2.1 can now be 
revisited as FERL. The example showed the relationships among a car manufacture, a 
model of a car, a spare part for that car, and a specialised service group that can fit the 
part. 
Analysis of the transactions reveals four knowledge capacities being called upon 
by four needs, one of which is transitive. There are four matches. 
To establish the core topic of the questions we have: 
capacity(Model expect table *  
offer(determination identifier key ModelNo)  
source(database "ODBC : CarParts")) 
This declares a capacity called Model, which can answer questions about car 
models, giving answers as a table, i.e. a shape-dominant source. Results from that 
source are determined by a key ModelNo, which means that they determined by a 
model identifying number, Model ID. The source itself is identified (in a manner 
derived from ODBC declarations) as being a database, with a name and an access path. 
Similarly, to enable questions about car manufacturers we have: 
capacity(Manufacturers expect table *  
offer(determination identifier key ManufacturerNo 
determination identifier key fields(Marque, NamePlate, Model, Year))  
source(database "ODBC : CarParts")) 
This declares a capacity called Manufacturers, which can answer questions 
about the manufacturer of a car if given a Manufacturer ID, or alternatively if given a 
car Marque, NamePlate, Model and Year. There is a corresponding Need declaration: 
                                                      
 
127 For demonstrating the adequacy of FERL DECLARATION divisions are sufficient, and is shown for all of them. 
Examples of CONVERSATION division code – i.e. QAR triplets – are given for the first example, but are not 
included for the other examples for reasons of space; they would however be similar to those QUESTIONs.  
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need(ManufacturerDetails expect table *  
determination identifier key fields(Marque, NamePlate, Model, Year)) 
which declares that there will be an ongoing need to identify car manufacturers based 
on supplied named variables: Marque, NamePlate, Model and Year. The Need and 
Capacity are then declared to be a match by the Match declaration:  
match(ManufacturerEnquiries ManufacturerDetails Manufacturers 2) 
which states that there is a match between the declared Need ManufacturerDetails and 
the declared Capacity ManufacturerEnquiries. The integer 2 states that the second of 
the 2 determinations is in use. 
The remaining Needs, Capacities and Matches are similar in their individual 
declarations. 
To enable questions about car part suppliers we have: 
capacity(SpareParts expect table *  
offer(determination value key fields(ModelID, Year, PartNo)  
determination identifier key fields(ModelID, Year, PartNo))  
source(database "ODBC : CarParts")) 
need(SparePartAvailability expect table *  
determination value key PartId) 
match(SparePartFinder SparePartAvailability SpareParts) 
To enable questions about technicians to fit a part we have: 
capacity(ServiceGroup expect table *  
offer(determination nexus key SkillSet  
determination identifier key GroupNo)  
source(database "ODBC : CarParts")) 
need(ServiceCapability expect table *  
determination nexus key SkillName) 
match(ServiceLocator ServiceCapability ServiceGroup) 
To enable questions about locating a service centre directly from the part ID we 
use a Transitive collation: 
capacity(PartFitter 
offer(determination value key fields(ModelID, Year, PartNo)  
determination identifier key fields(ModelID, Year, PartNo))  
source(collate(transitive ServiceGroup))) 
need(ModelServiceCapability expect table *  
determination nexus key PartNo) 
match(PartServiceLocator ModelServiceCapability PartFitter) 
To request details for a manufacturer, a simple QAR triplet can occur: 
question(ManufacturerEnquiries fields(Manufacturer)  
where Marque = "Austin" and NamePlate = "Metro"  
and Model = "Moritz" and Year = 1984)  
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answer(success values {"British Leyland"}) 
response(accept) 
CONVERSATION code for this case study would vary according to the 
immediate needs and context, so the following FERL code fragments are to be taken as 
examples among many. 
To determine part availability for a particular vehicle, a sample piece of FERL would 
be  
QUESTION(SPAREPARTFINDER FIELDS(SUPPLIER, SUBURB, PHONE, PRICE, PRICEGST)  
WHERE MODELID = "BLAUSTINMETROMORITZ" AND YEAR = 1984  
AND PARTID = "XZ1123") 
ANSWER(SUCCESS  
VALUES {"DUNNING", "OSBORNE PARK", "99441217", "37.20", "40.92" }) 
RESPONSE(ACCEPT) 
The Question asks of the Match SparePartFinder for the location of a spare part 
identified as “XZ1123” for a particular ModelID and Year. The Answer, a SUCCESS 
answer, gives a tuple of values – the name of the supplier, the suburb, the phone 
number and the price with and without GST. The Questioning system Accepts the 
Answer. 
To locate a service centre to fit the part the FERL might be 
question(ServiceLocator  
fields(ServiceCentre, Suburb, Phone)  
where SkillSet = "Automotive Air‐conditioning Technician")  
answer(success values {"Kruger", "Scarborough", "99441217"}) 
response(accept) 
To locate a service centre to fit the part directly from the PartID (with the skill 
being generated by the transitive operation), the FERL might be 
question(PartServiceLocator  
fields(ServiceCentre, Suburb, Phone)  
where ModelID = "BLAustinMetroMoritz" and Year = 1984  
and PartID = "XZ1123") 
answer(success values {"Kruger", "Scarborough", "99441217"}) 
response(accept) 
12.7.2 The Chemical Spill example in FERL 
The three aggregative functional entities presented in section 8.2.2 above can 
now be revisited as FERL. The example showed the relationships between the 
chemical spill and the environmental assets nearby, the closest response team, and the 
appropriate response (in terms of severity).  
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Analysis of the transactions reveals four knowledge capacities being called upon 
by four needs. There are three matches. 
To establish the core topic of the questions we have spill types: 
CAPACITY(Spills EXPECT Table *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY ChemicalName  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY ChemicalId)  
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : Chemicals")) 
To enable questions about environmental assets we have: 
CAPACITY(Distribution EXPECT Pool *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY LatLongPair)  
SOURCE(GIS "ArcCatalog : Facilities")) 
NEED(AreaAtRisk EXPECT Pool *  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY LatLong) 
MATCH(AreasToWarn AreaAtRisk Distribution) 
CAPACITY(ResponseTeams EXPECT Pool *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Value KEY LatLongPair,  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY TeamID)  
SOURCE(GIS "ArcGIS : ResponseTeams")) 
NEED(ClosestTeam EXPECT Pool *  
DETERMINATION Value KEY LatLong) 
MATCH(ClosestAssistance ClosestTeam ResponseTeams) 
CAPACITY(ResponseAdvisor EXPECT Pool *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Nexus KEY ChemicalID, Criteria,  
DETERMINATION Nexus KEY ChemicalName, Criteria,  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY ChemicalID) SOURCE(RuleBase "FuzzyCLips 
: ResponseAdvisor")) 
NEED(BestResponse EXPECT Graph *  
DETERMINATION Nexus KEY ChemicalName, Criteria) 
MATCH(SpillAdvice BestResponse ResponseAdvisor) 
12.7.3 The Epidemic example in FERL 
The three connective functional entities presented in section 8.2.3 above can 
now be revisited as FERL. The example showed the relationships between an 
epidemic, a case of the infection and the individuals with which the infected individual 
has interacted, the classification of the disease which accesses generalised knowledge, 
and the preferred treatment. We see in this example how special purpose scope-
dominant sources (such as JESS or Ontoserve) are being invoked as knowledge 
capacities in a manner that is homologous to the invocation of the SQL system. 
CAPACITY(Epidemic EXPECT Table *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY EpidemicName  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY EpidemicId)  
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : Epidemiology"))  
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CAPACITY(Classification EXPECT Graph *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY DiseaseName,  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY DiseaseCode)  
SOURCE(Ontology "OntoServe : WHO")) 
NEED(Classify EXPECT Table *  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY DiseaseName) 
MATCH(GetClassification Classification Classify) 
CAPACITY(Patients EXPECT Table *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PatientID, 
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PatientName Fields(LastName, 
FirstName)) SOURCE(Database "ODBC : PatientRecords")) 
CAPACITY(Contacts EXPECT Graph *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Value KEY Time, Location,  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PersonID)  
SOURCE(KnowledgeBase "HealthData : Cases")) 
NEED(ContactList EXPECT Table *  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PersonID) 
MATCH(ContactList ContactList Contacts) 
CAPACITY(Treatments EXPECT Graph *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION values KEY DiseaseID, Symptoms,  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY DiseaseID)  
SOURCE(RuleBase "JESS : Treatments”)) 
NEED(BestTreatment EXPECT Graph *  
DETERMINATION Nexus KEY DiseaseName, Symptoms) 
MATCH(TreatmentAdvice BestTreatment Treatments) 
12.7.4 The Endangered Birds example in FERL 
The three non-Aristotelian functional entities presented in section 8.2.4 above 
can now be revisited as FERL. The example showed the relationships between records 
of plant communities, local governments and bird-nesting habitats. To permit the non-
Aristotelian data sources to be available in this manner much articulation of data will 
be needed behind the FERL black boxing.  
CAPACITY(Birds EXPECT Table *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY BirdSpecies  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY BirdID)  
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : Ecobase")) 
CAPACITY(Plants EXPECT Table *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PlantSpecies  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PlantID)  
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : Ecobase")) 
CAPACITY(PlantCommunity EXPECT Table *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY CommunityName  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY CentroidLatLong)  
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : Ecobase")) 
CAPACITY(Shire EXPECT Amorphous *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY LocationName) 
SOURCE(KnowledgeBase "Protege : Ecobase"))  
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NEED(ShireRecords EXPECT Table *  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY LocationName) 
MATCH(LocateRecords ShireRecords Shire) 
CAPACITY(References EXPECT Amorphous *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Value KEY ClassNo, 
DETERMINATION Value KEY FIELDS(AuthorLastName, Year)  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY BibKey)  
SOURCE(Bibliography "Zotero : Ecobase")) 
NEED(Citation EXPECT Table *  
DETERMINATION Value KEY FIELDS(AuthorLastName, Year)) 
MATCH(CiteLocate Citation References) 
CAPACITY(Habitat EXPECT Amorphous *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Nexus KEY Criteria,  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY HabitatTypeID)  
SOURCE(KnowledgeBase "Protege : Ecobase")) 
NEED(LikelyNestingSites EXPECT Table *  
DETERMINATION Nexus KEY Criteria) 
MATCH(SiteLocator LikelyNestingSites Habitat) 
12.7.5 The Library Patron Identification example in FERL 
The three cartographic functional entities presented in section 8.2.5 above can 
now be revisited as FERL. The example showed the relationships between the 
borrower entity, the warranting external system, the entire library supersystem and the 
loans system that is a part of the patron system. As with the non-Aristotelian FE 
example, the FERL broker system written to permit the querying would have to 
address sub- and supra-system querying. This kind of querying is already a function of 
security services systems, where systems operation on a need-to-know basis (P. Wright 
& Greengrass, 1987). 
CAPACITY(Borrower EXPECT Table *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY BorrowerID,  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY BorrowerID)  
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : Library")) 
CAPACITY(Admin EXPECT Occlusion *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY LastName, FirstName  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PersonID)  
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : Admin")) 
NEED(Authentication EXPECT Table *  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY FIELDS(LastName, FirstName)) 
MATCH(Authenticate Authentication Admin) 
CAPACITY(Loans EXPECT Occlusion *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Value KEY FIELDS(BorrowerID,Date))  
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : Borrowing")) 
NEED(GetPenalties EXPECT Table *  
DETERMINATION Value KEY FIELDS(BorrowerID,Date))  
  301
MATCH(Fines GetPenalties Loans) 
CAPACITY(Library EXPECT Occlusion *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Nexus KEY BorrowerID)  
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : Library")) 
NEED(LibraryConnotations EXPECT Table *  
DETERMINATION Nexus KEY BorrowerID) 
MATCH(AllBorrowerRecords LibraryConnotations Library) 
12.8 Significance of FERL for the FE Framework 
This chapter has established an alternative symbology for the erotetic 
perspective, using a different kernel theory (Speech Acts) and a different modality 
(String Logic). Looking ahead to the successful docking of FERL with FERM in 
Chapter 13, we can conclude two significant points for the current research project. 
Firstly, the mutual encompassing with FERD means that there has been docking 
confirmation of both the erotetic perspective in general and FERD in particular.  
The second significant point is that it is consequentially acceptable to 
incorporate FERL into the Functional Entity framework as the official transactioning 
language of the framework.  
12.9 Summary 
This chapter has described the Functional Entity Relationship Language 
(FERL), a system for modelling the flow of knowledge in a question and answer 
conversation. FERL provides an alternative symbology for the erotetic modelling 
framework to the sketch logic FERD described in Chapter 9. FERL can provide the 
basis for software tools for enabling the interchange of encoded knowledge in systems 
through the EBNF grammar developed.  
FERL was developed using the speech acts/institutional facts analysis approach 
established by Moore (1993), substantiating the erotetic perspective through an 
examination of knowledge transfer. In doing so it provides the basis for evaluating the 
perspective through docking, which will be performed in Chapter 13.  
  303
Chapter 13  
 
Evaluation 
 
13.1 Chapter overview 
The chapter presents the final component of the internal evaluation process of 
the Erotetic Perspective and the Functional Entity framework, the distributed 
justification. Sets of criteria for design contract evaluation were set out in section 3.4. 
Validation and verification of the perspective and of the two research paths has been 
respectively carried out in their proper chapters, though the design contract evaluation 
has not been mentioned as it is a parallel process. This chapter formally iterates those 
criteria sets to demonstrate the successful completion of the design process.  
Subsequent to the validation and verification of the Erotetic Perspective, the two 
representation systems, FERD and FERL, are docked to ensure mutual encompassing, 
as outlined in section 3.3.7.  
The chapter concludes with a reprise of the substantiation through expository 
instantiations throughout Chapters 8, 9 and 12 and the three case studies in Chapter 11, 
and a brief consideration of accreditation. 
13.2 The distributed process of justification 
The impossibility of proving or confirming a modelling framework was 
demonstrated in 3.3.4. Instead, a distributed process of justification was set out, 
featuring ex ante, in medias res and ex post evaluation through verification, 
generalisation, validation, substantiation and accreditation of the perspective, its 
constructs and the languages used to represent those constructs located in target 
modelling systems. 
It was established in section 3.4 that verification of theoretical constructs is a 
core component of their construction unless they are extremely simplistic. The 
argumentation presented in Chapters 4-10 and 12 provide the verification necessary for 
justification up to the point of substantiation. This chapter represents that process of 
verification through a series of sets of criteria.  
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Validation is given in terms of representational adequacy criteria and research 
tradition conformance.  
There are two forms of adequacy criteria: general adequacy (the necessities that 
all models and artefacts require) and particular (adequacy to the immediate target of 
modelling – here the flow of question and answer responses). Representational 
adequacy can be ascertained ex ante (by an in principle adequacy test) in medias res 
(by an competence test) and ex post by a complete adherence to the adequacy criteria. 
Research tradition validation is impossible to determine ex ante, but can be 
expressed in terms of conformance to the criteria those coherence criteria used to 
evaluate existing traditions. 
Section 13.3 discusses the validation, verification, accreditation and 
substantiation of the Erotetic Perspective and its constructs.  
Section 13.4 presents the validation and generalisation of the three kernel 
theories – research librarianship, inquiry dynamics and speech acts – and their correct 
utilisation in developing the Erotetic Perspective and the Functional Entity Framework 
(including FERD and FERL).  
Section 13.5 gives an account of the verification (in terms of adherence to the 
research pattern) and validation (in terms of in terms of representational adequacy) of 
FERD, and section 13.6 the verification and validation for FERL. 
The criteria being met, final internal validation through docking of the FERD 
and FERL can proceed in Section 13.7. 
The substantiation of the perspective and the two representation systems was 
shown in the expository instantiations as continuing cases throughout the text (Chapter 
8 for the FE constructs, Chapter 9 for FERD, Chapter 10 for FERM, and Chapter 12 
for FERL) and in three major cases in Chapter 11. This is reviewed in Section 13.8. 
The scope of in medias res accreditation performed is discussed in 13.9. 
Section 13.10 reviews the design contract for achievement of design goals. 
It is important to note that there is some redundancy and repetition in the 
enumeration of the sets of criteria. This is required for confirming the design contract.  
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13.3 Verifying and validating the Erotetic Perspective and its 
constructs 
Formal verification of the erotetic constructs has been expressed through the use 
of theorems and formal expressions, so that they are amenable to accreditation. 
Adherence to the informing kernel theories is deferred to the section devoted to them, 
13.4. 
Validation of the perspective is conducted in terms of representational adequacy, 
and is folded in with the assessment for representational adequacy of FERD in section 
13.5. 
There has been continuous minor substantiation through expository instantiation 
per Gregor & Jones (2004, 2007) throughout the full description of the Functional 
Entity types in Chapter 8. 
13.4 Verifying and validating the selection and utilisation of 
the kernel theories 
Verification and validation of the kernel theories is given in terms of coherence 
and congruence criteria sets, established in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.3. 
13.4.1 The reference interview formalisation as kernel theory 
In section 3.4.1 we introduced the kernel theory appropriateness sets of criteria 
for coherence (internal sufficiency as a theoretical system) and for congruence 
(appropriateness for use in the current research). We now apply the two sets of criteria 
to the suitability for the formalising of the reference interview in library science, which 
was used in chapter 4 to underpin the erotetic metaphor for knowledge, and in Chapter 
12 for setting up the conversational and institutional structures for FERL. 
Table 13.1 evaluates the kernel theory as an adequate research tradition sensu 
Laudan (1977), while Table 13.2 (which repeats to some extent the detail in Table 
13.1) looks at the kernel theory’s adequacy in the terms prescribed by Gregor & Jones 
(2007). Table 13.3 gives an account of the congruence between the research tradition 
and the aims and domain of the application in the research. Tables 13.4 and 13.5 check 
for the complete utilisation of the appropriate features of the kernel theory. 
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Table 13.1 Criteria for research tradition adequacy 
Criterion  Matched by
Simplicity  The formalised reference interview is a conceptual model of the 
interchange between a research librarian and a patron, permitting a 
simplified account of the world that permits clear descriptions, 
explanations and predictions.
Consistency  It maintains a consistent usage of terms and constructs across the entire 
exposition and usage.
Conservatism  In its current state it represents a continuation of earlier accounts that 
were less sophisticated and limited in terms of digital artefacts and 
inter‐institutional cooperation, while acknowledging the 
appropriateness of earlier accounts of the interview.
Comprehensiveness  Although formalised for research libraries, it covers general libraries, and 
special libraries as well.
Fecundity  It has been used to model information needs and library development 
policies successfully.
Explanatory unity  It gives a single account of both the individual responding to a patron, the 
library as a entity responding to a patron, and the class of patrons 
generally. 
Refutability  It has been used to setup practical experiments to evaluate patron 
satisfaction and response effectiveness experiments that were 
refutable. 
Learnability  It has a small retinue of norms and forms that permit easy learnability. 
This demonstrates the adequacy of the reference interview kernel theory as a 
research tradition. 
Table 13.2 Coherence Criteria for Kernel Theory Selection for the Reference Interview. 
Criterion  Matched by
Robustness of kernel theory  Ongoing intellectual endeavour since the rise of the reference 
library as a repository for knowledge in the c19. Adapted 
repeatedly to the changes of societal needs for knowledge, and 
the modes of provision of that knowledge. 
Quality of kernel theory 
Respected academic discipline with long intellectual history, and 
many dedicated publications and conferences for the subject. Part 
of a broader tradition in library science with affine disciplines such 
as bibliography and classification, dedicated to the organisation 
and dissemination of knowledge. 
This demonstrates the coherence of the reference interview kernel theory. 
Table 13.3 Congruence Criteria for Kernel Theory Selection for the Reference Interview 
Criterion  Matched by
Similarity of objectives  Reference librarianship aims to organise the dissemination of 
knowledge on need/demand. It does this by preparation of the 
materials holding encoded knowledge bibliographically and by 
training the staff to understand the requests for knowledge. 
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Criterion  Matched by 
Appropriateness to the design 
research 
The phenomena being studied is the systematisation of requests 
for encoded knowledge in libraries. The current research is 
examining the systematisation of knowledge interchanges in 
organisations, so the kernel theory is entirely appropriate.
Causal structure of kernel 
theory 
The kernel theory holds that well‐run systems for answering 
requests for knowledge, combined with adequately planned‐for 
and prepared repositories of knowledge, can supply those 
requests for knowledge. The current research holds that view as 
to the causal structure.
Similarity of perspective  The kernel theory operates within a form of social epistemology 
established by Shera and Egan, which holds that repositories of 
knowledge granting affordances to knowledge seekers enable that 
search. It is a similar perspective.
This demonstrates the congruence of the Erotetic Perspective with the Reference 
Interview kernel theory. 
Table 13.4 Conformance of current research with significant appropriate elements of the Kernel Theory 
for the Reference Interview and FE/FERD  
ID  Criterion  Matched by 
Question and Answer attributes
A1  Formalised research question  The knowledge need and knowledge call, established 
through the first stages of FERM
A2  Query about a subject  The key of the knowledge call
A3  Query is typed  The typology of both the QA and the FE/KR 
A4  Query represents an 
information need 
The relationship between the FE and the Key/Call 
A5  Context of enquiry  Expressed as typed interrelated FEs 
A6  Complex question answered 
through factoring and 
collation 
Collation of complex images
Conversational Attributes
B1  Cooperative conversation  Represented in the knowledge contract 
B2   Turn‐taking  Represented in the knowledge call/image exchange
B3  Conversational path  Represented in the restrictions to possible exchanges and 
knowledge contract
B4  Cognitive authority  Represented by the pragmata mixins 
QA aggregation
C1  Social epistemological 
stream
Remains the underpinning model of knowledge for 
research 
C2  Social context   The analysis and formalisation stages of FERM ensure 
this
C3  Organised capacity  The planning for FEs and KRs represents the necessary 
organisation 
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This demonstrates that the conformance of FERD and the Erotetic Perspective 
with the Reference Interview kernel theory is complete. 
The conformance of the current research alternative docking path (FERL), 
which draws heavily on the Reference Interview, to the key points of the kernel theory 
is shown in Table 13.5.  
Table 13.5 Conformance of current research with significant appropriate elements of the Kernel Theory 
for the Reference Interview and FERL 
ID  Criterion  Matched by
Question and Answer attributes
A1  Formalised research question   QUESTION and NEED
A2  Query about a subject Declared topic
A3  Query is typed  The typology of Need, Capacity, Question and Answer 
A4  Query represents an 
information need 
Conformance between NEED and QUESTION
A5  Context of enquiry  Declaration section of FERL script
A6  Complex question answered 
through factoring and 
collation 
Collation operation 
Conversational Attributes
B1  Cooperative conversation   Represented in analysis and in the 
QUESTION/ANSWER/RESPONSE triplets
B2   Turn‐taking  In the Q/A/R protocol
B3  Conversational path In the extended Q/A/R protocol
B4  Cognitive authority  In the pragmata mechanism of FERL, expressed in 
declaration and in conversation
QA aggregation
C1  Social epistemological 
stream 
Used to justify the encoding and representability 
C2  Social context   Expressed in the declaration section
C3  Organised capacity  Expressed in the declaration section
 
This demonstrates that the conformance of FERL with the Reference Interview 
kernel theory is complete. 
Tables 13.1 through 13.3 show that the reference interview formalism in library 
science is a valid kernel theory in terms of adequacy, coherence and congruence with 
the current research. Tables 13.4 and 13.5 show that the significant features have been 
used in the research completely and appropriately. This completes the verification and 
validation for the research interview kernel theory.  
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13.4.2 Inquiry dynamics as a kernel theory 
In this section the kernel theory criteria sets are revisited for the Rescherian 
inquiry dynamics, which was itemised in Chapter 5 and operationalised in Chapter 6, 
and which forms the basis for the Erotetic Perspective of the current research. 
Table 13.6 evaluates the kernel theory as an adequate research tradition sensu 
Laudan (1977), while Table 13.7 (which repeats to some extent the detail in Table 
13.7) looks at the kernel theory’s adequacy in the terms prescribed by Gregor & Jones 
(2007). Table 13.8 gives an account of the congruence between the research tradition 
and the aims and domain of the application in the research. Table 13.9 checks for the 
complete utilisation of the appropriate features of the kernel theory. 
Table 13.6 Criteria for research tradition adequacy 
Criterion  Matched by
Simplicity  Rescher’s erotetics and the associated philosophical theories accounts for 
all of knowledge (personal, societal and institutional) in terms of 
inquiry and resolved inquiry.
Consistency  It maintains a consistent usage of terms and constructs across the entire 
exposition and usage.
Conservatism  As a philosophical tradition is respects the origins of erotetics in Greek and 
Arabic thought, and incorporates Kantian and Leibnizian thought, as 
well as modern philosophy of science and erotetic logic. 
Comprehensiveness  It is a general theory of knowledge, applicable in all areas. 
Fecundity  It has been used to discuss political science (Delphi) economics, ethics, 
theology and aesthetics in a school at Pittsburgh over 50 years.
Explanatory unity  It gives a single account of knowledge, its certainty and how knowledge 
changes through resolved inquiry.
Refutability  It makes testable claims about knowledge and learning. 
Learnability  It has a small compass of theoretical constructs easily understood and 
applied. 
 
This demonstrates the adequacy of the erotetics kernel theory as a research 
tradition. 
Table 13.7 Coherence Criteria for Kernel Theory Selection 
Criterion  Matched by 
Robustness of kernel theory  Ongoing philosophical program for 60 years beginning at RAND 
Corp, results have included the Delphi system.  
Quality of kernel theory 
Philosophical basis in logical and mathematical theory. Highly 
regarded and widely published. 
This demonstrates the coherence of the erotetics kernel theory.  
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Table 13.8 Congruence Criteria for Kernel Theory Selection 
Criterion  Matched by
Similarity of objectives  Theory is a pragmatic idealist account of the acquisition of 
knowledge in the individual and community, including how it is 
transmitted to others, and between generation, and in encoded 
form (literary or technological). Deals with the emergence of 
consensus within a community through this process, especially of 
a scientific consensus. All of these objectives similar to current 
research 
Appropriateness to the design 
research 
It is the only comprehensive account of knowledge arising from 
the interaction of questions and answers up to a community of 
inquiry. The current research proposes a similar erotetic 
epistemological hierarchy.
Causal structure of kernel 
theory 
The epistemology holds that representation of answers linked to 
the questions leading to them can lead to a representation of 
knowledge, and that a corpus of QA conversations leads to a 
knowledge representation system. The current research has a 
similar causal structure. 
Similarity of perspective  The perspective of the epistemology holds individuals as inquiring 
agents, whose discoveries and understanding form the knowledge 
of the societies in which they live. The incremental nature of 
scientific and social understanding is reflected in the actions of 
continuous inquiry. This is the same perspective as the erotetic 
perspective of the current research.
This demonstrates the congruence of the Erotetic Perspective with the erotetics 
kernel theory. 
Table 13.9 Conformance of FE Framework and FERD with Kernel Theory  
Criterion  Matched by 
Question attributes
A1  Sincerity of question(er)  Operationalised by use of informatic cooperation
A2  Benignity of cognitive environment Operationalised by use of informatic cooperation
A3  Commonality of universe of discourse Operationalised by use of squaring away 
A4  Shared truth of presuppositions  Operationalised by use of squaring away 
A5  Presupposition of an answer  Operationalised by use of squaring away 
A6  Formulation‐derived Intrinsically typing 
of Qs 
Operationalised by use of intrinsic typing of Belnapian 
triples
A7  Q‐>A standardisation  Operationalised as FE/KR pairs 
A8  Pragmatic limitation of QA  Operationalised using pragmata 
A9  Commitment to accept answer  Operationalised by use of squaring away 
A10  Openness to epistemic change  Operationalised by use of squaring away 
A11  Notatability of simple questions  Operationalised by use of Belnapian triples 
A12  Exfoliability of questions  Operationalised by use of holarchic QA 
Answer Attributes
B1  Answer appropriate and correlated Operationalised by use of informatic cooperation
B2   Answers are collectivities  Operationalised by use of informatic collectivity  
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Criterion  Matched by 
B3  Answers are intentionally formed Operationalised by use of informatic cooperation
B4  Answers have backing as facts and 
rationale 
Operationalised by use of Toulminian backing and 
warrant to claims and data, equivalent to QA 
B5  Answers have truth conditions as whole 
and as values 
Operationalised by use of Hedging Mixins
B6  Answers have a cost and a utility Operationalised by use of Pragmata Mixins
B7  Answers must be available Operationalised by use of Knowledge Contract
B8  answers from epistemic and practical 
authority 
Operationalised by use of Knowledge Contract 
B9  The best available answer will be chosen Operationalised by informatic cooperation
B10  Answer entailed by question and 
available knowledge
Operationalised by the Knowledge Image
B11  Answer will be of a kind Operationalised by the extrinsic typing
B12  Answer will be simple or complex Operationalised by use of holarchic QA Pair
B13  A complex answer can be epistemically or 
ontologically complex 
Operationalised by use of holarchic QA Pair
B14  Complex questions are answered by 
regression 
Operationalised by use of holarchic QA Pair
B15  Answers given as gestalt Operationalised by use of holarchic QA Pair
B16  Complex and simple answers both 
manifest as collectivities
Operationalised by use of holarchic QA Pair and 
informatic collectivity  
QA aggregation
C1  QAs form a question‐agenda Operationalised by use of domain entities and FE/KR 
structures 
C2  QAs will standardise Operationalised by use of intrinsic and extrinsic types 
through coaction matrix 
C3  QAs in an erotetic cycle Operationalised by use of Nishida’s travelling 
conversation
C4  QAs result in cognitive progress Operationalised by use of Nishida’s travelling 
conversation
C5  Inquirers becoming respondents Operationalised as the functional entity
C6  Inquirers resituated to be respondents Operationalised as the functional entity
C7  QAs form courses of inquiry Operationalised by use of Nishida’s travelling 
conversation
C8  QA conversation is dialectic, leading to 
satisfaction or a further enquiry
Operationalised by use of Moore dialogues
C9  Answer can be judged inadequate Operationalised by use of Moore dialogues
C10  Outcome is implication of answer Operationalised by use of Moore dialogues
C11  Communities of inquiry emerge from 
QAO triplets over time
Operationalised by use of Walsham’s Communities of 
Knowing 
C12  A community’s knowledge is a plenum Operationalised by use of Walsham’s Communities of 
Knowing
This demonstrates that the conformance of FERD and the FE Framework with 
the erotetics kernel theory is complete.  
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Tables 13.6 through 13.8 show that Rescher’s inquiry dynamics is a valid kernel 
theory in terms of adequacy, coherence and congruence with the current research. 
Table 13.9 shows that the significant features have been used in the research 
completely and appropriately. This completes the verification and validation for the 
erotetics kernel theory. 
13.4.3 Speech Acts Theory as a kernel theory 
We now apply the sets of criteria to the suitability for the formalising of the 
Speech Acts Theory, which was used in Chapter 12 to underpin the development of 
FERL. 
Table 13.10 Criteria for research tradition adequacy 
Criterion  Matched by
Simplicity  Expresses all discourse in terms of propositional content and illocutionary 
force. 
Consistency  Has a single explicatory framework for all discourse, although there is 
terminological and pragmatic differentiation across the discipline. 
Current research follows a strong tradition in informatics for using a 
particular kind of SAT
Conservatism  Accounts for traditional logic and rhetoric theories, as well as existing 
linguistics conventions.
Comprehensiveness  It is a general theory of communication.
Fecundity  Dominant theory in linguistic pragmatics and several other social scientific 
disciplines as well as being a standard stream in analytic philosophy. 
Explanatory unity  It accounts for all communication in terms of propositional content, 
illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect.
Refutability  It makes testable claims about speech and conversation.
Learnability  It has a few simple rules that are easily applied in practice.
This demonstrates the adequacy of the speech acts kernel theory as a research 
tradition. 
Table 13.11 Coherence Criteria for Kernel Theory Selection for Speech Acts Theory. 
Criterion  Matched by
Robustness of kernel theory  Ongoing intellectual endeavour since the Austin’s lectures in the 
1940s, powerful intellectual tradition underpinning linguistics, 
philosophy of language and several informatic traditions.  
Quality of kernel theory 
From origins in philosophy of language, it has been used to 
investigate the universality of several of language features. Now a 
widely used basis for linguistics as well as argumentation and 
pragmatics. 
Table 13.12 Congruence Criteria for Kernel Theory Selection for the Speech Acts  
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Criterion  Matched by 
Similarity of objectives  Aims to understand utterances in conversation by looking at the 
performative nature of utterances, and their illocutionary force. 
Through this the significance of certain utterances in socially 
mandated situations becomes clear, and evaluable. The creation 
of FERL has a similar aim, though restricted in compass.  
Appropriateness to the design 
research 
The approach is descriptive in form, looking at utterances in 
conversational exchanges as they happen, rather than assuming 
an idealised form first. This is the approach taken in FERL.
Causal structure of kernel 
theory 
Speech Act theory holds that analysis of performatives in 
utterances can create an abstract representation of exchanges. 
This is the same principle at work in developing FERL.  
Similarity of perspective  The principles of Speech Acts Theory hold that more than 
propositional content is held in utterance, and that they give the 
full picture of conversation. This is the same approach taken in the 
development of FERL.
The conformance of the current research alternative docking path (FERL), 
which draws heavily on SAT, to the key points of the kernel theory is shown in Table 
13.13.  
Table 13.13 Conformance of current research with significant appropriate elements of the Kernel 
Theory for Speech Acts and FERL 
ID  Criterion Matched by
Core Speech Acts Theory elements
A1  Separation of propositional from illocutionary 
components 
Done in the invention stage
A2  Use of taxonomy of Speech Acts Used in the invention stage
A3  Recognition of Turn taking Used in the invention stage
A4  Recognition of Conversational Paths Used in the invention stage
A5  Recognition of Hedging and Pragmata Used in the invention stage
A6  Recognition of roles and authority in conversations Used in the invention stage
Examination of formalised conversations
B1  Identification of major conversational paths Used in the elaboration stage
B2   Identification of turn taking in those paths Used in the elaboration stage
B3  Identification of agents in conversations Used in the elaboration stage
Conversation formalisation  
C1  F(P) representation of major speech acts Used in the elaboration stage
C2  Identification of speech acts Used in the elaboration stage
C3  Rationalisation of speech acts Used in the elaboration stage
This demonstrates that the conformance of FERL with the Speech Acts kernel 
theory is complete.  
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Tables 13.10 through 13.12 show that Speech Acts Theory is a valid kernel 
theory in terms of adequacy, coherence and congruence with the current research. 
Table 13.13 shows that the significant features have been used in the research 
completely and appropriately. This completes the verification and validation for the 
Speech Acts kernel theory. 
13.5 Verifying and validating FERD 
This section provides the verification and validation of the FE/FERD framework 
to ensure that it is worth proceeding to the major substantiation phase of the research. 
Minor substantiation through expository instantiation per Gregor & Jones (2004, 2007) 
has occurred in Chapters 8 and 9. 
To recapitulate the points in section 3.3 verification and validation occur 
throughout the design process. Verification relies on in medias res argumentation and 
ex ante planning, and validation relies on in medias res and ex post checking that the 
design direction remains oriented towards a useful and substantiatable design outcome.  
13.5.1 Verification: adherence to pattern stages 
This section confirms that the research path established from the pattern in 
Appendix C and Chapter 3 was in fact followed. Table 13.14 lists the points of 
conformance. 
Table	13.14	Adherence	to	RESEARCH	PATTERN	stages	
Stage  Usage
Metaphor→Perspec ve  QA metaphor → FE/KR perspec ve
Perspective→Framework  FE/KR Perspective → FE Framework
Framework→Models  FERD → conceptual models of knowledge systems
Models→Implementa ons  CMs → system design or delega on to subsystems/external systems 
Sketch logic formalism  Functional Entity Relationship Diagram (FERD)
Ontology  Set of constructs for representing the domain of discourse – 
Functional entities, knowledge contracts etc. (FE/FERD) 
Symbology  Set of symbols to indicate all of the constructs in the ontology (FERD) 
Deontology  Set of rules indicating the combinations of the symbols (FE/FERD) 
Methodology  Set of steps to indicate how the framework should be used to 
create conceptual models (FERM)
Conceptual models  Use of framework to produce conceptual models of trial projects 
(expository instantiations and substantiation in Chapter 13) 
Implementation Designs  Instances of conversion from conceptual model to implementation 
design (in Chapter 13) 
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Additionally, the process of logical derivation of the perspective and framework 
through demonstrable theorems and their functional expression in Chapters 6 and 7 
makes the process verified through exposition, and amenable to accreditation. 
13.5.2 Validation: adequacy criteria 
This section confirms that the criteria for design artefact adequacy, sufficiency 
for design tradition and adequacy of representation (established in section 3.4) were 
met.  
Gregor & Jones (2004, 2007) provide a checklist for necessary attributes of a 
secondary artefact. Table 13.15 lists those attributes for the FE/FERD framework. 
Table 13.15 Conformance to design artefact adequacy criteria  
Gregor & Jones attributes  Evidenced 
Purpose and scope  Aim is to develop a way of conceptually modelling systems of 
knowledge (as communities of knowing) and develop analysis 
design tools for them
Constructs  Functional entity, knowledge relation, functional entity 
relationship diagram, knowledge mixin, functional entity 
relationship representation language, knowledge contract
Principles of form and function  Models complex knowledge systems as communities of 
knowing, with knowledge needs and resources to satisfy those 
needs. These are modelled as networks of question‐and‐answer 
conversations
Artefact mutability  Takes existing ongoing cooperation in communities of knowing 
and represents them as categorisable within a simple 
knowledge relation taxonomy. The relations themselves do not 
change
Testable propositions  All complex knowledge systems can be portrayed losslessly in 
FERDs which can serve as maps for those systems, permitting 
analysis, error recovery and prediction 
Justificatory knowledge  Erotetic knowledge, communities of knowing, information as 
contextualised values (Mackay), relational theory (which is seen 
as a limited version of this theory), Software engineering 
programming by contract (Ada, Eiffel) 
Principles of implementation  Modification of the Beynon‐Davies structured KE development 
methodology 
Expository instantiation  Standardised models for thesis, small KS models, PV Box 
ironbark system 
Although (self-evidently) the FERD framework
128 is not an established 
informatic tradition, the criteria for information tradition are only partly realisable. 
                                                      
 
128 i.e. the FERD system, together with the erotetic perspective and its constructs  
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However, it meets the criteria for establishing one. Table 13.16 lists the conformance 
to the necessities for establishing such a tradition. 
Table	13.16	Adequacy	criteria	for	an	informatic	tradition	establishment		
Criteria  Evidenced
Simplicity  All knowledge needs can be seen as erotetic relationships, 
which can be modelled as being situated in a matrix typology of 
knowledge relations
Consistency  Same set of rules, no matter what knowledge domain 
Conservatism  Draws on established theory in relational model, erotetic logic, 
communities of knowing, software contracts
Comprehensiveness  Covers all systems of knowledge, all communities of knowledge 
Fecundity  Capable of producing new ways of auditing/predicting 
behaviour and deficits of communities of knowing 
Explanatory unity  One way of defining, typology makes single source of mapping 
variety
Refutability  Makes statements and predictions that can be tested/refuted 
Learnability  Easy system of explanation, small set of simple rules to apply 
The adequacy criteria for a representational framework (established in section 
3.4.2) are the most essential part of validation of representational theory artefacts. 
Table 13.2 lists the requirements at the logical, epistemological and conceptual level 
for representational adequacy. 
Table	13.17	Representational	adequacy	criteria	
Criteria  Evidenced
Logical Level
Well‐defined semantics  Draws on established principles (extending the semantics of the 
ERD within a tradition of such extension)
Compositionality  Clear compositionality for an ontologically‐restricted number of 
typed elements and an explicit statement of the rules for their 
combination
Sound inference rules  Predictability of knowledge dependency from multiples using 
transitive functional entities
Heuristic adequacy  Sketch logic permits the exploration of potential knowledge 
combinations and knowledge source reuse by manipulation of 
symbols representing FEs.
Uniformity  Single formalism for all knowledge typed according to two rules. No 
ambiguity about choices of representation.
Declarative representation  The sketch logic and the ERD derivation ensure referential 
transparency
Epistemological Level
Relevance  The erotetic discourse presents a satisficing model for knowledge, 
and the FE/FERD system are relevant to those 
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Metaphysical adequacy  There is no contradiction between the representation and the 
underlying knowledge to be represented
Epistemic adequacy  By use of erotetic discourse all representable forms of teachable 
knowledge (including incomplete and incoherent knowledge) are 
representable by virtue of referential transparency 
Naturalness of 
Expressiveness
The symbols are organisable in the same way as the teachable 
knowledge they represent
Modularity   The symbology and grammar permit modularity, including 
representation of the external discourse itself as a module 
Granularity  The FE/knowledge call granularity is sufficient to represent the 
required levels of knowledge
Alignment with the 
conceptual level 
There is comprehensive alignment between the constructs at the 
notational and epistemological levels
Conceptual Level
Conciseness  There is parsimony of constructs, enriched through combination
Notational convenience  Sketch logic with simple rules permits easy notation 
Clarity of Expressiveness  The notation system makes the logic of symbol juxtaposition, and 
the concepts expressed, comprehensible without full understanding 
of the symbology 
13.5.3 Summarising verification and validation for FERD 
These criteria sets have been successfully matched, and have shown that the FE 
Framework, the Erotetic Perspective and the FERD system are all verified and 
validated. 
13.6 Verifying and validating FERL 
This section provides the verification and validation of the FERL framework 
which was designed to ensure that it is worth proceeding to the major substantiation 
phase of the research itself. Minor substantiation through expository instantiation per 
Gregor & Jones (2004, 2007) has already occurred throughout the process of 
development. 
To recapitulate the discussion in section 3.3, verification and validation occur 
throughout the design process: verification relies on argumentation and planning, 
validation relies on checking that the design direction is still towards a useful and 
substantiable design outcome.  
13.6.1 Verification: adherence to pattern stages 
This section details how the research pattern defined in Appendix D and Chapter 
3 was specifically followed for the development of FERL. Table 13.18 lists the points 
of conformance.  
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Table	13.18	Adherence	to	RESEARCH	PATTERN	stages	
Criterion Evidenced
Identification of principal Speech Acts and 
Actors  
Used Speech Acts analysis of standard reference 
interview communication, following the 
literature.
F(P) representation  Created F(P) equivalents of discovered speech 
acts.
Formal Language  Created FERL from the F(P) representation. 
Expository Instantiation  Given for representative cases.
Additionally, the process of logical derivation of the language from the 
reference interview metaphor through demonstrable theorems and their functional 
expression makes the process verified through exposition, and amenable to 
accreditation. 
13.6.2 Validation: adequacy criteria 
This section shows how the criteria for design artefact adequacy, sufficiency for 
design tradition and adequacy of representation (established in Chapter 3) are met.  
Gregor & Jones (2004, 2007) provide a checklist for necessary attributes of a 
theory artefact. Table 13.19 lists those attributes for FERL. 
Table	13.19	Conformance	to	design	artefact	adequacy	criteria		
Gregor & Jones attributes  Evidenced
Purpose and scope  Aim is to develop a way of describing knowledge transfer in 
dialog (i.e. learning from the knowledgeable to the learner). 
Constructs  Speech acts in conversation, speech acts typology and lexicon, 
F(P) representation of speech acts.
Principles of form and function  Models requests for knowledge within complex knowledge 
systems as a series of typed questions, answers and responses, 
between previously declared actors.
Artefact mutability  Takes existing speech acts representation of reference 
interviews and generalises them to all knowledge exchanges. 
Testable propositions  All tuition can be portrayed losslessly as a series of conversations 
comprising typed questions, answers and responses to those 
answers. 
 
 
Justificatory knowledge  Speech acts theory reference interview body of knowledge, 
library science analysis of the nature of knowledge stores, 
representation of knowledge exchanges using formal languages. 
Principles of implementation Modification of the Buchanan et al. KB development 
methodology (to be done in chapter 10).
Expository instantiation  Standardised models for thesis, four realistically representative 
KS models.  
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Although (as with FERD above) the FERL system is not an established 
informatic tradition, it meets the criteria for establishing one. Table 13.20 lists the 
conformance to the necessities for establishing such a tradition. 
Table 13.20 Adequacy criteria for a informatic tradition establishment 
Criteria  Evidenced 
Simplicity  All knowledge needs can be seen as erotetic relationships, which 
can be represented as speech acts.
Consistency  Same set of rules, no matter what knowledge domain.
Conservatism  Draws on established theory in speech acts, library science, formal 
languages for communication.
Comprehensiveness  Covers all systems of knowledge of knowledge, all communities of 
knowledge.
Fecundity  Capable of producing new ways of representing interchanges of 
knowledge between experts and novices. 
Explanatory unity  Single lexicon of speech acts comprising 6 types can account for 
all tuition.
Refutability  Makes statements and predictions that can be tested/refuted.
Learnability  Easy system of explanation, small set of simple rules to apply.
The adequacy criteria for a representational framework (established in section 
3.4.2) are the most essential part of validation of representational theory artefacts. 
Table 13.21 lists the requirements at the logical, epistemological and conceptual level 
for representational adequacy. 
Table	13.21	Representational	adequacy	criteria	
Criteria  Evidenced
Logical level
Well‐defined semantics  Draws on established principles for creating formal languages from 
speech acts.
Compositionality  Two phase grammar requirements provide state/action distinction 
to permit compositionality for an ontologically‐restricted number of 
typed elements, together with a explicit statement of the rules for 
their combination. 
 
Sound inference rules  Predictability of access to knowledge based on matched needs and 
capacities.
Heuristic adequacy  Formal language permits the exploration of potential knowledge 
combinations and knowledge source reuse candidature of 
differently determined matches.
Uniformity  Single formalism for all knowledge according to speech acts 
formalism comprising 6 actions. No ambiguity about choices of 
representation.
Declarative representation  Speech acts derivation for the expressions ensures referential 
transparency. 
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Criteria  Evidenced
Epistemological level
Relevance  The reference interview formalism presents a satisficing model for 
knowledge, and the FERL representations are relevant to those. 
Metaphysical adequacy  There is no contradiction between the representation and the 
underlying knowledge to be represented.
Epistemic adequacy  By use of erotetic discourse all representable forms of teachable 
knowledge (including incomplete and incoherent knowledge) are 
representable by virtue of referential transparency.
Naturalness of 
Expressiveness 
The FERL expressions are as natural as any formal language can be, 
within that proviso ‐ as with (say) SQL or KRL.
Modularity   The formal language aspect requires prior declaration of matches, 
and logically prior declaration of needs and capacities to those 
matches. With that proviso (common to all formal languages) from 
that there is complete modularity.
Granularity  The Capacity/Need and Question/Answer/Response granularity is 
sufficient to represent the required levels of knowledge. 
Alignment with the 
conceptual level 
There is comprehensive alignment between the constructs at the 
notational and epistemological levels.
Conceptual Level 
Conciseness  There is parsimony of constructs, enriched through combination. 
Notational convenience  The derived formal language with simple rules permits easy 
notation. 
Clarity of Expressiveness  The formal language permits an unambiguous representation of 
sources of knowledge and potential knowledge users.
 
13.6.3 Summarising verification and validation for FERL 
These criteria sets have been successfully matched, and have shown that the 
FERL system is verified and validated. 
 
13.7 Validation of Erotetic Perspective: justification by 
docking FERD and FERL 
This thesis uses docking to confirm the Erotetic Perspective, to mutually justify 
the two symbologies, and to enable a unified modelling framework to be created from 
the symbologies. In this section docking of the FE/KR and FERD framework with the 
FERL modelling framework is performed. Modelling frameworks are generalised 
models – models of the abstract case, which claim to be a meta-model of all possible 
situations. By docking the two frameworks, and establishing congruence, a validation 
of the perspective and the frameworks is accomplished.  
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The FERD framework incorporates the FE constructs: the Functional Entity 
itself, the Knowledge Relation (embodying Knowledge Dependency), the Knowledge 
Contract, the Knowledge Call, the Key, the Image, the Knowledge Response, hedging 
and pragma mixins and collations.  
The FERL framework, although developed from the same perspective is not 
based on the same constructs, but based on a Speech Acts analysis of the transactions 
involved in establishing tuition (sensu Pask). The top level expressions in FERL are 
CAPACITY, NEED, MATCH, QUESTION, ANSWER, and RESPONSE. FERL has 
subsidiary operators PRAGMA, HEDGE, COLLATE, EXPECT, FIELDS, FOCUS 
and CONSTRAINT. 
We established a set of five criteria for docking in section 3.4.5, reproduced here 
as Table 13.22. 
Table	13.22	Criteria	Set	for	Model	Docking	
Criterion  Details 
Congruence of top level constructs There must be congruence of the top level 
constructs of each system. 
Congruence of construct perspective 
alignment  
There must be congruence of alignment with the 
perspective between constructs. 
Congruence of construct instantiation 
alignment 
There must be congruence of constructs aligning 
with test problem entities. 
Mutual encompassing of domains and 
situations 
The domains covered and the situations to be 
modelled by each framework must be the same.
Intertranslatability of modelling expressions Expressions created using top level constructs 
must be intertranslatable. 
 
The criteria provide five checkpoints for conducting the docking, which we will 
address in turn through showing the relevant mappings, with explanatory notes as 
required. 
13.7.1 Congruence of top level constructs 
The first docking checkpoint establishes the congruence between the top level 
constructs between the FE construct set as represented by FERD and the FERL 
construct set. The alignment is outlined in Table 13.23, clearly demonstrating the 
toplevel construct congruence and therefore satisfying the first docking criterion. 
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Table	13.23	Congruence	of	top	level	FE/FERD	and	FERL	constructs	
FE/FERD FERL
Functional entity
1  CAPACITY, NEED, EXPECT
Knowledge Relation, Knowledge Contract  MATCH
2
Knowledge Call  QUESTION
Key  CONSTRAINT
Image  ANSWER
Knowledge Response  RESPONSE, FOCUS
3
Hedging mixins  HEDGE
Pragma mixins  PRAGMA
Collations  COLLATE
Notes to Table 9: 
•  The Functional Entity itself as a construct has both source and enquirer modes, and therefore corresponds to the FERL 
construct CAPACITY and NEED. The functional entity has a high‐level structure conforming to the FERL EXPECT typology. 
•  The MATCH operator both acknowledges the correspondence between NEED and CAPACITY, and guarantees to ensure 
that usages of the correspondence will be honoured. Thus a MATCH acknowledgement corresponds with the FE 
construct Knowledge Relation and a MATCH guarantee with the FE construct Knowledge Contract. 
•  The Knowledge Response has four modes, accept, re‐enquire, clarify and expand. Re‐enquire is self‐evidently the 
equivalent of QUESTION. Expand and Clarify would be RESPONSE modes that make use of the FOCUS operator. 
13.7.2 Congruence of construct-perspective alignment 
The second docking task establishes the congruence between the alignments of 
the top level constructs and the underlying perspective with both the FE construct set 
and the FERL construct set. The alignment is presented in Table 13.24, and clearly 
demonstrates the congruence of top level construct/perspective alignment and therefore 
satisfies the second docking criterion. 
Table	13.24	Congruence	of	Construct‐perspective	alignment	
FE/FERD  QAR FERL
Functional entity
1  Question class  NEED
Functional entity
2  Answer class  CAPACITY
Knowledge Relation   Erotetic general proposition MATCH
Knowledge Contract  Ceteris paribus  MATCH
Knowledge Call  Question instance QUESTION
Key  Question topic  CONSTRAINT
Image  Answer instance  ANSWER
Knowledge Response  Answer response  RESPONSE
Notes. The Functional Entity itself as a construct has both source and enquirer modes, and therefore corresponds to 
the erotetic perspective constructs question class and answer class.   
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13.7.3 Congruence of construct instantiation alignment 
Eight expository instantiations have been presented throughout the thesis, in 
chapters 8, 9 and 12 and the substantiation chapter, Chapter 11. Alignment was shown 
between the various FERD and FERL representations of all of these expository 
instantiations. The sources of knowledge and the calls upon that knowledge when 
created identified independently the same real world features when represented using 
the two modelling systems, satisfying the third docking criterion.  
13.7.4 Mutual encompassing of domains and situations 
The expository instantiations are presented as FERD and FERL representations. 
The typology of FERD knowledge relations satisfies the universe of discourse; in a 
similar way, the combination of FERL determination types and expectation types also 
satisfies the universe of discourse. 
13.7.5 Intertranslatability of modelling expressions 
The state expressions in the FERL declaration division are intertranslatable with 
the FERD diagrams: significantly, the CAPACITY declaration is congruent in all cases 
where it is used with the FE in the contributory role in a FERD.  
13.7.6 Conclusion of Docking 
The five checkpoints for docking have been passed for the FERD and the FERL 
modelling representation systems. There are several consequences of this. 
Firstly, the underlying erotetic perspective has been validated. The verification 
for the perspective was established through principled derivation, but its usability and 
domain-appropriateness have been shown by the docking process. 
Secondly, the mutual encompassing has given additional validation to the two 
frameworks, supplementing the eight expository instantiations in a validatory role. 
Thirdly, the mutual encompassing has legitimised the merging of the FERL and 
FERD representational constructs in a unified Functional Entity Framework.  
13.8 Justification by substantiation 
Substantiation of theoretical constructs is carried out through expository 
instantiations, both hypothesised and derived from case studies. There have been minor 
substantiations in chapters 8, 9 and 12 to illustrate and inform the constructs and 
modelling framework as they were introduced.   
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There has also been major substantiation activity in Chapter 11, in the form of 
the conceptual modelling of three complex knowledge systems. In this case, the final 
artefact goal, the FERM, is substantiated through its usage in developing those models. 
This is in conformance with the nature of developing theoretical design artefacts 
(Gregor & Jones, 2004, 2006, 2007). 
13.9 Justification by accreditation 
Accreditation of the perspective – external justification using the epicycle of 
documentation, conversation with peers and experts, and feedback – is a continuous 
parallel process.  
There has been a continuous usage of epicycles in establishing the terms, 
symbols and methodological processes throughout the process (through the normal 
supervision and candidature process, and through discussion of the work with 
colleagues, both academic and practitioner), and at a level generally considered to 
occur too often and on too small a scale to be documented (Fuller, 2002a; Fuller & 
Collier, 2004). A continuous process of review of the symbology with supervisors was 
critical to its development, and ensuring its concinnity with our previous publications. 
Discussion with philosopher and linguist colleagues regarding the speech acts 
conformity of FERL was likewise vital to its development. 
There has been a formal mid-level use of accreditation with a paper presented at 
the 2009 Australasian Conference on Information Systems (D. J. Pigott & Hobbs, 
2009) and a paper published in the peer-reviewed journal VINE (D. J. Pigott & Hobbs, 
2011). Feedback from these has been incorporated into the modelling frameworks. 
We discussed in the methodology chapter the inappropriateness of quantitative 
and qualitative research methods for developing the erotetic perspective. Instead, the 
combination of techniques described in this chapter was employed to evaluate the 
perspective and the modelling framework created within it. Now that the perspective 
and the framework have been confirmed, we can proceed with other forms of 
evaluation, and test criteria for modelling frameworks such as learnability, retention, 
efficacy both for professional practitioners and for students using trials and interviews. 
These are however beyond the current research, and are considered in the further 
research section of the final chapter.  
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13.10  Validation: achievement of design goals 
As shown (in Appendix B) there are necessary components for a modelling 
framework, the set of constructs necessary to create regularised descriptions of the real 
world. The operating definitions for the perspective and framework, taken together, 
presented five design goal artefacts: 
•  A perspective providing the constructs for a approach to describing reality for a 
universe of discourse  
•  An ontology constructed according to a teleology within that perspective 
•  A symbology for representing a universe of discourse in terms of that ontology 
•  A deontology to give rules for their interrelation 
•  A methodology for applying the tools to the universe of discourse 
Chapter 4 created the perspective, and 6 through 8 created an ontology built to 
that perspective’s telos. Chapter 9 created the symbology according to that ontology, 
and Chapters 8 and 9 created the deontology for using constructs and symbols. Chapter 
12 built an alternative ontology, symbology and deontology. The two sets of constructs 
show complete congruence, and can therefore be legitimately merged unified into a 
unified modelling framework. Chapter 10 presented the routine methodology to serve 
the unified framework. We can therefore make the claim to the 
FE/FERD/FERL/FERM unified system as being an adequate representational system, 
and having achieved the design goals. 
13.11  Summary 
This chapter conducted an evaluation of the Erotetic Perspective and the 
Functional Entity Framework using an internal evaluation process culminating in the 
docking (as outlined in section 3.3.7). 
The chapter reviewed the distributed justification via validation, verification and 
generalisation to a satisfactory outcome. The process of docking was stepped through, 
also with a positive outcome. There was a brief consideration of accreditation, where 
portions of the validated framework was evaluated externally by peers. 
The conclusion of the evaluation is that the erotetic perspective is 
representationally adequate to the task of the conceptual modelling of knowledge, and  
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the two representation systems (FERD and FERL) are descriptively adequate to 
modelling all encoded knowledge.Chapter 14  
 
Conclusion 
 
14.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter reviews and summarises the main contributions of this research. It 
begins by recounting these contributions then revisits the research questions and design 
goals, describing the scope of the research to show the generalisability and bounds of 
the theoretical contribution. The second half of the chapter describes the potential for 
further research arising from this work. 
14.2 A summary of the research 
Having identified problems in knowledge modelling with current formalisms 
and their underlying metaphoric conceptualities, this thesis investigated an erotetic 
perspective for knowledge, based on the different metaphorical ground of a 
knowledge-seeking question and answer conversation. It established a conceptual 
modelling framework for encoded knowledge based on existing methods of responding 
to requests for knowledge within the formalised context of library reference services. 
This framework comprises four elements: an ontology, a deontology, a symbology and 
a methodology. 
Following the design research strategy for theory artefacts proposed by Gregor 
& Jones (2004,2007), a pattern for perspective building was created from the 
Language/Action Perspective, and a research path constructed to organise the 
development sequence. Since a perspective is a design tertiary artefact, a second 
research path, required for docking and to legitimate the perspective, was also 
identified. The ERD, SQL and the standard KR development cycle were chosen as 
mutable existing design artefacts, and the kernel theories of erotetics, category theory, 
speech acts and social epistemology selected to inform the research.  
Working on the principle that a theory artefact is a meta-model, a literature-
informed evaluation mechanism was established, using standard techniques of model 
confirmation (validation, verification, generalisation, docking and substantiation). This  
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was done before development began by identifying evaluation criteria, which were 
applied during development and revisited after its completion. 
The KNOWLEDGE IS A RESOLVED INQUIRY cognitive metaphor was 
given an explicit ground in the form of the reference librarian research interview, 
enabling a review of what is formally required to store encoded knowledge, to retrieve 
it on call, and to determine if the resulting answer is satisfactory. Drawing on 
established library science research, it was established that to represent knowledge is to 
represent the ability to answer a knowledge need. Using the erotetic epistemology 
established by Rescher, a consistent theoretical account of knowledge was presented. 
Extant literature was reviewed to provide the constructs to conceptualise a complete 
erotetic holarchy, which was then operationalised to produce a coherent perspective 
accommodating all possible askable questions from a simple QA pair up through levels 
of increasing concurrency, historicity and co-operation a high level community of 
inquirers. This community was shown to be the equivalent of Walsham's community of 
knowing. This accomplished the primary research goal of the thesis, to present a 
principled account of an erotetic perspective. 
Operationalising the Rescherian erotetic framework provides a theoretical basis 
to establish suitable artefacts for modelling knowledge systems. The typed holarchic 
cooperative QA pair was shown to be an instance of a categorial functional entity pair 
joined by a typed knowledge relation. It was shown how a conflux of interrelated 
functional entities give rises to Walsham's community of knowing, and so is 
representationally adequate to the task of modelling knowledge.  
The typing of functional entity pairs was then described using the established 
principles of erotetic logic, with an account of the pragmatic limitations for 
qualification and complexity. This final qualified typology gave an ontology that 
permits the representation of all encoded knowledge sources, together with the 
framework deontology guiding its use in practice. A complete account of the ontology 
and deontology with substantiating expository instantiations was given, establishing 
two of the goal components of the modelling framework.  
Two modelling symbologies (FERD and FERL) were presented from different 
theoretical justificatory standpoints: erotetics and category theory, and Speech Acts 
Theory respectively. FERD - the Functional Entity Relationship Diagram - is a 
symbology for the erotetic framework created by adapting and extending the 
established ERD diagramming tradition. FERL - the Functional Entity Representation  
  329
Language - is another symbology, but one based in string logic rather than sketch logic, 
extending and adapting the SQL informatic tradition to cover collectivities. The 
docking process showed the mutual encompassing of FERD and FERL meaning that 
they can coexist within the same modelling system. 
 FERM - the Functional Entity Relationship Methodology - completed the 
modelling framework. FERM is a design methodology for the erotetic framework 
formed by extending and adapting the standard KE principles to enable the discovery 
of encoded distributed knowledge needs and capacities. 
Gregor & Jones (2007) mandates expository instantiation as a method of 
verification, owing to the problematic nature of using untried theory artefact in a non-
laboratory setting. Accordingly, three real world test cases of complex knowledge 
systems - one scientific, one pedagogical, and one sociocultural - were modelled using 
FERM, with expository instantiations represented as FERDs to complete the 
substantiation of the designed framework. 
Finally, evaluation considerations were applied to the completed framework, 
having been previously expressed as sets of criteria established before the research, for 
application using a design contract system (per Hevner and Chatterjee 2010). Ongoing 
evaluation during development followed a (non-client) action research strategy that 
logically separated the researcher and developer roles to ensure artefacts were 
sufficiently developed to proceed. The overall evaluation strategy required docking - 
checking for mutual encompassing of two modelling systems (FERD and FERL) 
constructed using separate research paths from within the same perspective. This 
involved using several principled, literature-derived sets of criteria, which were all 
applied following the completed framework development and found to be satisfactory. 
This, combined with the successful substantiation, confirmed the erotetic perspective, 
and the functional entity framework, as coherent and useful. 
14.3 Research questions revisited 
The research goals aimed to contribute to knowledge management by 
establishing a novel, but theoretically legitimate, approach to modelling (realised as the 
erotetic perspective) and a principled design framework for modelling knowledge 
needs and capacities at the conceptual level (realised as the functional entity 
framework). The erotetic perspective, and the suite of modelling tools for use by KM  
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practitioners developed in this thesis permit modelling, planning and repurposing of 
diversely represented knowledge systems.  
All theoretical frameworks must however, explicitly scope their bounds of 
applicability in order to be usable for research (Dubin, 1976): stating the logical 
bounds for a domain, or potential pragmatic limitations to generalisability is required 
in order that the research constitutes a legitimate value-added contribution to theory 
development (Whetten, 1989). 
The design goals directly address the four research questions enumerated in 
section 1.3: 
1.  Is the erotetic perspective on knowledge theoretically legitimate as a paradigm 
for metamodelling? 
2.  How can the erotetic perspective be operationalised into a framework of explicit 
constructs for knowledge modelling? 
3.  Can the erotetic perspective and its constructs seamlessly encompass existing 
knowledge representation and conceptual modelling practices?  
4.  Can the framework produce representationally adequate implementation designs 
across different situations? 
These questions have been practically answered through the achievement of the 
design goals, however now we will consider more theoretically how those questions 
have been addressed, together with their scope and bounds of applicability. 
14.3.1 The erotetic perspective on knowledge 
Establishing a new IS perspective will involve dependence on a number of other 
theoretical frameworks, as well as general (superempirical) principles that are part of 
the worldview of the participants, (Nygaard & Sorgaard, 1985). The first research 
question — Is the erotetic perspective on knowledge theoretically legitimate as a 
paradigm for metamodelling? — has been resolved by examining the perspective for 
superempirical values – such as consistency, coherence, conservatism, 
comprehensiveness, and fecundity (Allix, 2003).  
The coherentist approach to the nature of theoretical structures is pragmatic, 
matching a key requirement of Design Science research (R. Cole et al., 2005; Göran 
Goldkuhl, 2008): within Allix’s set of super-empirical values a number of the values 
(especially those of comprehensiveness, fecundity and learnability) make for the  
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requisite utility of the theory as a Design Science artefact, legitimated by this 
coherence justification for knowledge.  
By introducing the formalisms of erotetic logic from philosophical logic to the 
process of modelling KMS, we can establish a theoretical underpinning for the 
conceptual modelling of knowledge systems that possesses a simplicity and rigour 
equivalent to that of modelling for traditional information systems. This new 
conceptualisation then incorporates traditional IS modelling as one aspect of a richer 
modelling system, and thereby includes all of traditional IS repositories as first class, 
unmediated sources of knowledge. The perspective is thus held to be both legitimate 
and fruitful.  
14.3.2 Operationalising an erotetic modelling framework 
  The erotetic perspective avoids many of the inherent problems in existing 
knowledge management and its tributary disciplines. In particular it accounts for the 
growth of knowledge through sharing, and sidesteps the necessity of knowledge 
being vested in a person or an organisation as a thing owned. The second question: 
How can the erotetic perspective be operationalised into a framework of explicit 
constructs for knowledge modelling? is addressed in this section. 
  By being based on abstract formalisms (collectivities as a generalisation of sets) 
multiple accounts of the same knowledge capacities are enabled, both for the inherent 
description of the reuse of the same knowledge capacity and a perspectivist account 
of its significance.  
  The formalism of the functional entity (FE), an encapsulated data resource that 
acts as a question-answering system, is based on the erotetic perspective. A FE is a 
generalisation of the standard relational entity for sources of knowledge that are non-
relational and not set-compliant, or for which the standard processes of single entity 
modelling are difficult to achieve. A FE permits the modelling of any source in 
response to a request for information by returning a tuple of a consistent nature, while 
black-boxing the inner working in both design and use.  
The FEs are interconnected by implicature, abstracted as the knowledge relation 
(KR), an extension of the relations of standard data modelling theory which is 
underpinned by formal category theory. The knowledge relation permits a usage- and 
perspective-determined typing of the FE that fully models the space of all answerable 
questions.  
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By establishing a typology of nine functional entities generated from two 
established principles this thesis described a set of constructs that can depict all 
existentially quantifiable relations. We defined three main types of functional entity: 
predicative, aggregative and connective, each with three subtypes.  
For those situations that do not permit such relations (i.e. where the Aristotelian 
unities of space and time implicit in predicative functional entities break down, 
resulting in intermittent or emergent entities) this thesis has demonstrated a satisficing 
extension to that typology, non-Aristotelian functional entities.  
For those situations where the nature of the modelling stance does not permit 
observation of the entire system modelled (temporarily or permanently, inherently or 
accidentally), this thesis presented a separate satisficing extension to the typology, 
cartographic functional entities, to permit formally verifiable recursive documentation.  
By recognising the universality of the pragmatic and hedging qualification of 
utterances, the modelling notation permits the combinatorial description of all encoded 
knowledge without the need for a splintered symbology.  
The encapsulation and occlusion of the functional entity permits us to show the 
logical relations that exist between parts of a distributed knowledge management 
system. This enables the physical design to be deferred or resources to be replaced with 
others that return the same answer at a functional level. This is very useful in high level 
planning, as knowledge management systems require that there be no destruction of the 
material recorded for a system as it is built. When the individual components of a wide 
area system are placed under the hegemony of different organisations, or even different 
professions, a high level map is necessary in order that some form of mutual 
understanding underwrite the progress of the KMS development.  
14.3.3 Adaptation of existing design tools to the erotetic framework  
The design of a tertiary, creative artefact mandates the reuse where possible of 
existing tools and practices (Tong & Siriam, 1992) both as a safeguard against 
excessive novelty and as a way of ensuring ready adoption through minimal disruption. 
To that end, the third question, Can the erotetic perspective and its constructs 
seamlessly encompass existing knowledge representation and conceptual modelling 
practices? is addressed by a survey of existing secondary artefacts that are appropriate 
and mutable, and the subsequent adaptation of them to the new perspective.  
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The notions of the Functional Entity and the Knowledge Relation, as well as the 
Knowledge Dependency, Knowledge Call, Knowledge Image, and Knowledge 
Contract, have been built on a series of established informatic practices, such as 
Belnap’s erotetic information retrieval (1963), Lee’s cooperative data systems (1978), 
Grimes’s information dependencies (1988) and the data generics of Childs (1968). This 
ensured that proven techniques for knowledge representation have been utilised in 
building up the new framework. 
The adaptation of the ERD, SQL and the standard KR Methodology to the 
erotetic framework was accomplished, creating the Functional Entity Relationship 
Diagram (FERD), the Functional Entity Relationship Language (FERL) and the 
Functional Entity Relationship Methodology (FERM) respectively.  
The FERD enables the conceptual models created within the erotetic perspective 
to be created, shared and critiqued (and amended). Using the FERD as a category-
theoretical argumentation, graphical proofs of anticipated or neglected needs or 
capacities can be provided, as well as strategies for integration or redundancy through 
collation. Significant features of knowledge systems such as hedging can be indicated, 
with degrees of trust and reliability clearly visual in the diagram. Pragmatic features 
such as trust and security, term limits or periodic availability also are easily 
representable.  
FERL has been written using an EBNF grammar to provide a complete 
description of the language and ultimately to be implementable as an interpreter. FERL 
permits the representation of all possible transactions within the domain of knowledge 
representation or exchange.  
FERM was built on the existing unifications of the standard KR methodology 
and traditional the SDLC by Beynon-Davies (1992), extending the ambit of the 
knowledge sources to fit the domain of the erotetic perspective, and to incorporate the 
developments in the SDLC itself since Beynon-Davies’s work in the 1990s such as 
incremental iteration.  
The framework secondary artefacts FERD, FERL and FERM, as well as the 
construct constituents such as FE and KR, Knowledge Contract, Knowledge 
Dependency, Knowledge Call, have been all been successfully adapted from proven 
existing mutable informatic artefacts. The major conceptual modelling framework for 
designing databases, the ERD, is fully accommodated within FERD without disruption 
or loss, and in the same manner, all classes of knowledge representational formalism,  
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legacy or yet to be invented, can equally be encompassed by the same modelling 
formalism without disruption or loss.  
Since, as noted previously, the conceptualisation incorporates traditional IS 
modelling as one aspect of a richer modelling system, and includes all of traditional IS 
repositories as unmediated sources of knowledge the third research question, Can the 
erotetic perspective and its constructs seamlessly encompass existing knowledge 
representation and conceptual modelling practices? is held to be answered in the 
affirmative. 
14.3.4 Expository instantiations of the framework 
The fourth research question, Can the framework produce representationally 
adequate implementation designs across different situations? is resolved by the 
creation of expository instantiations within the framework, instantiations that are 
conceptual models of complex knowledge systems. Representational adequacy 
combines descriptive adequacy (sensu Chomsky, 1957) and was operationalised using 
the criteria of Bench-Capon (1990), Reichgelt (1991), and Bingi et al (Bingi et al., 
1995). Justification through substantiation demonstrates that tertiary and secondary 
artefacts are more than hypothetical designs, and can prove useful in practice. While 
not accomplishing the same results as field trials or usability studies, the latter are ruled 
out for tertiary artefact development, and some measure of practicality is still needed. 
Three expository instantiations were created using real world complex 
knowledge-focussed scenarios. The case studies were chosen to ensure variety: from 
science, from education (business focussed) and from the sociocultural domain. One 
study (the Box-Iron Bark Thinning Trial) was an analysis of an existing system that 
had proven effective in knowledge creation and dissemination, with a view to 
documentation of that system. Another (the Dream Home Extensions) was an 
established pedagogical database for which knowledge-rich extensions were proposed. 
The third study (the Translation Support Knowledge Base) was a mixture of analysis 
and planning, as an existing rich knowledge environment was described with a view to 
adding features. 
The FERM approach to creating models was followed, and conceptual models 
created for all three knowledge systems. Thus the fourth and final research question, 
Can the framework produce representationally adequate implementation designs 
across different situations? is answered in that the expository instantiations  
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demonstrate that across different situations the designed models are adequate to 
represent the knowledge in each situation. 
In sum, through the design and demonstration of the goal design artefacts, the 
research questions have been answered to show that indeed an erotetic perspective can 
provide a fruitful basis for the conceptual modelling of knowledge. 
14.4 Further research 
We now describe the implications of the research for the theory and practice of 
knowledge management, following the answering of the research questions, and the 
implications for design science arising from the methodology followed in the research. 
14.4.1 Implications for knowledge management theory 
The erotetic perspective can be seen as a formalisation of the communicative 
model of knowledge pioneered by Walsham, in the tradition of Lave & Wenger, 
Giddens, and Polanyi. Walsham's account of knowledge is an informed reaction 
against the resource-based account of knowledge-as-object that has until recently been 
prevalent. However, as seen in section 2.2.1, underlying his reconstruction of the 
Community of Practice as the instrumentable Community of Knowing, there remain 
fictive artefacts, as the Community of Knowing rests upon Giddens and through 
Giddens, Schutz’s account of common knowledge expressed as stocks and flows of 
knowledge.  
This reliance meant that the current research had to seek an alternative kernel 
theory to the Austrian school epistemology with its concentration on knowledge as a 
thing owned, and deriving its value from that ownership. By using the kernel theory of 
inquiry dynamics, the erotetic perspective describes knowledge systems in terms of 
knowledge needs (questions) and capacities (answers). By considering knowledge as 
the ability to answer a question as well as the act of answering a question the apparent 
presence of stocks and flows respectively can be seen as fictive: artefacts of the act of 
observation.  
Significantly, it makes the worn “distinction” between data, information and 
knowledge (and variants) untenable. Since there is no discernible difference between 
(for instance) the capture or harvesting of data, information or knowledge, nor between 
the hunting and discovery of data, information or knowledge, they are unusable in 
making reliable descriptions of the world. By consideration of the denotation of such  
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terms, they are seen to be indiscernibles, and following Leibniz, unsuitable for 
constructing ontologies. This means that a large number of preconceptions and 
practices in the literature need to be reconsidered and re-evaluated.  
This need not necessarily be nihilist though, as a system of metaphoric 
reimaging is possible (Goddard, 2004). By reconstructing metaphoric utterances such 
as the examples above, the references to the reifying metaphors can be examined for 
genuine descriptions and methods, rather than fictive expressions. The problem lies 
with looking for the fictive accoutrements of reifying metaphors instead. A systematic 
treatment of key texts in the KM corpus using this approach is a fruitful avenue for 
further research. 
14.4.2 Implications for knowledge management practice 
The current KM implementation world is dominated by ad hoc systems that 
have grown to accommodate resources available, and the procrustean solutions of 
major vendors that have particular generalised solutions to KM problems, regardless of 
the circumstances prevailing in any given situation. Additionally, the prohibitive cost 
of conversion (and potentially reconversion) of existing noetica precludes adopting 
even current free software solutions in the KM domain. 
Several of the design solutions presented in the current thesis have promising 
potential in offering a third direction. Principled use of the Service Oriented 
Architecture framework through the development of FERL, by a process of articulated 
interfaces to the SOA APIs would prove a highly effective solution to many of the 
existing roadblocks to KM. As FERL has been defined using EBNF, building an actual 
Open Knowledge-Base Connectivity becomes a matter of building an interpreter to 
handle the FERL calls, and broker them to existing knowledge base, database and other 
informatic APIs. 
Research has already begun on this highly promising path. 
14.4.3 Implications for Design Science theory 
We saw in section 3.2 that there is no straightforward way of proving a tertiary 
design artefact using quantitative techniques, for a number of compelling reasons. The 
standard alternative to quantitative techniques, qualitative techniques, usually follows 
the path of action research. However, secondary and tertiary design artefacts are 
developed to deal with a class of problems rather than an individual problem facing an 
individual organisation or client. Even promising techniques like Practitioner Action  
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Research or Technical Action Research still require an external source of 
authentication of the action. Likewise Activity Theory must be embedded in the 
community to acquire verification and validation. Sonnenberg and vom Brocke’s 
promising approach (2012) still lacks the ability to deal with tertiary artefacts and only 
partly copes with secondary ones, again with partial external validation. 
This has been problematic with many significant sole practitioner projects, such 
as the World Wide Web or the Relational Model. Even teams of cooperating designers 
(such as with the Object Oriented paradigm or the spreadsheet) will need some form of 
justificatory principle to know when the right thing is built, and built right, when it 
comes to generic solutions to a (potentially unrecognized) class of problems. 
Since theory artefacts – both tertiary and secondary artefacts – cannot be 
evaluated using the conventional a posteriori methods of quantitative and qualitative 
analysis, a mechanism for ex ante evaluation is needed instead. 
Realising that all informatic artefacts are models of the world, this thesis drew 
on established techniques for evaluating models constructed in computational forms, to 
find ways of getting around this seeming impasse. By considering tertiary artefacts as 
meta-models, it is possible to situate their evaluation within an alternative tradition of 
analysis, one that looks at the components of models of the world to see how well they 
are put together. They are examined for super-empirical attributes, including 
parsimony, simplicity, consistency, conservatism with respect to existing practice and 
knowledge, comprehensiveness, generalisability, potential fecundity, explanatory 
unity, refutability, and learnability.  
The research drew on several areas of modelling, combined with the best 
practice of design theory building, to develop a principle of distributed justification 
through design contract and docking. Exhaustive criteria sets were created to determine 
in advance what would amount to a principled, generalisable, verifiable, and 
validatable artefact, what would be suitable kernel theories, and whether or not the 
research hewed to those kernel theories. The Gregor & Jones mandated Pattern 
selection and research pattern extraction was likewise instrumented through a design 
contract process.  
The process of docking, of bimodal development paths examined for congruence 
(again, according to a design contract) meant that there was a clear judgement to be 
made as to whether the tertiary artefact could prove fecund for secondary artefacts, and 
a fortiori, primary artefacts.  
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This approach to artefact building has the potential to be a universal solution. 
The principles of rigour and relevance in design science mandate that the body of 
knowledge be enriched by both the particular and general solutions at the completion 
of a design project. It is intended to follow up the current research with a fully 
established account of principled tertiary artefact development, including examination 
of the circumstances in which the creation of secondary or tertiary artefacts is 
warranted, and what form of generalisable “toolkit” for building them can be drawn 
from the current research. Formalising this alternative tradition of evaluation of design 
science artefacts further would be an important contribution towards design science 
theory artefact evaluation. 
14.4.4 Implications for Design Science practice  
A practical outcome of the current research was the stepping through on two 
occasions of the theory building process described by Gregor & Jones: of selecting a 
candidate intellectual predecessor, and using the research path of the predecessor to 
build a path for the new research to follow. 
Surety of design is given by finding a prior research programme within the 
literature than can serve as an Alexander Pattern for the research undertaken, giving a 
template for appropriate goals, milestones and kernel knowledge. The research 
programme chosen for the research must be selected using super-empirical criteria: 
coherence, completeness and appropriateness. This thesis has generic, reusable 
perspective- and theory-level checklists for the selection of research programmes to 
serve as design templates, using these criteria. 
An outcome of the requirement for this research-informed pattern is that every 
theory artefact design research path is unique. This unique research path, a local design 
science research methodology, must be established at the initial stage of the research 
once the research problem has been determined.  
Significantly, it was also discovered that the same kinds of considerations come 
into play for choosing kernel theories for deployment in design research, and that a 
similar set of constraints is placed on the designer by kernel theory and research 
pattern. 
A practical and immediate outcome of the current research for design science 
will be this rationalised and operationalised account of research pattern construction 
and kernel theory selection.   
  339
14.5 Summary 
This chapter concludes the research project. It has summarised the research 
undertaken in order to address the overarching research question: Can a fruitful 
modelling framework be derived from an erotetic perspective on knowledge? 
Within the erotetic perspective, encoded knowledge about a subject is 
considered as the ability to answer questions on that subject. It has investigated this 
question through design science theory artefact research, conceptualising a perspective 
as a tertiary design artefact. 
The outcome of the research has been a knowledge modelling framework, the 
Functional Entity Framework, conceptualised as a secondary design artefact within the 
erotetic perspective, that includes a diagramming system (FERD) and a knowledge 
modelling methodology (FERM) to facilitate the creation of conceptual models within 
the perspective. As an adjunct description mechanism, the framework includes a 
knowledge transaction language (FERL), designed to enable the description of 
knowledge needs and capacities and the transfer of knowledge between them.  
The core constructs within the erotetic perspective, the Functional Entity and the 
Knowledge Relation, conform to category theory, and are typed according to an 
emergent classification system. This ensures that the FE framework has the potential to 
model all forms of encoded knowledge. 
These outcomes have demonstrated that the erotetic perspective on knowledge 
has proved a fruitful line of research with outcomes of both theoretical and practical 
significance, and provides the basis for much further research into knowledge work. 
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Appendix A  
 
A Survey of Knowledge Representation 
Traditions  
 
 
This appendix contains Table A.1, which summarises a survey of different 
epistemological traditions in knowledge representation (KR) and the way those 
traditions impact on representational formalisms, the methodologies attached to them, 
and the final systems that that use them. It has been researched and constructed as an 
adjunct to the discussion in section 2.3.2, to demonstrate the range and distribution of 
the principal knowledge representation systems. Table A.1 Epistemologies, Formalisms and Systems for KR 
  1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 
Basis  Rules  Norms Situations Ontology Facts  Heuristics Ideas Communication Values 
Epistemology  Knowledge (especially 
expert knowledge) 
consists of a large set 
of rules that are 
learned though 
acculturation 
Knowledge consists of 
a set of rules of 
behaviour established 
for circumstances 
Knowledge consists of 
standardized 
occurrences that 
repeat over and again 
in particular instances
Interrelation of 
concepts is the major 
organising principle 
for knowledge 
Knowledge comprises 
the learned use of 
words to refer to 
things with 
commonalities playing 
roles with respect to 
one another 
Knowledge consists of 
ready‐to‐hand 
solutions to everyday 
problems 
Knowledge is about 
ideas mixing with facts 
about the world 
Knowledge is a 
phenomenon of 
shared 
communication and 
remembering found in 
communities 
Knowledge consists in 
approximations of 
states of the world, 
and that storage of 
partial facts is the 
most significant 
Formalism  Logic  Deontics  Frames/Scripts Hierarchy Semantic networks/ 
Conceptual Graphs 
Procedures Concepts Conversation Approximations 
Authority  Aristotle (ca 350 BCE‐
a); Boole (1854) 
von Wright (1951) Fillmore (1968); 
Goffman (1974); 
Minsky (1974)/Schank 
and Abelson (1977) 
Aristotle (ca 340 BCE); 
Günther (1962); 
Husserl (1900) 
Quillian (1967); 
Richens (1956)/Peirce 
(1998); Sowa (1976) 
Direct J. McCarthy and 
Hayes (1973) /Indirect 
Newell and Simon 
(1972); Norvig (1992) 
Kant (1800) Lave and Wenger 
(1991) 
Zdzislaw Pawlak 
(1984)/Zadeh 
(1965)/T. Y. Lin (2004) 
Method  Modelling the rules 
and establishing the 
facts to which those 
rules apply becomes 
the main priority 
Modelling the rules 
and establishing the 
circumstances to 
which those rules 
apply becomes the 
main priority 
Looking for frames to 
help you encode 
statements 
Mapping the ontology 
and the relationship 
between the ontology 
and the ontology‐
usages 
Finding generalised 
terms and their 
interrelations 
Looking for the 
evidence of problem 
solving techniques 
embedded in 
expertise 
Looking for common 
or significant concepts 
and their relations 
Looking for regular 
correspondents in 
dynamic 
conversations 
Looking for ways to 
measure for 
participation in 
rough/fuzzy/granular 
value sets 
KM Paradigm  KM becomes rule 
modelling 
KM becomes norm 
modelling 
KM becomes frame 
modelling 
KM becomes ontology 
modelling 
KM becomes a matter 
of modelling semantic 
networks 
KM becomes a matter 
of modelling the 
heuristics at either the 
symbolic (Newell & 
Simon, 1976) or 
subsymbolic 
(Smolensky, 1988) 
level and storing them 
as procedures 
KM becomes concept 
modelling 
KM becomes 
modelling of 
communication 
KM becomes a matter 
of modelling 
participation in such 
sets  
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System  Production systems 
(R. Davis & King, 1977; 
Charles L. Forgy, 1974, 
1979; Hewitt, 2009; 
Newell, 1973; 
Wielemaker, 
Schreiber, & Wielinga, 
2003) and expert 
system frameworks 
(B. G. Buchanan, 1986; 
Chana & Johnston, 
1996; Clancey, 1983; 
R. T. Hartley, 1982) 
Deontics systems (R. 
M. Lee, 1993, 1998; R. 
M. Lee, Bons, Wrigley, 
& Wagenaar, 1994; R. 
M. Lee & Ryu, 1995; R. 
K. Stamper, 1991; R. K. 
Stamper & Lee, 1986; 
R. K. Stamper, Liu, 
Hafkamp, & Ades, 
2000) 
Frames: KRL (Bobrow 
& Winograd, 1977), 
KL‐ONE (R. Brachman 
& Schmolze, 1985) 
Protege (Gennari et 
al., 2003), 
KADS/CommonKADS 
(Bolchini, Curino, 
Quintarelli, Schreiber, 
& Tanca, 2007; De 
Hoog, Benus, Vogler, 
& Metselaar, 1996; 
Fensel et al., 2003; 
Flores‐Mendez, 
Lukose, & van 
Leeuwen, 1998; A. T. 
Schreiber et al., 2000; 
Tordai, Omelayenko, 
& Schreiber, 2007; B. 
Wielinga, Schreiber, 
Wielemaker, & 
Sandberg, 2001) 
Scripts: Knowledge 
Machine (P. Clark & 
Porter, 1997a, 1997b, 
1999, 2003) 
Many ontology 
projects (e.g. C.N.G 
Dampney & Johnson, 
1999; Gaines, 1996; 
Gaines, Guarino, & 
Poli, 1995; Gruber, 
1993; Gruber & Olsen, 
1994; Gruber, 
Tenenbaum, & Weber, 
1992; Guarino & Poli, 
1995; Guarino & 
Welty, 1998; P. J. 
Hayes, 1977, 1978; 
Neches, Fikes, Finin, 
Gruber, & Patil, 1991; 
Poli, 1996, 1999; 
Wand, Monarchi, 
Parsons, & Woo, 
1995; Wand et al., 
1999; Wand & Weber, 
1990b, 1993). This is 
the basis for 
generalised systems 
such as CYC, SUMO 
and the OWL system. 
(Pask, 1973) 
NIAM/ORM systems 
(Abrial, 1974; 
Falkenberg, 1976; 
Halpin, 1989; Kent, 
1977, 1978; Nijssen, 
1980, 1986; Nijssen & 
Halpin, 1989) or 
Conceptual Graphs 
(Sowa, 1976, 1979, 
1980, 1984, 1992, 
2000) RDF. 
ORM/NIAM (Creasy, 
1989, 1990) 
General Problem 
Solver (Newell, 1963; 
Newell et al., 1959) , 
LISP (John McCarthy, 
Abrahams, Edwards, 
Hart, & Levin, 1962), 
Planner (Hewitt, 1969)
Soar (Laird, 2005; 
Laird & Rosenbloom, 
1996; Newell, 1990; 
Rosenbloom et al., 
1989).  
formal concept 
analysis (FCA) lattices 
pioneered by Formal 
Concept Analysis 
(Wille, 1982) 
Communities of 
Practice (Barrett et al., 
2004; J. S. Brown & 
Duguid, 2001; 
Surowiecki, 2004; 
Walsham, 2001, 2004, 
2005) 
Systems built with 
Rough Sets 
(Komorowski, Pawlak, 
Polkowski, & 
Skowron, 1999; 
Zdzislaw Pawlak, 
1984, 1985; Zdzislaw 
Pawlak & Skowron, 
1996; Peters & 
Skowron, 2002) Fuzzy 
Sets (Cubero, Pons, 
Medina, & Vila, 1995; 
Tang, Dillon, & Khosla, 
1995; Zadeh, 1965) 
Granular Computing 
(Han & Lin, 2010; T. Y. 
Lin, 2004, 2005, 2009; 
T. Y. Lin & Chiang, 
2006; Yao, 2005) and 
combinations and 
variations (T. Y. Lin, 
1997, 2001; 
Mordeson, 2001; 
Zdzislaw Pawlak, 
1985, 1997; Yao, 
2002; Yeung, Chen, 
Tsang, Lee, & Xizhao, 
2005) 
Note to table A.1: 
Entries are to be read vertically as Knowledge assumed to be based on [Basis] uses epistemological stance that [Epistemology], using 
formalism of [Formalism] (following [Authority]). This results in knowledge being modelled by [Method], which results in the paradigm where [KM 
Paradigm]. It has been used in system of [System]. 
For example, the entry for the formalism Concepts would read: Knowledge assumed to be based on Ideas uses epistemological stance that 
Knowledge is about ideas mixing with facts about the world, using the formalism of Concepts (following Kant, 1800). This results in knowledge 
being modelled by Looking for common or significant concepts and their relations, which results in the paradigm where KM becomes concept 
modelling. It has been used in system of formal concept analysis (FCA) lattices pioneered by Formal Concept Analysis (Wille, 1982)  
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Appendix B  
 
Working Definitions 
 
The goal of the current research is to provide a multilayered set of design artefacts for 
use in modelling of complex knowledge systems. It articulates the underpinning philosophy 
on which erotetic modelling is based, in a way that permits its principles to be used to justify 
a set of guidelines and tools used to create conceptual models of knowledge systems. Figure 
B.1 shows the relationship between these modelling components in this thesis. 
 
Figure B‐1 Relationship amongst terms used to describe research outcomes 
The perspective provides the philosophy of the research, the framework comprises the 
guidelines and tools established within that perspective. This framework is used to create 
conceptual models realisable as implementation designs. The remainder of the appendix 
explores the usage of these terms in the literature and the concepts they express, and 
establishes definitions for them that are used in the current research. To disambiguate the 
usage of terms from that use in other research in the same problem domain, the appendix 
concludes with a terminology crosswalk between the current research and the literature in 
which they are expounded, specifically Lindland et al. (1994), Burton-Jones et al. (2009) and 
Guizzardi (2005). 
B.1 Perspective 
The current research establishes a new set of design tools by looking at the problems 
of conceptual modelling of knowledge from a new point of view. It begins with a conscious 
examination of the background and origin of the philosophical assumptions shared by the 
current knowledge modelling tools, and seeks a new background instead. This philosophical  
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background is termed perspective (sensu Nygaard & Sorgaard, 1985). However, the 
definition of the term perspective must begin with an examination of the commonly-used 
related term paradigm. 
The use of the word paradigm both in IS and in the general community is so 
widespread and vague that many authors see it as no more than a rhetorical token (Fulford, 
1999), or at least in need of language therapy (Gokturk & Akkøk, 2004; Van Roy, 2009). 
The concept, borrowed from philosophy of science, was introduced there for quite a precise 
purpose by Kuhn (1970b): a paradigm is the knowledge context within which scientists 
works, a “disciplinary matrix” comprising symbolic generalisations, metaphysical 
presumptions, values, and exemplars.  
In computing, the word “paradigm” is used in two separate ways. One use is for the 
common intellectual context within which information and computer scientists (or a self-
defining subset of them) work. This usage follows (after a fashion) Kuhn, occurring in such 
terms as “the object oriented paradigm” or “the functional programming paradigm”.  
The other, non-Kuhnian, sense in which it is used derives from Kuhn, but has a less 
encompassing than Kuhn’s sense, meaning a conscientious orienting of work or research 
towards a set of precepts (S. Weber, 2010). Van Roy (2009) gives the narrower non-Kuhnian 
definition: 
A programming paradigm is an approach to programming a computer based on a mathematical 
theory or a coherent set of principles. Each paradigm supports a set of concepts that makes it 
the best for a certain kind of problem. Van Roy (Van Roy, 2009, p. 10) 
This double-usage is not unexpected – there is an aspect of the involuntary about the 
idea of the paradigm used in its original: the thinker abides within it, and only in times of 
scientific revolution does it become an object of reflection (Lakatos, 1965). Conscious or 
reflective adoption of a viewpoint at other times will always be within the context of a 
greater, Kuhnian paradigm. 
Dasgupta (1989; 1991) makes the distinction between these two definitions in design 
research by differentiating Kuhnian paradigms (which he terms “K-Paradigms”) and non-
Kuhnian paradigms (which he calls simply “Paradigms”), but such a coinage is not 
guaranteed to alleviate ambiguity unless the context of descriptions is clearly maintained. 
The K-Paradigm has been given particular labels in IS and systems science: an 
ontology (Wand & Weber, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c), an explicated Weltanschaung (Checkland,  
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1995) or an enunciated metatheory (Vakkari, 1997). Weber (S. Weber, 2010) suggests 
approach for the lesser, non-Kuhnian, “paradigm”. 
In establishing the context for their research into the democratic informatics 
methodology, Nygaard and Sorgaard (Nygaard & Sorgaard, 1985) deliberately chose the 
word perspective rather than paradigm, to indicate the presence of just that reflective choice 
that is missing in the conventional scientific paradigm.
129 Nygaard and Sorgaard enumerated 
the three potential meanings of perspective: standpoint, interpretation and selection, all of 
them always present in act of analysis or description from simple operation to discipline 
wide theorising.  
When a perspective has been chosen, the possibilities for the person operating within 
it are limited. As Nygaard and Sorgaard show, this will be so whether the invocation of the 
perspective is deliberate or not. By making it intentional, however, it is explicit rather than 
tacit (Ikujiro Nonaka, 1991) or implicit (Dumont & Wilson, 1967) it becomes part of the 
research methodology – another object of investigation within the research. 
This was the methodological approach taken by Flores (1982), who began his 
research by considering what perspective would serve office automation best if it was 
adopted intentionally instead of by habituation. Winograd (1986) introduces the term in 
similar phrasing to Nygaard and Sorgaard: 
In creating computer-based systems, we work within a perspective that shapes the design questions that 
will be asked and the kinds of solutions that are sought.[…] the concerns and interpretations that shape 
the design, whether they are articulated explicitly or are just part of the unexamined background of the 
work. A perspective does not determine answers to design questions, but guides design by generating 
the questions to be considered. (1986) 
In Winograd & Flores (1986 p 24) and Flores (1982) it is made clear that the research 
is being considered as an embodiment of a Lakatosian research programme rather than a 
Kuhnian paradigm. Somewhat confusingly, this methodological approach to creating a 
perspective is called an orientation. The informatic tradition Flores established
130 became 
called the Language/Action Perspective because of this methodological approach. 
                                                      
 
129 Elsewhere Nygaard strove to point out that the use of “paradigm” for object-orientation was a late arrival not 
of his choosing (Gokturk & Akkøk, 2004). 
130 which is analysed extensively in Chapter 3 of this thesis  
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Since the current research is about taking a conscious and deliberate stand, from a 
particular philosophical viewpoint, following the lead of Nygaard and Sorgaard (1985), 
Winograd & Flores (1986) and of Welke (1983) we use the term perspective for this 
intentionally adopted non-Kuhnian paradigm.  
Definition 1 derives from Welke’s definition (Welke, 1983 p. 209): 
Definition 1: perspective  
A perspective is the set of fundamental categories by which a part of reality is 
constructed in an observer’s mind. These are generally a priori categories to an 
individual, associated with some value system which the individual, through training 
and reinforcement, subscribes to and which provide the basis for an initial selection 
of frame(s).  
B.2 Informatic tradition 
For the current research, a descriptor is needed to discuss a broad agreement in terms, 
approach, viewpoint amongst IS/CS/KM practitioners. As was seen in the discussion of the 
term perspective above, there is a great deal of ambiguity about the commonly used term 
paradigm, first proposed by Kuhn (1970b). Subsequent historians of science have proposed 
various terms such as research program (Lakatos, 1965). Laudan (1977) proposed the term 
research tradition to cover the broad combination of consensus regarding scientific 
assumptions and practical approaches to problem solving within a discipline.  
Jacob (1987) took Laudan’s term and used it deliberately as part of a reflective 
examination of qualitative research in order to identify and classify the different approaches 
to QR and the assumptions and methods they involved: she proposed that a research 
tradition is 
a group of scholars who agree among themselves on the nature of the universe they are 
examining, on legitimate questions and problems to study, and on legitimate techniques to seek 
solutions. (1987 1-2) 
Following Jacob, Gregor & Jones (2007 p316) explicitly invoke the idea of a research 
tradition to inform their reflective research into design science. The current research seeks to 
continue the reflective practice of Gregor & Jones (2007). By reflective practice to extend 
this research tradition, the current research is carrying out creative and innovative research 
rather than the routine design science research which operates within the established 
tradition.  
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When working within informatics,
131 the object of study is partly the world, partly the 
activities and behaviour of the people within it, but overwhelmingly the focus of study is 
design artefacts themselves (Iivari, 2007). Consequently, we can conceive of an informatic 
tradition, which is a research tradition within informatics sharing a common view of the 
designed universe, i.e. of the multilayered design artefacts within informatics. This 
terminology enables us to avoid the level and scope ambiguities of the term “paradigm”. We 
can therefore arrive at definition 2. 
Definition 2: Informatic tradition  
An informatic tradition is an intentional research tradition within informatics that 
works within a shared perspective, and shares a common framework. 
B.3 Framework 
The main goal of the current research is the creation of a set of design tools for 
creating conceptual models of knowledge systems, including both constructs for defining 
models with, and normative operating principles for their use. This set of tools is called a 
framework, and is developed within an explicitly established perspective. 
The goal of a conceptual modelling framework is descriptive adequacy (Chomsky, 
1957, p. 286): for all situations that the user of the framework is likely to encounter withiin 
their universe of discourse, the framework will be adequate to making a clear, unambiguous 
and exectuable description. 
Frameworks operationalise theoretical systems (Denzin, 1970, p. 32): they make it 
possible to use theoretical principles established by a perspective to create tools clearly 
enough defined to enable their use without continuous resorting to design principles 
(McKinney, 1954). They provide an essential component of any theory building exercise, as 
can be seen in the foundation theory-building works of empirical and deisgn sign approaches 
to research. Two of the four theory building principles of the more empirical Dubin (1978) 
pertain to theoretical frameworks, as principles of the variables or units of analysis and the 
                                                      
 
131 Informatics is used (sensu Nygaard and Sorgaard, 1985):  
The science that has as its domain the information aspects of phenomena in nature and society 
(Nygaard & Sorgaard, 1985 p. 378).  
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laws of interaction among these units. Within Gregor & Jones’s account of theory building 
in design science (2003, p 325-7) we can see that two of the eight components that deem 
necessary (constructs and Principles of form and application) are parts of a design 
framework.
132 
As with a consciously-adopted perspective, a framework functions by a process of 
simplified affordance (sensu Gibson, 1977): by limiting the possible options, the potential 
for representation is both more limited and more useful, and the task of the modeller is both 
simplified and empowered (Amarel et al., 1967).
133  
This affordance-through-simplification is seen starkly in the extremely narrow usage 
of “framework” in the current practice of writing applications almost exclusively within 
programming language frameworks – “Frameworks are an object-oriented reuse technique” 
(R. E. Johnson, 1997 p. 1) – which improves programming capability with a potential 
opportunity cost of skill (Brin, 2006). “Framework” has only recently come to be used in 
this narrow sense, and the framework developed in the current research is used in the larger 
more formal sense. 
The word “framework” is in itself a very powerful and intuitive metaphor, one of the 
set that Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) call structural metaphors that are invoked to convey the 
sense of solidity and reliability, as well as strength in construction (when the object under 
scrutiny cannot yet bear its weight).  
Because of the efficacy of the metaphor of framework, the concept of a design 
framework in computing and management is too commonplace to single out any one 
originator. Certainly (e.g.) Amarel & Newell (1967), Blumenthal (1969), Gorry & Morton 
(1971) , Mason & Mitroff (1973), Agosti & Johnson (1984), Yadav (1985), and Bingi et al. 
                                                      
 
132 A third, Principles of implementation, is the methodology, see section B.7 
133 Amarel states this clearly: “In the design of a problem solving system the designer has to make many choices 
about local and global decision functions, evaluation schemes, etc. By first choosing an overall problem solving framework 
he can proceed more systematically in his design, and he can better judge the rationale for his specific choices.” (Amarel et 
al., 1967 p. 2-3)  
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(995) all considered the establishment of a design framework to be a critical part of systems 
analysis and design.
134  
Choice of a framework within which to work is a fundamental step in the process of 
problem solving, and it was intentionally so from what is likely the first explicitly described 
IS/KM framework by Amarel in Amarel et al (1967): 
In choosing a language for a problem representation the important questions are not rules of 
formation and surface structure, but the basic concepts to be used in describing the universe of 
discourse in which the problem is to be treated. (1967, p. 3) 
The framework consist of  
the notions of states, operators or moves, move selection functions, evaluation functions and a 
global strategy for sequencing decisions. (1967, p. 3)  
This affords the modeller with the building blocks for the model, and removes the 
need for the regular creation of innovative design arefacts. However, it also poses risks – 
choosing a framework nudges the problem towards a pre-factored solution.  
Again, Amarel points out: 
At present, if a designer decides to fashion his system according to this framework, then it is up 
to him to translate the problem that he wants his system to solve into the framework. This 
means that he has to choose specific interpretations for states, moves and evaluations in 
accordance with the problem on hand. In so doing he is reformulating the problem in a manner 
that is acceptable to his chosen framework. In other words, the designer is choosing the 
representation of the problem for the problem solving system. This is an extremely important 
choice and it affects all the other choices of decision functions etc. that have to be made in 
order to complete the specification of the problem solving system. (1967, p. 3)  
                                                      
 
134 There is also a problem of multiple terms at play here – what here is referred to as a framework is also referred 
to as a methodology by some authors. Although the idea of a methodology is grounded in the temporal, Hirschheim and 
Klein (1992) show that in use it has two aspects, process and framing. This framing methodology is that denoted by 
framework by other authors, such as Checkland’s (1990 p. 160) classic usage “A set of principles of method, which in any 
particular situation has to be reduced to a method uniquely suited to that particular situation”. Welke (1983 p. 204) 
concentrates on process, and defines a methodology as a particular temporally-embedded framework – “A comprehensive, 
procedural framework directed toward accomplishing a particular change in the object system”. The definition draws on 
thinkers such as Checkland even though they do not use the word “framework” per se, while in simulations the “conceptual 
modelling framework” described by Robinson (2008 p. 291) is laid out as a methodology consisting of “five iterative 
activities”.  
  8
The act of choosing the representational system for a problem is both beneficial and 
limiting: it gives the heightened affordance of the toolkit, limits the possible solutions that 
can exist to those one that use the tools: 
The act of choosing a representation for a problem involves the specification of a space where 
the search for solution can take place. a specification involves the choice of a language – and its 
use – for expressing problem conditions, properties of solutions, and knowledge of regularities 
in the search space. In addition, it involves the formulation of a schema according to which 
problem conditions and knowledge about properties of the space can be used effectively in the 
solution-seeking procedures. (1967, p. 3).  
We can take Amarel’s exposition of a framework and formalise the requirements for 
the composition of a framework in terms of design artefact subgoals. Accordingly, a 
framework will comprise: an ontology, a symbology, a deontology and a design 
methodology.  
Definition 3: ontology 
An ontology is an intentional simplification of a universe of discourse to the point 
of a set of generic manipulable descriptions. 
Definition 4: symbology 
A framework symbology is a set of symbols for represent the instantiations of an 
ontology. 
Definition 5: deontology 
A framework deontology is a ruleset for the combination of elements of a 
symbology. 
The definition for a design methodology is discussed in the next section, for current 
purposes we can follow Amarel in saying that it is a set of solution-seeking procedures for 
applying the constructs.  
In addition, the intentional goal in the framework construction (its teleology) and a 
clear identification of the perspective under which it has been constructed must be made 
explicit in order to mitigate the potential of any framework to draw the user towards the 
point of view of the framework designer. Drawing on these required rules and components 
we can arrive at definition 6. 
Definition 6: Informatic framework  
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An informatic framework is the set of constructs necessary to create regularised 
descriptions of the real world; comprising an ontology constructed according to a 
teleology within a perspective, a symbology for representing a universe of discourse 
in terms of that ontology, a deontology to give rules for their interrelation, and a 
methodology for applying the tools to the universe of discourse. These regularised 
descriptions include but are not limited to conceptual models, problem statements, 
and domain descriptions. 
We can therefore create a straightforward derived definition for a conceptual 
modelling framework such as the target for the current research.  
Definition 7: Conceptual modelling framework 
A conceptual modelling framework is an informatic framework that is descriptively 
adequate to create conceptual models. 
This definition therefore gives as deliverables for the current research an conceptual 
modelling ontology, symbology, deontology and methodology. 
A conceptual modelling framework is self-evidently a suite of tools that permits 
conceptual models to be created 
B.4 Routine methodology 
A significant part of an established framework is the sequence of operations for 
creating routine design artefacts (conceptual models and implementation designs) within it. 
This sequence of operations is called a methodology.  
Mingers (2002) makes the claim that the term methodology is used multiply and 
inconsistently in the literature (calling for a multimethodology approach). Examination of 
instances in the informatics literature shows rather that two separate but logically consistent 
usages occur in line with Kaplan’s (1964) framework: one for principled mechanism, one for 
the mechanism of technique. 
We can see the two usages in coupled writings by Hirscheim, Iivari and Klein. In their 
1995 treatise (Hirschheim, Klein, & Lyytinen, 1995) they describe a methodology as  
an organized collection of concepts, methods, beliefs, values and normative principles 
supported by material resources (1995, p. 22 emphasis added)  
  10
This definition clearly contains elements of what we have defined here as perspective 
and framework. Yet three years later, the same authors have an apparently contradictory 
definition, formed immediately after quoting the 1995 definition: 
[a codified set of] goal-oriented procedures that guide the work and cooperation of the various 
parties (stakeholders) involved in the building of an IS application. These procedures are 
usually supported by a set of preferred techniques and tools, and activities […]. A technique or 
method, in this context, consists of a well-defined sequence of elementary operations which 
permits the achievement of certain outcomes if executed correctly. Iivari et al. (1998, p. 165 
emphasis added) 
The theoretical constructs – concepts, beliefs, values and normative principles – are 
no longer listed, leaving a much more pragmatic definition.  
Kaplan points out that such usage looks dissimilar because “methodology” is one of a 
family of formal terms (like “physiology”, “history” and “logic”) which are used “both for a 
certain discipline and for its subject-matter” (Kaplan, 1964 p18). That is to say, the term 
methodology refers both to the study of methods, and to individual formalisms of method 
themselves, which are generally bound to individual contexts.  
Kaplan makes a further useful distinction between two approaches to knowledge 
creation Logic-in-use and Reconstructed Logic (Kaplan, 1964 p3). The former refers to the 
cognitive processes that occur at the moment of inquiry, while the latter refers to an 
idealised representation of those processes, a formalism that makes it easier to understand, 
teach and audit, but which is not necessarily a true representation of the events as they 
occurred. This goes some way to clarifying the apparent divergence of the definitions in 
Iivari et al. (1998) and Hirschheim (1995) above. Iivari et al. (1998) represents reconstructed 
logic, while Hirschheim et al. (1995) represents logic in use. 
Using this distinction, Kaplan creates a catalogue of four separate legitimate usages of 
methodology (in addition to its service as a name for a discipline): techniques, honorifics, 
epistemology and methods: 
1.  Techniques are “the specific procedures used in a given science, or in particular 
contexts of inquiry in that science.” (1964, p. 21) 
2.  Honorific methodology is a statement of adherence to an accepted normative practice 
in science, which is included as part of a declaration of scholarly intent in scientific 
reportage.  
3.  Methodology as epistemology refers to the basic set of assumptions that prevail in  
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establishing knowledge about the world and which give the sense of reliability to the 
other usages (this is the usage common in philosophy of science).  
4.  Methods are “techniques sufficiently general to be common to all sciences, or to a 
significant part of them.” (1964, p. 23) 
Elements of this catalogue are present in both of the opening quotes of Hirschheim, 
Iivari and Klein: we can see that Iivari et al. (1998) contains the honorific and 
epistemological usages, while Hirschheim et al. (1995) contains methods and techniques. 
The apparent problem lies in the accepted double usage of the word “methodology” itself, 
and so the challenge lies in working out which sense is intended, and making that choice 
explicit. In this thesis, the honorific and epistemological senses are embodied in the 
perspective, while the technique and procedural senses are explicitly described as part of the 
framework.  
For the purposes of the current research, a definition that is based on the 1995 
exposition of Hirschheim et al, embodying the technique and procedural senses, will be 
used. 
Definition 8: Methodology 
A methodology is a codified set of goal-oriented procedures that guide the work and 
cooperation of the various parties (stakeholders) involved in the building of an IS 
application, constructed in accordance with an explicit perspective, and drawing on 
tools provided by a framework established within that perspective. 
B.5 Conceptual model 
The definitions for perspective, informatic tradition, framework and routine 
methodology discussed so far in this appendix all relate to the definition of innovative 
design artefacts, but now we have to define the two routine design artefacts, the conceptual 
model and the implementation design. We start with the definition of the conceptual model. 
Conceptual models play such a huge role in informatics and the term is used so 
widely that some clarification is necessary to establish its use in the current research. They 
are representations of the of a universe of discourse (Boole, 1854), created making use of the 
symbols established within a framework and manipulated with a grammar that framework 
supplies (Lindland et al., 1994). In the physical and social sciences generally, conceptual  
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models are simplifications of the world that enable it to be described, monitored, measured 
and predicted (Gelfert, 2011 p 251). They also have a secondary communicative role in 
allowing those descriptions, measurements and predictions to be communicated (Petri, 
1977). This secondary role has additional significance in IS/KM in that the descriptions and 
measurements can be conveyed to and interpreted by computers (Oberquelle, 1984; Petri, 
1977) 
Conceptual models are a loan concept from natural science where they play a vital 
two-aspect role in the scientific process (Pearson, 1892). There, they are representations of 
the world in simplified abstract terms, created for the purposes of simulation or experimental 
design. For simulation: 
…conceptual models should identify, at some level of detail, all significant components and 
processes of a resource that contribute to its ecological organization and operation. These 
models then can provide strategic frameworks to identify and develop indicators. (Barber, 1994 
p. 13) 
These models can exist at every level from entire disciplines (e.g. physics) through 
large scale models (climate, weather, water-cycle) down to localised predictors or formulae.  
For experiment the idea of a conceptual model has more of the quality of a blueprint: 
The utility of the conceptual model rests in its conversion and evolution into an explicit 
mathematical statement capable of evaluation as a hypothesis. (Gillett, Hill IV, Jarvinen, & 
Schoor, 1974, p. 6) 
Both of these two notions of conceptual models can be seen in informatics. For 
systems science, the simulation meaning is important, as for instance with the Soft Systems 
Methodology, where 
the [root] definition is an account of what the system is; the conceptual model is an account of 
the activities which the system must do in order to be the system named in the definition. 
(Checkland, 1981, p. 168) 
 Within informatics, conceptual models have been seen as a specification (Young & 
Kent, 1958) to lay out the flow of information through a system. Conceptual models were 
seen in this important but restricted form from the beginning in all forms of shared 
information systems (Biller & Neuhold, 1977; Kent, 1976, 1977; Nijssen, 1977a; Schmid, 
1977; Schmid & Swenson, 1975, #57440). In particular the various systems of conceptual 
modelling have been presented as a graphical formalism, with a lexicon of shapes and a 
symbolic connective syntax used both as a working out method and a final documentation 
(Ageshin, Diskin, & Beylin, 1995; Diskin, 1997; Diskin & Kadish, 1997). Variations and 
improvements of conceptual models have chiefly been considered as improvements in rival  
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forms of diagramming (e.g. Entity-Relationship Diagram vs. Unified Modelling Language) 
within different frameworks (e.g. relational vs. object orientation) (Diskin, 2005b, 2005c; 
Halpin, 2002). 
Attention to the crucial role of the conceptual modelling phase in design (especially 
for verification, e.g. N. David, 2009; Olive & Cabot, 2007) has seen a merging of the two 
meanings such as:  
A conceptual model is a representation (typically graphical) constructed by IS professionals of 
someone’s or some group’s perception of a real-world domain. (Shanks, Nuredini, et al., 2003, 
p. 85) 
and 
A conceptual model is a predefined, partial image of the real world. Such an image evidently 
consists of descriptions of objects that are considered relevant in the part of the real world we 
are considering. (ter Bekke, 1991, p. 43) 
Wand et al. (Wand et al., 1999 p. 495) make a stipulated equation of conceptual 
modelling with semantic modelling to reinforce this approach to a merged usage, and point 
out the need for the recontextualisation of the conceptual model in a greater framework (for 
them, the Bunge, Wand & Weber ontology, Wand & Weber, 1990a): 
Conceptual modeling (or semantic modeling) focuses on capturing and representing certain 
aspects of human perceptions of the real world so that these aspects can be incorporated into an 
information system. (Wand et al., 1999 p. 495) 
It is this unified sense that is needed for modelling complex knowledge systems. The 
requirements of knowledge modelling include both the general (what types of things need to 
be recorded?) and the specific (how and where am I going to record them?) (Gregor, Bunker, 
Cecez-Kecmanovic, Metcalfe, & Underwood, 2007; Linger, Hasan, & Burstein, 2007).  
Drawing on the definitions given by Shanks et al. (2003), ter Bekke (1991) and Wand 
et al. (1999) we can construct definition 9. 
Definition 9: Conceptual model 
A conceptual model is a simplified, temporally-embedded, representation 
of a universe of discourse, prepared for the purpose of representing that 
universe in an informatic manner, taking account of both the points of 
measurement available and the agencies that cause the changes in those 
measurements.  
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Note that this definition shows how a chosen framework and the perspective within 
which it is embedded creates a simplified affordance. In effect the creation of conceptual 
models is only possible because of this affordance. 
B.6 Implementation design 
The workflow in knowledge system building leads from modelling to implementation, 
and preparatory to the work of coding or customisation there must be a comprehensive 
specification, an application-independent representation that can act as both blueprint and 
checklist for the implementation. This specification is termed the implementation design. 
The implementation design artefact is a direct representation of those components that 
must be constructed and assembled in order for a system to operate. It does not possess telos, 
and equally does not specify exact components that are used to fulfil the system. It provides 
enough information to the implementer to build the system, while also providing a 
confirmation of his work for the knowledge engineer who created the conceptual model. 
This fits well with the standard KM practice, first proposed by Newell, of mapping 
three levels of system descriptions (Newell, 1981, 1993; Rosenbloom et al., 1989). 
Conceptual models (along with the perspective in which they are conceived and the 
framework in which they are expressed) are constructed in the knowledge level, where 
agency can be modelled, while the system is built and operates at the register transfer level 
where values in predefined contexts are stored and manipulated. The implementation design 
is created within the layer that comes between the two, the symbol level, where direct 
representations of the world are stored and manipulated.  
Newell developed the idea of a knowledge level to address the limitations of 
representation in AI research at the time, proposing that the proper place for consider the 
artefacts of knowledge was the new, higher knowledge level where the idea of agency could 
be discussed. The knowledge/symbol level separation recast many problems in AI research 
as problems of articulation between the knowledge level and the symbol level, rather than 
(as had previously been proposed) one of increasingly sophisticated representations in the 
symbol level.  
This notion had existed previously: Gane and Sarson (1979) argued for such a 
division, between specification and implementation in systems analysis and design, quoting 
Brooks’s seminal Mythical Man Month (1975) :  
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The manual (specification) must not only describe everything the user does see, including all 
interfaces, it must also refrain from describing what the user does not see. That is the 
implementer's business, and there his freedom must be unconstrained. The architect (analyst) 
must always be prepared to show an implementation for any feature he describes. but must not 
attempt to dictate the implementation. (Brooks, 1975 quoted in Gane and Sarson, 1979) 
For most writers on data modelling, implementation comes as the last stage, better 
delegated to software engineering and quality control. Simsion (1994) explicitly sees the 
process of conceptual design ending in a series of pragmatic decisions that are out of the 
control of the designer.  
In database design and implementation, the process of implementation is seen as 
existing in two stages, with the role of the conceptual model in the database creation model 
set as an abstract plan, which could be realised in any number of ways according to which 
database system is preferred amongst the rival flavours. A more concrete blueprint, still 
independent of the final system to be put in use, is described in a logical model. The final 
specification itself, detailing exactly what system is to be built is called the physical model. 
These terms are mentioned explicitly from the very earliest data standards such as 
ANSI/X3/SPARC (Bachman, 1974; Brodie & Schmidt, 1982). 
This shifting of focus from the knowledge level to the symbol level permits the 
isolation of design from implementation, in that the tools within the knowledge level offer a 
necessary simplification. However, a standard critique of all KBS research has always been 
that in locating these considerations in the symbol level, there is a potential for creating 
potentially unworkable solutions; Brooks (1987) called this “chasing fiction”. Domingo and 
Sierra (Domingo & Sierra, 1997) describe such scepticism as “philosophical suspicions that 
a relation from such an abstract description and a concrete implementation framework could 
never be found.” In a review article of the knowledge level, Basden (A. Basden, 2002) sums 
this up: 
 The problem lies in the irreducibility of the knowledge level to the lower levels…, in that the 
very freedom this affords leaves the analyst and designer with little guidance on how to 
implement the desired system. (A. Basden, 2002) 
However, this criticism ignores the fact that even within the symbol level abstractions 
are possible. In fact, it was the evolved affordances in symbolic computing that permitted 
the widespread growth of computing in business. These structural affordances are present in 
the choices presented by the conceptual model. The design decisions are still isolated from 
the actual choices which are made in making a real-world computing or sociotechnical  
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system amount to a conceptual stipulation, i.e. bring it to the level where the intended 
declarative usages can be made of it (Gane & Sarson, 1979; Rosenbloom et al., 1989). 
Moreover, in all generally used implementation design systems, implementation designs are 
represented with maps (Busch, Richards, & Dampney, 2001; Diskin, 2005a; Diskin & 
Dingel, 2006, #67523; Rolland, 2007), which are a mechanism of sketch logic, and which in 
turn means that the work is simplified by a visual schemata afforded by an unambiguous 
symbology. The sketch logic maps and the symbology with which they are constructed form 
part of the framework as defined in definition 6. 
This representation of conceptual models with sketch maps can be seen in the classic 
Design Science case study, wherein the conceptual mechanism of the relational model 
(Codd, 1970, 1974) was ultimately represented by the implementation design mechanism of 
the Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD) (Chen, 1976, 1977). The benefits ascribed to the 
ERD and its extensions (Chen, 2002) can also be seen in (e.g.) the Object Relation Model 
(ORM) (Halpin, 1993, 1996) and the Unified Modelling Language (UML) (Booch & 
Rumbaugh, 1995; Booch, Rumbaugh, & Jacobson, 1996a, 1996b). In fact the ability to 
ignore the ultimate implementation of the designed system while being able to specify it 
closely is a much cited advantage of UML (e.g. Arlow, Emmerich, & Quinn, 1999), making 
a virtue of necessity.  
Common understanding of the sketch logic mechanisms enables implementation 
designs to serve as IS “blueprints” and gives them the power of symbol-level abstraction 
(Diskin, 2002; Siau & Cao, 2001; Siau & Tan, 2005; Siau & Tian, 2005). It also makes for 
the requirement of care in the creation of the sketching mechanism and the concomitant 
symbology. 
It is just such interpretable specifications that are required in the repurposing of 
knowledge solutions (Borgida, 2007), and their inclusion is the reason why an 
implementation design is necessarily located in the symbol level (Basden, 2002; Basden & 
Klein, 2008) (despite its being such an intensely cognitive task), and why the form of an 
implementation design must be a fourth major innovative design artefact of the current 
research, as defined in definition 10. 
Definition 10: Implementation design  
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An implementation design is the representation of a conceptual model with sketch 
logic according to a symbology established within an explicitly stated modelling 
framework. 
Within the context of creative design research, an implementation design is 
represented as an expository instantiation. 
B.7 A Terminology Crosswalk for Conceptual Modelling 
We have established required components for an informatic framework for conceptual 
modelling: an ontology, a symbology, a deontology and a methodology. There is now a 
requirement for aligning these terms with sets of terminology used by other researchers into 
conceptual modelling frameworks. 
At first glance, there appears to be a consistent usage of linguistic terminology to 
describe conceptual modelling frameworks and research methods for evaluating and 
comparing them. The work of Lindland et al. (1994), Burton-Jones et al. (2009) and 
Guizzardi (2005) independantly establishes such systems. All three arrive at requirements 
for a syntax, pragmatics, and semantics for conceptual modelling systems. The systems are 
considered to have grammars, and to have an intrinsic sense of correctness. 
Aligning the target goals in the current research is not straightforward as the 
terminologies have different derivations, and each has extended the semantic fields of 
existing terms from other disciplines, and they have ended up with varying meanings. This 
section provides a 'crosswalk' between the terms used in this thesis and those used by these 
three separate research traditions (summarised in Table B.1). 
Table B.1 Terminology crosswalk for key terms 
Current Research  Linland  Burton‐Jones Guizzardi 
Perspective ‐   ‐ UML
Telos ‐   ‐ Ontology
Framework  Framework  Grammar Language
Ontology  Semantics  Semantics
Semantics, Concrete Syntax, 
Abstract Syntax  Symbology  Alphabet 
Grammar and syntax 
Deontology  Grammar and syntax 
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Methodology ‐   Method and 
pragmatics 
Pragmatics
Conceptual model  Model  Script Diagram
Note: The reference are Lindland: Lindland et al. (1994), Burton‐Jones: Burton‐Jones et al. (2009) and 
Guizzardi: Guizzardi (2005) 
Lindland et al. (1994) derive their usage metaphorically: conceptual modelling is “is 
essentially making statements in some language” (Lindland et al., 1994 p. 42). Accordingly, 
they use linguistic terms for conceptual modelling systems: syntax, semantics and 
pragmatics. Syntax  
relates the model to the modeling language by describing relations among language constructs 
without considering their meaning. (1994, pp. 44-45) 
Semantics 
relates the model to the domain by considering not only syntax, but also relations among 
statements and their meaning. (1994, pp. 44-45). 
Pragmatics 
relates the model to audience participation by considering not only syntax and semantics, but 
also how the audience (anyone involved in modeling) will interpret them. (1994, pp. 44-45) 
This enables Lindland et al. To define a modelling language formally: 
The modeling language, L, consists of all the statements that can be made according to the 
syntax, which for most languages is an infinite number. L's syntax is formed by an alphabet and 
a grammar. The alphabet contains a set of modeling constructs, each of which has a unique 
notation, which are the building blocks for the conceptual model. The grammar contains rules 
that define how to legally combine modeling constructs. […] L also has semantics, which 
defines the meaning of L's constructs and thus the statements' implications. Semantics may 
contain deduction rules explaining how new statements can be derived from statements already 
made. (1994, pp. 44-45 italics added) 
Accordingly, the framework symbology is to be equated to the modelling language 
alphabet, while the framework deontology and methodology is to be equated with the 
modelling language grammar and syntax. Utterances within the language are conceptual 
models just as in the current research. Methodology is deliberately excluded, and there is no 
discussion of either perspective or telos. 
Burton-Jones et al. (2009) build on Wand & Weber (Wand & Weber, 2002) 
(following from the guidelines laid down in Wand et al., 1995) and are treated together as 
they are all output of the same research group. They use the mechanism of a formal language 
to investigate conceptual modelling, which establishes the rules for operating within the  
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system, ensures verifiability of an instance of usage for that system, and (ideally) permits the 
creation of automatic parsers and generators for the system (Salomaa, 1987). 
There are a number of benefits to considering a system of description as a formal 
language: we know that certain components of formal languages must exist, and must 
cooperate in certain ways (Mateescu & Salomaa, 1997). Burton-Jones et al. draw on Parker 
and Riley (2005) and describe a conceptual modelling language using those components. 
There will be at heart a grammar that 
provides a set of constructs and a set of production rules that enable a user of the grammar to 
represent someone’s perception, or some group’s negotiated perception, of the semantics of a 
domain. 
Within the context of that grammar, a model becomes a script, which is sentence or a string 
that is  
a representation of the semantics of a domain, often diagrammatic, generated using a 
conceptual modeling grammar. (2009, p. 497) 
which in turn makes a modelling language 
the set of all scripts that can be generated via a conceptual modeling grammar (2009, p. 497). 
In a manner similar to Linland et al., Burton-Jones et al. Define syntax as 
[The] valid ways in which scripts can be created using a grammar or examining alternative 
ways that individuals form scripts using the grammar (2009, p. 497) 
semantics as 
the meaning of the constructs in the grammar, the meaning of production rules in the 
grammar, and the meaning of scripts generated via the grammar (2009, p. 497). 
and pragmatics as  
the meaning that different users assign to the constructs and production rules in the grammar 
and the scripts generated via the grammar. (2009, p. 497)  
Separately, Wand and Weber (2002) state that 
A conceptual-modeling method provides procedures by which a grammar can be used. (2002, p. .364) 
Significantly, Burton-Jones et al. (2009) and Wand and Weber (2002) do not use all 
of the standard mechanism of a formal language, folding the details of alphabet (which they 
term constructs) into the grammar. This makes it hard to use their terminology for 
investigating components of the conceptual modelling framework that they class under 
grammar (i.e. framework symbology and deontology): utterances within the language (i.e. 
conceptual models) are scripts. There is no discussion of either perspective or telos.  
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Guizzardi (2005) draws on the graphical grammar work of Harel and Rumpe (2000), 
which proposes a linguistic model based on the semiotic rather than the mathematical view 
of language, and focuses explicitlyon the needs of graphically- as well as textually-expressed 
conceptual models. It draws on the semiotics of Morris (1964). 
Guizzardi (2005) uses the terms to define two groups of modelling languages, 
diagrammatic (graphical) and sentential (textual). There are common features to both:  
In order to communicate, agents must agree on a common communication language. This fixes 
the sets of signs that can be exchanged (syntax) and how these signs can be combined in order 
to form valid expressions in the language (syntactical rules) (2005, p. 19)  
but they differ in the nature of their symbologies: In sentential languages the syntax is 
defined using 
an alphabet (set of characters) that can be grouped into valid sequences forming words. (2005, 
p. 19)  
while in a diagrammatic language 
the vocabulary of the language is not defined in terms of linear sequence of characters but in 
terms of pictorial signs. (2005, p. 20) 
Textual languages syntaxes have lexical layers for creating words, context-free 
grammars permitting words to be formed into sentences, and context-determined sentence-
forming rules. On the other hand, for graphical languages 
The set of available graphic modeling primitives forms the lexical layer (the concrete syntax) 
and the language's abstract syntax is typically defined in terms of an abstract visual graph […] 
or a metamodel specification. (Guizzardi, 2005, p. 20) 
To establish a common set of terms for both types of languages, a general mapping 
function (borrowed from Harel and Rumpe, 2000) is used: 
In general terms, a semantic definition for a language L consists of two parts: (i) a semantic 
domain D; (ii) a semantic mapping (or interpretation function) from the syntax to the semantic 
domain, formally  :   ➝  . The semantic mapping tells us about the meaning of each of the 
language's expressions in terms of an element of the semantic domain. (Guizzardi, 2005 p. 20) 
Guizzardi (2005) further draws a distinction with the other two traditions by arguing 
against a uniformity of semantic domain: he draws a distinction between ones that map back 
to non-mathematical domains and material domains which are the product of (e.g.) 
engineering, medicine, science and business (i.e. the product of artefacts). He cites Partridge 
(2002): 
Underlying the variety of forms of integrating data and applications there is a common 
semantic task – what can be called the 'semantic matching'. There is a reasonably clear  
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recognition that the analysis stage of this task needs to focus on identifying the entities that the 
data describes, i.e. the 'real-world semantics'. (Guizzardi, 2005, pp. 20-21) 
Guizzardi (2005) goes so far as to say that concentrating on the formal semantics of 
language at the expense of representability is a potentially dangerous distraction. He cites 
Ferreira Pires (1994):  
Designers should concentrate on the elaboration of models, using the modeling language 
merely as a vehicle far the representation of design characteristics. A modeling language can 
only be useful for its community of users, if its vocabulary, syntax, semantic and pragmatics, 
are defined based on the needs of this community far the elaboration of specifications. This 
view, supported here, emphasizes the precedence of real-world concepts aver mathematical 
concepts in the design and evaluation of modeling languages or, in other words, the precedence 
of real-world semantics aver purely mathematical semantics. (Guizzardi, 2005 p. 21) 
The equivalent of the symobology and deontology are represented by a number of 
syntactic formalisms, methodology is represented by pragmatics and a conceptual model is 
given the formalism of a diagram. Unlike the previous two modelling traditions discussed, 
there are explicit statements of perspective and telos: however perspective is restricted to 
general ontologies represented in UML: the telos is the representation of the conceptual 
modelling of ontologies in UML, which different to that of the current research. 
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Appendix C  
 
Criteria for Evaluation 
 
C.1 Criteria for exemplars for a research pattern 
As exemplars for the current research, informatic traditions chosen as exemplars must 
exhibit design artefacts that match those of the current research (here termed 
appropriateness). In addition, the exemplars must satisfy those necessary attributes of design 
theories identified by (Gregor & Jones, 2007) (here termed completeness), as well as having 
superempirical virtues (Allix, 2003; Laudan, 1981) necessary for them to constitute 
informatic traditions (here termed coherence). 
C.1.1 Criteria for template exemplar selection 
Although Gregor & Jones describe the attributes for design theories, and the necessity 
for the research for a template (Gregor & Jones, 2007), they do not describe how to choose 
exemplars for making the template. Since theirs is a generalised design framework, we can 
make use of the generalised evaluative principles of congruence and coherence (Allix, 2003) 
to supply criteria for exemplar selection. We can establish a set of criteria for template 
exemplar selection: 
As exemplars for the current research, informatic traditions chosen as exemplars must 
exhibit design artefacts that match those of the current research, here termed 
appropriateness. The exemplars must exhibit design artefacts that are functionally and 
teleologically comparable to those in the research being undertaken (Schiller & 
Mandviwalla, 2007) 
•  Similarity of objectives: is the theory “descriptive, normative, prescriptive, and/or 
developmental?” (2007 pp28-29) 
•  Similarity of perspective: is the perspective similar in terms of “social setting, 
organizing concepts, dynamics of technical diffusion, technology, and workplace 
ideology”? (2007 pp32) 
 
Additionally, the exemplars must satisfy those necessary attributes of design theories 
identified by (Gregor & Jones, 2007), here termed completeness. The exemplars must satisfy  
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the eight necessary attributes of design theories identified by Gregor & Jones, described in 
section C.1.3. It is necessary that all of these attributes are present for the exemplar to be 
complete in this sense. 
Finally, the exemplars must have superempirical virtues (Laudan, 1981) necessary for 
them to constitute intellectual traditions, here termed coherence. For selecting an exemplar 
in informatics, coherence comprises simplicity, consistency, conservatism, 
comprehensiveness, fecundity, explanatory unity, refutability, and learnability (Allix, 2003). 
It is not enough that they can be inferred; there must be an intentional attempt to achieve 
these attributes. Moreover, all of them must be present for coherence to be established. 
With these criteria established, we can now look at the exemplars selected. 
C.1.2 Appropriateness for the current research 
Firstly, following Gregor & Jones, the exemplars must be close enough to the current 
research to be of use as Alexander Patterns. There must be a match-up artefacts as design 
goals to the current research project. If there is not a similar research arc, then a research 
programme cannot serve as an exemplar.  
Effectively, this is operationalising the current research for pragmatic purposes, so 
that all of the key research targets can be matched: if the research tradition matches for these 
criteria it may be considered as an exemplar for a Gregor & Jones Alexander Pattern. 
This set of criteria is used to confirm that an informatic tradition selected as an 
exemplar for making an Alexander pattern is similar enough to the current research to be 
useful. This set operates in addition to the requirements for Gregor & Jones completeness 
and research tradition coherence described above. 
The appropriateness criteria require that exemplars must exhibit design artefacts that 
are functionally and teleologically comparable to those in the research being undertaken 
(Schiller & Mandviwalla, 2007). 
C.1.2.1 Appropriateness criteria for primary research path 
In the current research, we have as a telos the creation of a novel principled 
perspective, created with the explicit purpose of solving intractable informatic problems. 
This has to be an explicit heuristic rather than an accident of existing research outcomes. 
This perspective is being driven a metaphoric resituating of existing tasks and procedures 
with a view to creating a better understanding of them with the least disruption possible. In  
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addition to the metaphoric resituating, we are looking to underpin the novel perspective with 
a kernel theory from an established philosophical tradition that can give a structured 
descriptive framework for the domain studied. 
Additionally we have the creation of a toolset within that framework, with the intent 
that they can be used to explain existing practices and create conceptual models for 
improved practices. Again, this must be an intentional part of the research, stated explicitly 
at the outset rather than an outcome of research results. 
 
Table C.1 Appropriateness Criteria for Exemplar Selection 
Attribute  Questions to ask
Perspective as design goal Does the research program begin with the intention of creating a 
new perspective as a problem solving heuristic? 
Perspective the outcome of 
metaphoric resituation 
Does the research program commence with metaphoric resituating 
of existing practices?
Perspective drawing on untried 
philosophical basis 
Does the research involve looking for new philosophical principles 
on which to base the research?
Perspective used to create 
framework 
Does the research set out to create a modelling framework? 
Framework used to create 
models 
Is the framework designed to create conceptual models? 
Model implementable  Are those conceptual models of sufficient clarity and detail to 
permit the creation of implementation designs? 
 
 
C.1.2.2 Appropriateness criteria for second research path 
For the second research path, we have as a telos the creation of a transactioning 
language for recording details of the exchanges between participants in a conversation. This 
proceeds by identification and classification of the principal speech acts, creating an F(P) 
representation of those speech acts, and subsequently creating a formal language based on 
that representation. This formal language must be both human-readable and machine-
readable (in the same way as SQL) 
As with the pattern criteria for the primary research path, all of these steps must 
intentional and it must be explicitly stated that this is the case. This formal language must be  
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intended for recording real events, and examples of it in use must be given. Ideally the 
research program would have been seen as of sufficient use to put into practice.  
These criteria are listed in Table C.2 
Table C.2 Appropriateness Criteria for Exemplar Selection 
Attribute  Questions
Formal language for 
transactioning as design 
goal 
Does the research program begin with the intention of creating a 
new formal language for recording significant transactions 
within already observed communications? 
Methodology is investigation 
and typing of speech acts in 
conversation 
Does the research program commence with an analysis of typical 
conversations with turntaking, and classify those conversations 
using a speech acts typology?
F(P) representation of the 
generic speech acts 
Does the research program create an F(P) framework for the 
generic speech acts?
Formal language (including) 
EBNF created from the F(P) 
representation  
Does the research produce a formal language expressed as an 
Extended Backus Naur Form grammar? 
Formal language is human‐ and 
machine‐readable 
Is the formal language expressed in a way that is human‐ and 
machine‐readable?
Expository instantiations of the 
formal language given
Does the exposition of the work include expository instantiations? 
Language adopted and used to 
some extent 
Was the final system used in production so that the efficacy of the 
approach was shown? 
 
 
C.1.3 Gregor & Jones completeness 
Next, it must be established that the exemplars have all of the Gregor & Jones 
necessary attributes of a design science theory. The following list of attributes are taken 
directly from (Gregor & Jones, 2007 p 323): 
•  Purpose and scope: are they clearly stated? 
•  Constructs: are they described clearly? 
•  Principles: are principles of form and function incorporating underlying constructs 
given? 
•  Artefact mutability: is artefact mutability established? 
•  Testable propositions: is the artefact capable of producing testable propositions? 
•  Justificatory knowledge: is the kernel theory proving justificatory knowledge 
explicitly given? 
•  Principles of implementation: are the principles of implementing a primary artefact 
with the theory artefact given clearly and in a form that can be followed? (This 
criterion is optional in Gregor & Jones) 
•  Expository instantiation: does the exposition of the theory provides instantiations of 
primary artefacts demonstrating that it can work in practice? (This criterion is also 
optional in Gregor & Jones)  
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Again, if the research tradition matches for these criteria it may be considered as an 
exemplar for a Gregor & Jones Alexander Pattern. 
C.1.4 Explanatory coherence 
The exemplar must meet the criteria for a coherent informatic tradition
135. The criteria 
are chosen from the summarising list of attributes presented in Allix (2003) but are to be 
found in most philosophy of science treatments (e.g., Chalmers, 1976; Thagard, 1992a, 
1992b), namely 
 simplicity, consistency, conservatism, comprehensiveness, fecundity, explanatory 
unity, refutability, and learnability (Allix, 2003) 
It is not enough that they can be inferred; there must be an intentional attempt to 
achieve these attributes. Moreover, all of them must be present for coherence to be 
established. 
C.2 Criteria for kernel theory selection 
Although criteria for kernel theory selection are held to be essential for the principled 
construction of design theories (Iivari, 2005), there are no such criteria in Walls et al. (1992), 
Markus et al (2002) or Gregor & Jones (2007). We know that any set of selection criteria for 
kernel theories must instantiate the generalised nature of evaluation (section C.1.4 above), 
and the criteria themselves conform to the principles of congruence and coherence. 
Schiller and Mandviwalla (2007) establish such a selection framework, providing six 
criteria for selecting a kernel theory. Four of these conform to the principle of congruence 
(concerning the homology between the design and kernel theories) while two conform to the 
principle of coherence (concerning the quality of the kernel theory itself). The criteria 
pertaining to congruence are 
•  Similarity of objectives: is the theory “descriptive, normative, prescriptive, and/or 
developmental?” (Schiller & Mandviwalla, 2007 pp28-29) 
•  Appropriateness to the design research: is the theory appropriate to the phenomena 
being studied? (Schiller & Mandviwalla, 2007 pp29) 
                                                      
 
135 see definition 2  
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•  Causal structure of kernel theory: are the kernel and design theories similar in terms 
of the causal relationship between factors and design objectives? (Schiller & 
Mandviwalla, 2007 pp31-2) 
•  Similarity of perspective: is the perspective similar in terms of “social setting, 
organizing concepts, dynamics of technical diffusion, technology, and workplace 
ideology”? (Schiller & Mandviwalla, 2007 pp32) 
The criteria pertaining to coherence: 
•  Robustness of kernel theory: is it part of a cumulative tradition with explanatory 
power? (Schiller & Mandviwalla, 2007 pp29-30) 
•  Quality of kernel theory: does the kernel theory demonstrate the attributes of 
principled research? (Schiller & Mandviwalla, 2007 pp30-31) 
 
The congruence criteria serve to ensure an overall match between the kernel theory 
and the design theory: this avoids undue recontextualisation of the kernel theory, which 
would undermine the justificatory power of the design theory (Iivari, 2005). Explicitly 
stating the reasoning behind each criteria ensures that the kernel theory are not selected for 
lip-service, but have been part of the research process (Iivari, 2007). Adherence to the 
complete set of criteria stops the selection for reasons of superficial similarity. Errors that 
can arise in the kernel theory selection process, and in the selection of reference disciplines 
more broadly, are discussed in section 3.4.1. 
The coherence criteria serve to ensure that only established rigorous theoretical 
constructs get used as kernel theories. In particular, it should prevent theories being chosen 
for homological reasons alone, that are otherwise unsatisfactory in terms of their own 
research path. 
C.3 Criteria for template exemplar selection 
Although Gregor & Jones describe the attributes for design theories, and the necessity 
for the research for a template (Gregor & Jones, 2007), they do not describe how to choose 
exemplars for making the template.   
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Since theirs is a generalised design framework, we can make use of the generalised 
evaluative principles of congruence and coherence (section C.1.4 above) to supply criteria 
for exemplar selection. We can establish a set of criteria for template exemplar selection:
136 
•  Appropriateness: the exemplars must exhibit design artefacts that are functionally and 
teleologically comparable to those in the research being undertaken (Schiller & 
Mandviwalla, 2007), as discussed in section C.1.2 above  
•  Completeness: the exemplars must satisfy the eight necessary attributes of design 
theories identified by Gregor & Jones (2007), as discussed in C.1.3 above 
•  Coherence: the exemplars must have superempirical virtues (Allix, 2003; Laudan, 
1981) necessary for them to constitute informatic traditions as discussed in section 
C.2 above 
 
These criteria are used in Appendices D and E to derive a research pattern from two 
informatic traditions: the Language/Action Perspective (Flores & Ludlow, 1980; Weigand, 
2006; Winograd & Flores, 1986) and Organisational Semiotics (Gazendam & Liu, 2005; R. 
K. Stamper, 1973). Both of these informatic traditions have established informatics 
perspectives, and then frameworks within those perspectives, and subsequently proceeded to 
build real-world systems within those frameworks with a range of demonstrable 
implementations. 
Other candidate systems are Simula (Brandt & Knudsen, 1996; Dahl, 1962; Dahl & 
Nygaard, 1963, 1965; Handlykken & Nygaard, 1981; Kristensen et al., 1985, 1995; Nygaard 
& Dahl, 1966, 1981), Gestalt Programming (Ross, 1956, 1959, 1960, 1977; Ross & 
Schoman Jr, 1977), Frames (Bobrow & Winograd, 1977; R. Brachman & Schmolze, 1985; 
Gennari et al., 2003; Karp, 1992; Minsky, 1974; Roberts & Goldstein, 1977) and Smalltalk 
(Goldberg & Kay, 1976; Daniel Ingalls, 1981; Dan Ingalls et al., 1997; Kay, 1967, 1969, 
1993; Kay & Goldberg, 1977).  
These all follow the same trajectory and pursue similar design goals, so they could 
also have served as exemplars. The number of potential exemplars suggests that the 
metaphor-driven paradigm meta-artefact creation is a widespread phenomenon. 
                                                      
 
136 We note that these map to the Schiller and Mandviwalla (2007) criteria discussed in section C.2 above, as 
would be expected of sibling forms of intellectual reliance..  
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C.4 Establishing a criteria set for docking meta-models 
As stated in the previous section, existing extensions of docking and triangulation 
permit sole-practitioner research using the mutual assurance of multiple models of complex 
systems. In this thesis, a conceptual modelling construct set is elaborated separately into two 
representational systems based on different modalities
137, which are then used to create 
conceptual models as implementations according to the strictures of Gregor & Jones (2007) 
for a representative range of knowledge systems. 
By developing separately two modelling frameworks of differing modalities from the 
same core constructs, and demonstrating that they are both adequate to the representation all 
of the complexities of those constructs and congruent with each other, confirmation by 
docking can be achieved. To enable this, we can employ Aier criteria (Aier & Fischer, 2009, 
2011) for comparing design theories that conform to the Gregor and Jones (2007) model that 
we discussed in section 3.2 above.  
Although developed for comparing rival theories to detect progress, they can logically 
be used to compare two meta-models for equal representational adequacy. These criteria 
conform with the principles established previously in this chapter, so give an 
operationalising mechanism for the docking process to occur: 
•  Utility: “how ‘well’ a design theory fulfills its purpose and scope” 
•  Internal consistency: “consistency between the theory’s elements, both among 
elements of the same type and between different types of element”. This conforms to 
the principle of coherence. 
•  External consistency: consistency “with the IS knowledge base”. This conforms to the 
principle of congruence.  
•  Generality: whether the “scope and purpose of a design theory can be enlarged by 
adapting the artifact to different purposes and scopes without its usefulness 
decreasing”. This conforms to the principle of generalisability. 
•  Simplicity: that the design theory in both content and definition be as simple as 
possible (but no further). 
•  Potential for further research: whether the design theory can lead to further research 
based on it, or whether it is a cul-de-sac leading only to rote artefact creation. 
                                                      
 
137 One based on Speech Acts (J. L. Austin, 1962) following Kimbrough & Lee (Kimbrough & Lee, 1986), and 
one based on Category Theory (Barr & Wells, 1990; Eilenberg & MacLane, 1945) following Dampney et al. (C.N.G 
Dampney et al., 1993)  
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Implicit in these criteria is the conception of representational adequacy; however, 
such considerations (though touched on) are not included in either of the Aier et al papers 
(Aier & Fischer, 2009, 2011; Aier & Gleichauf, 2010). However, we can established criteria 
for adequacy for docking the meta-models using existing systems knowledge representation 
comparisons. In this thesis we are combining Bench-Capon’s criteria for Knowledge 
Representation (1990) with Reichgelt’s criteria based on levels of applicability (1991) after 
the manner of Bingi et al (Bingi et al., 1995).
138 
Bench-Capon’s criteria are for representational adequacy, expressiveness, notational 
convenience, relevance, and declarative representation:
139 
  Representational adequacy: it must be adequate to the task of representing the 
universe of discourse that it is serving. This break down into three separate 
adequacies: 
○  Metaphysical adequacy: “it must be the case that there is no contradiction 
between the facts that we wish to represent and our representation of them.” 
(1990 p.13) 
○  Epistemic adequacy: “the representation must provide us with the ability to 
express the facts that we wish to express” (1990 p.14) 
○  Heuristic adequacy: “the representation must be itself capable of expressing 
the reasoning that is gone through in solving a problem” (1990 p.14)  
  Expressiveness: “not only can one say what one means, but also that one can say it 
clearly and without ambiguity.” (1990 p.15) 
○  Lack of ambiguity: “The requirement to be unambiguous means that every 
valid expression in the representation should have one and only one 
interpretation.” (1990 p.16) Bench-Capon goes on to state: “This is essentially 
the requirement that the semantics of the representation be well defined.” 
(1990 p.16) so an alternative name for the criteria, which we shall use, is well-
defined semantics.  
○  Clarity: “the representation must be amenable to understanding by people, 
even those who may not be entirely immersed in the particular representation 
formalism.” (1990 p.16) 
○  Uniformity: “all knowledge of a given type [must be] represented in the same 
                                                      
 
138 Bingi et al’s framework for comparison is directed at computer-based representational systems, not conceptual 
modelling frameworks, so could not be used here. Their rationale for combination has, however, been followed. 
139 Bench-Capon’s requirement for Computational Tractability is intended to assess computer-stored knowledge 
representational systems, and is not appropriate for a conceptual modelling framework, and accordingly so has been left out 
here  
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way, and that we have principled reasons for choosing how to represent a 
particular item of knowledge” (1990 p.16). Bench-Capon goes on to state: 
“The criterion of uniformity is thus suggesting that in any given system, the 
manner of representing a given item of knowledge should not be an arbitrary 
choice” (1990 p.16) 
  Notational convenience: the notation system must be convenient to use in practice 
(1990 p.17) 
  Relevance: the representation must be relevant to the universe of discourse which it 
serves. (1990 p.17)  
  Declarative representation: “ the meanings of the statements are independent of the 
use made of them.” (1990 p.17). Bench-Capon goes on to state that the usages of the 
representation system must have “the property of referential transparency” (1990 
p.17) so a useful alternative name for this criteria would be referential transparency. 
Reichgelt’s criteria are based on adequacy criteria at the levels of applicability: 
logical, epistemological and conceptual
140, focusing on the two aspects of notational (the 
way in which information is stored explicitly) and inferential (the way in which implicit 
information can be derived from the representation): 
  Logical Level: “the logical properties of the knowledge representation formalism” 
○  Clear semantics: the representation system “should clearly specify what the 
meanings are of the syntactically well formed expressions” (1990 p.259) 
○  Compositionality: “it should be possible to completely determine the meaning 
of a complex expression on the basis of the meanings of the simpler 
expressions that make up the complex expression, and the way in which they 
have been syntactically combined.” (1990 p.259) 
○   Sound inference rules: “if the information that is explicitly stored in the 
knowledge base is true, then the implicit information that can be retrieved 
using the inference rules should be true as well.” (1990 pp259-60) 
  Epistemological level: this level is concerned with “the knowledge structuring 
primitives that are needed for a satisfactory knowledge representation language and 
the types of inference strategy that should be made available” (1990 p.258) 
○  Naturalness: The organisations possible with the representations must match 
the potential organisation of the knowledge. (1990 p.260) 
○  Modularity: The representation should be modular to the extent that the 
representation system should be adequately changeable to match the kinds of 
changes possible in the knowledge to be stored. (1990 p.260) 
○  Granularity: The granularity of representation should match the granularity 
                                                      
 
140 As with Bench-Capon’s criteria, parts of Reichgelt’s criteria set are intended to assess computer-stored KR 
systems rather than a conceptual modelling framework: Reichgelt’s implementation level with it’s criteria of time- and 
space-efficiency has been omitted.  
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found in the knowledge to be represented. (1990 p.260) 
○  Alignment with the conceptual level: the representation system “should 
support whatever actual primitives one chooses at the conceptual level.” (1990 
p.260) 
  Conceptual level: this is concerned with “the actual primitives that should be included 
in a knowledge representation language.” 
○  Conciseness: the principle of parsimony should be observed, both for notation 
and inferences (1990 p.261) 
Based on Bench-Capon’s descriptions of the purposes for his adequacy criteria 
(1990), Reichgelt’s description of both levels and criteria (1991), and the consolidation 
principles outlined in Bingi et al (1995)
141 we can arrive at a composite 19-item criteria set 
shown in C.3, which we shall use for docking criteria. 
 
Table C.3 Conceptual modelling framework adequacy criteria 
Level  Criteria
Logical Level  Well‐defined semantics
Compositionality
Sound inference rules
Heuristic adequacy
Uniformity
Declarative representation
Epistemological level  Relevance
Metaphysical adequacy
Epistemic adequacy
Naturalness of Expressiveness
Modularity 
Granularity
Alignment with the conceptual level
Conceptual level  Conciseness
Notational convenience
                                                      
 
141 Bingi et al have a different goal in their rationalisation of Bench-Capon and Reichgelt, which is why their 
criteria set cannot be used directly.  
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Clarity of Expressiveness
 
In the current research modelling frameworks based in string logic and sketch logic 
will be developed, and shown to be both adequate to representation of functional entities and 
congruent with each other. This will provide docking confirmation of the systems and the 
underlying constructs, as well as the viability of the overall erotetic perspective.  
By subsequent usage of both modelling tools to create representations of trial 
knowledge domains that are equally adequate and representative, further confirmation can 
be achieve of both adequacy and utility. Docking can again be applied to the outcome of 
each appraisal. Drawing on the Aier et al criteria, and leaving aside criteria that are not 
logically applicable for docking (such as potential for further research) and those covered by 
the criteria for representational adequacy, we arrive at a useful set of docking criteria (see 
Table 1). 
It is important to stress that the criteria are applicable only when the criteria for 
representational adequacy have been met. Only then can the congruence be established. In 
other words, what is to be found congruent must have already been found to function as 
representationally adequate, and the congruence must be total. This means that the Aier et al 
criteria for coherence, utility, internal consistency, external consistency, consistency with IS 
knowledge base, generality and simplicity remain significant, but have already been 
established for both modelling frameworks under consideration. 
The docking criteria for verified, adequate, generalised and useful frameworks is 
therefore: 
•  Congruence of top level constructs: There must be a congruence of the top level 
constructs of each system, this means that for each construct that is significant in one 
system them must be one found in the other system 
•  Congruence of construct perspective alignment: There must be congruence of 
alignment with the perspective between constructs, that is there must be an alignment 
of the constructs for each system that have already been aligned with the 
underpinning perspective. 
•  Congruence of construct instantiation alignment: There must be congruence of 
constructs aligning with test problem entities; that is, there must be alignment of the 
constructs of each system with the dominant entities and their attributes in the test  
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problems. 
•  Mutual encompassing of domains and situations: The domains covered and the 
situations to be modelled by each framework must be the same, or a referentially 
transparent combinatory mechanism to achieve this must exist. 
•  Intertranslatability of construct compound expressions: There must be 
intertranslatability of expressions using top level constructs; that is, expressions 
written in one system must be translatable to the other system. 
Table	C.4	Docking	Criteria	for	Frameworks	
Criterion  Details
Congruence of top level constructs  There must be congruence of the top level 
constructs of each system.
Congruence of construct perspective alignment There must be congruence of alignment with the 
perspective between constructs. 
Congruence of construct instantiation alignment There must be congruence of constructs aligning 
with test problem entities.
Mutual encompassing of domains and situations The domains covered and the situations to be 
modelled by each framework must be the same. 
Intertranslatability of modelling expressions Expressions created using top level constructs 
must be intertranslatable.
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Appendix D  
 
The Language/Action Perspective as a Design 
Pattern 
 
In this appendix we examine the Language/Action Perspective (Flores & Ludlow, 
1980; Weigand, 2006; Winograd & Flores, 1986) in order to create a design pattern for 
conducting research into a perspective and modelling framework. We will draw on the 
reflective practice of Gregor (2007) as well as standard principles within the philosophy of 
science to establish criteria for suitable exemplars. We will then use those criteria to select 
an informatic tradition, and examine them for suitable research steps. 
D.1 Criteria for design pattern exemplar selection 
It was established in section 3.1 that a template for a design pattern must form to 
criteria for appropriateness, completeness and coherence. This conformance will be checked 
off in section D.2.3 below, but first the specific criteria for appropriateness must be 
established.  
Effectively, establishing these criteria is operationalising the current research for 
pragmatic purposes, so that all of the key research targets can be matched. For the main 
design pattern for the current research these are: 
1)  The perspective must have been created with a view to making conceptual 
models. There must be an identifiable and equally separable framework 
comprising a graphical language for this modelling and a set of guidelines to use 
them.  
2)  There must be an explicitly created, separable, perspective established logically 
from a discernible conceptual metaphor. If the perspective did not follow this 
trajectory, then there is no reason to assume that the path taken will be useful. 
3)  The conceptual models must permit the creation of useful design 
implementations. Only a conceptual model that can be interpreted by a 
knowledge engineer and used for the creation of a design implementation, and 
thence an implementation, will be useful. Since utility is a core concern of the  
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creation of design artefacts, abstract conceptual models will be insufficient for the 
purposes of the current research. 
4)  In terms of the linguistic framing of a conceptual modelling framework (after 
Linland et. al. 1994, and Burton-Jones et. al., 2009) we need to find examples of a 
language, a syntax, a grammar, a symbology and instances of the framework 
being used for the creation of conceptual modelling scripts devolving into 
implementation designs. These must be seen to be constructed according to an 
explicitly stated methodology 
If the research tradition matches for these criteria it may be considered as an exemplar 
for a Gregor & Jones Alexander Pattern. 
D.2 Examining the Language/Action Perspective 
This section concerns the description of the two classic informatic traditions chosen 
as exemplars for the establishment of an Alexander Pattern for a conceptual modelling 
informatic tradition. The informatic traditions chosen were the Language/Action Perspective 
(Flores & Ludlow, 1980; Weigand, 2006; Winograd & Flores, 1986) and Organisational 
Semiotics (Gazendam & Liu, 2005; R. K. Stamper, 1973). Both of these informatic 
traditions have established informatics perspectives, and then frameworks within those 
perspectives, and subsequently proceeded to build real-world systems within those 
frameworks with a range of demonstrable implementations. 
In this section a justification is made for the use of the Language/Action Perspective 
informatic tradition as an exemplar. In section D.2.1, a brief history of the L/AP is given, 
together with extensive extracts from some of its primary source material. This level of 
detail is required to demonstrate the conformance of the development of the L/AP with the 
design science method. In section D.2.2, the history of its development is examined to 
demonstrate its fitness as an exemplar for the Alexander Pattern, finally a literature-justified 
checklist of the requirements is presented. 
D.2.1 An introduction to the Language/Action Perspective informatic 
tradition 
The Language/Action Perspective (L/AP) (Flores & Ludlow, 1980) is an informatic 
research tradition established at Stanford University in the late 1970s by the Chilean emigre 
Fernando Flores. It seeks a solution to the problem “How can IT play a role in improving 
human communication in organisations and in society as a whole?”(Weigand, 2006) Flores  
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(an engineer by training) drew on his experience as Minister of Finance for Chile 
142 and his 
subsequent gaol-time reading of the philosophers Austin, Searle, Gadamer, Heidegger and 
Habermas and the systems theorists Maturana and Varela (Flores, 1982) to design a new 
way of seeing how computers could assist people in that most fundamental of human 
activity, communication. As Flores put it: 
We human beings are linguistic, social, emotional animals that co-invent a world through language 
[…] that means that reality is not formed by objects. That opens a different world of possibilities. 
(Flores interviewed in Fisher, 2009) 
 
L/AP was founded as a reaction to the dominant model of organisational informatics 
at the time, which failed (according to Flores) in two respects: 
The first is the common belief that design should be dominated by the desires of the user…The 
structure of the interactions is not chosen or agreed upon by the users, but rather must reflect the 
structure of the deeds performed.  
The second erroneous notion results from a poor understanding of communication. Although we agree 
with the consensus that communication is the crucial element in the office, we disagree with the notion 
that communication is merely the transmission of information or symbols. (Flores & Ludlow, 1980) 
The first point means that the system should be judged as a system in and of itself, not 
as something that exists to gratify the whims of the user. This holistic approach to system 
evaluation is inherited from the Chilean systems thinking of Maturana and Varela (Fisher, 
2009; Flores, 1982). As a systemic approach Flores was also influenced by working with the 
Systems thinker Beer (Flores, 1982) who saw the solution to complex problems in designing 
viable systems (Beer, 1972, 1974, 1984). 
The second point meant revisiting the nature of what occured in communication, and 
deriving a new perspective from the ideas of language of Austin and Searle. It is this new 
perspective that gives the research tradition its name. Contrasted with the Shannon and 
Weaver (Shannon, 1949a, 1949b) model of communication prevalent at the time, which 
portrayed communication as comprising transmitted statements from an active transmitter 
(speaker) to a passive receiver (listener), LAP saw communication as sets of Searle’s speech 
acts, which amount to actions in the world: 
                                                      
 
142 Flores's work there included creating with Stafford Beer (the English systems theorist) Cybersyn, a 
generalised system for the reporting and control of the entire Chilean economy  
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The fundamental assumption of LAP is that language is not only used for exchanging information 
about the world, as in reports and statements, but also for changing the (social) world, for example, by 
means of promises, orders, and declarations. LAP emphasizes the patterns of speech acts by which 
humans create a common understanding, and how they coordinate their activities on the basis of this 
common understanding. (Weigand, 2006) 
 
There are five kinds of speech acts in Searle’s philosophy (1975a, 1975b): Assertives, 
Directives, Commissives, Declarations and Expressives
143. Each of these can occur within 
four different kinds of conversations: for Action, for Orientation, for Clarification and for 
Possibility (Winograd, 1987 p. 207). 
Conversations for Action are where the LAP is mostly concerned (Winograd, 1987 p. 
207). The LAP holds that informatic systems best serve the needs of people by supporting 
their shared reality, and therefore a fortiori must represent the inherent human characteristic 
of cooperative endeavour, best seen in the coordination of workflow in organisations. This is 
best seen in organisations because organisations exist because of the communication 
between participants. As Winograd and Flores say: 
[organisations] exist as networks of directives and commissives. These directives include orders, 
requests, consultations, or offers; commissives include promises, acceptances, denial. (Winograd & 
Flores, 1986 p 157) 
 
 Within this context, informatic systems serve as coordinators for those actions, 
therefore they can only coherently be portrayed as contextualised as the context gives them 
meaning (i.e., they are fundamentally socially- and politically-embedded). 
This was an intentional act of repositioning on the part of Flores, and in his 
dissertation he states explicitly it is part of his research methodology: 
It is fundamental to such an approach to see management and communication within a unified 
perspective, but in order to do this we need to abandon the misleading view that sees the essentials of 
management in the transmission and processing of information and in making decisions by merely 
choosing among alternatives. (Flores, 1982 p XI) 
and 
To this end, we have explored many different intellectual traditions, resolving finally to found our 
work on two of these: the philosophy of language in the tradition of Austin and Searle, and, 
Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity, as interpreted by Hubert Dreyfus. (Flores, 1982 p I) 
                                                      
 
143 For speech act theorists, directives are those utterances which are orders, commissives are those utterances 
which are promises to carrying our actions in the future.  
 
 
 
5
 
Building on Searle and Dreyfus, Flores created a new approach, with two stated aims 
(Flores & Ludlow, 1980): 
•  Focussing on a model of organisational communication which is conversational, and 
build tools for communication which make that possible. 
•  Seeing the world as a shared description rather than an objective reality, and build 
systems that reflect that shared description. 
Together with Stanford AI pioneer Terry Winograd, Flores fleshed out a fully 
explicated version of the L/AP, which resulted in the classic text “Understanding Computers 
and Cognition: A New Foundation for Design” (Winograd & Flores, 1986). Working within 
this informatic tradition, Flores and his colleagues designed and implemented a range of 
commercially successful software (The Coordinator and Action Workflow), organisational 
tools (Business Design) and training systems (Logonet and Landmark) (P. H. Jones, 2010). 
Flores and Winograd were joined in their work by European researchers (G. Goldkuhl 
& Lyytinen, 1982) who had started slightly earlier but whose work was based on the same 
set of philosophical principles. A series of conferences has been held annually since, and 
despite some major critiques from rival philosophical positions (e.g. Suchman, 1993) and 
restatements of position (e.g. de Michelis & Grasso, 1994; Winograd, 2006)), it continues to 
inform research and design to this day (Ågerfalk, Goldkuhl, Fitzgerald, & Bannon, 2006; 
Dietz, 2006; Dietz, de Moor, & Schoop, 2006; Göran Goldkuhl, 2006; Te'eni, 2006; 
Weigand, 2006; Winograd, 2006). 
The ability to be critiqued and self-modify in response (mutability) is a critical factor 
for a research tradition to be viable. Winograd in particular has adapted the perspective twice 
(Winograd, 1994, 2001, 2006) to meet the critiques (e.g. (Suchman, 1993) and (Dietz & 
Widdershoven, 1991)), by incorporating Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action and 
a more sophisticated linguistic model, and the research tradition has been stronger for it (de 
Michelis & Grasso, 1994; Schoop, 2001). Although not adopted universally as its founders 
had hoped (M. Dumay, J. L. G. Dietz, & H. B. Mulder, 2005a; M. Dumay, J. L. G. Dietz, & 
J. B. F. Mulder, 2005b; Winograd, 2006), L/AP remains an actively researched informatic 
tradition. (For reviews, see de Moor & Weigand, 2007; Weigand, 2009; Weigand & Lind, 
2008). In particular the pluralist/communicative epistemology it embraces has anticipated 
(and been seen as a useful modelling system for) many currently researched systems such as  
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automatic message filtering (Lampert, Dale, & Paris, 2010; Sørby & Nytrø, 2010), 
coordinating Open-Source development (Huysmans, Ven, & Verelst, 2010) and managing 
ad hoc wide-area service systems (Albani & Dietz, 2011; Ghadiri, Baraani-Dastjerdi, 
Ghasem-Aghaee, & Nematbakhsh, 2011). 
We can see that the research tradition fits the criteria needed to be an exemplar for an 
Alexander Pattern for a Design Science Research Methodology for the current research, 
since it contains a conceptual-metaphor-driven response to a perceived broad informatic 
problem, a sustained and vital research tradition, and established a perspective within which 
to carry out that research.  
Flores had a Sketch Logic formalism for diagramming in his Berkeley dissertation 
(Flores & Ludlow, 1980). The diagrams were enhanced state-transition graphs, with 
annotations to indicate which Actors, Speech Acts and states were involved. This 
ontologically limited set meant that quite complex systems could be represented with a small 
vocabulary. The diagrams can be seen as evolving through the next decade gradually 
incorporating more text and annotations (Flores et al., 1988; Medina-Mora, Winograd, 
Flores, & Flores, 1992; Winograd, 1986, 1987; Winograd & Flores, 1986; Winograd, 
Newman, & Yim, 1991). Figure D.1 shows a generic Action Workflow diagram from 
(Winograd, 1987). In it the actors are represented by the prefixes on the edges (here A and 
B) with the balance of the edge labelling indicating the Speech Act instance, while the nodes 
indicate states within the system. 
 
Figure	D‐1	An	Action	Workflow	diagram	from	(Winograd,	1987)	
The diagrams were constructed through a mechanism of analysing communication 
within an organisation, called workflow analysis. The clearest exposition of this is in 
Medina-Mora et al. (1992) where the methodology is stepped through, and there are  
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excellent instances of both conceptual models and design implementations. Later variants of 
the L/AP such as DEMO have further evolved diagramming methods (Dumay et al., 2005a; 
Dumay et al., 2005b; K. Liu, Dietz, & Barjis, 2003; Van Reijswoud & Lind, 1998).  
In the next section we will align this history with the DSRM, and provide tables 
which list the matching criteria and supporting justifying citations (after the manner of 
Gregor & Jones, 2007). 
D.2.2 Identifying the research path of the L/AP programme 
We now give a derived narrative structure of the L/AP, in order than the simplified 
steps can become a design pattern. 
Dissatisfied with the ability of the then current conceptions of both organised work 
and of informatics methods of coordinating it, Flores used a metaphor of individual 
conversations to model informatic material in context; this metaphor drew on philosophical 
ideas (the ideas of Speech Acts and Hermeneutics amongst others) to establish a perspective 
within which to operate a framework. From there Flores created an operating framework 
including an ontology of types of things that can exist, rules for combining them, a sketching 
logic for them, and criteria for matching the anticipated solution with the actual solution to 
be use 
Flores firstly built a prototype version of the Coordinator, then later a production 
version. The initial perspective and framework were refined and then provided the basis for 
Flores’s PhD, and later the results were published both in conference papers and in a classic 
IS text.  
Criticism from (amongst others) Suchman and Dietz led Winograd back to a 
refinement of the perspective definition and iteration over the process of design and 
demonstration. The impetus for the research came from Flores’s experience of problems, but 
also from his preparation of the perspective from first principle, while his experience of 
running the technology as a business led to generations of the software and of its 
implementation in organisations. 
D.2.3 Summary: exemplar checklist for the L/AP 
This section contains a checklist for the L/AP’s suitability as an exemplar for an 
IDSRAP. This summarises the details in sections C.1.1-3 above. Details are referenced  
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Flores and Ludlow (1980), Flores (1982), and Winograd and Flores (1986) unless otherwise 
stated. 
Table	D.1	L/AP	conformance	with	appropriateness	criteria	
Criterion  Matched by
Metaphor→Perspec ve  Metaphor (Viewing all organisational communication as speech 
acts) → Perspec ve (Communal phenomenological perspec ve, 
L/AP) 
Perspective→Framework Perspective (L/AP)→Framework (Coding frame of set of possible 
illocutionary acts and conversational contexts, Conversation 
Structure diagram, The Coordinator environment) 
Framework→Models  Framework (Frame, diagrams, environment) – Models (planning 
documents for Coordinator installs) 
Models→Implementa ons  Models (plans)→ Implementa ons (Coordinator conﬁgura ons) 
Sketch logic formalism  Action workflow diagrams
Ontology  Present in limitation of entities to states, actors and speech acts 
Symbology  Present in simple circle node and labelled edges, though later 
diagramming methods added enhancements 
Deontology  Present in limitation of possible combinations and sequences of 
Speech Acts  
Methodology  Present in workflow analysis methodology
Conceptual models  Present in action workflow diagrams 
Implementation Designs Present in detailed Coordinator configurations
Table	D.2	L/AP	conformance	to	completeness	criteria	
Criterion  Matched by
Purpose and scope 
Aim is “to create a new understanding of how to design computer 
tools to human use and human purposes” (Winograd and 
Flores, 1986) 
Constructs  Illocutionary acts built into conversations for action built into 
conversational networks. 
Principles of form and function  All cooperative work can be represented losslessly as a network of 
speech acts, and computers (and other office machinery) can 
help this by acting as coordinators as well as vectors of 
communications. 
Artefact mutability  The conversations represented by the constructs are already 
occurring in organisations, but they are disconnected and badly 
represented in current office system. Reliability and efficiency  
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result from making a better match between conversations and 
computing systems, with any change being the result of a non‐
computing rationalisation.  
Testable propositions  Reports have the rigour of science.
The system always has a good answer to the question “what should 
I do?” 
Justificatory knowledge  Speech acts:
from Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) 
Phenomenology: 
from Heidegger (1962) and Dreyfus (1971) 
Autopoiesis and complex adaptive systems 
from Maturana (1974) and Varela (1975) 
Systems‐based control theory for business: 
(Beer, 1973) 
Principles of implementation  Commitment analysis – analysing directives and commissives, 
recurrent conversation analysis 
Expository instantiation  Scenario of The Coordinator in use is given
Table	D.3	L/AP	conformance	with	coherence	criteria	
Criterion  Matched by
Simplicity  Reduces all social action to a limited set of speech act types, 
operating within a limited set of conversational contexts 
Consistency  While making universal claims, the number of claims are small, and 
internally and externally consistent. 
Conservatism  Draws on the existing understanding of human communication, 
although breaking somewhat with IS views (which were 
recently constructed anyway) it does so in a tradition 
conservative regarding the best understanding of language and 
phenomenology. 
Comprehensiveness  Makes a universal claim to all human communication in all 
organisations 
Fecundity  Promises new ways of constructing IS artefacts, especially 
interfaces tasks, theories of organisational artefacts, new ways 
of analysing problems, looks forward to a new more rigorous 
commitment to analysis 
Explanatory unity  Has one source of explanation of how people create the world 
around them with language, and how they use it to 
communicate with each other in that shared reality 
Refutability  Can be refuted either theoretically (if new kinds of speech arise 
which do not fit) or pragmatically (if the design framework  
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cannot produce solutions)
Learnability  Easily learned as simple and intuitive principles that can only 
combine in a limited number of ways 
D.3 Extracting an Alexander Pattern from the exemplars 
Having examined these two exemplars, we can now establish a reusable Alexander 
Pattern that can be used for the development of new perspectives in IS, and see how the 
pattern can be used for directing the current research project. 
D.3.1 Phases of the research pattern 
We can now look for common points and phases in the road to making a multi-
layered, perspective-to-instance research approach. 
We can usefully identify three phases: 
1)  An invention phase involving a clear use of borrowed metaphor at the start of the 
research process, selected intentionally to solve observable problems in the 
informatics domain. In particular Wieringa’s research question “What will be the 
problem-solving power of this proposed artifact?” (R. J. Wieringa, 2010 p. 69) 
was identifiable. This consisted in Flores’s using the metaphor of the Speech Act 
(borrowed from Austin and Searle) to answer the question “What is 
Management?”(Flores, 1982). 
2)  An elaboration phase creating a sufficiently complex and rigorous design that 
comprises the goal artefacts. This also incorporates the verification portion of the 
validation. This was the argumentation outlined in (Flores & Ludlow, 1980) and 
(Flores, 1982). 
3)  A substantiation phase comprising action research, tested by the design 
practitioners, feeding back into the design cycle. This also incorporates the 
accreditation portion of the validation. This comprised the design systems for 
Action Technologies (Dunham, 1991; Medina-Mora et al., 1992). 
D.3.2 Extracting the research pattern 
We can establish a narrative of the research process for these phases  
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D.3.2.1 Phase 1: invention 
Invention comprises meeting a perceived need in the world, a metaphor is 
intentionally and explicitly borrowed from a philosophical discipline to model informatic 
materials in context. That metaphor is used to set up a perspective within which to create a 
new conceptual framework, which is then explicitly stated in such a way as to permit that 
framework to be created . 
D.3.2.2 Phase 2: elaboration 
Elaboration involves creating (within the established perspective) a framework for 
analysing and describing informatic systems in context. This should comprise an 
ontologically complete catalogue of types of things that exist, rules for their combination, 
sketching tools to describe them, and a methodology for using the tools. Parallel to these 
activities would be the establishment of criteria for success, namely criteria for matching the 
anticipated solution with the actual achieved one via demonstrations. These criteria would 
make up the tools in the framework. 
D.3.2.3 Phase 3: substantiation 
Substantiation involves using practitioner action research to create the demonstration 
artefacts to show the efficacy of the produced design tools and the framework, and 
comparing their problem solving abilities with the solution objectives defined earlier. 
Feeding back the findings to the design activities. Professional communication and feedback 
of criticism to all prior stages. 
D.3.2.4 Summary of research pattern 
These three stages are summarised in Table D.4 and laid out in Figure D.3. 
Table	D.4	The	phases	and	in‐phase	steps	of	the	research	pattern	
Phase   Step
Invention 
A  A. Finding useful construct to uses as a metaphor 
B  A. Finding useful construct to use as a metaphor 
C  A. Work with perspective for construct 
D  A. Adapt construct to new perspective 
E  A. Make statement of perspective  
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Phase   Step
Elaboration 
A  Extrapolate to get new constructs, which map onto domain entities (and 
are therefore capable of solving the initiating problem) 
B  Make generic model of domain entities, and their relations
C  Make sketching logic mechanism
D  Establish steps to making a conceptual model (methodology)
E  Set up criteria for success in test
Substantiation 
A  Find suitable test situations (being aware of risk of opportunistic 
sampling errors) 
B  Apply conceptual modelling tool to make conceptual model
C  Make implementation design
D  Make implementations and check
E 
Feedback to three levels
  i.  to improve design 
  ii. to improve tools 
  iii. to improve perspective 
 
 
Figure	D‐2	The	research	pattern	for	FLBC	laid	out	
 
Invention Elaboration Substantiation
Respond to perceived problem
Find useful substitute metaphor 
for perspective of problem
Adapt perspective to new metaphor
Get kernel theory for underpinning
    new perspective 
Make formal statement of perspective
Map existing practices and artefacts
onto perspective
Make generic model of entities,  
 and their relations
Make sketch logic mechanism
Establish steps for creating a 
conceptual model
Find suitable test situations 
Apply conceptual modelling tool to 
make conceptual model
Make implementation design
Make implementations and check 
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Appendix E  
 
FLBC as a Design Pattern 
 
In this appendix, we will establish a research pattern for speech acts analysis by 
identifying and examining an exemplar. We will draw on the reflective practice of Gregor 
(2007) as well as standard principles within the philosophy of science to establish criteria for 
suitable exemplars. 
The task is more straightforward than that of establishing the Sketch Logic research 
pattern in Appendix D since (unlike the exemplars there) the exemplar chosen here explicitly 
states a research path in advance of the research. This removes the need for inference, 
alignment and docking that was present in the Sketch Logic research pattern, and 
consequently simplifies the research pattern establishment process. 
E.1 Criteria for exemplars for an research pattern 
It was established in section C.1 that a template for a research pattern must conform 
to criteria for appropriateness, completeness and coherence. This conformance will be 
checked off in section E.4 below, but first the specific criteria for appropriateness must be 
established.  
Effectively, this is operationalising the current research for pragmatic purposes, so 
that all of the key research targets can be matched. For the secondary research pattern the 
goals are a list of principal speech acts, an F(P) representation of the illocutionary force and 
propositional content of those speech acts and a formal language based on that 
representation. Specifically, the criteria are: 
1)  The identification of principal Speech Acts and Actors in a clearly defined 
universe of discourse must be present in the methodology 
2)  An F(P) framework for illocutionary force and propositional content based on 
those must be a design goal 
3)  The final goal must be a formal language that is human-read- and -writeable, as 
well as ultimately machine-interpretable  
  2
4)  There must be an expository instantiation as the immediate research goal 
If the research tradition matches for these criteria it may be considered as an exemplar 
for a Gregor & Jones Alexander Pattern. 
 
E.2 An introduction to the FLBC informatic tradition 
Moore’s FLBC research (1995), combines Lee’s deontic analysis of business 
computing (e.g. R. M. Lee, 1978, 1980, 1983; R. M. Lee & Gerritsen, 1978) with the speech 
acts account of Searle & Vanderveken (e.g. John R. Searle & Vanderveken, 1985; 
Vanderveken, 1990a, 1990b, 1994). Moore’s research path followed the practice in use by 
the research team led by Kimbrough at the Wharton School at the University of 
Pennsylvania (e.g. Kimbrough & Lee, 1986; Kimbrough et al., 1984; Kimbrough & Moore, 
1992, 1993; Kimbrough & Thornburg, 1989), but it is first explicitly stated in Moore’s PhD 
thesis (1995), so it is that exposition from where we derive the DSRM. 
Moore began by studying expected occurrences of communication within a model 
office, ex ante, in a mode similar to that employed in L/AP. Speech acts were identified by 
locating communications that resulted in the exchange of information, using a five-part 
structure: 
•  Speaker – who is making the communication (i.e. the utterance)? 
•  Hearer – who is receiving the communication?  
•  Illocutionary force – what is the type of speech act? 
•  Content – what is the propositional content? 
•  Context – under what circumstances does this occur? This represents both the time 
and circumstances, and the background organisation structure, and conforms to the 
two types of pre-condition discussed above. 
By locating these values, a set of elementary sentences are constructed, represented 
with the F(P) framework. The resulting sentences were used to form the basis of the Formal 
Language for Business Communication (FLBC). FLBC was formalised using an EBNF 
(Extended Backus-Naur Form) context free grammar (Wirth, 1972, 1973, 1977).
144 The 
EBNF is in itself an expository instantiation per Gregor & Jones. 
                                                      
 
144 Moore did his work before the ISO standardisation (ISO, 1996) and subsequent discussion 
(Scowen, 1998).  
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The goal of the research was to create a system that was adequate to the task of 
representing some sample EDI communication, which were subsequently represented in 
FLBC messages. A simple parser for these messages was created, which made business 
English equivalents. 
E.3 A derived research pattern for speech acts analysis in IS 
A research pattern for Speech Acts Analysis in IS can be derived from the work of 
Moore and Kimbrough: 
A) Analysis 
1.  Identify the significant communications within a speech situation ex ante 
2.  Represent them using the Moore five-part structure for speech acts 
3.  Represent these communications as elementary expressions using the F(P) 
framework 
B) Synthesis 
1.  Create a formal language, expressed as an EBNF grammar for representing the 
significant communications 
2.  Test the adequacy of the representation with simple test cases 
This can be construed as a three phase research pattern to align with the pattern 
derived in Appendix D from L/AP. This is shown in Figure E.1 
Phase One: Invention 
1.  Identify the significant communications within a speech situation ex ante 
2.  Represent them using the Moore five-part structure for speech acts 
Phase Two: Elaboration 
1.  Represent these communications as elementary expressions using the F(P) 
framework 
2.  Create a formal language, expressed as an EBNF grammar for representing the 
significant communications 
Phase Three: Substantiation 
1.  Test the adequacy of the representation with simple test cases 
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Figure	E‐1	The	research	pattern	for	speech	acts	analysis	
This research path will be used in Chapter 12 of the thesis for establishing the 
Functional Entity Relationship Language, FERL, based on the erotetic perspective. 
E.4 Exemplar checklist for FLBC 
This section contains a checklist for FLBC’s suitability as an exemplar for a research 
pattern. Details are referenced (S. A. Moore, 1993) unless otherwise stated. 
Table	E.1	Conformance	to	appropriateness	criteria	
Criterion  Matched by
Formal language for 
transactioning as design 
goal 
Aim is a formal language for business interchange FLBC (1993, p. 3) 
Methodology is investigation 
and typing of speech acts in 
conversation 
Explicitly uses speech acts theory (1993, p. 5). Lists generic 
conversation elements (1993, p. 139ff) 
F(P) representation of the 
generic speech acts 
Stated as aim (1993, p. 34), described (1993, p. 49) 
Formal language (including) 
EBNF created from the F(P) 
representation  
Stated as aim (1993) described (1993, p. 110)
Formal language is human‐ and 
machine‐readable 
Stated as aim (1993, pp. 23,87), implemented as FLBC (1993, p. 
108ff)
Expository instantiations of the 
formal language given
Bike shop example (1993, p. 127ff) (called a simulation) 
Language adopted and used to 
some extent 
Some usage, evolved into other languages (S. A. Moore, 2000) 
 
Table	E.2	FLBC	conformance	to	completeness	criteria	
Criterion  Matched by
Purpose and scope  Aims to create formal system for representing business 
communication to allow duties, roles and tasks as well as 
information to be transmitted through messages. 
Constructs  FLBC, FLBC‐based EDI protocols
Principles of form and function  Communications themselves already have components of duties 
and roles: analysing them will show the basis of co‐operation in  
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Criterion  Matched by
business. Use of F(P) can cover all possible communications. 
Artefact mutability  The existing messages can be seen to conform to the new, 
expanded messaging system, with certain default values. 
Subsequent research by Moore and Kimbrough (e.g. Kimbrough 
& Lee, 1997; Kimbrough & Moore, 1997; S. A. Moore, 1996; S. 
A. Moore & Kimbrough, 1995) has evolved FLBC. 
Testable propositions  Samples of business communications can be represented with the 
messaging system, and an ontological analysis reveals complete 
coverage of domain.
Justificatory knowledge  Draws on Speech Act Theory (SAT), the version of Searle and 
Vanderveken (John R. Searle & Vanderveken, 1985). 
Principles of implementation  Described FLBC methodology.
Expository instantiation  EBNF for FLBC, Representation of existing EDI messages, FLBC for 
hypothesised instances where duties and roles more 
significant.
 
Table	E.3	FLBC	conformance	to	coherence	criteria		
Criterion  Matched by
Simplicity  Reduces complex business systems to exchanges of standardised 
messages.
Consistency  Single set of rules apply across all messages in all context. 
Conservatism  Draws on extended research in philosophy and linguistics in Speech 
Acts, as well as following on the L/AP tradition established by 
Flores and Winograd (Flores, 1982; Flores & Ludlow, 1980; 
Winograd, 1986; Winograd & Flores, 1986), to inform 
perspective.
Comprehensiveness  Covers all situations and cultures, is pan‐cultural.
Fecundity  Shows how new potential automated messaging systems can be 
created for any field of human activity.
Explanatory unity  Single source of explanation – Human interaction can all be 
represented by Speech acts, as they all comprise institutional 
facts.
Refutability  Has complete set of tests for systems, and for artefacts created 
within system.
Learnability  Designed to be easily learned and adopted, has proven so. 
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Appendix F  
 
A Description of FERL 
This appendix presents a description of FERL, and demonstrates its adequacy to 
the task of represent Functional Entities and their knowledge relations. 
FERL gives a means for describing the operations involved in knowledge 
transfer messages, from hypothesised collectivities whose structure may be late-
binding in the form of table, graph or pool, and from which subcollectivities may be 
determined by value, identifier or nexus.
145 FERL provides for defining the 
collectivities and the subcollectivities. 
This section begins with an account of the 6 top level operators. This is followed 
by a description of the common FERL clauses. References to the EBNF grammar refer 
to section 12.6.3. Examples are drawn from a standard pedagogical model database, the 
Dream Home system (Connolly & Begg, 2004). 
F.1 The Six FERL Operators 
This section will cover the six FERL operators, with reference to Figure F.1. 
 
Figure	F‐1	The	EBNF	for	the	FERL	Operations:	CAPACITY,	NEED,	MATCH,	QUESTION,	
ANSWER,	RESPONSE	
                                                       
 
145 This set of collectivities is in conformity with the systematics of the Noetic Prism (D. J. Pigott et al., 
2005), as expressed in just-below-the-surface knowledge repository (D. J. Pigott et al., 2004b).  
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F.2 Three Declaration Operators: CAPACITY, NEED and 
MATCH 
This section covers the three Declaration section operators, and shows how they 
are used to establish the environment for the subsequent Conversation section. 
F.2.1 CAPACITY 
The CAPACITY operator declares a named knowledge capacity, making it 
available for enquiry. A named knowledge capacity is a collectivity of values, which 
can be accessed by questions in the Conversation section of a FERL message.  
In speech act terms, it is representing a commissive stating a capability and 
willingness (subject to certain conditions) to tell people about a nominated subject. 
Drawing on the Dream Home system, were we to wish to represent the commissive "I 
can and am willing to tell you about houses for rent, identified by an office 
identification", we could use the simple Capacity declaration: 
CAPACITY(PropertiesForRent EXPLICIT Table *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PropertyNo)  
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : DreamHome") 
The CAPACITY declaration has four parameters, a name, a content clause, an 
optional hedge clause and an optional pragmatics clause. In EBNF it is given as:  
Capacity_declaration = 'CAPACITY''('Capacity_name Capacity_content 
[Hedge_clause] [Pragmatics_clause]')'. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.2. 
 
Figure	F.2:	Capacity	declaration	
 
The Hedge and Pragmatics clauses are common to many of the FERL 
operations, so are covered in detail in sections F.6.4 and F.6.5 below. 
The capacity content clause describes the nature of the collectivity it is 
referencing. It can either be an individual source of values or a collated source of 
values.  
Capacity_content = (Capacity_content_item | Collation_clause). 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.3.  
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Figure	F.3:	Capacity	content	can	be	either	a	single	collectivity	or	a	collation	of	collectivities	
 
As the collated source of values ultimately devolve into single collectivities, the 
COLLATE operator is dealt with separately in section F.6.6 below.  
The Capacity Content Item (the Capacity Content proper has five components: 
1.  The Expectation Clause, which states the form of the collectivity 
2.  The Fields Clause, which states the values comprising the collectivity available 
as fields 
3.  The Offering Clause, giving the means available for identifying items within the 
collectivity - these are all instances of Determination Clauses 
4.  The Hedge Clause (Optional), giving the Hedges that qualify the values or the 
entire collective 
5.  The Sourcing Clause, which states the source of the collectivity 
The EBNF for the Capacity Content is: 
Capacity_content_item = Expectation_clause Field_clause Offering_clause 
[Hedge_clause] Sourcing_clause. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.4. 
 
Figure	F.4:	The	clauses	of	a	Capacity	Content	Item	
The Expectation, Fields and Hedge clauses are common to many of the FERL 
operations, so are covered in detail in Section F.6 below. 
Offering Clause: the Offering Clause identifies possible ways of calling on 
collectivities. It permits the content declaration to demonstrate the means by which a  
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collectivity can be retrieve (i.e. by identifier, value or nexus). It does this by use of 
Demonstration clauses. Since the Demonstration clause is common to several 
operators, it covered in detail in Section F.6 below. In the example above it is 
expressed as: 
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PropertyNo) 
The EBNF for the offering clause is: 
Offering_clause = 'OFFER' '(' Determination_clause 
{, Determination_clause} ')'. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.5. 
 
Figure	F.5:	Offering	clause	
Sourcing Clause: the Source Clause identifies the origin of the collectivity as 
stored. It has two parameters, a typing and a system description as a string. In the 
example above it is expressed as: 
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : DreamHome”) 
Its EBNF is: 
Sourcing_clause =  
'SOURCE' '(' Source_type_list ' "'Source_content '"' ')'. 
Source_type_list =  
'Database' | 'Spreadsheet' | 'Statistical' |'Knowledgebase'  
| 'Ontology' | 'LogicBase' | 'RuleBase' | 'GIS'. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.6, the potential source types in Figure F.7. 
 
Figure	F.6:	Source	declaration		 
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Figure	F.7:	Source	type	list	for	a	collectivity	
The current model is not exhaustive of the possibilities for data sources: it is an 
enumeration from encountered values. For example, it does not support the inclusion of 
paper or real world dialogic systems. However, the current list is sufficient to the needs 
of adequacy as required for the Moore research path. 
F.2.2 NEED 
The NEED operator declares a named ongoing need to know about a subject, 
making it available for MATCH operations with a knowledge capacity. A named 
knowledge need is a request for access to a collectivity of values, which can be 
instantiation as an enquiry in the Conversation section of a FERL message. 
In speech act terms, it is representing a directive requesting the ability to be 
apprised of details concerning a nominated subject. Drawing on the Dream Home 
system, were we to wish to represent the directive "I am going to need to know details 
about particular houses for rent, which I will identify using an office identification", 
we could use the simple NEED declaration: 
NEED(PropertyDetails EXPECT Table *  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PropertyNo) 
The NEED declaration has three parameters, a name, a content clause, an 
optional hedge clause and an optional pragmatics clause. In EBNF it is given as:  
Need_declaration = 'NEED''('Need_name Need_content 
[Hedge_clause][Pragmatics_clause]')'.  
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This syntax is shown in Figure F.E. 
 
 
Figure	F.8:	Need	declaration	
The Hedge and Pragmatics clauses are common to many of the FERL 
operations, so are covered in detail in sections F.6.4 and F.6.5 below. 
The need content clause describes the nature of the collectivity it is going to rely 
on, in terms of Expectation, Fields and Determination. These clauses are common to 
many of the FERL operations, so are covered in detail in F.6 below. In EBNF a Need 
declaration is given as: 
Need_content = 
[Expectation_clause][Field_clause][Determination_clause]. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.9. 
 
Figure	F.9:	The	clauses	of	a	Need	Content	declaration	
In the example above, the expectation clause was: 
EXPECT Table 
the fields clause: 
* 
and the determination clause was: 
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PropertyNo 
For more details see the section under CAPACITY. 
F.2.3 MATCH 
The MATCH operator declares a congruence between a declared knowledge 
CAPACITY and a declared knowledge NEED. Once a match has been declared, 
QUESTIONS can be asked in the Conversation section of a FERL message using the 
MATCH name.   
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In speech act terms, it is representing a verdictive: making an institutional 
judgement as to the suitability of a CAPACITY for fulfilling a NEED, subject to 
pragmatic constraints. This is effect a contract binding that CAPACITY to that NEED 
for a specified terms, given the common subject. A match instruction can declare a 
congruence between two apparently disparate subjects, thereby permitting knowledge 
reuse. Drawing on the Dream Home system, were we to wish to represent the 
verdictive "It is possible, and therefore mandated, that accommodation details 
required by RentProperties will be met by PropertiesForRent", we could use the 
simple Match declaration: 
MATCH(PropertyEnquiries PropertyDetails PropertiesForRent) 
The MACTH declaration has four parameters, a match name, a need name and a 
capacity name an optional pragmatics clause. In EBNF it is given as: 
Match_declaration = 'MATCH''(' Match_name Need_name Capacity_name 
[Determination_Choice] [Pragmatics_clause]')'. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.10. 
 
Figure	F.10:	Match	declaration	
The Pragmatics clause is common to many of the FERL operations, so is 
covered in detail in sections F.6.4 and F.6.5 below. 
The Determination_choice option permits the selection of a determination 
offering when there is more than one determination described in the CAPACITY 
statement. If, for instance, the declaration for the XXX capacity was 
CAPACITY(PropertiesForRent EXPLICIT Table *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PropertyNo  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY FIELDS(Suburb, Street, Number, Apartment)  
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : DreamHome") 
for the same NEED then the MATCH could have been 
MATCH(PropertyEnquiries PropertyDetails PropertiesForRent 1)  
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although the determination selection could have been omitted, as the default 
would have been chosen automatically. If on the other hand the NEED declaration had 
been 
NEED(PropertyDetails EXPECT Table *  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY FIELDS(Suburb, Street, Number, Apartment) 
then the MATCH would have had to have been 
MATCH(PropertyEnquiries PropertyDetails PropertiesForRent 2) 
F.3 A complete FERL declaration example 
Drawing on the examples in the three previous sections, we can create the 
following simple FERL declaration section, in which the is a match between a capacity 
to give information about rental properties and a need for such details 
CAPACITY(PropertiesForRent EXPECT Table *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PropertyNo)  
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : DreamHome")) 
NEED(PropertyDetails EXPECT Table *  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PropertyNo) 
MATCH(PropertyEnquiries PropertyDetails PropertiesForRent) 
The following FERL code matches the identity of a tenant with a particular 
property (assuming a stored view in the database derived from the standard Dream 
Home schema providing such information): 
CAPACITY(TenantsInProperties EXPECT Table  
FIELDS(propertyNo, clientNo, lName, fName)  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PropertyNo)  
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : DreamHome")) 
NEED(PropertyTenant EXPECT Table *  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PropertyNo) 
MATCH(TenantEnquiries PropertyTenants TenantsInProperties) 
F.4 The conversation operators: QUESTION, ANSWER and 
RESPONSE 
This section covers the three Conversation section operators, and shows how 
they are used to create dynamic exchanges of knowledge. Conversations are a three-
part speech event, comprising Question⇒Answer⇒Response. As discussed in section 
6.4.1 above, the conversation is under the communicative control of the questioning 
speech act as it alone has the right to response.  
There are three operators for the conversation section of FERL messages that 
correspond to these speech acts, QUESTION, ANSWER and RESPONSE.  
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F.4.1 QUESTION 
The QUESTION operator executes an erotetic request for a collectivity from a 
named match, which brokers the request to a named knowledge capacity, thereby 
soliciting a response from that capacity. Only matched CAPACITY operations can be 
called upon by QUESTION operations. 
In speech act terms, it is representing a directive, indirectly asking a knowledge 
capacity to make an ANSWER (of one form or another). Drawing on the Dream Home 
system, were we to wish to represent the directive “What is the rent on the property 
[PA14]?”, we could use the simple Capacity declaration: 
QUESTION(PropertyEnquiries FIELDS(rent) CONSTRAINT(PropertyNo = 
"PA14")) 
The QUESTION statement has six parameters, the match name upon which it is 
calling, an expectation clause, a fields clause, a constraint clause, a focus clause and an 
order clause. In EBNF a QUESTION statement is given as: 
Question_statement = 'QUESTION' '(' Match_name Question_content')'. 
Question_content = [Field_set][ Expectation_clause][ Constraint_clause] 
[ Focus_clause][ Order_clause]. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.11. 
 
Figure	F.11:	Question	statement	comprising	the	match	name,	and	Question_content;	
Question_content	comprising	expectations,	fields,	constraint,	focus	and	order	clauses.	
 
The Expectation, Fields and Focus clauses are common to many of the FERL 
operations, so are covered in detail in F.6 below. Of interest to the ANSWER operator 
is the ability to both rename and cast the fields.  
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The constraint clause is used to determine the members of the sub-collectivity 
requested: this is the token WHERE and a standard criteria (see separate section below 
on Criteria clauses). This is modelled on SQL. In the example above, the 
CONSTRAINT clause is: 
CONSTRAINT(PropertyNo = "PA14") 
The EBNF expressing this clause is: 
Constraint_clause = ' CONSTRAINT' '(' Criteria_clause ')'. 
The syntax is shown in Figure F.12. 
 
Figure	F.12:	Constraint	clause	
The order clause is used to request a sorting order for the sub-collectivity to be 
returned. It functions by presenting a list of fields to provide the sort values, along with 
an optional keyword to request inverse sort. This is modelled on SQL. (There is no sort 
clause in the example above). The EBNF expressing this clause is: 
Order_clause = 'ORDERED ' Field_clause ["DESC"]. 
The syntax is shown in Figure F.13. 
 
Figure	F.13:	Order	Clause	
F.4.2 ANSWER 
The ANSWER operator contains a response to a QUESTION operation. It is 
delivered by a declared knowledge CAPACITY articulated by a MATCH declaration 
(only MATCHed CAPACITY operations can give ANSWERS).  
In speech act terms, it is representing a number of different responses, as 
described in section 12.5.2above:  
•  assertive (for a SUCCESS answer, when there are values found for an answer) 
•  expressive (for a FAILURE answer, when there are no values found) 
•  commissive (for an EXTEND answer, when there might be values found after an 
extended search, and an offer is made) 
•  verdictive (for a DENY answer, when there may be values to be found but the  
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question is disallowed) 
•  directive (for a CLARIFY answer, where there is a need for clarification) 
Each of these answer types must be described separately. Examples will be 
given for each answer type separately. 
An ANSWER operation will have varying number of parameters, depending on 
the type of question. In EBNF the ANSWER statement is given as: 
Answer_statement = 'ANSWER' '(' Answer_content ')'. 
Answer_content = (Success_clause | Failure_clause | Extend_clause | 
Denial_clause | Clarify_clause). 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.14. 
 
Figure	F.14:	Answer	statement	with	answer	types	
We will now examine each answer type in turn. 
F.4.3 SUCCESS answer 
A SUCCESS ANSWER occurs when there are values found on processing a 
QUESTION request. For example, in answer to the Dream Home request for “What is 
the rent on the property PA14?”, the answer would be: 
ANSWER(SUCCESS VALUES {650}) 
The SUCCESS ANSWER statement has four parameters, the SUCCESS token, 
an expectation clause, a fields clause, and a value set. In EBNF a SUCCESS 
ANSWER statement is represented as:  
Success_clause = 'SUCCESS' [Expectation_clause] 
[Field_clause] Value_set.  
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This syntax is shown in Figure F.14. 
 
Figure	F.15:	Success	answer	with	expectation	and	field	clauses	and	a	value	set	
F.4.4 FAILURE answer 
A FAILURE ANSWER is given when an acceptable, clear and well-formed 
QUESTION operation results in an empty collectivity being defined. If the Dream 
Home rental search had the wrong constraint (e.g. "QA14") then there would be a 
FAILURE ANSWER like this: 
ANSWER(FAILURE 0) 
The FAILURE ANSWER statement has three parameters, the FAILURE token, 
an error code, and an optional failure message. The failure code 0 in the example 
indicates that there are no record in an otherwise satisfactory query. This is different to 
the “empty set” method in SQL, as there are some circumstances (such as data mining 
searches, or networked crawls) that are susceptible to time-outs and where empty 
collectivities would give a noncooperative answer. An optional third parameter gives 
more information.  
 In EBNF a FAILURE ANSWER statement is represented as:  
Failure_clause = 'FAILURE' Failure_code 
[Failure_message][Field_clause]. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.14. 
 
Figure	F.16:	Failure	answer	with	failure	code	and	optional	failure	message	
F.4.5 EXTEND answer 
An EXTEND ANSWER is possible if the CAPACITY is a co-operative system 
(R. M. Lee, 1978). A co-operative response offers expansions of the parameters to an 
unsuccessful request for information. It will also offer alternatives or potential 
neighbourhoods for successful searches. The term “extension” here refers to the 
extension of the erotetic conversation: there are currently four suggestions for this 
extension: 
•  Focussing: this occurs in different situations such as where there are too many 
values in the collectivity returned so suggestions for useful sub collectivities are 
given, and where there are populated informatic neighbourhoods (peer, parent,  
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value neighbourhood etc). It uses the standard FOCUS clause. 
•  Relaxation: where the criteria are relaxed so more items can be found. This uses 
a RELAX token. 
•  Ontological: where consideration is given to the ontological rather than the 
factual structure of the question. This uses the ONTOLOGY token. 
•  Metadata-driven: where consideration is given to the provenance and ownership 
of records. This uses the META token. 
Considering the worked example, if the Dream Home rental search had the 
wrong constraint (e.g. "QA14") and the collectivity was hosted on a co-operative data 
server, the response might look like this: 
ANSWER(EXTEND RELAX PRAGMA(COMMENCEMENT Now) SUGGESTIONS(KEY(propertyNo 
like "PA*"))) 
which signifies that there might be some values to be found relaxing the search 
criteria using a wildcard suffix on the first two letters of the ID. The PRAGMA 
statement states that the conversational extension could be effected immediately. 
The EXTEND ANSWER statement has four parameters, the EXTEND token, a 
standard pragmatics clause, an optional standard value set and a suggestions clause In 
EBNF an EXTEND ANSWER statement is represented as: 
Extend_clause = 'EXTEND' Extend_list Pragmatics_clause [Value_set] 
Suggestion_Clause. 
Suggestion_clause = 'SUGGESTIONS' '(' {KEY_Constraint_Clause} ')'. 
Extend_list = 'FOCUS' | 'RELAX' | 'ONTOLOGY' | 'META'. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.17. 
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Figure	F.17:	Extend	answer	with	extend	list,	pragmatics	clause,	optional	value	set	and	suggestion	
clause	
F.4.6 DENIAL answer 
A DENIAL ANSWER is given when the source of a question does not have the 
right to ask the question. In this case it is imperative that the actual existential import of 
a question not be acknowledged, so even the fact of acceptable fields, determinants, or 
form is not considered. As well as system and organisational permissions, there can be 
denials for reasons of cultural significance or privacy. It can also be that the PRAGMA 
statement of a MATCH is specific and requires identification rather than an 
anonymous answer. 
If the Dream Home database had such a permissions system working, then the 
rental enquiry would give the result: 
ANSWER(DENIAL 0) 
The DENIAL ANSWER statement has three parameters, the DENIAL token, a 
denial code, and an optional denial message. The denial code 0 in the example 
indicates that no detail about the denial is available (i.e., it doesn’t even give detail 
about the reason for the denial). An optional third parameter gives more information 
should the system co-ordinator think it appropriate.  
 In EBNF a DENIAL ANSWER statement is represented as: 
Denial_clause = 'DENIAL' Denial_code [Denial_message]. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.14. 
 
 
Figure	F.18:	Denial	answer	with	denial	code	and	optional	message	
F.4.7 CLARIFY answer 
A CLARIFY ANSWER is given when the question does not make sense, and 
correction is needed. Something of this sort occurs in existing SQL-based systems 
when there is a parsing error or an unknown field or constraint. If the rental query  
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above had an unknown field in the search parameter – say PropertyID instead of 
propertyNo – then the clarify answer would be: 
ANSWER(CLARIFY 0 "Unknown field in constraint" {"PropertyID"}) 
The CLARIFY ANSWER statement has four parameters, the CLARIFY token, 
a clarify code, an optional clarify message and an optional value set. The clarify code 0 
in the example indicates that there was an error in the question form. 
 In EBNF a CLARIFY ANSWER statement is represented as: 
Clarify_clause = 'CLARIFY' Clarify_code [Clarify_message] [Value_set]. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.19. 
 
Figure	F.19:	Clarify	answer	with	clarify	message	
F.4.8 RESPONSE 
The RESPONSE operator serves as a feedback arc to the knowledge capacity 
that gave the answer. 
In speech act terms, it is either an expressive performative (terminating the three 
part Question-Answer-Response conversation) or a directive performative requesting a 
new answer from a knowledge capacity. The five forms it takes are: 
 
F.4.8.1 ACCEPT Response 
An ACCEPT response indicates that the answer was accepted: this occurs where 
the answer satisfices the question, or a failure or denial is accepted. It uses the 
ACCEPT token, and is an expressive performative. 
F.4.8.2 EXPLAIN Response 
An EXPLAIN response indicates that the answer was insufficient: it is a request 
to give the reasoning behind an answer (for systems that support explanation). It can 
also be used to asked for a text message for an unsatisfactory answer that only gave a 
code. This uses the EXPLAIN token and is a directive performative.  
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F.4.8.3 CLARIFY response 
A CLARIFY response indicates that there was perceived ambiguity in the 
answer: it is a request to clarify an answer that is for some reason obscure or 
ambiguous, generally for person-in-the-middle systems. It uses a CLARIFY token and 
is a directive performative. 
F.4.8.4 RESUBMIT response 
A RESUBMIT response restates the original question with new pragmatics: it is 
a request to answer a declined question with a new set of PRAGMA, in the event of 
either a denial or a MATCH with dissimilar PRAGMA. It uses the RESUBMIT token 
and is a directive performative. 
F.4.8.5 EXTEND response 
An EXTEND response is a request for the erotetic conversation to continue. 
This is a response that is also a new question: it is used in response to an EXTEND 
answer, or when an answer was correct but unsatisfactory. It has a similar set of 
operations to the EXTEND answer (without the Values parameter). It uses the 
EXTEND token and is a directive performative. 
F.4.8.6 RESPONSE structure 
Drawing on the Dream Home system example, we can finalise the QAR 
conversation with an acceptance of the answer: 
RESPONSE(ACCEPT) 
The RESPONSE statement has varying arity, depending on the form of 
RESPONSE used. ACCEPT, EXPLAIN and CLARIFY are niladic; RESUBMIT is 
monadic and has the PRAGMA clause as a parameter; EXTEND has four parameters, 
there is no parameter, the match name upon which it is calling, an expectation clause, a 
fields clause, a constraint clause, a focus clause and an order clause. In EBNF a 
QUESTION statement is given as: 
Response_statement = 'RESPONSE' '(' Response_content ')'. 
Response_content = 'ACCEPT' | 'EXPLAIN' | 'CLARIFY' | 'OBJECT' | 
'RESUBMIT'[ Pragmatics_clause] | Focus_clause. 
Response_extend_clause = 'EXTEND' Extend_list Pragmatics_clause 
Key_Clause Criterion. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.20. 
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Figure	F.20Response	statement	comprising	a	response	token	and	optional	clauses.	
F.5 A complete FERL declaration and conversation example 
This example shows a complete message of FERL establishing and matching up 
a need to know rents with the capacity to talk about rents, and a request for a particular 
rent, followed by an answer and an acceptance response. 
CAPACITY(PropertiesForRent EXPECT Table *  
OFFER(DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PropertyNo)  
SOURCE(Database "ODBC : DreamHome")) 
NEED(PropertyDetails EXPECT Table *  
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PropertyNo) 
MATCH(PropertyEnquiries PropertyDetails PropertiesForRent) 
QUESTION(PropertyEnquiries FIELDS(rent) WHERE PropertyNo = "PA14") 
ANSWER(SUCCESS VALUES {650}) 
RESPONSE(ACCEPT) 
 
F.6 Significant FERL clauses 
Several important sub-operational units are reused throughout the FERL system: 
this section describes them. Formally such significant sub-sentential components are 
considered embedded performatives (Krifka, 2009); as speech acts have the potential to 
be recursive these all have performative bases, which will be mention in the 
descriptions.  
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F.6.1 EXPECT clauses 
Expectation clauses provide the details regarding the form of the collectivity, 
and are assertive performatives. Note that this is not binding to the collectivity itself; it 
is how the capacity is to be expected. The choices are TABLE (a collectivity presented 
as a structured series of values, as found in relational systems), POOL (a collectivity 
presented as a matrix of values, without presumed structure), or GRAPH (a collectivity 
presented as nodes linked by arcs), based on the theoretical framework of the noetic 
prism (D. J. Pigott et al., 2004b, 2005). Additionally (and following the reasoning at 
section 7.3.1.1 and 7.3.1.2) there are the possibilities that the nature of the collectivity 
could be amorphous (giving an AMORPHISM collectivity), or occluded (giving an 
OCCLUSION collectivity).  
In the example above, the snippet: 
EXPECT Table 
provided the Exception Clause, stating that the source collectivity would behave as a 
table. The EBNF for the expectation clause is: 
Expectation_clause = ' EXPECT ' Expectation_list. 
Expectation_list =  
'TABLE' | 'POOL' | 'GRAPH' | 'AMORPHISM' | 'OCCLUDED'. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.21. 
 
 
Figure	F.21:	Expectation	clause	and	Expectation	list	for	a	collectivity	
 
F.6.2 DETERMINATION clause 
Determination Clauses describe how records are identified as significant to their 
telos; they are verdictive performatives. All information is collected for a particular 
purpose, although it can be repurposed to reveal other truths about the (institutional) 
world. The Determination Clause reveals how the individual records were intended to  
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be accessed, regardless of the purpose. An optional parameter, Key, identifies the name 
of the determinant. In the example above, the properties are accessed by an identified 
PropertyNo, which is ascribed by the real estate company: 
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PropertyNo 
This could have been implicitly identified (i.e. without a KEY statement): 
DETERMINATION Identifier 
or it could have been explicitly typed: 
DETERMINATION Identifier KEY PropertyNo AS Text 
The EBNF for the Determination Clause is: 
Determination_clause = 'DETERMINATION ' Determinata_list [Key_clause]. 
Determinata_list = 'IDENTIFIER’ | 'VALUE' | 'NEXUS'. 
Key_clause = ' KEY' (Field_clause |  
Key_name ['AS ' Value_type_list]) 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.22. 
 
 
Figure	F.22:	Determination	and	determination	type	for	collectivity,	together	with	the	Key	clause	
F.6.3 FIELDS clauses 
Fields Clauses describe the fields that are made available from the collectivity 
for the current capacity; they are assertive performatives. Optionally (e.g.) an asterisk 
can be used as a wild card to select all available fields. Each field is optionally 
typeable, the default type being text. In the example above, the * option was used. 
Other usages might be: 
FIELDS (PropertyNo, Street, City, Postcode, Type,  
Rooms as Integer, Rent as Currency, OwnerNo)  
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The EBNF for the Field Clause is: 
Field_clause = 'FIELDS' '(' (' * ' | Field_name ['AS ' Type_list] {',' 
Field_name ['AS ' Type_list]} )')'. 
Field_type_list = 'Integer' | 'Float' | 'Real' | 'Date' | 'time' | 
'Moment' | 'Boolean2' | 'Boolean3' | 'Text' | 'Memo' | 
'Currency' | 'Position2' | 'Position3' | 'Waypoint' | 
'Doc' | 'Image' | 'Vector' | 'Sound' | 'Video'. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.23, and the list of possible types in Figure F.24. 
 
Figure	F.23:	Fields	declaration	for	a	collectivity	 
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Figure F.24: Field type list for a collectivity 
The current model is not exhaustive of the possibilities for field types: it is an 
enumeration from encountered values. For example, it does not support the recall of 
abstract data types (ADTs) such as arrays or lists as values, but such a facility could be 
easily added to FERL if it was seen as necessary. Certainly some AI systems store lists 
as data values, but the current list is sufficient to the needs of adequacy as required for 
the Moore research path.  
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F.6.4 PRAGMA clauses 
Pragma clauses expresses real-world limitations on access to knowledge, they 
are verdictive performatives. They are expressed using the PRAGMA token, and can 
contain multiple pragma values.  
The pragmata currently included in FERL are representative of the domains 
studied for test examples, but are enumerative, not exhaustive of the universe of 
discourse. We can consider some commonly met-with pragmata as examples of how 
pragmata in generally can be dealt with. 
F.6.4.1 PERMISSION pragmata 
The PERMISSION pragma includes all deontic considerations as per 
Kimbrough & Lee (1984), so it employs a greater concept of permission than the 
standard concerns of security and organisational property. It includes responsibility of 
usage (e.g., no public dissemination, no commentary permitted). It uses the 
PERMISSION token. 
F.6.4.2 AVAILABILITY pragmata 
The Availability pragma is concerned with when a knowledge capacity is 
available for use both in terms of times of day/week/year and in terms of 
urgency/priority. It uses the AVAILABILITY token. 
F.6.4.3 COMMENCEMENT and EXPIRATION pragmata 
The Commencement and Expiration pragmata are concerned with when access 
to the capacity begins and ends. A duration statement would require both, but a 
promissory commissive in an EXTEND ANSWER would have an expiration as a due 
date. The two tokens used are COMMENCEMENT and EXPIRATION respectively. 
F.6.4.4 COST pragmata 
The Cost pragma informs the cost (in monetary, item or labour) of either an 
overall or per-item questioning. It uses the COST token. 
F.6.4.5 PRAGMA structure 
The EBNF for PRAGMA is: 
Pragmatics_clause = 'PRAGMA' '(' Pragmatics_statement 
{Pragmatics_statement} ')'. 
Pragmatics_statement = Pragmatics_list '(' Criteria_set ')'. 
Pragmatics_list = ('PERMISSION' | 'AVAILABILITY' | 'COMMENCEMENT' |  
'EXPIRATION' | 'COST'). 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.25.  
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Figure	F.25:	The	PRAGMA	clause,	with	the	individual	pragmata	declarations	and	the	type	list	
F.6.5 HEDGE clauses 
Hedge clauses describe the hedges that exist for collectivities and the items 
within them. They are verdictive performatives. The hedges currently included in 
FERL are representative of the domains studied for test examples, but are enumerative, 
not exhaustive of the universe of discourse. We can consider some commonly met-with 
hedges as examples of how hedges in generally can be dealt with. 
F.6.5.1 ORDER Hedge 
The Inherent order hedge signifies that there is an intrinsic order to a 
collectivity. It is signified by the ORDER token. 
F.6.5.2 ACCURACY Hedge 
Hedges for Accuracy of values and fuzzy membership occur where either values 
are subject to questions of accuracy, tolerance or fuzziness, or where there is fuzzy 
membership of a collectivity. It is indicated by the ACCURACY token. 
F.6.5.3 LIKELIHOOD Hedge 
The hedge for Likelihood of value and membership is found where there are 
probabilistic considerations in either membership or value. It is indicated by the 
LIKELIHOOD token.  
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F.6.5.4 EVIDENTIALITY Hedge 
The hedge for Evidentiality of value indicates the presence of evidentiality in 
values or membership – whether or not there is direct observation, or whether the 
recounting of a value is secondary. It is indicated by the EVIDENTIALITY token. 
F.6.5.5 CONJECTURE Hedge 
The hedge for Conjecture of attribution occurs where there is reasoning behind a 
value or membership, rather than observation or stipulation. It is indicated by the 
CONJECTURE token. 
F.6.5.6 DEONTIC Hedge 
The hedge for Deontic attribution occurs where there is a deontic process – one 
concerning sociolegal reasoning or force. It is indicated by the DEONTIC token. 
F.6.5.7 TEMPORALITY Hedge 
The hedge for Temporality occurs when there are temporal considerations 
around values or membership – for instance where there may be a time lag involved 
with values, or whether the values are a snapshot of a moving process. It is indicated 
by the TEMPORALITY token. 
F.6.5.8 HEDGE Structure 
The EBNF for the Hedge clause is: 
Hedge_clause = 'HEDGE ' Hedge_list ['OF' Hedge_value]  
['ON ' Field_clause]. 
Hedge_list = 'ORDER' | 'ACCURACY' | 'LIKELIHOOD' | 'EVIDENTIALITY' | 
'CONJECTURE' | 'DEONTICS' | 'TEMPORALITY'. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.26, and the list of possible types in Figure F.27. 
 
Figure	F.26:	Hedge	declaration	for	a	collectivity	 
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Figure	F.27:	Hedge	types	
F.6.6 COLLATE clauses 
Collation clauses describe the collation of knowledge capacities to serve as 
virtual knowledge capacities through an algebra depicting various collating processes. 
The collations currently included in FERL are representative of the domains studied for 
test examples, but are enumerative, not exhaustive of the universe of discourse. The 
rest of the section gives an account of some exemplary collations. 
F.6.6.1 CONJUNCTION collation 
Union or intersection via Conjunction merges the content multiple collectivities 
through intersection or union. It uses the CONJUNCTION token. 
F.6.6.2 DISJUNCTION collation 
Differentiation through Disjunction differentiates the content of multiple 
collectivities through relative or absolute difference. This collation uses the 
DISJUNCTION token. 
F.6.6.3 SUCCESSION collation 
The Succession collation permits fall-back utilisation of resources, that is, one 
capacity to be called upon in the absence of another. It uses the SUCCESSION token. 
F.6.6.4 CONSENSUS Collation  
The collation for Consensus conjunction merges multiple collectivities through a 
socio-political process. It uses the CONSENSUS operator.  
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F.6.6.5 ROTATE collation 
The Rotate collation cycles through multiple sources, one capacity after another 
in a predetermined series, to permit their individual consultation. This can be to ensure 
variety or to minimise load on one capacity. It uses the ROTATE token. 
F.6.6.6 ROSTER collation 
The Roster collation allocates a capacity from a set of candidate capacities, 
depending on particular time/location, according to a predetermined schedule. It uses 
the ROSTER token. 
F.6.6.7 SUPERSESSION collation 
Supersession operates by including an expectation that the resource has 
superseded other equivalent resources, and will in turn be superseded: it uses the 
SUPERSESSION token. 
F.6.6.8 COLLATE structure 
The EBNF for theCollation Clause is: 
Collation_clause = 'COLLATE''('Collation_content')'. 
Collation_content = Collation_list Capacity_content  
{', ' Capacity_content}[ Hedge_clause]. 
Collation_list = 'CONJUNCTION' | 'DISJUNCTION' | 'SUCCESSION' | 
'CONSENSUS' | 'ROTATE' | 'ROSTER' | 'SUPERSESSION'. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.28, and the list of possible types in Figure F.29. 
 
 
Figure	F.28:	The	Collation	declaration		
 
Figure	F.29:	Types	of	current	possible	collations		 
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F.6.7 FOCUS clauses 
Focus clauses permit the direction of a capacity to focus on a particular aspect of 
an answer. They are directive performatives. They direct focus in three ways – by item 
selection, by value selection and by choice presentation. 
The EBNF for the Focus clause is: 
Focus_clause = 'FOCUS' '(' (Focus_items_list Number['%'] | 
Focus_values_list Field_clause | 
Focus_choice_list Criteria_clause) ')'. 
This syntax is shown in Figure F.30, and the list of possible types in Figure F.31. 
Figure	F.30:	The	Focus	declaration	
F.6.7.1 Focus by item selection 
Focussing by quantity of items works by addressing the number returned. These 
focus operations request a focus on the top n or n% items, the middle n or n% items, 
the bottom n or n% items, a selected quartile, a selected standard deviation, an n-
thinned population or n randomly selected items. 
 
Figure	F.32:	Focus	by	item	types	 
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F.6.7.2 Focus by value selection 
Focussing by value selection works by addressing the actual values address, 
chiefly used for symbolic systems. These forms of focus request a unique set of values, 
a collectivity that typifies, a collectivity that exemplifies the head by ‘sort of groupings 
within a collectivity, and a value-centric winnowing. 
 
Figure	F.33:	Focus	by	value	types	
F.6.7.3 Focus by choice of items 
Focussing by choice of items works by addressing the collectivity as a set, and 
operating new questions over those sets. These forms of focus request a filtering of the 
collectivity, a location of a record within a collectivity, or permit exploration of a 
neighbourhood. 
 
Figure	F.34:	Focus	by	item	choice	
The last option, the neighbour list, lets the user select a type of connected item 
collectivity. 
 
Figure	F.34:	Focus	by	item	choice	 
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F.6.8 CONSTRAINT clauses 
The criteria clauses are used to create the constraint expressions to either ask 
capacities for collectivities or else filter such collectivities when returned. Extension 
suggestions are also couched in constraint terms, as are focus expressions. These 
constraint expressions are fairly closely based on the expressions in SEQUEL/SQL, as 
expounded in the BNFs in Chamberlin & Boyce (1974) and Melton & Simon (1993 
pp.481-527). 
In the example given above, the FERL expression that formed the question had 
this constraint clause: 
CONSTRAINT(PropertyNo = "PA14") 
The EBNF for the constraint is  
Constraint_clause = ' CONSTRAINT' '(' Criteria_clause ')'. 
which can be seen as a syntax diagram in Figure F.35. 
Figure	F.35:	The	Focus	declaration		
The criteria clause is given by the EBNF 
Criteria_clause = Criterion {( OR | AND ) Criteria_clause }. 
represented by the syntax diagram Figure F.36. 
Figure	F.36:	Constraint	criteria	
The criterion itself is given by the EBNF: 
Criterion= Value_literal ( [' NOT '] ( Between | Like | In | Compare | 
Containing | Starting ) |' IS ' [' NOT '] ' NULL ') | (' ALL '|' 
SOME '|' ANY ') '(' Field_clause ')' | ' EXISTS' '(' 
select_expression ')' | ' SINGULAR ' '(' select_expression ')' | '(' 
Criteria_clause ')' | ' NOT ' Criteria_clause. 
which can be seen as a syntax diagram in Figure F.37.  
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Figure	F.36	Criterion	construction	
The supplementary words are given by: 
Between = BETWEEN value_literal AND value_literal. 
Like = LIKE value_literal [ ESCAPE value_literal ]. 
In = IN '(' value_literal { ',' value_literal } | Field_clause ')'. 
Compare = operator ( value_literal | '(' select_one_field ')' ). 
Operator = ' = ' | ' < ' | ' > ' | ' <= ' | ' >= ' | ' <> '. 
Containing = CONTAINING value_literal. 
Starting = STARTING [ WITH ] value_literal.  
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Appendix G  
 
A Glossary of Original Terms used in this 
thesis 
 
Abductive	non‐Aristotelian	
functional	entity	
A	linkage‐dominant, non‐Aristotelian	functional	entity	that	occurs	where	
the	linkage	is	conjectural.	These	FEs	realise	knowledge	needs	where	we	
need	to	represent	the	different	items	within	the	knowledge	system	that	
we	are	assuming	(in	the	absence	of	proof)	are	linked	in	some	way,	and	
consequently	the	law	of	excluded	middle	 	is	violated.		
Absolute	aggregative	
functional	entity	
A	shape‐dominant, aggregative functional	entity	that	occurs	when	
knowledge	is	represented	as	values	expressed	in	absolute	terms,	
within	a	universal	static	framework.	
Aggregative	functional	
entities		
A	class	of	functional	entities that	realise	aggregative	knowledge	needs.
There	are	three	aggregative	FEs:	absolute	aggregative,	intensional	
aggregative	and	fuzzy	aggregative.	
Aggregative	knowledge	needs A	class	of	knowledge	needs entailing	value‐dominant	knowledge	calls,	
and	which	are	realised	as	aggregative	functional	entities.	
Answer	 A	knowledge	triple with	no	free	variables.	In	a	QA	context,	an	answer
fixes	the	free	variable	present	in	a	question.	
Cartographic	functional	entity A	functional	entity where	the	nature	of	the	key‐entailment	is	not	
(entirely)	known,	owing	to	the	observational	stance	of	the	modeller.	
There	are	three	cartographic	FEs:	remote	cartographic,	folded	
cartographic	and	exofolded	cartographic.	
Collation	 A functional	entity for	which	the	inherent	holarchic	nature	is	significant	
for	the	purposes	of	modelling.	A	collation	can	be	either	a	composition	
collation	or	a	mediation	collation.	
Collectivity	 A	set‐like	assembly	of	facts	gathered	to	some	purpose.	A	collectivity	
extends	the	set	construct	by	permitting	attributes	such	as	duplication,	
recursion	and	order.		
Composition	collation	 A	collation	wherein	an	articulated	assemblage	of	tuples	is	presented as	
a	single	tuple.	
P  P 
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Connective	functional	entities		A	class	of	functional	entities that	realise	connective	knowledge	needs.
There	are	three	connective	FEs:	ontological	connective,	networked	
connective,	and	ruleset	connective.	
Connective	knowledge	needs	 A	class	of	knowledge	needs entailing	linkage‐dominant	knowledge	calls,	
and	realised	as	connective	functional	entities.		
Constitutive	recursive	
functional	entity	
A	scope‐dominant, predicative	functional	entity where	a	knowledge	call	
denotes	articulated	recursion	of	shape‐dominant	sources	of	
knowledge,	where	there	is	a	rule	determining	the	links	between	
relational	versions.	
Contiguous	non‐Aristotelian	
functional	entity	
A	shape‐dominant,	non‐Aristotelian	functional	entity	where	the	
identities	of	the	instances	cannot	be	assured	through	time,	yet	the	
knowledge	need	requires	that	they	be	entailed	as	identity.	These	FEs	
realise	knowledge	needs	when	identity	is	fractured	or	fragmentary,	and	
consequently	the	law	of	identity	 	is	violated.	
Discourse	bounds‐setting	
pragma	
A	pragma that	describes	such	bounds	as	rights,	access,	completeness	
and	cost.	
Discourse	orienting	pragma	 A	pragma	that	describes	the	way	in	which	the	enclosed	discourse	is	to	
be	understood.	
Emergent	non‐Aristotelian	
functional	entity	
A	value‐dominant,	non‐Aristotelian	functional	entity	where	the	late	
binding	nature	of	the	value	makes	for	a	potentially	changing	
significance	for	that	value,	yet	the	knowledge	need	requires	that	they	be	
entailed	by	the	key	as	values,	even	though	a	value	without	any	context	
is	meaningless	in	a	conventional	sense.	These	FEs	realise	knowledge	
needs	when	we	change	the	telos	of	a	recorded	value,	and	consequently	
the	law	of	non‐contradiction	 	is	violated.	
Erotetic	perspective	 An	approach	to	the	modelling	and	representation	of	knowledge	based	
on	question‐answering.	Knowledge	about	a	topic	is	considered	to	be	
the	ability	to	answer	questions	on	that	topic.	
Exofolded	cartographic	
functional	entity	
A	scope‐dominant	cartographic	functional	entity,	where	the	knowledge	
capacity	must	be	represented	as	the	general,	holarchic	system	within	
which	the	model	is	situated.	
Folded	cartographic	
functional	entity	
A	granularity‐dominant	cartographic	functional	entity	where	the	
knowledge	capacity	is	represented	so	that	the	telos	of	the	system	is	
apparent	in	the	diagram	of	the	system	at	that	level	of	abstraction.	
Operating	at	the	knowledge	level,	the	declarative	nature	of	subsystems	
means	that	they	are	occluded;	modelling	at	that	level	is	an	appropriate	
abstraction.	
A  A
 P  P   
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Functional	entity	(FE)	 Any	logically‐defined	subsystem	that	provides	referential	transparency,	
and	which	provides	a	schema	and	a	tuple	for	a	given	key,	and	which	
has	a	consistent	degree	and	cardinality,	and	is	the	functional	equivalent	
of	a	Chen	entity	in	a	given	domain.	It	is	a	plenum‐based	holarchic,	
cooperative	extension	of	the	Chen	entity	construct	used	to	model	
domains	of	interest	in	knowledge	management,	representing	a	
collectivity	of	facts.	
Functional	entity	relationship	
diagram	(FERD)	
An	extension	of	the	“Crow’s	foot”	ERD	that	permits	the	modelling	and	
representation	of	the	functional	entities	and	their	15	knowledge	
relations,	together	with	collation	and	mixins.	
Functional	entity	relationship	
language	(FERL)	
A	knowledge	description	and	transactioning	language	based	on	SQL,	
established	within	the	erotetic	perspective.	
Functional	entity	relationship	
methodology	(FERM)	
A	knowledge	modelling	methodology	that	permits	the	modelling	of	
knowledge	systems	from	the	erotetic	perspective,	culminating	in	FERDs	
or	FERL	expressions.	
Fuzzy	aggregative	functional	
entity	
A	scope‐dominant, aggregative	functional	entity	where	the	knowledge	
call	requires	determining	if	values	are	members	of	fuzzy	sets,	invoking	
a	kind	of	rule	mediation	to	determine	to	which	kind	of	phenomenon	
the	value	amounts	to.	
Granularity‐dominant	
functional	entities	
Functional	entities	acting	as	granularity‐dominant	knowledge	capacities.
There	are	three	granularity‐dominant	FEs:	standard	recursive,	
intensional	aggregative	and	networked	connective.	
Granularity‐dominant	
knowledge	capacities	
Knowledge	capacities	where	there	is	an	articulated	knowledge	
gathering	from	the	constraining	variable,	providing	an	answer	at	one	
remove,	because	the	answering	processing	must	look	for	instances	
which	have	a	shared	value	with	the	constraining	variable.	Granularity‐
dominant	knowledge	capacities	are	realised	by	granularity‐dominant	
functional	entities.		
Hedge	(plural	hedges)	 A	mixin that	occurs	when	there	is	a	systematic	qualification	of	values	
within	functional	entities.	
Image		 A	triple comprising	denoted	members	of	the	knowledge	capacity,	which	
corresponds	to,	and	is	automatically	determined	by,	the	key.		
Instance	 The	variable	in	a	knowledge	triple containing	a	collectivity of	subject	
identifiers.	 
  4
Instance‐dominant	knowledge
calls	
A	class	of	knowledge	calls,	mandating	a	focus	on	set	membership	within	
a	plenum	for	a	designated	key,	in	prepared,	self‐similar	structures.	
Consequently	the	denoted	collectivities	are	determined	by	matching	a	
given	attribute	(potentially	a	unique	instance	identifier)	with	the	key.	
They	are	realised	as	predicative	knowledge	needs.		
Institutional	knowledge	
affordances	
Knowledge	affordances that	are	present	automatically	through	the	
informating	process.	
Intensional	aggregative	
functional	entity	
A	granularity‐dominant, aggregative functional	entity	that	occurs	when	
the	significance	of	a	knowledge	call	derives	from	its	being	instantiated	
in	a	moment	or	a	place,	of	both	observer	and	of	defined	point/time.	
Key	 A	collectivity drawn	from	the	knowledge need.	The	key	is	the	
independent	knowledge	triple	in	a	knowledge	call.	
Knowledge	affordance	 Accessible	encoded	knowledge	within	a	knowledge	system.		
Knowledge	call	 An	instance	of a knowledge	relation comprising	a	key	which	
automatically	determines	an	image,	which	are	both	formally	triples.	It	
is	an	operationalization	of	the	QA	pair.	
Knowledge	capacity	 The	dependent	functional	entity	within	a	knowledge	relation.	
Knowledge	contract	 The	set	of	assumptions	guaranteed	by	a	system	to	permit	the	
occurrence	of	knowledge	including	the	assurance	of	continuity	of	
schema	for	functional	entities,	as	well	as	transparency	of	operation.	
This	is	the	equivalent	of	an	acknowledgement	of	the	ceteris	paribus	
clause	underpinning	all	assertions	in	discourse.	It	guarantees	sincerity,	
comprehensiveness,	timeliness	and	repeatability	of	tuple/schema	
responses	in	a	knowledge	relation.	
Knowledge	dependency	 The	denotation	of	the	key	within	a	knowledge	domain,	resulting	in	an	
image	of	that	domain.	
Knowledge	need	 The	independent	functional	entity within	a	knowledge	relation.	
Knowledge	relation	(KR) The	categorical	relationship	between	two	functional	entities	(the	
knowledge	need	and	knowledge	capacity),	representing	the	abstraction	
of	a	question‐answer	situation.	It	is	an	erotetic	implicature,	comprising	
the	denotation	of	facts	dependent	on	any	facts.	
Knowledge	triple	 A	well‐formed	formula	with	instance,	value and	linkage	variables.	A	
triple	is	a	collectivity,	and	each	variable	can	also	be	seen	as	a	datum	
collectivity.	
Linkage	 The	variable	in	a	knowledge	triple containing	a	collectivity	of	predicated	
functions.	 
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Linkage‐dominant	knowledge	
calls	
A	class	of	knowledge	calls,	mandating	a	focus	on	linkages	to	a	
designated	key,	and	seeking	within	a	universe	of	discourse	for	things	
that	can	be	connected	either	directly	or	mediately	to	a	presented	value,	
through	the	discovery	of	candidate	links.	The	denoted	collectivities	
comprise	triples	that	are	subsequently	attached	to	discovered	links.	
They	are	realised	as	connective	knowledge	needs.		
Mediation	collation	 A	collation wherein	a	process	selects	a	single	tuple	from	among	many.
Mixin	(plural	mixins)	 The	inherent	qualification	of	all	knowledge	relations.	Mixins	are	of	two	
sorts:	pragmata	and	hedges.	
Networked	connective	
functional	entity	
A	scope‐dominant,	connective	functional	entity	that	occurs	where	there	
is	an	association	between	entities	within	a	dataset,	and	the	number	of	
instances	entailed	by	the	key	connection	can	vary	to	an	indeterminate	
degree.	
Non‐Aristotelian	functional	
entities	
Functional	entities that	occur	where	the	Aristotelian	principles	upon	
which	the	propositional	forms	depend	are	not	present.	There	are	three	
non‐Aristotelian	FEs:	contiguous	non‐Aristotelian,	emergent	non‐
Aristotelian	and	abductive	non‐Aristotelian.	
Ontological	connective	
functional	entity	
A	shape‐dominant, connective	function	entity	that	occurs	where	there	is	
a	hierarchical	relationship	between	instances	in	a	knowledge	
representation	based	on	attributes	that	are	pre‐established	as	
significant,	with	predetermined	methods	of	establishing	set	
membership.	
Plenum	(plural	plena)	 The	collectivity	that	represents the	sum	of	all	things	known	about	
everything	by	a	community	of	knowing	about	a	subject.	
Pragma	(plural	pragmata)	 A	mixin	that	occurs	when	the	bounds	of	discourse	are	set	or	organised.
Pragmata	operate	at	the	gestalt	level,	that	is,	they	are	true	of	a	
functional	entity,	not	of	values	within	the	functional	entity.	A	pragma	
can	be	either	discourse	orienting	or	discourse	bounds	setting.	
Predicative	functional	entities A	class	of	functional	entities that	realise	predicative	knowledge	needs.
There	are	three	predicative	FEs:	standard	relation,	standard	recursive	
and	constitutive	recursive.	
Predicative	knowledge	needs A	class	of	knowledge	needs entailing	instance‐dominant knowledge	calls,	
and	realised	as	predicative	functional	entities.		
Question	 A	knowledge triple with	a	free	named	variable.	It	denotes	an	answer. 
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Question	and	answer	pair	
(QA)	
A	pair	of	knowledge	triples comprising	a	question	and	an	answer.	
Remote	cartographic	
functional	entity	
A	shape‐dominant	cartographic	functional	entity,	where	the	knowledge	
capacity	must	be	represented	as	subcomponents	that	are	always	going	
to	be	hidden	or	outside	the	control	of	the	system	under	consideration,	
modelling	them	as	black	boxes.	 
Ruleset	connective	functional	
entity	
A	scope‐dominant, connective	functional	entity that	occurs	where	values
and	instances	are	associated	by	chains	of	logical	reasoning	from	a	given	
key.	
Scope‐dominant	functional	
entities	
Functional	entities	acting	as	scope‐dominant	knowledge	capacities.	
There	are	three	scope‐dominant	FEs:	constitutive	recursive,	fuzzy	
aggregative	and	ruleset	connective.	
Scope‐dominant	knowledge	
capacities	
Knowledge	capacities	where	the	identification	of	either	values	or	
instances	(or	both)	determine	a	new	collectivity	of	either	values	or	
instances	(or	both).	A	scope‐dominant	response	is	mediated	
knowledge	gathering	from	the	constraining	variable,	and	provides	an	
answer	by	starting	with	a	value	and	applying	rules	to	determine	
membership	of	the	answer	collectivity.	Scope‐dominant	knowledge	
capacities	are	realised	by	scope‐dominant	functional	entities.	
Shape‐dominant	functional	
entities	
Functional	entities	acting	as	shape‐dominant	knowledge	capacities.	
There	are	three	shape‐dominant	FEs:	standard	relation,	absolute	
aggregative	and	ontological	connective.	
Shape‐dominant	knowledge	
capacities	
Knowledge	capacities where	the	response	to	the	knowledge	call	involves	
knowledge	gathering	directly	from	the	constraining	variable.	The	three	
shape‐dominant	forms	(standard	relation,	absolute	aggregative	and	
ontological	connective)	provide	an	unmediated	answer.	Shape‐
dominant	knowledge	capacities	are	realised	by	shape‐dominant	
functional	entities.	
Standard	recursive	functional	
entity	
A	granularity‐dominant, predicative	functional	entity	that	occurs	when	
knowledge	is	represented	in	terms	of	part/whole	relationships	that	are	
structurally	self‐similar,	and	the	knowledge	call	denotes	the	entirety	of	
that	recursion.		
Standard	relation	functional	
entity	
A	shape‐dominant, predicative	functional	entity that	occurs	when	there	
is	a	set	of	directly	entailed	instances	for	a	key.	This	conforms	to	the	
conventional	relationship	in	the	relational	model,	as	described	by	
Codd.	
Value	 The	variable	in	a	knowledge	triple containing	a	collectivity	of	predicated	
values.	 
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Value‐dominant	knowledge	
calls	
A	class	of	knowledge	calls,	mandating	a	focus	on	values similar	to	a	
designated	key,	regardless	of	prepared	structure	through	searching	for	
a	value‐centric	aggregation.	Consequently	the	denoted	collectivities	are	
determined	by	keys	that	are	values,	but	where	the	comprising	elements	
are	not	necessarily	self‐similar.	Value‐dominant	knowledge	calls	are	
realised	as	aggregative	knowledge	needs.	
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